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THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY

A New History of the World

EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

ITALY

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JOHN BUCHAN

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THE SICILIAN VESPERS. MASSACRE OF THE FRENCH AT PALERMO (1282)

(From the original by Le Beich)

ITALY

THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY

A New History of the World

EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS series has been undertaken to provide for the ordinary citizen a popular account of the history of his own and other nations, a chronicle of those movements of the past of which the effect is not yet exhausted, and which are still potent for the peace and comfort of the present. The writers conceive history as a living thing of the most urgent consequence to the men of to-day; they regard the world around us as an organic growth dependent upon a long historic ancestry. The modern view of history—apart from the pedantry of certain specialists—is a large view, subordinating the mere vicissitudes of dynasties and parliaments to those more fateful events which are the true milestones of civilisation. Clio has become an active goddess and her eyes range far. History is, of course, like all sciences, the quest for a particular kind of truth, but that word “truth” has been given a generous interpretation. The older type of historian was apt to interest himself chiefly in the doings of kings and statesmen, the campaigns of generals and the contests of parties. These no doubt are important, but they are not the whole, and to insist upon them to the exclusion of all else is to make the past an unfeathered wilderness, where the only personalities are generals on horseback, judges in ermine and monarchs in purple. Nowadays, whatever we may lack in art, we have gained in science. The plain man has come to his own, and, as Lord Acton has put it, “The true historian must now take his meals in the kitchen.”

The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man's ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have “closed up.” Whether we like it or not, our isolation is shattered, and not the remotest nation can now draw in its skirts from its neighbours. The consequence must be that even those who are averse to science, and prefer to settle everything by rule of thumb, will be forced

to reconsider their views. Foreign politics have become again, as they were in the age of Pitt and Castlereagh, of Palmerston and Disraeli, urgent matters for every electorate. The average citizen recognises that the popular neglect of the subject contributed in no small degree to the War, and that problems in foreign affairs are as vital to him as questions of tariff and income tax. Once it used to be believed that a country might be rich while its neighbours were poor; now even the dullest is aware that economically the whole world is tightly bound together, and that the poverty of a part lessens the prosperity of the whole. A merchant finds his profits shrinking because of the rate of exchange in a land which was his chief market; he finds his necessary raw material costly and scarce because of the dislocation of industry in some far-away country. He recognises that no nation is commercially sufficient to itself, and he finds himself crippled, not by the success, but by the failure of his foreign colleagues. It is the same in other matters than commerce. Peace is every man's chief interest, but a partial peace is impossible. The world is so closely linked that one recalcitrant unit may penalise all the others.

In these circumstances it is inevitable that interest in foreign countries, often an unwilling and angry interest, should be compulsory for large classes which up to now have scarcely given the matter a thought. An understanding of foreign conditions—though at first it may not be a very sympathetic understanding—is forced upon us by the needs of our daily life. This understanding, if it is to be of the slightest value, must be based upon some knowledge of history, and Clio will be compelled to descend from the schools to the market-place. Of all the movements of the day none is more hopeful than the spread through all classes of a real, though often incoherent, desire for education. Partly it is a fruit of the War. Men realise that battles were not won by muddling through; that as long as we muddled we stuck fast, and that when we won it was because we used our brains to better purpose than our opponents. Partly it is the consequence of the long movement towards self-conscious citizenship, which some call democracy. Most thinking people to-day believe that knowledge spread in the widest commonalty is the only cure for many ills. They believe that education in the most real sense does not stop with school or college; indeed, that true education may only begin when the orthodox curriculum is finished. They believe, further, that this fuller training comes by a man's own efforts and is not necessarily dependent

upon certain advantages in his early years. Finally, they are assured that true education cannot be merely technical or professional instruction; that it must deal in the larger sense with what are called the "humanities." If this diagnosis is correct, then the study of history must play a major part in the equipment of the citizen of the future.

I propose in these few pages to suggest certain reasons why the cultivation of the historical sense is of special value at this moment. The utilitarian arguments are obvious enough, but I would add to them certain considerations of another kind.

Man, as we know, is long-descended, and so are human society and the State. That society is a complex thing, the result of a slow organic growth and no mere artificial machine. In a living thing such as the State growth must be continuous, like the growth of a plant. Every gardener knows that in the tending of plants you cannot make violent changes, that you cannot transplant a well-grown tree at your pleasure from a wooded valley to the bare summit of a hill, that you cannot teach rhododendrons to love lime, or grow plants which need sun and dry soil in a shady bog. A new machine-made thing is simple, but the organic is always subtle and complex. Now, half the mischiefs in politics come from a foolish simplification. Take two familiar conceptions, the "political man" and the "economic man." Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the "economic man" is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.

We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly unhistorical, that they have been framed without any sense of the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen was regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrendered his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He had no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the

citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning ; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write on it what you pleased, that you could build a new world with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces ; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It also was a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining ; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age the creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that " counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify."

The second reason is that a sense of history is a safeguard against another form of abstraction. Ever since the War the world has indulged in a debauch of theorising, and the consequence has been an orgy of catchwords and formulas, which,

unless they are critically examined, are bound to turn political discussion into a desert. The weakening of the substance of any accepted creeds seems to have disposed men to cling more feverishly to their shibboleths. Take any of our contemporary phrases—"self-determination," "liberty," "the right to work," "the right to maintenance," "the proletariat," "class consciousness," "international solidarity," and so forth. They all have a kind of dim meaning, but as they are currently used they have many very different meanings, and these meanings are often contradictory. I think it was Lord Acton who once said he had counted two hundred definitions of "liberty." Abraham Lincoln's words are worth remembering: "The world has never yet had a good definition of the word 'liberty,' and the American people just now are much in want of one. We are all declaring for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. We assume the word 'liberty' to mean that each worker can do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labour, while, on the other hand, it may mean that some man can do as he pleases with other men and the product of other men's labour." Are we not in the same difficulty to-day? Perhaps the worst sinner in this respect is the word "democracy." As commonly used, it has a dozen quite distinct meanings, when it has any meaning at all, and we are all familiar in political discussions with the circular argument—that such and such a measure is good for the people because it is democratic; and if it be asked why it is democratic, the answer is, "Because it is good for the people." "Democratic" really describes that form of government in which the policy of the State is determined and its business conducted by the will of the majority of its citizens, expressed through some regular channel. It is a word which denotes machinery, not purpose. "Popular," often used as an equivalent, means merely that the bulk of the people approve of a particular mode of government. "Liberal," the other assumed equivalent, implies those notions of freedom, toleration and pacific progress which lie at the roots of Western civilisation. The words are clearly not interchangeable. A policy or a government may be popular without being liberal or democratic; there have been highly popular tyrannies; the German policy of 1914 was popular, but it was not liberal, nor was Germany a democracy. America is a democracy, but it is not always liberal; the French Republic has at various times in its history been both liberal and democratic without being popular. Accurately employed, "democratic" describes a

particular method, "popular" an historical fact, "liberal" a quality and an ideal. The study of history will make us chary about the loud, vague use of formulas. It will make us anxious to see catchwords in their historical relations, and will help us to realise the maleficent effect of phrases which have a fine rhetorical appeal, but very little concrete meaning. If political science is to be anything but a vicious form of casuistry it is very necessary to give its terms an exact interpretation, for their slipshod use will tend to create false oppositions and conceal fundamental agreements, and thereby waste the energy of mankind in empty disputation.

The third reason for the study of history is that it enables a man to take a balanced view of current problems, for a memory stored with historical parallels is the best preventive both against panic and over-confidence. Such a view does not imply the hard-and-fast deduction of so-called laws, which was a habit of many of the historians of the nineteenth century. Exact parallels with the past are hard to find, and nothing is easier than to draw false conclusions. A facile philosophy of history is, as Stubbs once said, "in nine cases out of ten a generalisation founded rather on the ignorance of points in which particulars differ, than in any strong grasp of one in which they agree." Precedents from the past have often been used with disastrous results. In our own Civil War the dubious behaviour of the Israelites on various occasions was made an argument for countless blunders and tyrannies. In the same way the French Revolution has been used as a kind of arsenal for bogus parallels, both by revolutionaries and conservatives, and the most innocent reformers have been identified with Robespierre and St. Just. During the Great War the air was thick with these false precedents. In the Gallipoli Expedition, for example, it was possible to draw an ingenious parallel between that affair and the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse, and much needless depression was the consequence. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution there were many who saw in it an exact equivalent to the Revolution of 1788 and imagined that the new Russian revolutionary armies would be as invincible as those which repelled the invaders of France. There have been eminent teachers in recent years whose mind has been so obsessed with certain superficial resemblances between the third century of the Christian era and our own times that they have prophesied an impending twilight of civilisation. Those of us who have been engaged in arguing the

case for the League of Nations are confronted by its opponents with a dozen inaccurate parallels from history, and the famous plea of the "thin edge of the wedge" is usually based upon a mistaken use of the same armoury.

A wise man will be chary of drawing dapper parallels and interpreting an historical lesson too rigidly. At the same time there are certain general deductions which are sound and helpful. For example, we all talk too glibly of revolution, and many imagine that, whether they like it or not, a clean cut can be made, and the course of national life turned suddenly and violently in a different direction. But history gives no warrant for such a view. There have been many thousands of revolutions since the world began; nearly all have been the work of minorities, often small minorities; and nearly all, after a shorter or longer period of success, have utterly failed. The French Revolution altered the face of the world, but only when it had ceased to be a revolution and had developed into an absolute monarchy. So with the various outbreaks of 1848. So conspicuously with the Russian Revolution of to-day which has developed principles the exact opposite of those with which it started. The exception proves the rule, as we see in the case of our own English Revolution of 1688. Properly considered, that was not a revolution, but a reaction. The revolution had been against the personal and unlimited monarchy of the Stuarts. In 1688 there was a return to the normal development of English society, which had been violently broken. It may fairly be said that a revolution to be successful must be a reaction—that is, it must be a return to an organic historical sequence, which for some reason or other has been interrupted.

Parallels are not to be trusted, if it is attempted to elaborate them in detail, but a sober and scientific generalisation may be of high practical value. At the close of the Great War many people indulged in roseate forecasts of a new world—a land fit for heroes to live in, a land inspired with the spirit of the trenches, a land of co-operation and national and international goodwill. Such hasty idealists were curiously blind to the lessons of the past, and had they considered what happened after the Napoleonic wars they might have found a juster perspective. With a curious exactness the history of the three years after Waterloo has repeated itself to-day. There were the same economic troubles—the same rise in the cost of living, with which wages could not keep pace; the same shrinking of foreign exports owing to difficulties of

exchange ; the same cataclysmic descent of agricultural prices from the high levels of the war ; the same hostility to profiteers ; the same revolt against high taxation, and the same impossibility of balancing budgets without it. The Property tax then was the equivalent of our Excess Profits tax, and it is interesting to note that it was abolished in spite of the Government because the commercial community rose against it. There was the same dread of revolution, and the same blunders in the handling of labour, and there was relatively far greater suffering. Yet the land, in spite of countless mistakes, passed through the crisis and emerged into the sunlight of prosperity. In this case historic precedent is not without its warrant for hope.

One charge has been brought against the study of history—that it may kill reforming zeal. This has been well put by Lord Morley: “The study of all the successive stages and beliefs, institutions, laws, forms of art, only too soon grows into a substitute for practical criticism of all these things upon their merits and in themselves. Too exclusive attention to dynamic aspects weakens the energetic duties of the static. The method of history is used merely like any other scientific instrument. There is no more conscience in your comparative history than there is in comparative anatomy. You arrange ideals in classes and series ; but the classified ideal loses its vital spark and halo.” There is justice in the warning, for a man may easily fall into the mood in which he sees everything as a repetition of the past, and the world bound on the iron bed of necessity, and may therefore lose his vitality and zest in the practical work of to-day. It is a danger to be guarded against, but to me it seems a far less urgent menace than its opposite—the tendency to forget the past and to adventure in a raw new world without any chart to guide us. History gives us a kind of chart, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the darkness. The hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find himself condemned to repeat it.

There is little to sympathise with in the type of mind which is always inculcating a lack-lustre moderation, and which has attained to such a pitch of abstraction that it finds nothing worth doing and prefers to stagnate in ironic contemplation. Nor is there more to be said for the temper which is always halving differences in a problem and trying to find a middle course. The middle course, mechanically defined, may be the wrong course. The business of a man steering up a difficult estuary is to keep to the deep-water channel, and that channel

may at one hour take him near the left shore and at another hour close to the right shore. The path of false moderation sticks to the exact middle of the channel, and will almost certainly land the pilot on a sandbank. These are the vices that spring from a narrow study of history and the remedy is a broader and juster interpretation. At one season it may be necessary to be a violent innovator, and at another to be a conservative; but the point is that a clear objective must be there, and some chart of the course to steer by. History does not provide a perfect chart, but it gives us something better than guess-work. It is a bridle on crude haste; but it is not less a spur for timidity and false moderation. Above all it is a guide and a comforter to sane idealism. "The true Past departs not," Carlyle wrote, "nothing that was worthy in the Past departs; no Truth or Goodness realised by man ever dies, or can die; but all is still here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless change."

JOHN BUCHAN.

NOTE

THE Introductory chapter, Chronological Tables, and the History of Italy from Renaissance times to 1912—with the exception of the “Risorgimento,” which is by Miss Helen Zimmern—have been written by Mr. J. C. Powell, M.A., King’s College, Cambridge; he is also responsible for Chapter XIV on Recent Social Movements. Mr. W. K. McClure, late *Times* Correspondent in Rome, describes the Italy of just before, and during, the Great War; whilst the Economic Section is the work of Mr. Aldea Cassuto, correspondent of the *Secolo* and *Messaggero*.

The whole has been compiled under the care of Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen.

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A—HISTORY

INTRODUCTORY

GEOGRAPHY AS A FACTOR IN ITALIAN HISTORY

THE influence of Geography on History may be said to be greater and more direct in primitive times, when man is more helpless and more of a wild animal; but, as civilisation proceeds, it becomes more and more modified by human invention and complicated by human purpose, so that in recent historical times it becomes difficult to disentangle geographical from political and economic causes.

Thus the prehistoric and the earlier historic invasions of Italy—to begin with the most prominent feature of her history—were no doubt determined very largely by geographical causes which in later times, though they continued to operate, were obscured by political prettexts.

The three great “pierheads” which Europe throws out into the Mediterranean naturally attracted migrant tribes in search of easier conditions of subsistence than those offered by the forests and steppes of Central and Eastern Europe. And Italy, once known, would be the most attractive of the three. With much the same latitude as the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas (35° – 45° N.), Italy has a more equable climate and a surface better suited for tillage and pasture than either of her neighbours. This she owes to her narrow and elongated shape and to her comparatively recent geological formation. There was indeed a triple barrier to be crossed—the Alps, the Po and the inner ring made by the Apennines. But the Alps are a less valuable protection than they appear to be. They are traversable by numerous passes, the approach to which from the north, thanks to the southward tilt, is relatively easy. On the west they can be altogether circumvented by hugging the coast. On the east they spread out fanlike, and the successive ridges are of lower altitude. It was by this eastern route that the Goths entered in the fifth century, the Lombards in the sixth, and the Magyars in the tenth—probably also the Etruscans and the Latin races in prehistoric times. The Ligurians probably followed the Riviera coast route.

The first Roman road over the Alps went by the Mont Genève Pass (6,083 feet), securing communication with Provence, but this was superseded in the Middle Ages by the Mont Cenis (6,893 feet), leading likewise into the Rhone Valley. There was also a Roman road over the Little St. Bernard (7,179 feet). The Great St. Bernard (8,111 feet) was largely used in the Middle Ages by pilgrims and others travelling to Rome from North-western Europe. Since Napoleon constructed a carriage-road over the Simplon (6,628 feet), it has been the main route from the Upper Rhone into Italy and now has its own railway line. From the Rhine country, road and (since 1870) rail lead up the Reuss Valley and over the St. Gotthard (6,936 feet) to the Valley of the Ticino and Lago Maggiore. The Septimer Pass, branching from the Splügen, and also leading into the Rhine Valley, was used in Roman times, as was the Maloja leading by the Julier Pass northwards to the Rhine and north-eastwards along the Inn Valley. But the historic main road from South-eastern Germany into Italy, and that commonly used by the Emperors in their goings and comings, was that which leads over the Brenner (4,588 feet) and down the Valley of the Adige to Verona, which latter guards the entrance to the Po Valley and was for that reason important to the Emperors.

The Valley of the Po, with its upper regions covered by dense forest and its lower by swamps, was in primitive times a more efficient defence than the Alps, but it lost its protective value in proportion as civilisation progressed. For several centuries its course and that of the Adige have been canalised.

The Northern Apennines, like the Alps, have their gentler slope on the north side. They offer little obstruction to an advance southward, but divide the north-and-south communications of Italy into two systems, an eastern and a western.

For her mediæval primacy in trade Italy is directly indebted to her geographical position. The habit of sea-traffic between east and west along the Mediterranean was established before 1000 B.C. by the Phœnicians, who were followed and surpassed by the Greeks. Phœnician and Greek settlements in Sicily and Greek colonisation of Southern Italy made her the central, as the region of the Straits of Gibraltar and the Levant were the western and eastern, focus of this traffic. With the establishment of Roman supremacy over the Mediterranean region Rome became the centre of attraction for the whole civilised world, until the transference of the Imperial Government to

Constantinople left her only a peripheral importance—a loss presently compensated by the wealth and world-power which the Papacy conferred on Rome. During the period of the barbarian invasions and even after the coming of Charlemagne, Naples, Amalfi, Gaetà and Bari with Venice (founded as a city of refuge at the time of Attila's invasion, A.D. 452), maintained their allegiance to the Emperors at Constantinople and their profitable trade-relations with the East. The growth of a new civilisation from the fusion of Teutonic and Roman cultures north of the Alps, consolidated in the Empire of Charlemagne, favoured the rise of the trading cities of North Italy by providing them with new markets in which the cities of the South could not compete. The trade of the East henceforth finds its way to Europe through the ports of Northern Italy and over the Brenner to Augsburg, Nürnberg and farther. Thus in the Middle Ages Italy came to be the foremost trading-country of Europe, and held that position just so long as the Mediterranean continued to be the main avenue of commerce. Her prosperity culminated in the period following the Crusades, which so notably quickened Europe's interest and contact with the East. It was checked and disturbed by the westward advance of the Turks, and finally entered on its decline with the discovery of the Cape route, diverting the traffic from the Mediterranean, and that of the New World, which shifted the focus of world-trade to the Atlantic.

The great expansion of Venice began about A.D. 1000, in the Dogeate of Pietro Orseolo, who concluded advantageous commercial treaties with Constantinople and with the Saracens and, by taking vigorous action against the Slav pirates of the Adriatic, was recognised as protector of the Dalmatian cities, thus gaining for Venice the harbours on the Adriatic which the Italian coast lacks. Genoa and Pisa, rising to importance rather later than Venice, developed their sea-power in conflict with Moorish sea-robbers. A long quarrel over Sardinia, from which they had combined to expel the Moors, ended in the defeat of Pisa, which henceforth took a subordinate position and was finally subjected by Florence. Genoa aspired to be, and for a time was, the rival of Venice in the eastern trade, all three cities having profited largely by the provision of transport for the Crusades and the acquisition of trade-depots.

In the fifteenth century the products of the Far East—spices from the Malay Archipelago, pepper, ginger and cinnamon from Ceylon, Sumatra, India and China, precious stones from Persia, India and Ceylon, glass, porcelain, silks, rugs, tapestries

and metalwork from China, India and Persia—reached Europe by three main routes: (1) from the Far East by sea to the Persian Gulf and up the Tigris to Baghdad, whence caravans crossed to Aleppo and Antioch or viâ Damascus to the Syrian ports; (2) across the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, and thence by caravan to Cairo and Alexandria; (3) by caravan across the desert to Samarkand and Bukhara, thence either through Russia to Novgorod and the Baltic or through Astrakhan to the Azov and Black Seas, or viâ Tabriz to Trebizond on the southern shore. The transport of goods by sea from the Black Sea, the Syrian ports and Egypt, was mainly in the hands of the Italian cities, though Marseilles and Barcelona also took part in it.

In the dissociation of the various regions of Italy and in establishing the great contrast between North and South, which still creates serious difficulties for Italian statesmanship, geographical causes have played their part along with political. In contrast with the broad plain of the Po Basin, the Apennines in Southern Italy spread out, leaving room only for short river-courses and plains of limited extent, though in some cases of great fertility. The shorter and steeper slopes and the great summer heat make the rivers almost useless for irrigation, while after the rains they cause disastrous inundations. The small-scale agriculture imposed by nature on the South cannot compete with the large spaces and facilities for irrigation afforded by the Po Basin. Again, the remoteness of Southern Italy from Central Europe and from Piedmont, the nucleus of modern Italy, along with the social and political backwardness of the South, have retarded its industrial development, while its export of agricultural products suffers under the protective tariffs imposed in the interest of the manufacturers of the North.

The vast majority of the towns of Italy are of ancient foundation. Position and plan were determined by physical conditions which modern civilisation has in some cases deprived of value. Rome is an instance. The command of a ford over the Tiber, even though the ford has been replaced by bridges, does not compensate for remoteness from the centres of political and industrial life, and Rome is ill-suited by position to be the capital of modern Italy. Milan, on the contrary, at the junction-point of the western and eastern systems of Italian communications with the roads from the Alpine passes, has gained rather than lost by the transition from road to rail. Bologna, commanding the most important pass of the Apennines,

nines, and Turin, where the western Alpine routes converge, likewise retain their importance.

The possession of a harbour would seem to be a permanent advantage, but harbours may be silted up and the stream of commerce be diverted, while small harbours lose in value with the increase in the size of ships. Thus Ravenna has been left high and dry, and Rimini has been destroyed as a port by the sediment from the Po and Adige; Pisa has ceased to be on the sea and has been replaced by Livorno.

Finally, as a consequence of the displacement of trade westward caused by the discoveries of the fifteenth century, Genoa has altogether outstripped Venice, while of the southern ports Naples alone is of first-class importance.


CHAPTER I

AN OUTLINE OF EVENTS, 330-1370

AFTER the adoption by the Emperor Constantine (307-337) of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, the sharply-defined separation between the Church (as spiritual authority pure and simple) and the outer Roman world could no longer be maintained. It is probable that what Constantine desired and what he found in Christianity was a sort of moral cement for the Empire—a body of common beliefs and hopes capable of giving it the spiritual unity which, since its northward expansion and the irruption of barbarian hordes, strangers to Greco-Roman culture, it so conspicuously lacked. The Church in becoming the spiritual counterpart and complement of the civil power, and to some extent its instrument, thereby entered “the world.” Henceforth it was a great political institution, its organisation modelled on that of the Roman municipal and provincial administration. It had to depend on authority, wealth and power for the maintenance of its unity and newly-acquired prestige and for the propagation of the inevitably formalised and materialised faith; and we shall find that its claim to financial support and to control over large departments of the lives of its members, whether Kings or Commoners, brought it into never-ending conflict with the civil power, whilst secular business tended more and more to absorb the attention of Popes and Bishops to the detriment of their spiritual functions.

The history of Italy indeed is in the main the history of a conflict between Papacy and Empire; and it was the pretensions of the mediæval Papacy to temporal principedom that more than anything else, for good or for evil, made impossible the consolidation of Italy as a national State under a single strong monarchy such as grew up in other provinces of the decaying Empire—in Gaul and Spain and Britain.

During the fifth and sixth centuries Italy was invaded by successive hordes of Barbarians, partly drawn thither by the fame of Rome's ill-defended wealth and splendour, partly urged



forward by the pressure of westward-moving Huns. It had long been the established practice of the Empire to fill up the ranks of its armies from barbarian reservoirs, and certain tribes had for some time been settled in parts of the Eastern Empire and had been in some degree Romanised and Christianised. The first to arrive were the Visigoths, the western section of the Goths, who during the first decade of the fifth century made their way under Alaric into Italy, sacked Rome, and passed away westwards. Next came Attila and his Huns, who, however, overawed, it is said, by the majesty of Pope Leo, spared the capital. In 455 Rome was again plundered, this time by the Vandals from Germany. Finally, in 476 Odoaker, chief of a mixed band of Teutons, removed the latest puppet-Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, sent his insignia to Zeno, Emperor of the East, and brought the Western Empire to an end.

A dozen years later Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths, wrested the power from Odoaker and, holding a direct commission from Byzantium, held despotic but beneficent sway over a large portion of Italy until his death in 526. His Arian proclivities, however, and those of his predecessors, offended the Athanasian susceptibilities of the Byzantine Empire, and Justinian despatched his General Belisarius to recover the country for the Catholics. After heavy fighting the Goths finally retired over the Alps in 551, and Italy was nominally reunited with Byzantium.

But not for long: for in 568 the Lombards (originally from Scandinavia) descended on the basin of the Po and took possession of an Italy weakened by twenty years of war. Their reign lasted for the next two centuries, but the vigorous action of Gregory the Great (590-604) had already borne fruit and laid the foundations for the power and independent sovereignty of the Papacy which were to form so important a factor in the subsequent history of Italy.

In 751 the capture of Ravenna by the Lombards finally extinguished the power of the Empire in North Italy, and in desperation Pope Stephen applied for aid to Pepin, son of Charles Martel of France. The meeting between the Pope and the Frankish King, which took place in 754, is memorable not only in Italian but in European history, since it paved the way for that bold stretch of power by which the Papacy by its own act created a new scheme of unity for the Western world under an Empire not based, like the old, on the power of the sword, but on community of religious faith, and depend-

ing for its authority on the sanction of its creator, the Papacy. Pepin was crowned King of the Franks, and had conferred on him by the Pope the title of Patricius. By the former of these actions the Papacy asserted the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal principle and its claim to international authority; by the second it arrogated to itself a right which constitutionally belonged to the Emperor.

After the destruction of the Lombards by Pepin and his greater son Charlemagne, the latter took over the Lombard kingdom as the Kingdom of the Franks or the *Regnum Italicum*, as distinct from Romania, i.e. the Papal Territory; but Southern Italy was still under the titular sovereignty of the Greek Emperor. This exclusion of the South from Charlemagne's kingdom created for a thousand years a political splitting-up of the peninsula, the unhappy effects of which are even now acutely felt.

A new order, however, was now about to begin: for on Christmas Day, 800, Charlemagne was solemnly crowned by Pope Leo III in Rome and proclaimed by him Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. By thus arrogating to himself the right of creating Emperors the Pope laid down, and Charlemagne seems to have accepted, the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal branch of the theocracy—for so Charlemagne appears to have conceived his Empire. In face of the new Emperor's energy and masterful temper the Pope had to content himself with a humbler position; but the pretension once formulated was never wholly lost sight of, and at a later time, when the Empire was weak and the Papacy had become a great international Power, it was revived in the great struggle between the two which so disastrously divided Italy.

Charlemagne died in 814, and the Empire which his hand had been strong enough to hold together in spite of its natural lack of unity rapidly fell to pieces. Italy was broken up into a multiplicity of feudal holdings, each centring round one of those cities whose walls had preserved against all barbarian assaults something at least of Latin culture and municipal life. Raids by Magyars in the north followed, as well as incursions in the south by Saracens, who strove for the conquest of Sicily and during the next two centuries proved a scourge and a menace to Southern Italy. In the north a series of "kings" disputed with each other the Iron Crown of Lombardy; but meanwhile the claim of the Empire to contest the Papacy and the pretensions of the latter to be something higher than the Empire continued without ceasing, and led eventually to

Otto the Great of Germany re-establishing the Empire in Italy and completely controlling the Church (966).

The eleventh century introduced a new factor into Italian history in the shape of the Normans. The first of these appear to have been a small party of pilgrims returning from Jerusalem, who were invited by a local princelet to help him in repelling a Greek raid (1016); their fighting qualities so impressed the Lombard lords that they sent to Normandy for more of the same stock. The numbers grew, and soon these gentlemen-adventurers were rewarded for their assistance by the grant of fiefs. By the end of the century the descendants of Tancred of Hauteville had established a strong monarchy, consisting of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, and until its fall in 1368 they gave full acknowledgment to the suzerainty of the Pope, as *remplaçant* of the Greek Empire, over Sicily and the South of Italy.

Strengthened by this acknowledgment the Papacy began once more to challenge the supremacy of the Empire. A succession of bad Popes led to a movement of reform, headed by the monk Hildebrand of Cluny, within the Church. In 1073 Hildebrand himself became Pope as Gregory VII and claimed for the Church an absolute supremacy over all lay potentates. The Emperor Henry IV at once took up the challenge and, in his own name and that of the German bishops, invited Gregory to retire. Gregory's answer was an ex-communication of the Emperor, which released all Henry's vassals from their oath of fealty; further, he decreed—and this decree was endorsed by all magnates, lay and ecclesiastical, of the Empire—that unless Henry had received absolution by February 2, 1077, he should be considered as having forfeited his office. Unable to withstand this, Henry gave way, went to Canossa—where the Pope kept him waiting for three days in the snow—and, throwing himself at the feet of the Holy Father, obtained his forgiveness and received the Sacrament at his hands. Not yet, however, did he acknowledge his defeat; for five years afterwards he laid siege to Rome and blockaded Gregory in the Castle of St. Angelo; but the latter was rescued at the last moment by an army of Normans and Saracens.

The struggle was ended for the time being in 1122 by the Concordat of Worms, which secured for the Papacy the freedom of episcopal elections whilst leaving to the Emperor only a modified right of investiture; and the moral loss to the Empire was accentuated by the initiative for the first Crusade having come from Pope Urban and not from the Emperor.

The net result of the bout lay therefore decidedly in favour of the Papacy.

The next phase of Italian history is represented by the conflict of the towns, gradually growing in strength, both with feudalism and with the overlordship of the Hohenstauffen dynasty during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and of this conflict the Papacy took full advantage, by ranging itself on the side of the cities. A lengthy struggle to retain his supremacy over the northern cities resulted in Frederick I (Barbarossa) meeting with a severe defeat near Milan in 1176; and, like his predecessor of hundred years before, he found himself humbled before the Pope at the Congress of Venice (1177). Two parties then gradually arose throughout Italy, the Guelfs (the party of the people and the Papacy) and the Ghibellines (the Imperial or nobles' party), taking their names originally from the Welf and Waibling dynasties of Germany.

It is unnecessary to follow their struggles here in any detail, but attention may be called to the development of the cities. In these the power centred successively in the hands of the Consuls; the Concittadini (i.e. *castellani* or property-owners from outside who took up their residence in the city); the Podestà (a lord of distinction from outside, chosen to be head of the city-state); the Capitano del Popolo; the Councils; the Despots; and finally the Signori or Princes. The development was of course gradual, and varied in the different cities and communes; but, intertwined as it was with the perpetually-recurring feuds between Guelf and Ghibelline, it is not surprising that each succeeding change led as a rule to fierce fighting within the city and to individual struggles with its neighbours in which the worst passions of the Middle Ages were called forth.

Meanwhile Henry VI, King of the Romans, had been betrothed by his father Barbarossa to the daughter of Roger II, who was sole legitimate heir to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; and thus the union of the Sicilies with the Empire was for a time secured. His son Frederick II (1199-1250), in spite of the efforts—successful at first—of his guardian, Pope Innocent III, to supplant him by bargaining with other claimants for an increase of his own temporal power, succeeded to a great extent in his aim of making the Empire a union of the three Kingdoms—Germany, North and Central Italy, and the two Sicilies. His conflict with the Papacy was not merely political, but was one of mentality and general outlook: he stood for toleration, broad-mindedness and the acquisition of general



knowledge, as against the fixity and reactionary tendencies of the Papacy: whilst his brilliant court at Palermo became the first in Europe, and one of the great centres of international culture.

After his death, however, the consolidation of the Empire for which he had striven rapidly fell to pieces. His illegitimate son Manfred, after defeating the Papal forces at Foggia (1254), had himself crowned in 1258, and aspired to the kingship of all Italy; but three years later the French Pope Urban IV called in Charles of Anjou, and in the resulting battle of Benevento (1266) Manfred was killed. The supremacy of the French lasted for a few years, until the massacre of the "Sicilian Vespers" in 1282 drove them out of Sicily and left that island in the hands of Pedro of Aragon, son-in-law of Manfred. Six years afterwards the Angevin Charles II was allowed to return to Naples and resume the crown of the continental South—which remained with his descendants for 150 years.

The obstinate struggle of the Papacy to exclude the Empire from supremacy in Italy had succeeded, but the success was purchased at a heavy price. Italy had been kept divided—was now indeed more divided than ever—while the hold of the Papacy itself on Italy had grown steadily weaker. Boniface VIII, whose pretensions equalled those of Innocent III but in whom ambition outran judgment, completed the downfall of the Papal power in Italy. After strengthening the French hold on Italy and on the Church by calling in Charles of Valois, brother of Philip IV (le Bel), to undertake the task (in which he failed) of recovering Sicily from the House of Aragon, he proceeded to quarrel with Philip IV over the taxation of Church lands. He thus brought destruction upon himself, and upon the Papacy the "Babylonian Captivity." On the death of Boniface, brought about by the violent treatment inflicted upon him in Rome by Philip's agents, the King was able to secure the election of French Popes, who were persuaded to take up their residence in Avignon. From 1304 to 1377—except for the brief visit of Urban V (1367-1370)—there was no Pope in Rome. The removal to Avignon, by subjecting the Papacy to the French monarchy, weakened its authority and prestige for the rest of Christendom, while the luxury and extravagance in which the Papal Court there indulged, and the corresponding increase in the tribute demanded from the faithful in all lands, offended at once the moral sense and the self-interest of the national Churches.

CHAPTER II

THE RENAISSANCE, 1250-1500

THE decline in the moral and political authority of the Papacy as an Italian power; the decline of the Empire and its withdrawal from the Italian scene; the extraordinary efflorescence of creative human energy of which the city communes of Italy were the scene, and which is known as the Italian Renaissance; the closer contact with the Greek and Arab East; the impulse given to the spirit of enquiry and criticism by Frederick II and the Court of Palermo; the recovery of Aristotle's works; the growth of Universities; the revived study of Roman Law—which, unlike the Canon Law, laid no ban on usury and was generally more in harmony with the growth of commerce and the revival of monetary economy which was in full progress during the thirteenth century—all these influences made for the secularisation of the European point of view and the undermining of the intellectual supremacy of the Church.

On the moral side the anarchic wickedness of feudal lords had produced in the tenth and eleventh centuries a reaction which in the thirteenth took form in the orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic, whose basic principle of poverty was a direct challenge to the temporal power. The official recognition of the orders in a modified form represented the Church's compromise with the new morality, as the *Summa Theologiæ* of Thomas Aquinas represented its compromise with the new knowledge and new political ideas. The fourteenth century saw the birth of the modern theory of the sovereignty of the people. Dante at the beginning of the century was still in the Middle Ages and believed in the double sovereignty of Pope and Emperor. Marsiglio of Padua—alumnus of the University of Paris—in his *Defensor Pacis*, written in 1324, definitely propounded the modern theory which regards the people as the source of all authority. Economically, the growth of commerce created a resentment in all countries against the exactions of the Church, which the Black Death of 1348 made more acute.

The extravagance and excesses of the Papal Court at Avignon and the scandal of the Great Schism (1377-1415) still further weakened the prestige of the Church, while the sale of indulgences resorted to in order to meet the extravagant expenditure of the Renaissance Popes precipitated the final revolt of the Reformation.

The persistence of feudalism in the Germanies and the independent sovereignty conceded by Frederick II to the feudal princes had placed the Empire in a position of inferiority in relation to the national monarchies. After the extinction of the Swabian line the interventions of the Empire in Italy became occasional and ineffective. The feudal system had been definitely destroyed in Italy and was felt to be obsolete. The Emperors came more and more to be regarded as foreign interlopers—vendors of decorative titles. So far as they had any actual power they were dependent on Italian forces—Ghibellines and feudal reactionaries—and by them were more and more distrusted. Dante still dreamt his Ghibelline dream of the ideal Emperor who in partnership with an ideal Church stripped of its temporalities should bring order and unity to Italy. Henry of Luxemburg, on whom his hopes were fixed, coming to Italy in 1311, with noble intentions but inadequate knowledge and resources, sought to place himself above the parties but became involved in their feuds. He was forced into the Ghibelline camp and escaped disastrous failure only by death. Ludwig of Bavaria, who came to Italy thirteen years later, having set out to assert the rights of the Empire against such potentates as Robert, King of Naples and the Visconti of Milan, failed in both objects for lack of money and men, and after reimbursing himself by the acceptance of bribes and the sale of titles, returned to Germany, having done nothing but reveal the impotence of the Empire. The Pact of Charlemagne—the original agreement between Papacy and Empire—had kept Italy politically divided. The opposition between Emperors and Popes, the intermittent character of Imperial rule in Italy and the hopelessness of the Papacy apart from the Empire, had made it impossible for either to establish a solid monarchy even in its own sphere. Thus the only sort of political progress possible outside the Sicilian kingdom was that which the cities—the centres of Italianità from Roman times on—could attain for themselves under the shelter of, but in despite of, the two superior powers. This political development was, as we have seen, determined and conditioned by the growth of industry and commerce, struggling to free themselves

from the local and legal restrictions of feudalism. In the event economic progress was purchased at the price of political degradation.

Released from the constant pressure of Empire and Papacy, the native forces of Italy—social, political and economic—found themselves free to work out their own destinies. The republican ideal—bound up with classical memories and revived with their revival in such out-of-time phenomena as the career of Cola di Rienzi—was at the opening of the fourteenth century everywhere being sacrificed to practical needs. Despots were accepted by the stronger and wealthier cities as the only means to economic expansion, by the weaker as the only alternative to absorption. The transition from the civil war of citizens and co-citizens, Guelfs and Ghibellines, to inter-municipal wars of expansion, demanded a strengthening of the executive power and suppression of intestinal feuds. The old cumbrous machinery of Councils and the continual change of *personnel* in the executive were found to be a handicap in the struggle for economic survival. The animosities of Guelf and Ghibelline were dying down, though from time to time the embers were fanned into flame by the intervention of Emperors and Popes. They had been blunted by time, subdivision of parties and inter-marriage while the growing importance of the working-class, fostered by the *Grandi* in opposition to the industrial tyranny of the Bourgeoisie, acted as a check on the feuds of the upper classes. Only a few cities—Florence is the outstanding example—clung to their republican constitutions. Even Florence had her episodes of despotism, and before the close of the century she acquiesced in the monopoly of government by a single family.

The despot had represented the supremacy of a party. The *Signore* represented the suppression or conciliation of the parties. The transition was in full progress during the early decades of the fourteenth century. It took place in Milan in 1313, where the Ghibelline Visconti, displacing the Guelf Torriani, eventually imposed peace upon the factions and ruled Milan, first as *Signori* and from 1395 as Dukes, for a century and a half. At Verona Alberto della Scala, made *Capitano del Popolo* for life in 1277, was succeeded by his son Can Grande, with whose descendants the *Signoria* remained for almost a century. Guelf Padua in 1318 entrusted the government to a citizen Jacopo da Carrara, in whose family it remained until 1405, when Padua was annexed by Venice. At Mantua the *Signoria* of the Gonzagas, founded in blood, outlasted many

of the greater and richer principalities, thanks to the military importance of Mantua and to the protection given to them for that reason by Emperors to whom they remained consistently faithful. Oldest of all the princely families, the Estensi had been lords of Ferrara since 1208.

The growth of commerce and accumulation of capital, along with the exclusive economic policy everywhere prevalent at this date and for long afterwards, made it inevitable that the leading commercial cities should seek to enlarge their borders; the larger the economic unit, the better chance it had of survival. It was the territorial limitations imposed upon the Italian city-states by previous history which placed them at a disadvantage in comparison with the great monarchies of Europe and led eventually to their downfall so soon as the latter had reached an equal level of economic organisation. But for the present the Italian cities were well in advance, thanks to their Mediterranean position which had made them middlemen between East and West. By the fourteenth century their prosperity was well established on widespread trade connections and a developed capital- and credit-system. The wealth of such cities as Florence, Milan and Venice was prodigious and out of all proportion to the size of their territories. In the struggle for expansion which rose between the cities the weaker were subjected by the stronger, until in place of a great multitude of small independent units a few comparatively large city-states came to occupy the field—Milan and Venice sharing Lombardy between them, Florence with Tuscany, Genoa. Outside of these stood the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily in the south, in the centre the States of the Church, in the extreme north Savoy, half French, half Italian. The history of Italy split up into many divergent channels, following the rich and varied development of each of these separate States. Here we can do no more than note the principal stages and turning-points in their history and attempt with a very broad brush to sketch the character of Renaissance civilisation.

Rome and the Papacy

The "Babylonian Captivity" lasted from 1305 to 1377, during which period seven Frenchmen occupied the Papal chair. Clement V, with whom it began, arrogating to himself on the death of Henry VII the rights of the Empire in Italy, conferred on Robert, King of Naples, the title of Imperial Vicar—an appointment confirmed by his successor, John XXII.

Thus during the absence of the Popes the Angevin House of Naples acted as protectors of the Guelf interest in Italy. In 1324 a republican revolution, which made Sciarra Colonna *Capitano del Popolo*, expelled King Robert's governors from Rome, whereupon the city relapsed into its usual state of political turmoil and instability. The condition of the city, reduced to comparative poverty by the absence of the Papal Court, soon became deplorable. It was a cockpit for faction-fights between Guelf and Ghibelline nobles, Orsini and Colonna, and between nobles and people. Human life was not safe in the streets; ancient monuments were torn down to make barricades and fortresses. At one time the city submitted to the rule of Papal officers or offered to the Pope the dignity of Senator on condition of his return to his capital; at another, experiments were made in republican government.

Of these the most notable was the bubble Republic of the plebeian Cola di Rienzi. Nourished upon Latin literature like his friend Petrarca, who in 1341 had been crowned with the poet's laurel crown on the Capitol, he was intoxicated with the glories of ancient Rome, felt deeply the disunion of Italy and the absence of an Italian patriotism, and dreamed of restoring a republican Rome to the headship of a federally united Italy. But the extravagant aberrations of his vanity destroyed the surprising success which his democratic fervour and his eloquence had actually achieved. Having won the hearts of the people by his harangues and an ingenious propaganda, he established a complete ascendancy over the city. Calling himself Tribune and Liberator and surrounding himself with a body-guard in classical style, he succeeded in quelling the turbulence of the nobles and in restoring order to the city. Then, essaying the more difficult task of making Rome the capital of Italy, he summoned the States of Italy to a national Parliament. The son of the washerwoman seemed to be on the point of achieving that federal unity under an Italian head which had been beyond the reach of Emperors and Popes, when his own weaknesses ruined everything. Success seems to have turned his fanciful brain, and from this point onwards his career degenerated into histrionics and self-glorifying display, which ended by making him offensive or ridiculous. When he found that his spell was broken, his nerve deserted him. He fled, and the eight months' wonder was at an end. Rienzi, like his predecessor, Arnold of Brescia, had "mistaken the memories of the past for the promise of the future."¹

¹ Madame de Staël, *Corinne en Italie*—quoted by Hallam.



RIENZI IN THE FORUM (1349)
(From the painting by A. Elmore, R.A.)

The episode is nevertheless historically interesting in several aspects. It exhibits the Humanist movement in its ingenuous and sanguine youth. It shows incidentally how the revival of interest in the past had reinvigorated the ideal of Italian unity. It reveals in a striking way the state of unchartered freedom created for Italy, by the withdrawal of the overshadowing supremacies of Empire and Papacy and the decay of old conventions and traditional reverences. The Italian world was one in which every experiment and every audacity was possible—in which personality was the supreme warrant and plebeian birth no obstacle to ambition.

Rienzi appeared again on the Roman stage a few years later in the train of Cardinal Alborno. Pope Clement VI (1342–1352) had imprisoned him but had not dared to put him to death. Innocent VI (1352–1362) seems to have hoped to use him as a means of re-establishing Papal authority in Rome, and Rienzi to have accepted the office. In spite of previous discredit and self-stultifying compromises, he was at first well received; but again his personal weaknesses were his ruin, and this time, failing to make good his escape, he was torn to pieces by the infuriated mob of Rome. Innocent VI, encouraged by the success of Alborno, had the thought of returning to Italy, but was deterred by age and infirmity.

Urban V actually did come back to Rome, moved thereto not so much by the eloquent letters of Petrarca as by the unpleasant conditions created in France by the pillaging soldiery whom the Peace of Bretigny had let loose upon the land, and by the effects of the Black Death following long years of war. Urban remained only for three years (1367–1370). The final return of the Papacy took place seven years later under Gregory XI. Meanwhile most of the cities forming the Papal State had revolted, while the Visconti tyrant of Milan was threatening to make himself supreme in Italy.

With the election of an Italian Pope, Urban VI, in 1378, followed in the same year by that of a rival French Pope, Clement VII, the Great Schism began. The Powers of Europe being about equally divided in support of the rival Popes, a deadlock occurred which allowed tyrants to establish themselves in many cities of central Italy. The restoration of Rome to order and dignity under the Papal sovereignty and the recovery of the States of the Church were delayed for several decades.

The Conciliar movement, by asserting the superiority of the Church as a body over the Papacy, further weakened the

authority of the latter. Martin V successfully resisted the attempt of the Council of Constance to impose a general scheme of Church reform, but the alternative to which he had to resort, that of Concordats with the different National States, was even more damaging to Papal authority in Europe, which rested upon the unity of Christendom. The progressive loss of European authority and European revenue which dates from this epoch made the Papacy more and more dependent upon the States of the Church and the wealth of individual Popes. The work of recovery was slow and difficult and was not completed until the close of the fifteenth century. Some account of it will be found in a later section.

The Neapolitan Kingdom

Charles of Anjou at his investiture with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by Pope Urban IV (1266) had sworn never to aspire either to the Empire or to supremacy in Italy. But ambition and his position at the head of the Guelf interest were too strong, and after the battle of Tagliacozzo the ascendancy of the Guelfs carried with it that of the southern kingdom. Charles was Senator of Rome, Imperial Vicar of Tuscany, and natural ally and patron of all Guelf cities. As ruler of Provence he was in close touch with the French monarchy. As Count of Piedmont he had a *locus standi* in North Italy. Manfred had aspired both to the kingship of Italy and to the capture for his family of the Greek Empire. Charles inherited both ambitions. He reaped all the fruits of the Eighth Crusade, in which his brother St. Louis of France lost his life. Tunisia paid him tribute, as it had to his Norman and Swabian predecessors. His power extended over the whole Near East.

There was good prospect of both ambitions being realised when the " Sicilian Vespers " (1282) and its sequel, the loss of Sicily, put a stop to Angevin expansion.

No recovery took place under Charles II, preoccupied in securing the Crown of Hungary for his eldest son. But under his second son and successor, Robert (1309-1343), the kingdom again became the strongest power in Italy and seemed to be on the verge of enlarging itself into a Kingdom of all Italy.

Left by the removal of the Papacy to Avignon sole leader of the Guelfs, Robert inspired and energetically supported the Guelf resistance to Henry VII (1310-1313) and united Guelfs and Ghibellines against the interventions of Ludwig of Bavaria (1327-1329) and of Henry VII's son John of Bohemia (1330-

1333). His influence was supreme in Tuscany and considerable in Lombardy.

Then under his granddaughter Joanna (1343–1382) the kingdom fell to pieces, politically and morally. Her reign was occupied with the struggle between her cousin Charles of Durazzo and the heir adopted by her late in life—Louis, son of King John of France, to whom his father had given the Duchy of Anjou, vacant by the extinction with Robert of the male line of the Angevins of Naples. From this time on until the Spanish conquest at the beginning of the sixteenth century there were always rival claimants to the throne of Naples. Charles of Durazzo in 1382 strangled Joanna and reigned in her stead. Under his son Ladislaus the kingdom again rose to importance and was a rival to Milan for the supremacy of Italy. In 1414 Ladislaus was succeeded by his sister, Joanna II—the *vedova allegra* of an Austrian nobleman. For twenty-four years the history of Naples was taken up by her amours and by a complicated struggle between the old Angevins, the new Angevins and Alfonso, King of Aragon and of Sicily, whom Joanna II had made her heir. In 1442 Alfonso made good his claim. He was a man of strong character, a clever diplomatist and an enlightened patron of learning and the arts. In his own kingdom his rule favoured the power and independence of the feudal barons—a policy which his successor reversed with fatal consequences.

In his relations with the Italian States Alfonso had a happier influence. He succeeded in converting Francesco Sforza's enmity into friendship and was a party in 1455 to the Treaty of Lodi, which united all the greater powers of Italy—the Papacy, Venice, Florence, Milan and Naples—in a policy of internal peace and resistance to external enemies. The conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 supplied sufficient incentive, but Naples and Milan had more pressing grounds for alliance in a common fear of the French. Louis, Duke of Orleans, by his marriage with the daughter of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, had a better claim to the Dukedom than the usurping Sforza. René of Anjou still upheld the claim of the new Angevins to Naples. Alfonso, who had given up Aragon, Sicily and Sardinia to his brother, died in 1458, leaving the crown of Naples to his bastard son Ferrante. This was the signal for a renewed attack from René of Anjou, who was encouraged by the Pope (Calixtus III) and supported by the disaffected barons of the Regno. The union happily established at Lodi seemed to be on the point of breaking up. But

Pius II (Aeneas Silvius, the Humanist) had sufficient Italian patriotism to refuse his support to the French claimant, so that the danger was for the time averted. Ferrante took savage revenge upon his rebellious barons, and it was some of these who, as refugees at the French Court, incited the invasion of Charles VIII in 1494.

Milan

From the beginning of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century a long series of Visconti despots, most of whom combined political intelligence and an appreciation of art with complete indifference to moral considerations, carried forward by the help of various famous Condottieri and their mercenary bands the extension of Milanese dominion. The subjected cities gained by incorporation in a larger economic unit. They retained their own constitutions, and conquest merely involved the transference from a despot in possession of less to one in possession of more capital—now the sole basis of military power. Taxation was doubtless heavy, but novel and excessive demands were forbidden by the precarious nature of the despot's tenure and his vital interest in the prosperity of his subjects. In the Italian "tyrannies" we have the earliest modern examples of State economy scientifically organised with a view to self-sufficiency.¹

Matteo Visconti (1311-1322) made a good beginning with the acquisition of Pavia, Alessandria, Piacenza, Como and Bergamo. Azzo, his grandson (1323-1339), liberated from the dungeon into which he had been cast along with his father and uncles by Ludwig of Bavaria on his coming to Milan to receive the Iron Crown (1327), bought the title of Imperial Vicar from the impecunious Emperor. Joining with Venice and Florence in an attack on the Della Scala tyrants of Verona, to whose denunciations the Visconti owed their incarceration by Ludwig and whose growing power was felt as a menace by all three allies, he gained Brescia and recovered Bergamo. Luchino (1339-1349), violent and vicious and eventually poisoned by his wife, added Novara and Parma. Giovanni, Archbishop and Signore (1349-1354), the host of Petrarca, is described by him as "humane and gentle," but he was none the less a redoubtable personality. Having bought the city of Bologna, he was

¹ "The chief sources of income were: a land-tax based on a valuation; definite taxes on articles of consumption and duties on exported and imported goods; together with the private fortune of the ruling house."—BURCKHARDT, *Renaissance in Italy*.

summoned by Pope Clement VI to Avignon to answer for his conduct. He replied by ordering food and quarters for himself and his 18,000 armed retainers; whereupon the Pope thought well to let the matter drop. Genoa, hard pressed by Venice, surrendered itself in 1353 to Milan, which became so formidable as to unite Florence, Rome, Naples and the Emperor Charles IV in opposition. The division of the realm on Giovanni's death between his three nephews, one at least of whom, Bernabò, was a monster of ingenious brutality, led to a decline in power and the loss of Bologna and Genoa.

Under Gian Galeazzo (1378-1402), who arrived at power by kidnapping and murdering his uncle, and was the most viperlike of the "Viper" brood, the power of Milan reached its zenith. The Della Scala of Verona having quarrelled with the Gonzaga of Padua, he first used the latter to destroy the former and then turned on his ally and possessed himself of Padua. On the west the purchase of Pisa made good the loss of Genoa. Gian Galeazzo aspired to the kingship of Italy and a European position. His dominions embraced a large part of Northern and Central Italy from Pisa, Siena and Perugia in the west to Verona and Bologna in the east, and at the time of his death he was preparing to attack Florence. He bought the title of Duke from the Emperor Wenzel. His first wife was Isabella, daughter of King John of France, and his sister was wife of Lionel, Duke of Clarence. On the marriage of his daughter to Louis, Duke of Orléans, the French King presently based his claim to the Duchy.

During the minority of Gian Galeazzo's son the power of the duchy again declined, but recovered again under Filippo Maria. Among the Condottieri employed by him was the famous Francesco Sforza, whom he bribed to enter his service by promising him the hand of his beautiful daughter Bianca Maria. On Filippo Maria's death without male heirs, the duchy being disputed between various claimants, the people of Milan asserted themselves and proclaimed a republic. On the failure of the republic at the end of three years, Francesco Sforza captured Milan and was accepted by the people as Duke (1450). The Treaty of Lodi (1455) confirmed his title.

Francesco Sforza was a straightforward soldier and ruled with good sense and moderation. His son Galeazzo Maria, who succeeded to the duchy on his father's death in 1466, inherited from his mother the Visconti temperament. While not neglectful of practical things by which the prosperity of his duchy might be promoted, he was in private life luxurious

and heartless, and was finally stabbed to death in a church by some republican youths who, like their classical models, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, had the dishonour of a sister to avenge. No revolution followed, and Galeazzo Maria's son, a boy of ten years old, was proclaimed Duke under the guardianship of his mother, a Savoy princess. Lodovico, a brother of Galeazzo Maria, having been invited by her to become her partner in the regency, presently thrust aside both mother and son and made himself sole ruler. The young Duke Gian Galeazzo Maria was feeble of mind and body, while Lodovico was capable and determined, so that the duchy lost nothing by his usurpation. All the children of Francesco had received an excellent education, and Lodovico had really imbibed the scientific spirit of the Renaissance. Education, agriculture, irrigation, means of transport, town-planning were actively promoted by him. He was also the patron of Leonardo da Vinci, who found scope in his service for his many-sided genius as painter, sculptor and engineer. Lodovico married the famous lady, Beatrice d'Este, and their court was a centre of attraction for all the talents.

The friendship established between the Sforza, the Estensi of Ferrara, the dei Medici and the Aragonese rulers of Naples gave Italy peace during the latter part of the fifteenth century. But Lodovico's power was founded on an act of usurpation. The nephew whom he had ousted was married to Isabella, granddaughter of Ferrante, King of Naples, and the fear of an intervention of Naples in his favour induced Lodovico to support Charles VIII of France in his attack on Naples. The gates of Italy were thus laid open, and the year 1494 was the first of many "*anni miserrabili*" for Italy.

Florence

The political and social history of fourteenth-century Florence is hardly intelligible apart from its economic basis. Florentine prosperity was founded on the wool trade—first the dressing and dyeing of imported cloth (*calimala*), then later the manufacture of cloth chiefly from imported wool (*lana*)—and the silk industry, which flourished at Lucca as early as the ninth century and was very early established in Florence. Both industries were by about 1100 organised in Guilds or *Arti*, which, like the early republican government of the city, had their consuls, their councils and their Gonfalonieri or bannermen, under whom the members of the Guild took their

place in the civic militia. Other trades and professions adopted the same organisation, and by the thirteenth century the more lucrative and important trades and professions were represented by the seven *Arti maggiori*¹ while the retail dealers and lesser trades had their *Arti minori*. The agents of the great wool-firms, sent to buy the wool-crops of England and other countries, were utilised as early as the twelfth century by the Popes for the collection of the Papal dues. "The revenue from England was transmitted by bills of exchange, which were generally met by the exportation of English wool."² The Papal example was early followed by the Kings, and Florentine bankers were employed by Henry III and by the Edwards.

But it is the connection of the Florentine capitalists with the Sicilian Kingdom which is of prime importance in explaining the policy and internal history of Florence in the fourteenth century. Already under Frederick II Florentine business men had played an important part in the economic development of the *Regno*. When Urban IV induced Charles of Anjou to undertake its conquest, he got the Florentine bankers to finance the enterprise. A connection was thus established of which the Florentines took full advantage. A number of the great trading firms had branches in the Kingdom and its eastern dependencies. Florentine trade found in the ports of the south outlets to the sea which until the conquest of Pisa it lacked in Tuscany.

The ascendancy of the Guelfs in Florence after 1266 is sufficiently accounted for by this close economic interdependence of the Papacy, the Angevin Kingdom and the great trading-families of the Republic.

The *Parte Guelfa*, which for almost a century after the triumph of Charles was the real power concealed behind the façade of an elaborate republican constitution, was dominated by the great banking families—Bardi, Frescobaldi, Peruzzi, Acciaiuoli, and others, who with their cosmopolitan connections and the honours, wealth and prestige acquired in the service of kings—added in some cases to feudal nobility—had come to form a class apart, an aristocracy of trade. They were known as the *Grandi* or *Popolo grasso*, in contrast to the simple *bourgeoisie*, the *Popolo minuto* or *magro*. They had either ousted or absorbed the older territorial and Ghibelline

¹ Calimala, Wool, Silk, Bankers (Cambiatori), Physicians and Druggists, Lawyers, and Furriers.

² Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, ii, p. 86.

nobility who had previously kept them in check. After 1282 no citizen not enrolled in one of the Greater Guilds was eligible for office.

Meanwhile a wealthy middle-class was growing up, which acquiesced in the predominance of the Grandi so long as the latter were able to secure the prosperity of the city; but when both they and their ally, the King of Naples, fell on evil days, it made itself master of the Government. Until 1343 the Grandi controlled the Parte Guelfa, kept the upper hand with the help first of Charles (1266-1285) and later of Robert of Naples (1309-1343). Their alliance was based on common economic as well as political interests, the prosperity of Florence, menaced by Ghibelline neighbours—Pisa, Lucca, Arezzo—being closely bound up with that of the southern kingdom.

In 1301 a split occurred in the Parte Guelfa which the chroniclers explain by a family feud imported from Pistoja. The Neri or Blacks, true to the alliance of the Parte Guelfa with Naples, supported Boniface VIII's attempt to recover the Kingdom of Sicily from the Spanish House by the help of Charles of Valois, brother of the French King. The Whites opposed the scheme and were accused by the Blacks of Ghibellinism—with justice if, as seems probable, the former were inclined to prefer an alliance with the now weakened Empire to increasing the power of the French in Italy. The poet Dante, who looked to the Emperor Henry VII to be the saviour of Italy, was one of the *Bianchi* and shared the exile which followed the triumph of the Neri aided by Charles of Valois, whom the Pope had sent to “mediate” between the factions. With the Neri the Guelf-Angevin policy won the day.

In 1313 Florence successfully defied Henry VII, whose ally was the Spanish King of Sicily. But the Ghibelline revival produced by the Emperor's presence in Italy continued to be a serious danger to the Guelf republic after his death. Despite the aid of Robert as Signore of the city (1313-1321), Ugucione, whom Henry had made Imperial Vicar and with whom some of his German troops had taken service, became Podestà of Ghibelline Pisa, gained possession of Lucca, expelling the Angevin garrison and inflicted a heavy defeat on Florence and her Guelf allies at Montecatini (1315). Castruccio Castracani, the friend and ally of Ludwig of Bavaria, who made him Duke of Lucca and Pistoja, not only defeated Florence in 1325 at Altopascio but came near to capturing the city itself. In these straits the Parte Guelfa induced the city again to offer the Signoria to King Robert of Naples, whose son Charles of

Calabria came to Florence in 1326 as his Vicar. The sumptuous extravagance of Charles's court was a gold-mine for his friends of the great financial firms, but a heavy burden for the taxpayers. His death in 1327 deprived the Grandi of their protector and enabled the Popolani to introduce constitutional changes of a democratic character—among them the system of choosing the executive officers of the Republic by lot (*Imborsazione*).

The death of Castruccio Castracani in 1328 relieved Florence from external danger, and for some years she enjoyed comparative peace without and within. But toward 1340 an accumulation of difficulties and disasters brought about the fall of the Parte Guelfa, followed by a struggle for power between the three elements of the city population—the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the manual workers—which only found its solution in the acceptance of “tyranny.”

In order to recover Lucca from the Della Scala tyrant into whose hands that city had fallen after the departure of John of Bohemia (1333), Florence in 1336 joined Venice and Milan in a costly war with Verona. The failure of an important firm in 1325, the wholesale arrest and blackmailing of Florentine traders by the King of France in 1337, and the failure of Edward III, then embarking on the Hundred Years' War, to repay enormous advances made to him by the Bardi and Peruzzi, by crippling the great firms threw the burden of the war on the already heavily taxed citizens. Lucca, recovered at the peace made with Verona in 1339 but lost again three years later to the Pisans, seems to have been an object of special desire to the Florentines—perhaps on account of its silk industry—and of this motive the Parte Guelfa took advantage in 1342 to get the Signoria of the city again conferred on the King of Naples.

Power had begun to slip from their hands. In 1341 a Ghibelline section seems to have gained control of the Government, which applied for help in the war with Pisa to the Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria. The blow dealt to Florentine credit in the southern kingdom by this infidelity brought about the failure of a large group of influential Florentine firms, which caused a serious repercussion on the whole banking business. The appeal to King Robert and the support given by the Grandi to the Vicar sent by the King—one Walter of Brienne, titular Duke of Athens—seem to have been a desperate attempt on their part to gain protection against their creditors. The incompetence of the Duke of Athens and his attempts to seize

absolute power stirred the citizens to revolt; and his violent expulsion in July 1343 ended the long régime of the Parte Guelfa. The failure of the great Bardi and Peruzzi firms and the death of King Robert completed the downfall of the Grandi, and a violent attempt to recover power only produced a popular tumult which was followed by an extension of the franchise, the establishment of the new rich in power, and special measures for the exclusion of nobles from office. This persecution of the Guelf aristocracy by the new rich after a time seems to have created a reaction in their favour. They recovered control of the government and retaliated on their opponents, reviving the bogey of Ghibellinism to secure their ostracism.

In 1378 a successful revolt of the unenfranchised working-class took place, the fruits of which were, as in the Paris Revolution of July 1830, reaped by the bourgeoisie. Weary of the unstable conditions created by the fall of the Guelf régime and the growing claims of the working-class, which were encouraged by a section of the rich bourgeoisie, Florence acquiesced in the monopoly of power by a single family. The Albizzi, supported by the Guelf aristocracy, exercised supreme control of the republican machinery for about fifty years (1382-1434) and then gave place to the great banking family of the dei Medici who, while retaining the forms of republican government and of popular election, practically established an hereditary despotism. The Capitalist class, unable to retain its political supremacy, purchased the conditions for economic success at the price of political liberty.

Already under the Albizzi régime the Republican Constitution had been reduced to nullity by the system of *Balie*—packed bodies of partisans to whom the sovereignty (in particular the appointment of magistrates) was delegated. The precedent was followed by the Medici, whose power was maintained partly on such dexterous manipulation of political machinery, partly on popularity. They posed as simple citizens and were careful to keep the populace in good humour by lavish expenditure on public amusements and displays.

During the sixty years of the Medici dynasty (Cosimo 1434-1464) Piero'il Gottoso 1464-1469, Lorenzo il Magnifico 1469-1492, and Piero II 1492-1494) Florence enjoyed comparative peace and great prosperity. Cosimo's friendship with Francesco Sforza, whose claim to the Duchy of Milan he supported on the death of the last Visconti in 1447, relieved Florence of the long desultory war with Milan and led the way to the general peace established by the Treaty of Lodi in 1454 and



A PETITIONER BEFORE DOGE FRANCESCO FOSCARI (DOGE OF VENICE, 1423-1457)

(From the original by Francesca Hayez)

maintained with some breaches till almost the close of the century. The Gueff tradition of intimacy with the French monarchy was continued by the Medici and only revealed its dangerous possibilities when France had recovered from the long war with England and Louis XI was succeeded by Charles VIII.

The expansion of Florence into Tuscany, begun in the latter half of the fourteenth century with the acquisition of Prato, Pistoja, San Gimignano, Arezzo and Volterra, took a great step forward with the acquisition of the long-coveted port of Pisa in 1406.

It is impossible here to attempt any account of the revival of learning and in particular of Greek studies which took place under Cosimo and his successors, or of the wonderful efflorescence of all the arts which form the really important contribution made by Italy—and by Florence pre-eminently—to European civilisation and which make some amends for the political decadence of the "Second Italy."

In lurid contrast with the gaiety and the libertinism of Lorenzo's Florence appears towards the end of this period the austere and menacing figure of Savonarola, denouncing as a tragic catastrophe the brilliant episodes that were taking place around him.

Venice

The privileges bestowed on Genoa as reward for the help given to Michael Paleologus in the recovery of Constantinople enabled that city to recover much of the ground it had lost in the Eastern trade during the sixty years' existence of the Latin Empire, which latter had owed its origin to the diversion by Venice of the fourth Crusade to an assault on Constantinople.

For more than a century Genoa and Venice competed on fairly even terms in the Levant. About the middle of the fourteenth century competition developed into open war. Between 1352 and 1354 several naval battles were fought in which victory alternated between the two republics. It was the destruction of the Genoese fleet off Cagliari in the year 1353 which brought about the voluntary surrender to Milan already referred to. Then after some twenty years of peace the war of Chioggia, which opened with a striking success for Genoa, ended in 1380 with the complete destruction of her fleet. By this disaster the sea-power of Genoa was finally broken and Venetian supremacy established.

With the suppression of Genoese competition the commerce of Venice expanded greatly. But the expansion was confined to the Adriatic and Ægean, for the Turkish hordes of Osman were in the first quarter of the fourteenth century already overrunning Palestine, Egypt, Tripoli and Anatolia. Year by year the Turkish advance curtailed the sphere of Venetian trading operations. Not only the prosperity but the existence of Venice was threatened, since the City of the Lagoons possessed no hinterland from which to draw her supplies of food. Accordingly from about the year 1330 Venice was forced into a policy of landward expansion which brought her into conflict with the Scaligeri, the lords of Verona and many neighbouring cities, from whom she won (1338) Treviso and the suzerainty of Padua. Later, after the death of Gian Galeazzo (1402), she seized from Milan Verona and Vicenza, annexed Padua, and a few years later conquered Friuli. In further wars with Milan she acquired Brescia and Bergamo, so that at the beginning of the fifteenth century her mainland dominion extended from the Isonzo to the Adda and included Padua, Treviso, Belluno, Udine, Gorizia, and Istria with Trieste.

In order to compete with the "tyrannies," to whom the employment of mercenaries was indispensable, even the Republic, whose navy was manned by the conscription of its own citizens, had to employ the famous Condottieri, Carmagnola, Colleone, Francesco Sforza, Jacopo Piccinino. These masters of the art of war sold their services to the highest bidder, so that heavy expense was entailed by Venice's acquisition of a mainland dominion. But the expense was counterbalanced by the great increase of her trade which followed her final victory over Genoa, while the full effects of the Turkish advance were not felt until late in the century.

The rule of Venice in the cities subjected by her aimed in the first place, as did all the activities of the Republic, at the economic advantage of Venice. The subject cities were forced to use Venice as their sole market. In other respects her sway was not oppressive; and when during the war with the League of Cambrai (1509) she released them from their allegiance, they were glad afterwards to return to it. Her overseas colonies were treated strictly as dependencies existing for the benefit of the Republic. Revolts, when they occurred, were sternly repressed.

The government of the Republic tended with the growth of her commercial empire to become more and more of a close oligarchy. The Doge, who had originally been elected by an

assembly of all the people, was after the year 1172 chosen by the Maggiore Consiglio, membership of which was in 1292 limited to those families which were then, or had previously, been represented in it. After the Tiepolo conspiracy, formed in resistance to this limitation, a Committee of Enquiry, consisting of ten Commissioners, was appointed; it became permanent and eventually came to be the real seat of power. From among the "Dieci" were chosen later the "Three Inquisitors of State" whose primary duty it was to discover and remove traitors.

That the often arbitrary and violent procedure of this narrow oligarchy should have been acquiesced in by its subjects for so many centuries is perhaps explicable by the peculiar position of Venice. Her impregnable situation, exempting her from the dual supremacy of Pope and Emperor and allowing her to maintain her close connection with the Eastern Empire, isolated her from the rest of Italy, whilst her commercial success and prosperity made her an object of envy. In the face of many enemies Venetian patriotism flourished and was able to tolerate abuses of power by a government which had proved itself capable of efficiently defending the State.

The decay of Venetian prosperity began with the encroachment of the Turks, but was made inevitable by the discovery of the Cape route and of America, and the consequent shifting of the centre of the world-trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

Renaissance Culture (1250-1500)

If from the point of view of political unity the Papacy was a baneful influence in Italian history, it is none the less true that the equilibrium of Empire and Papacy made possible the early emancipation of the Italian cities from the shackles of feudalism and so enabled them to become the pioneers of Europe, both in politics and economics. Moreover, the very divisions of Italy and her fierce intestinal feuds by intensifying and concentrating patriotism helped to produce an intellectual ferment and a quickening of faculty in every department of life—which can only be compared with that produced in ancient Greece by similar causes.

The splendid outburst of creative energy, artistic and intellectual, which sets a halo on the Italian Renaissance and on Florence in particular as its most perfect exponent, was made possible by a happy conjunction of favourable conditions—the intense life of the city-state, the absence of superior con-

trolling powers, the decay of old traditions, the command of large capital.

Something has already been said of the wealth and widespread business connections of the Italian traders and of their activity as capitalists and financiers. How wealthy the Italian cities were may be best appreciated by comparison with the contemporary great monarchies of Europe. According to Giovanni Villani, the Florentine chronicler, the sum owed and never repaid by Edward III to the two Florentine firms of the Bardi and the Peruzzi amounted to upwards of 1,365,000 golden florins. At about the same time (1330-1340) the revenue of the English king is given as 155,000 pounds sterling, which is about the equivalent of the sum owed to the Italian firms. Villani reckons the annual revenue of Florence for the years 1336 to 1338 at something over 300,000 golden florins, which he says is equal to that of King Robert and considerably greater than the revenues of Sicily or France. That private firms should have been able to recover, as the Bardi and Peruzzi did, from losses equivalent to more than the whole annual revenue of their native city is sufficient proof of the solid basis on which Florentine prosperity rested.

Concrete evidence of this prosperity is still to be seen in the magnificent buildings, public and private, with which the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries glorified so many Italian cities, so that even quite insignificant towns can show to-day their masterpieces of architecture, sculpture and painting. In Florence we have the main part of the Duomo, the Campanile of Giotto, Santa Croce, the Palazzo Vecchio, San Marco, Orsammichele—to mention only the best-known buildings dating from before 1400.

Of the expenditure on dress, amusements and pageants some idea may be gained from such paintings as Benozza Gozzoli's frescoes in the Medici chapel. Mysteries, pantomimes, gorgeous processions and allegorical shows were the fashion of the day. Lorenzo dei Medici records that he spent some 2,000 ducats (the ducat about equals the florin) on the tournament given by him in the Piazza Santa Croce in 1467.

It was on the wealth amassed by successful commerce and manifested in these material ways that the power of the Italian "tyrants" was founded and maintained. They were accepted by the bourgeoisie of the cities as the only effective protection against interference with their trade by external enemies on the one hand and the demos on the other. By means of it they made themselves absolute rulers. From the beginning

of the fourteenth century citizen armies disappeared. Their place was taken by mercenary troops captained by soldiers of fortune. The earlier "bande" were formed from the foreign soldiery disbanded in the pauses of the war between Naples and Sicily, remnants of the German armies which accompanied the Emperors Henry VII (1313), Ludwig (1329), Charles IV (1354), French and English troops disbanded after the Peace of Bretigny (1360). The earlier Condottieri too were foreigners—Werner von Urslingen, Robert of Geneva, Sir John Hawkwood.

In the fifteenth century the business had passed into the hands of Italians. Francesco Sforza, Jacopo Piccinino, Federigo di Montefeltro, Colleone, Carmagnola, are some of the most famous captains. Rival cities bid against one another for their services, so that the rewards of the profession were high. Some princes of the smaller States adopted it as a means of increasing their revenue. Some Condottieri obtained principalities. From a military point of view the substitution of professional armies commanded by men who made a science of strategy for feudal levies or civic militia, enlisted for the occasion and imperfectly trained and co-ordinated, was a great step in advance. Politically it meant that the citizens had sacrificed public duty to private convenience and were henceforth unarmed at the mercy of an armed despot. If the rule of the tyrants was not found intolerable, and if their abuse of power was kept within certain limits, it was because tyrant and citizens were mutually necessary to one another. The first interest of the latter was successful commerce; whilst the former, since he could only hope to maintain his position so long as the citizens were rich enough not to feel his exactions, made the economic expansion and organisation of the State his first business.

But if the basis of the Italian Renaissance was commercial, the men who made it and were made by it were essentially aristocrats—exponents of a new type of aristocracy which combined the distinction of manner, the social self-confidence, the audacity of old nobility with the force, the intellectual curiosity, the freshness and simplicity of men of the people. It was as if an old race had been re-born to see with the eyes of youth and to explore with the zest of youth the beauties and wonders of a new and larger world. In Italy of the fourteenth century we see human nature more completely emancipated from the tyranny of collective and long-established conventions than it has perhaps ever been within historic times. The

withdrawal of Empire and Papacy had left the city-states free to develop on their own lines. The danger of interference from the Empire soon became almost negligible. The feudal supremacy of the Empire was broken for good. The buying of Imperial titles represents no renewal of it. It was rather of a piece with the fashion which we find prevailing among the commercial magnates of fifteenth-century Florence of putting a German noble at the base of their family-trees and of figuring as knights in bloodless tournaments. So innocuous had Ghibellinism become. Socially, the break-up of the feudal order gave to the individual Italian a freedom to be and do what he chose which was as yet denied to the inhabitants of other lands. Morally and intellectually, the near presence of Rome with its double tradition, religious and imperial, while it made the Church, as an institution, a cherished national possession, diminished its spiritual authority over the Italian mind. It was partly because the degradation and corruption of Rome were more obvious in Italy and touched her more closely than the secularising process, which elsewhere only reached maturity in the fifteenth century or later, was there of earlier development. The critical spirit was already active in the Sicilian Court of Frederick II, whose open-minded intercourse with Orientals, Moslem and Greek, did much to enlarge the mental horizons of Italy. By the fourteenth century intimacy with Greek philosophy and with the religion and civilisation of Islam had gone far to destroy the supremacy of the Church in the world of learning. The soil was prepared for the Humanist movement. The always-powerful fascination exercised over the Italian imagination by the tradition of ancient Rome, together with the respect inspired by the maturity of mind and technical mastery of the Greek and Roman authors, gave to the recovered classical literature an authority and a sanctity almost equal to those of the Christian Scriptures. The multitude and diversity of philosophical systems presented in this literature and its purely human treatment of morals completed the process of emancipation already begun, while the habit of accurate scholarship acquired in its study was presently applied in other fields and gave birth to the modern scientific spirit.

For a brief space Italian humanity appears to move in a sort of Nietzschean Paradise "beyond Good and Evil," giving itself up to its natural instincts with a conscience untroubled by introspection or respect for authority. It is no matter for surprise if such "unchartered freedom" produced some mon-



sters of evil. It was an age in which everything was illegitimate and everything legitimate. Personality was free to expand to its natural limits. Extremes and glaring contrasts were the natural result. Against the brutalities of a Bernabò or a Giovanni Maria Visconti, the poisonings, wholesale murders and incests of the Borgias, the rascalities of Benvenuto Cellini, we may set the saintly gentleness of St. Catherine of Siena, the many-sided accomplishment and perfect humanity of a Vittorino da Feltre or a Leo Battista Alberti, the unflinching earnestness of Savonarola. Cruelty and bloodshed are not more common in this age than in those which preceded it, though its crimes are perhaps more deliberate and cold-blooded and appear blacker by contrast with the background of brilliant, intellectual culture in which they are set. The application of intelligence to every department of life is characteristic of the age. It is unmoral rather than immoral, concerning itself with what is, rather than with what should be. It is set on knowing and enjoying. A great variety of subjects—geography, history, commercial method, domestic and public economy, war—are treated of in an objective spirit and in some cases on a basis of statistics. Machiavelli's work in some of these fields is known to everyone and would be more justly appreciated but for his habit of plain speaking. His principles are not more immoral than the practice of modern statecraft. Only he has no use for circumlocution. To be naked and unashamed is another characteristic of the age which appears very markedly in some of the autobiographies, those, for example, of Girolamo Cardano of Milan and of Benvenuto Cellini. Its joy in life expressed itself in painting and sculpture, in pageants, in literature, in intellectual and convivial intercourse. The standard set up in the arts of social converse and gentle manners by the "Courtier" of Castiglione has never been surpassed. Of the Court circle of Urbino which he describes the presiding and inspiring spirit was a woman; and the fineness of Italian Renaissance culture is perhaps best seen in this—that it could produce women capable of "talking the talk" and sharing in the pursuits of men as well as men sufficiently civilised to enjoy their comradeship.

CHAPTER III

THE RETURN OF THE BARBARIANS AND THE SPANISH RÉGIME, 1494-1529

France and Spain Rivals for the Possession of Italy

THE hope which had seemed to dawn with the Peace of Lodi of a permanent unification of Italy in a national federation was extinguished by the mutual jealousies and selfish ambitions of the various rulers. In this respect Italy was only a miniature replica of Europe, whose newly consolidated national monarchies, sprung from the decay of the Empire, were no less self-centred and self-seeking in their policy than the petty States of Italy. The unity of Christendom was a quickly vanishing dream; we are in the modern world of competition. At the opening of the sixteenth century the Powers of Europe, their national boundaries fixed and their internal constitution settled for the time being, were about to engage in a trial of strength, urged to conflict by the same economic motive which produced the inter-municipal wars of Italy. Meanwhile the Italian States, having failed finally to achieve national unity, had spent their strength in the over-luxuriant blossoming of their Renaissance summer and were powerless to resist the Continental Powers, whose development had been later but who had outstripped their instructor. Italy's wealth was the prize contended for between the Valois Kings of France and the Habsburg dynasty, which to the prestige of the Imperial title and its vast hereditary dominions in Austria and the Netherlands had added the Crowns of Aragon and Castile.

Before the close of the fifteenth century the first wave of the deluge had fallen upon Italy.

Charles VIII of France was the descendant of the Louis of Anjou (son of King John of France) whom Joanna of Naples had adopted as her heir when, about 1380, her throne was in danger from her cousin Charles of Durazzo. Ever since that time the claims of the new house of Anjou had been kept alive, and they were now vested in Charles. Urged to undertake the

conquest of Naples by Neapolitan nobles whom Ferrante's ferocious measures had driven into exile, he crossed the Alps in September 1494. Lodovico il Moro had his own reasons for welcoming the French King to Milan.

Piero dei Medici's abject surrender brought upon him the wrath of the citizens whom he had betrayed. He was ignominiously expelled from Florence while Charles, whom imperialist Pisa welcomed as a deliverer, after negotiations in which Savonarola was spokesman of the city, contented himself with the exaction of 120,000 ducats, the retention of Pisa and of the forts which Piero had promised to give up to him, and, after looting the Medici palace, passed on.

In the south the confusion caused by the abdication of Alfonso II, after less than a year's reign, in favour of his young son Ferrante II, made Charles's task easy. Naples was occupied without a blow, Capua betrayed. Ferrante fled to Ischia, and Charles possessed himself of the vacant throne.

After two months he returned to France; Ferrantino recovered his kingdom, and the French were expelled.

Italy appeared to be as she was before, but her weakness had been revealed, and the quasi-burlesque of Charles's expedition was the prelude of tragedy.

In 1498 Charles was succeeded on the throne of France by his cousin Louis XII, Duke of Orléans, who in virtue of the marriage of his grandfather with the daughter of Filippo Maria Visconti claimed to be rightful heir to the Duchy of Milan, usurped by Francesco Sforza, father of Lodovico il Moro, now at the height of his glory. Louis likewise claimed the Kingdom of Naples.

The main invasion opened in 1499 with the conquest of Milan by the French King.

Venice, eager to extend her frontier to the Adda, Florence, afraid of endangering her republican institutions by alliance with the greatest of the despots, Naples, trembling for her own safety, refused to stand by Lodovico, who presently disappeared into a French prison.

Master of the Duchy, Louis' next aim was Naples. Here he had to reckon with the King of Spain, Ferdinand the Catholic, to whose house the restored Ferrantino belonged.

Louis and Ferdinand came to a compromise. They agreed to join in the conquest of the Neapolitan kingdom and to share it between them. The conquest was successfully accomplished, but the conquerors quarrelled over the partition. Louis' army was defeated at the battle of the Garigliano

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(1503), and the Kingdom of Naples passed to the House of Aragon, which reunited under its rule the "Two Sicilies."

Thus the sixteenth century opened for Italy with France in occupation of the great Duchy of Milan, and Spain master of the whole Southern Kingdom.

Louis' experience in the south did not deter him from entering into a second partnership with Ferdinand. In 1508 a syndicate for the plunder of Italy, dignified by the name of the "League of Cambrai," was formed between Louis, Ferdinand and the Emperor Maximilian, and was joined by Pope Julius II with his eye on the recovery of Bologna and other cities claimed as part of the Patrimony.

This time Venice was the objective. Maximilian wanted Verona and Vicenza, the historic corridor between the Empire and Italy; Louis would have liked to recover the territory between Adda and Mincio ceded to the Republic as the price of help given in his conquest of Milan; Ferdinand's share was to be the freeing of the ports of Apulia from Venetian control. Such a combination could not be resisted, and Venice, defeated in a battle near the Adda, lost for the time being the whole of her possessions on the mainland (1509).

Again the thieves fell out. Julius II, in fear for the States of the Church, threatened by the growing strength of the French in Milan, posed as patriot, and with the cry "*Fuori i barbari*" organised the "Holy League" for the expulsion of the French. The League consisted of the Pope, Ferdinand of Spain and Venice—two of the three robbers in league with the robbed against the third robber. The Spanish viceroy of Naples brought his Spanish infantry, over whom the French were victorious at Ravenna (April 1512); and here with the figures of Gaston de Foix and of the "*Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*" the age of chivalry flickered out.

The victory placed Rome and Naples in imminent danger, but the death of Gaston delayed the French advance, and meanwhile the Emperor Maximilian was gained over to the side of the League. In the rear of the French, Milan was attacked and occupied by an army of Swiss in the name of Lodovico's son, Maximilian, whose cousin was married to the Emperor.

The League had thus triumphed, and the French retired from Italy, leaving Milan in the hands of the Swiss and the young Sforza.

The recovery of Milan by Francis I in 1515, the year of his accession, renewed the duel of France and Spain over the body of Italy.

In 1516 the death of Ferdinand of Spain made his young grandson, Charles V, master of Spain, Naples, Sicily, the Netherlands and the New World. In 1519 died Charles's paternal grandfather, Maximilian. The ensuing contest between Charles and Francis I for the vacant Empire destroyed whatever beginnings of reconciliation had been made in the interval. The fight for Italy began again in 1521. The issue of the struggle was for some years in doubt; but finally Francis was defeated and taken prisoner at Pavia (February 1525), and Spain was left supreme in Italy.

The Counter-Reformation

The Medici Popes Leo X¹ (1513-21) and Clement VII² (who succeeded Adrian VII in 1523), were more concerned in guarding their interests in Florence and in the recovery of certain towns for the Papal State than in the salvation of Italy—which may well have seemed a hopeless enterprise. Their policy as between Francis and Charles was one of hesitation and hedging. Leo, while remaining on good terms with the French, insured himself in 1521 by a secret treaty with the Emperor. Clement had made a similar treaty with Francis, and now on the news of Pavia had to dread the vengeance of Charles. He accordingly attempted to propitiate the winning side and at the same time to secure his own private interests by concluding a treaty with the Emperor (April 1525). At the same time he continued secretly to intrigue with France, Milan and Venice. Charles was forced into action, and the selfish and short-sighted duplicity of the Pope must be held in large part responsible for the horrors of the sack of Rome which followed (May 1527). It was the expression not of Charles's vindictive feelings, but of the greed and blood-lust of ill-disciplined troops and in particular of the anti-Papal fury of Frundsberg's 12,000 Lutheran Lanzknechts, by which Bourbon's army had been freshly reinforced. For eight days the Eternal City was barbarously violated by these modern vandals.

Meanwhile the French army had crossed the Alps and was threatening Naples, and the fate of Italy still seemed to be in doubt. During 1528 disasters which befell the French finally brought Clement to a decision, and in 1529 a new treaty was concluded. Only two years after the sack of Rome Clement

¹ Giovanni, son of Lorenzo il Magnifico.

² Giulio, son of Lorenzo's murdered brother.

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undertook to crown Charles as Emperor and invest him with the Kingdom of Naples in return for the reinstatement of the Medici in Florence and the restoration to the Papal State of the four coveted cities. Shortly afterwards the Peace of Cambray, by which Francis renounced his claims to Milan and Naples, left Italy completely in the power of Charles.

In November 1529 Charles's coronation duly took place at Bologna, where he received the Pope in Imperial state, settled the affairs of the States of Italy and distributed honours and titles among their now obsequious rulers.

Venice was made to cede Ravenna and Cervia and to pay an indemnity.

Mantua was made a duchy. The Duke of *Urbino* was confirmed in his possessions.

Francesco Sforza, brother of Massimiliano, was reinstated in the *Duchy of Milan*. Dying without issue in 1535, Francesco bequeathed the duchy to the Emperor, and it was numbered among the private possessions of the Habsburg family.

The d'Este family was confirmed in the *Duchy of Ferrara* in spite of the vindictive enmity of the Pope. To compensate for this disappointment, the Medici were to be restored in Florence. After a year's siege, famous for the heroic resistance made by the republic and for the part taken in it by Michelangelo, Florence fell and received as its Duke the bastard son of a Moorish slave, Alessandro, great-grandson of Lorenzo il Magnifico.

All Italy was thus brought under the Spanish control. Spanish viceroys ruled in Naples and Sicily, Spanish governors in Milan. Florence was dependent on the armed protection of the Emperor, while Spanish fortresses kept the minor principalities in awe. In 1540 Charles V invested his son Philip II with the Dukedom of Milan and made over to him as Vicar-Imperial for life the charge of all his Italian dominions. The character of that narrow-souled and gloomy fanatic is faithfully reflected in the Spanish régime of Italy. The free, pleasure-loving, irresponsible Italy of the Renaissance is dragooned into sanctimonious hypocrisy. Men are valued and gain advancement not by personal excellence or force of character, but by their readiness to become the tools of a narrow absolutism. It is the age of supple ecclesiastics, place-hunting, title-hunting courtiers, formal propriety and secret libertinism. The draping of Michelangelo's nudes by order of Paul IV paints the age.

Philip was a religious fanatic and, although he might be no

tool of the Papacy, the Counter-Reformation had his full support.

The religious revival and reform movement in Italy had spent itself early and with little result on the Government of the Church or the morals of Churchmen. Its most vital elements had run into absurd extremes of Manichæism, Flagellantism and the like, and made themselves impossible. The moderate spirits had been emasculated by the patronage of the Church which had taken them into its service. The main body of the Franciscans, abandoning the inconvenient doctrine of Poverty, had been converted into useful and well-to-do propagandists. To the Dominicans had been given the charge of extirpating heresy by word and deed, preaching and persecution. Thus the vital forces in Italian religion had been diverted from reform to the support of external unity and uniformity, leaving the temporal power and the mundane character of the Papacy unshaken.

Before the end of the fourteenth century the ever-increasing burden of Church exactions, the growing sense of national independence, the profligacy of ecclesiastics generally and of the Papal Court at Avignon in particular, and finally the scandal and absurdities of the Great Schism, had convinced Europe of the need for reform. The question was brought up at the Council of Constance in 1414, but the Papacy had then successfully defended its autocratic government of the Church against the reforming party which desired to subject the authority of the Pope to that of Oecumenical Councils, and so impose upon the former the character of a Constitutional monarchy.

But at the beginning of the sixteenth century fear of the Reformation movement, which now with Luther threatened the Church with disruption and consequent loss of revenues and authority, joined with the fanatical religiosity of Philip, compelled the Papacy to set about the work of cleansing its stables and spurred the Church to great proselytising activity in Europe, in the East and in the New World just opened by the Spanish Conquest of Mexico (1522) and Peru (1532).

The Inquisition had been established since 1482 in Spain, where it was a State department controlled by the Crown. In 1542 it was introduced at Rome. The Jesuit order of Ignatius Loyola was approved by Paul III in 1540. The congregation of the Index was established by Paul IV in 1559.

The Council of Trent (1545-63) was the statute of the Counter-Reformation. Its work, in which the Protestants did

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not participate, was partly doctrinal, partly disciplinary. In neither department did the Papacy abate anything of its claims to supremacy. The Head of the Church was to be the final court of appeal in matters of dogmatic orthodoxy and the absolute ruler of the Church.

Not compromise, but a more rigid definition of dogma was the means which the Catholic Church adopted for securing its unity against disruptive tendencies. In the tightening of the bonds of discipline expressed in a series of decrees we see the Church preparing to resist attacks and to conquer new fields.

This régime of Absolutism and rigid orthodoxy in Church and State could not and was not intended to result in any national regeneration. It bred, on the contrary, corruption, hypocrisy and deadening of spirit. Heavy taxation and the oppressive privileges of a Court nobility produced misery and desperation. Crimes of violence became common and were not decreased by ferocious repression. The Congregation of the *Index* put literature in shackles. The Inquisition did its utmost to kill freedom of thought.

Giordano Bruno (1550–1600) was burned at the stake. Galileo (1574–1642) was humiliated. And Galileo and Bruno are the most eminent among a crowd of thinkers and students.

In philosophy and science Italian genius continued to light the way for the nations of Europe, and for this credit is due to the city so often reproached for its selfishness and indifference to national interests. Venice had always kept the Papal Supremacy at arm's length, and now did good service to Italy in providing a refuge in which some freedom of speculation was possible.

CHAPTER IV

ITALY IN BONDAGE, 1540-1796

DURING all this period the Powers of Europe were engaged in almost constant war—wars of religion, wars of European balance of power, wars of economic expansion.

Italy, crushed and paralysed, had no national history of her own and played no active part in the history of Europe. The religious issue was fought out chiefly in Germany; Paris became the intellectual capital of the world. The tide of battle overflowed the Alps, and Italy suffered in causes which were not hers. At the peaces which marked the phases and pauses in the unceasing conflict her little States were bandied about as makeweights in the game of Balance of Power.

But though paralysed, Italy was not dead. She was like a tree which has shed its blossom, borne its fruit and has entered upon its winter sleep of recuperation. Beneath the surface the sap was still flowing and the plant still drew its food from the soil. The movement of ideas which lay behind the wars of Europe percolated, thanks to the printing-press, to Italy also.

The Reformation movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, asserting in defiance of Rome the right of the individual to independence of thought and belief, contained the germ of a general revolt against authority.

One result of the Wars of Religion, closed by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), was to establish the independence of State Churches. In this form the Reformation invaded even the Catholic States of Italy, whose princes everywhere engaged in a struggle with the Papacy, the object of which was to remove the last check imposed on their complete absolutism by the privileges of the Church. From the Reformation again sprang the conception of the rights of man to political independence. The age of Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot was the natural successor of that of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. New ideas of political and economic liberty and a new theory of the State were elaborated chiefly by Frenchmen, and their

dissemination was assisted by the perfecting under Louis XIV of the French language and the great vogue which French literature enjoyed throughout Europe. But as yet education was confined to the upper classes, while only the Princes could say with truth "L'état, c'est moi."

The new ideas accordingly expressed themselves in Italy, not in revolutions and regicide as in England, nor even in such political demonstrations as the Fronde in France, but in reforms imposed by enlightened despots such as Charles III of Naples or Leopold of Tuscany on peoples who accepted them passively but were as yet incapable of entering into their spirit or making it their own. Nevertheless, the monarchs in undermining the authority of Rome were unconsciously undermining their own "Divine Right," and paving the way for the democratic revolution. The seed thus sown was watered by the revived prosperity which the reforms made possible and which gave rise to the beginnings of a modern middle class; finally, under the breath of the French Revolution the seed germinated and a new spring commenced for Italy. Meanwhile for two centuries and more all creative energy seems to have deserted her. She was too utterly exhausted to care what happened to her, and watched with indifference the deformation by unintelligent and unsympathetic foreigners of all the achievements on which she had most prided herself—her commerce, her spirit of social equality and of free enquiry, her artistic culture. She accepted submissively Spanish manners and Spanish class-prejudices. Her merchants began to be ashamed of trade and retired from business, disguising themselves with bought titles. The courts where princes had freely associated with artists and men of letters were invaded by a ceremonious and chilling etiquette. Commerce was hampered by stupid restrictions, while taxation was heavier and more brutally collected than under the worst of native despots.

Over this period of hibernation we shall pass rapidly, only giving such account of internal development and changes in dynastic geography as is necessary to the understanding of nineteenth-century Italy.

Venice

Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Venice was in decline. The War of Cambray (1508-9) had severely shaken her power on the mainland, while her oversea empire was shrinking as that of the Turks expanded.

In 1540 she had to give up the last remnants of her conquest of the Morea. In 1573 she lost Cyprus. The selfish rivalries of the various Powers frustrated her efforts to form any lasting coalition against the common enemy, and on the rare occasions when she did obtain support from Spain or the Pope their alliance was rather a hindrance than a help. For a moment her ancient glories were revived. Her great Admiral Morosini, the heroic defender of Candia, only surrendered after an eleven-years' siege, lived to avenge the loss by the re-conquest of the Morea and by that occupation of Athens on which the accidental destruction of the Parthenon has cast a shadow. But the Turkish advance was not to be stemmed by isolated efforts, and the strength of the Republic was all the while being sapped by other causes. The discovery of the Cape route diverted its shipping-trade to Portugal, Holland, England and Genoa. Its commerce suffered from the pirates who infested the African and Dalmatian coasts. The public spirit of its nobles was gradually corrupted. They learnt from the Spaniards to look down on trade and all active work and sank into idleness and dissipation.

Nevertheless, its prosperity ebbed but slowly, and Venice remained the happiest and the best-governed of all the Italian States. She maintained her close oligarchical constitution—Doge, Grand Council, Committee of Ten and inner Committee of Three—the dreaded Inquisitors of State, whose special business was to nip treason in the bud. But since order, justice and personal liberty were assured by the Government, the people were on the whole contented and loyal. With the spread of Liberal ideas and the impoverishment of the noble families in the eighteenth century discontent and factious opposition appeared, but, though reforms of the Constitution were made, there was no revolution. The art and culture of the Renaissance continued to flourish in Venice when they had been extinguished elsewhere. In Venice, too, freedom of thought found some shelter from the persecutions of the Holy Office. Venice had always been jealous of Papal interference, and during the seventeenth century engaged in more than one quarrel with the Papacy in defence of her independence and of the principle of religious toleration. But with the decline of her empire went a decay of moral fibre, and Spanish religiosity and obscurantism gradually invaded the State which had dared to defy the Counter-Reformation. As the eighteenth century progressed, Venice sank into the last stage of decay, and as a European pleasure-resort traded upon the

fascination which emanated from the very corruption of her ancient glories.

Florence and Tuscany

In 1494, after the expulsion of Piero dei Medici, Florence, under the influence of her great prophet and revivalist, Savonarola, reverted to her Republican tradition. But not for long. The cumbrous machinery was ill-suited to such dangerous times, as Savonarola himself perceived. In 1495 a Great Council on the Venetian model was superimposed upon the Signoria, while the Parlamento—the generally tumultuous assembly of the populace, on which the Medici had relied—was abolished. Savonarola was done to death in 1498. The modified Republic which he had established survived him for fourteen years—the sunset period of the Florentine Renaissance made glorious by the achievements of Michelangelo as artist and military engineer, and by the heroic defence of the city against the Spanish (1529-30).

In 1512 the Medici were restored to Florence by Pope Julius's "Holy League," and the city remained under Papal tutelage until 1529, when the Medici were again expelled and the Republic restored. After two years the Medicean Pope, Clement VII, sacrificing the welfare of Florence and of Italy to the interests of his family, bargained with Charles V for the aid of his army and, having at last overcome the obstinate resistance of the city, finally subjected it to degenerate Medicean despots, dependent no longer now on personal ability but on the favour of Spain.

The first of the new line, Alessandro, was the worst sort of tyrant and at the end of seven years was fitly assassinated. Happily for Florence, his successors were less intolerable masters. Cosimo I (1537-74) received Siena as a Spanish fief, while five towns on the coast—known as the *Presidi*—were retained by Spain to check any anti-Spanish inclinations on the part of the Grand Dukes. The higher title was conferred on Cosimo by Pius V, to the annoyance of Philip II and of the neighbouring princelets.

Cosimo and his son and successor Francesco (1574-1587) showed little disposition to resent Spanish domination.

The French leanings of Fernando (1587-1609), whose niece was married to Henri IV, were effectively checked by further Spanish occupations.

The reign of Ferdinando II (1621-70) was brightened by his patronage of Science. The "*Accademia del Cimento*"

(College of Experiments) was founded, and valuable work was done by various pupils of Galileo whose names are honourably remembered in the history of Italian science. But with the seventeenth century the Court of Florence fell more and more under the blight of a narrow and superstitious clericalism, which reached its height under Cosimo III (1670–1723). The gloomy bigotry of the family régime was relieved at the last in Gian Gastone (1723–37)—an easy-going, cheerful and popular prince in whom the line became extinct.

On his death the Duchy of Tuscany was conferred (to suit the convenience of the “Concert of Europe”) on Francis of Lorraine, afterwards the husband of Maria Theresa of Austria and Emperor under the name of Francis I.

The Tuscans had been fond of Gian Gastone, and the regents sent by the new Duke were at first unpopular. But the régime of the Lorrainers soon proved its superiority over the priest-ridden stupidity of the Medici, under whom the prosperity of Tuscany had steadily declined. Liberal and intelligent like his brother Joseph, Francis’s successor Leopold would willingly have given his monarchy a constitutional character had the Tuscans been ready for it. As it was, he and his ministers introduced useful reforms in finance, agriculture and law. The abolition of the old *Arti* or Trade Guilds, which had become an incubus, was followed by a marked revival of trade.

Leopold became Emperor on the death of Joseph in 1790 and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand, who, when the army of the French Revolution invaded Italy in 1792, maintained a strict neutrality. Nevertheless, Tuscany was occupied in 1799, when Ferdinand retired to Vienna to await the passing of the storm.

The Papal State

The sovereignty of the Popes over the Patrimony, as distinct from the “Duchy” of Rome usurped by the Popes in Lombard times, had its origin in the “Donations” of Pepin and Charlemagne. The Popes were by no means always in a position to make this sovereignty a reality. Their claims were almost always in excess of their actual possessions; private property was not clearly distinguished from lands over which feudal suzerainty could be claimed, while certain lands were claimed in sovereignty by both Empire and Papacy. It is therefore impossible to define with precision the limits of the Papal State in mediæval times. In the chaos which

followed the break-up of the Carolingian Empire it practically disappeared until Otto the Great came to the rescue of the Church. The breach with the Empire over the question of investitures deprived the Papacy of its secular sword, and its authority over the Patrimony was partial and intermittent until the times of Innocent III (1198-1216).

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the various cities with their surrounding territories which made up the States of the Church were in the hands of a number of dynasts, whose vassalage to the Church was no less nominal than that of the cities of Upper Italy to the Empire. The Papacy removed to Avignon was threatened with complete loss of its temporal possessions. But in 1353 Cardinal Albornoz, sent by Innocent VI, re-established Papal rule both over the Papal State and over Rome, where Rienzi's fantastic attempt to restore the Roman Republic (1344-47) as an all-Italian federation had recently ended in fiasco. The rapacious and arbitrary conduct of the French Legates presently sent to rule the recovered cities ended in undoing the work of Albornoz. They did not scruple to employ the professional swashbucklers known as "Free Companies," and it was the launching by the Legate of Bologna of Sir John Hawkwood's "English Company" upon Florentine territory that roused Florence to organise a revolt (1375), by which some eighty cities rid themselves of their Papal governors and recovered their independence.

The restoration of Papal rule began in earnest with Martin V (1417-31), with whose election the Great Schism ended. But the creation of the Papal State, as it existed in later centuries, was the work principally of the infamous Alexander VI and the fighting Pope Julius II. Cesare Borgia, created "Duke of Romagna" by his father and acting with his authority, succeeded by force and fraud in dispossessing the dynasts of the Patrimony and in recovering Benevento from Naples. His ambition was to create for his family a Kingdom of Central Italy, and he appeared to be on the verge of success when Alexander's death coinciding with his own illness left him without a standing. Julius II (Della Rovere), who succeeded, appropriated to the Church the kingdom which Cesare had carved out for himself, recovering by means of the League of Cambrai (1508-9) the three cities, which Venice had snatched on the fall of Cesare, Ravenna, Faenza and Rimini.¹ Clement VII's vacillations and infidelities came near to undoing

¹ Again seized by Venice in 1527 when Clement VII was a prisoner, but restored to the Church after Charles V's coronation at Bologna in 1529.

the State-building of his predecessors, but his reconciliation with Charles V in 1529 (Treaty of Barcelona) saved the States of the Church. They were enlarged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the acquisition of Ancona (1532), Camerina (1539), the Duchy of Ferrara (1597), and the Duchy of Urbino (1631).

The administration of these territories was such as might be expected from the fundamental principles of the Papacy. It had always affected the immutable and omnipotent nature of the Deity whose representative on earth it claimed to be. Absolutism and resistance to innovation, thus inherent in its nature, were driven to exaggerated expression by the Reformation. Rome, having rejected every compromise, henceforth became the centre of all that was reactionary in Church and State, the last stronghold of authority in religion and of feudal autocracy in politics. The Catholic dynasts of the eighteenth century, in seeking to complete their own absolutism, introduced or allowed their ministers to introduce a series of reforms which involved the secularisation of the State and the curtailment of the Church's power. But Liberalism was incompatible with theocracy, and was bound in course of time to destroy Divine-Right monarchy. The Church, more clear-sighted than the dynasts, would allow no Liberal ideas to undermine its foundations. The administration of the Papal State was accordingly entirely in the hands of priests. Legislation was by Papal decree. As for results—Beccatini, the biographer and apologist of Pius VI (1775–99), admits that the Papal State was the worst-governed State in Europe, with the exception alone of Turkey.¹

Individual Popes were sometimes overborne by the advancing tide of Modernism, which the Papacy had set itself to keep out with its mediæval broom. The Reform movement of the eighteenth century culminated in a universal outcry against the Jesuits, in whom the new spirit rightly recognised the real strength of Papal reactionism and obscurantism. In an age when crass ignorance and indifference or a dilettante and casuistical modernism was characteristic of the beneficed clergy, the Society of Jesus remained faithful to its mission. They were the prætorian guard of Papalism. And when in 1773 Pope Clement XIV, giving way to the pressure of the Bourbon monarchs, whom his predecessor had stoutly resisted, dissolved the Society of Jesus, he was disarming the Papacy.

¹ Alfredo Oriani, *La lotta politica in Italia*, vol. i, p. 252.

Spanish Italy (Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily)

Lombardy, Naples and Sicily were ruled during the seventeenth century by Spanish Viceroys, nominally controlled by the "Council of Italy" at Madrid, but in practice independent and high-handed. The governors looked upon their office as a quick road to wealth, and their subordinates followed suit. Rapacity, stupidity and calculated policy combined to impoverish, corrupt and divide the population. The great were demoralised and hedged off from the active population by the lure of privilege and titles; commerce and industry were hampered and discouraged by heavy duties and internal customs-barriers, the peasants crushed under the burden of taxes unfairly distributed and inhumanly collected. Hence the secondary evils of brigandage on land, piracy at sea, and the frequent recurrence of famine and epidemics.

Such a régime left little spirit of resistance, while the deliberate encouragement of class divisions and distinctions made combination difficult. Such risings as took place have no political significance or result. The revolt of Masaniello at Naples (1647-48) cannot be dignified with the name of a revolution, in spite of the appearance upon the scene of the Duc de Guise. It was provoked by the imposition of a duty on fruit and subsided at once on the appearance of a Spanish fleet. It found no echo in Lombardy. No one really believed in the possibility of shaking off the Spanish yoke. Savoy dreamed of winning with French help the ancient crown, but the ambition was clearly impossible and was quickly abandoned while the thought of Italian unity was not yet above the horizon, and the persistent advance of Savoy excited no enthusiasm in the rest of Italy.

Both to Lombardy and to the South the eighteenth century brought a betterment of conditions. In 1713, by the Peace of Rastatt, Milan and Mantua were transferred from Spain, now under a Bourbon dynasty, to Austria. With Maria Theresa (1740-1765) and her minister Kaunitz the era of benevolent and enlightened despotism began for Lombardy and continued under Joseph II (1765-90) and Leopold II (1790-92). Finance was set in order, free trade in grain was introduced, and a uniform tariff established. The old communes re-emerged as administrative bodies. Roads and canals were constructed; the coinage was purified, and an educational ladder from elementary school to university set up. Freedom

of enquiry, religious, scientific and political, was favoured by the Government. But the Reforms and the consequent prosperity, being imposed from above, left the people as abject in spirit and as devoid of initiative as before, and Lombardy betrayed no political consciousness.

In 1735 Naples and Sicily again became an independent kingdom under the Spanish-Bourbon Don Carlos, son of Philip V, Louis XIV's grandson, whom the Peace of Utrecht had made King of Spain. Under Charles and his son Ferdinand, who succeeded in 1759 when Charles became King of Spain, Tannucci their Tuscan minister set to work to improve the deplorable conditions created during centuries of feudal anarchy and Angevin absolutism, and which the régime of the Habsburg Spanish viceroys had done nothing to mitigate. The country had no decent roads or bridges; no manufactures; little trade in its ports; internal exchange was hampered by customs; agriculture was burdened by all manner of mediæval servitudes and privileges; innumerable priests and monks monopolised a large part of the products, contributed nothing to the exchequer, and were unamenable to the civil courts. Courts of Justice were few and far between; robbers and smugglers abounded. Tannucci met with powerful opposition, but he succeeded to some extent in limiting the power and privileges both of the clergy and the feudal nobility. Laws were passed restricting the number of the clergy, imposing taxes on Church property and preventing its increase. The Inquisition was excluded and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts curtailed. The privileges of the feudal nobility were next attacked and local jurisdictions suppressed. In fact, the framework of a modern State was created by authority and on paper. But the people remained mediæval, and when Tannucci fell into disfavour with Ferdinand's imperious and capricious wife, Carolina of Austria, the edifice he had raised was bit by bit pulled to pieces again by princes who, having only followed the fashion in amusing themselves with Liberal ideas, soon fell back into the old absolutism and priest-ridden bigotry. Vested interests rejoiced in the demolition, while the people were too ignorant and too easily cajoled by cheap food and amusements to protest or even to understand what was happening.

The Rise of Savoy

Milan and Naples lie torpid and paralysed. In Venice and Tuscany we watch a gradual failing of vitality. Only in the

barren mountains of Savoy does the spirit of liberty find a refuge. On that promontory of Italy exposed to all the storms of the European conflict, battered and from time to time overrun by the contrary floods, it defies destruction and awaits its hour.

The rise of Savoy was the work of its Counts, the origin of whose family runs back into the mists of legend. As its historical founder we may take Umberto Biancamano (Humbert of the White Hand), who was followed by a number of Umbertos and Amadeos and Emanueles, mostly virile and efficient, good soldiers and practical men of business. The original nucleus of its Piedmontese territory was the County of Susa (including Susa, Turin and Aosta), acquired by the marriage of Otto, Count of Savoy with the heiress of Susa. The County of Susa was of importance in the eyes of the Emperors as commanding the north-western gateway of Italy. A Count Amadeo was made Duke of Aosta and Vicar Imperial by Frederick II in 1241, another Amadeo (VIII) Duke of Savoy by Henry VII. Savoy at this time included territory now French and Swiss as well as Italian—Swiss territory lost in the seventeenth century. In 1247 the family split into two branches—the elder holding Savoy, the younger Piedmont. In 1418 Piedmont and Savoy were reunited on the extinction of the younger branch. The former had meanwhile acquired Pinerolo and other pieces of territory, while to Savoy Soree and Nice had been added. Parts of Montferrat were added during the fifteenth century.

During the struggle between Charles V and Francis I for Northern Italy, Savoy was overrun by French and Imperial armies, and for some twenty years it knew neither independence nor prosperity.

Its first resurrection was the work of Emanuele Filiberto, who, in reward for good services rendered to Charles V, was by the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis (1559) reinstated in his ancestral possessions of Savoy and Piedmont, though for some years certain key positions continued to be held by France and Spain respectively. The position of the duchy astride of the passes by which alone French armies could enter Italy, even though it had been the cause of Savoy's disasters, was also the cause of its recovery. Neither France nor Spain could consent to see it in the hands of its rivals, while both were deeply interested in securing its friendship. It was thus that by playing off one against the other with true Italian duplicity the successive dukes succeeded in forming and preserving a compact and independent principality.

Of this process it will be sufficient to notice the most important stages.

Emanuele Filiberto succeeded in recovering by diplomacy the fortresses which had been retained by France and Spain, and at his death in 1580 left to his son and successor a Government well-organised on autocratic lines, an efficient army and a position of independence. Carlo Emanuele I (1580-1630) at the beginning of his reign pursued an anti-French policy, which served to keep France alive to the importance of his friendship. But getting little support from Spain, he presently accepted the advances of Henri IV and arranged with him to exchange territory beyond the Rhone for Saluzzo, which in 1559 had been left in French possession. By this transaction Savoy, while exchanging fertile plains for barren mountains, became more compact and more Italian. Though his plans for the conquest of Milan from Spain concerted with Henri IV were cut short by the assassination of the French King in 1610, Carlo Emanuele at his death left Savoy in a stronger position than he had found it. But before his death he had broken with France, now under Richelieu's guidance (1614-1642), and, while gaining Montferrat with the fortress of Casale, had lost to the French Pinerolo and Saluzzo. His successor Vittorio Amadeo I (1630-1687), while acquiescing weakly in the loss of the two fortresses, allowed himself to be bound to the French interest by accepting in marriage the sister of the French King, Louis XIII. Consequently, during the minority of his son Carlo Emanuele II (1637-1675) and the regency of his widow Christine, Savoy fell entirely under the power of France, who used it as a base for operations against Spain.

The second resurrection of Savoy takes place under Carlo Emanuele II's son, Vittorio Amadeo II, who succeeded in 1675. In 1690 he shook himself free from French domination and joined the Grand Alliance of Spain, England and the Empire. Then, repeating the tactics of Carlo Emanuele I as the price of a return to the French allegiance, he recovered Pinerolo and other places retained by France. His demand that the "neutrality of Italy" should be guaranteed by the Empire having been refused, he went over to the French side, thereby so turning the balance against the Imperialists that they declined the contest, and within the year (1696) a peace was concluded by which the neutrality of Italy was guaranteed. Piedmont was shortly relieved of the presence of both armies, and the Peace of Ryswick (1697) confirmed the territorial gains of Savoy.

In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), in which possession of the Spanish crown was disputed between French Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs, the same manœuvre was repeated in the inverse direction—but this time not with impunity. Vittorio Amadeo, who had rather reluctantly accepted for his daughter the hand of Louis XIV's grandson, Philip V of Spain, entered the war on the side of France; but after two years, tempted by the promise of Montferrat and part of Lombardy, he again changed sides. In consequence Savoy was entirely overrun by a French army. Turin, hard pressed by Vendôme, offered obstinate resistance, and was only (1706) saved from capture by the strategy of Prince Eugene, the Duke's cousin, and the opportune victory of Marlborough at Ramillies. As a result of these successes the French were driven from Italy, Austria recovered Milan (and presently Naples) from the Bourbon King of Spain, and Vittorio Amadeo his duchy with the addition of Montferrat, Alessandria and part of Lombardy (Lomellina). Not only these territories but Sicily, along with the title of King, were the gains of Savoy at the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), while Milan, Sardinia and Naples passed to Austria. In 1720 Sardinia was exchanged by Austria for Sicily, so that henceforth the dominions of the House of Savoy are known as the Kingdom of Sardinia. The result of the wars of 1690-1714 was to free Savoy from dependence on France and to raise the mountain principality to the position of a European Power, recognised as an important factor in the balance of power, and therefore not to be neglected in international settlements.

The extinction of the Spanish Habsburg line in 1700, together with the passing of the Spanish crown to the Bourbons, divides Spain from the Empire and places the Bourbons and Habsburgs in the position of rivals for supremacy in Italy. The peace of Rastatt (1714) left Austria dominant with Naples, the five coast towns of Tuscany known as the Presidi, Sardinia—to be exchanged in 1720 for Sicily—Mantua and all the Milanese territory except the slice given to Savoy. But her ascendancy was short-lived. The dispute between France and the Emperor over the Polish Succession (1733-38) rekindled war in Italy from which, though Savoy's conquest of Milan only gained for it small pieces of Milanese territory, Spain recovered the two Sicilies, the Emperor retaining only Lombardy and obtaining for his son-in-law—the husband of Maria Theresa—the reversion of Tuscany and Parma.

Only one further addition to the territory of Savoy has to

be recorded. By the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), Carlo Emanuele, who had well maintained the prestige of Savoy and had gained the good-will of the Powers and of England in particular, obtained a further and more considerable slice of Lombardy which brought Savoy's eastern frontier to the Ticino.

With Milan, Mantua and Tuscany in Habsburg hands, Parma-Piacenza, Naples and Sicily in those of the Spanish Bourbons, and the Kingdom of Sardinia an independent Italian State, a miniature copy of the European balance of power had been established in Italy, which endured until the French Revolution upset all equilibrium. Outside the Powers enumerated, the States of the Church, the decadent Republics of Genoa and Venice and the small principalities were from the European point of view negligible quantities.

The State built up by the House of Savoy faithfully reflected the character of its builders. The family type shows a striking persistence—the small active body, the red hair, the restless energy and practical bent of mind reappears continually. The same concentrated aim was pursued with few lapses from generation to generation—by Vittorio Amadeo II and Carlo Emanuele III in the eighteenth as by Filiberto Emanuele in the sixteenth century. It is this persistency and narrowness of aim which made of Savoy the vessel of Italian liberty. The kingdom itself knew little of liberty. The régime of the Dukes was eminently personal and autocratic, and if it made for the prosperity and contentment of the people, this was not its first object. The careful attention paid to finance and to the fostering of industry and agriculture was dictated by the need for military efficiency which was necessarily the first care of the rulers. King Carlo Emanuele III liked to hear his kingdom called the "Prussia of Italy." The policy pursued from generation to generation by which the political power of the feudal nobility was gradually broken down and replaced by a centralised and personal rule, invading every department of the subject's life, was imposed by the necessity for a strong executive in a world where to hesitate was to be lost.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century the Kingdom of Sardinia gave no welcome to those Liberal ideas which were elsewhere making head and of which the amateur philosopher, the Emperor Joseph, was the exponent in Austria and the neighbouring Lombardy. Feudalism, if it had ceased to be a danger to the monarchy, survived in the form of oppressive privilege. Church influence was strong and welcomed by

monarchs who were no believers in freedom of thought. Of freedom in its democratic sense they had no notion, and only under irresistible pressure did they eventually consent to relinquish their absolutist traditions. Perhaps no less masterful and martinet régime could in such circumstances have preserved Savoy to be, as it were, the hard shell protecting the germ of a new Italy.

CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON, 1792-1815

SINCE the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) Italy had enjoyed unbroken peace. The reforms of enlightened despotism had greatly increased prosperity, and with prosperity had come contentment and political indifference. The peoples of the different States were absorbed in local and private affairs and seemed to have lost all interest in wider issues and all consciousness of a common Italian nationality. So little present was the thought of revolution that the rulers of Naples and Tuscany had been able to withdraw some of the concessions made in the heat of the reform movement without arousing popular opposition. They had equally little fear of disturbance from without, and had reduced their armies to a minimum. Only in Piedmont and Naples was there any appearance of military activity. Queen Carolina at Naples had created an expensive navy with the help of her favourite, Sir John Acton, and an army of 30,000 men which "could only be counted on to run away." In Vittorio Amadeo III (1773-1796) the military traditions of the Savoy princes had degenerated into a mania for military tailoring, while the decadent nobility made indifferent officers. The country possessed some fifteen forts and an army of 35,000 men which the event proved to be unequal, whether in numbers or moral, to the task of holding the country against an invader.

The close family connection of the Bourbon princes of Italy with the French Royal family and the fact that Marie Antoinette was the sister of Leopold of Austria made it inevitable that the French Revolution should sooner or later invade Italy; and the news of the events of 1789 in Paris filled the Courts of Italy with dismay, which expressed itself in reactionary severities. The sympathies of the King of Sardinia, closely connected as he was with the Bourbons by matrimonial ties, were all with the enemies of the Revolution. Accordingly in 1792, rejecting the overtures of the French Government,

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which offered him the Crown of Lombardy as the price of his help, he allied himself with Austria and took the offensive. It was the signal for the invasion of Italy by the forces of the Revolution. Swept out of Savoy and the coast districts, Vittorio Amadeo held out obstinately in Piedmont and stuck by the side of Austria, while Prussia and Spain made terms with the Republic (1795). In March 1796 Napoleon Bonaparte arrived on the scene, and in the course of a month Savoy was put out of action. The King was forced to withdraw from the Austrian Alliance and to place his territory at the disposal of the French, whose passage into Italy was now secure.

During the eighteen years which followed, Napoleon treated the map of Italy as a jig-saw puzzle. For the history of Italy, his deliberate work—the creation of ephemeral States with ephemeral Constitutions—is of less importance than unforeseen results. By throwing together provinces which had long been separate and self-contained units, he started Italy on the way to national unification. At the same time the new republican governments, though kept under French domination, provided the middle and upper classes of Italy with a much-needed education in practical administration, while the ideas of the Revolution, everywhere disseminated, roused the people from their long lethargy and infused into the rising generation a passion for liberty and the dream of a free and united Italy.

The work of Napoleon in Italy may be most conveniently summarised in four periods :

- (a) From the first invasion up to the Treaty of Campo Formio, October 1797.
- (b) From Campo Formio to the entry into action of the First Coalition at the beginning of the year 1799.
- (c) The Austrian recovery of 1799.
- (d) From Napoleon's reappearance to his final fall.

1796 to the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797)

Having opened and secured his corridor of communication with France, Bonaparte rapidly completed the work of clearing Lombardy of the Austrians. In May he made his entry into Milan ; then concentrated on Mantua, the cardinal position of Austria in Italy. Its capture after six months' fighting in February 1797 ended the Austrian resistance in Italy. Further operations in Carinthia threatening Vienna forced upon the Archduke Charles, the best of the Austrian Generals, the armistice of Leoben (May 1797), which was followed in October

by the Treaty of Campo Formio. In exchange for Belgium, annexed to France, and Lombardy, declared independent, Austria received the territory of Venice. In the crisis of Italy's fate the behaviour of the once justly proud and now ineffectually haughty Republic had been contemptible. It had refused to ally itself either with the Revolution or with those who proposed an Italian Coalition to resist it, yet had taken no effective measures to defend its neutrality, so that its territory became the battle-ground of French and Austrian armies. Cringing before the victorious French, it earned the contempt of Napoleon and was treated by him as a mere counter.

After the fall of Mantua Napoleon had advanced into Papal territory, easily routing the Papal troops. The instructions of the Directory were that the temporal power was to be ended and the Pope removed from Rome. On this occasion, probably because pressed for time, Napoleon deferred the execution of their sentence. At Tolentino in February 1797 the Papal envoys agreed to the cession of Avignon to France, the release from Papal rule of the Legations (Bologna, Ravenna, Forli and Ferrara—governed by the Pope's Legates) and Romagna, the payment of 30,000,000 francs and the handing over of one hundred works of art.

Bologna and Ferrara had already at the approach of Napoleon thrown off the Papal government and sworn allegiance to the French Republic, and their example had been followed by Reggio and Modena. The four city States had in October 1796 formed themselves into the "Cispadane Republic"—which in the following year was allowed to amalgamate with the Cisalpine Republic. Under this title Lombardy, increased by such Venetian territory as lay west of the Mincio, had received the forms of self-government but had to support a French army of occupation, besides contributing a contingent for service with the French colours.

Campo Formio to the First Coalition (1799)

In November 1797 Napoleon left Italy and was occupied in Egypt until the autumn of 1799.

During his absence further transformations were effected by the generals of the Revolution. As the Mecca of autocracy and reaction and the centre of intrigues, Rome was naturally obnoxious to revolutionary France. Moreover, the Pope had been slow in complying with the terms of the Tolentino truce. But it was the murder of a French General in Rome by a Papa-

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list mob which finally drew the lightnings of the Revolution. General Berthier, arriving in Rome in February 1798, by order of the Directory sent the Pope into exile and set up a Roman Republic.

Thereupon Ferdinand of Naples (or rather his headstrong wife Carolina, backed by Acton and Sir William Hamilton) determined to intervene and proposed to Piedmont and Tuscany that they should join him in driving out the French. They refused, but nevertheless, on the strength of Austrian encouragement and the loan of General Mack to command his armies, he persevered and marched on Rome. Championnet, unprepared for the attack, retired, and Ferdinand, entering Rome in triumph, proclaimed from the Capitol that "the Kings have awakened from their sleep." A fortnight later the Neapolitan army was in full flight for home, pursued by Championnet. Ferdinand escaped in disguise and induced Nelson to carry him to safety at Palermo. At Naples royalists and republicans came to blows, until the gates were opened by the latter and Championnet, entering, imposed order. The "Parthenopean Republic," set up with a fantastic pseudo-classical constitution (January and February 1799), maintained a short and troubled existence, harassed by the demands of the French for money, unpopular with all classes, and perpetually assailed by insurrections stirred up by the Court in Sicily and reactionaries at home.

About the same time Carlo Emanuele IV of Piedmont, who had succeeded Vittorio Amadeo, struggling against revolutionary risings at home and attacks from republican neighbours, was forced by other French Generals first to give up the citadel of Turin and then to abdicate. Piedmont suffered the same fate as Savoy and Nice and was annexed to France. The King was allowed to retain Sardinia only, whither he retired.

A month later the Grand Duke Frederick of Tuscany, the only Italian prince who had played a dignified part in presence of the Revolution, retired to Vienna, Tuscany, which had so far maintained a strict neutrality, having been occupied by a French army on the renewal of war between France and Austria in March 1799.

The Austrian Recovery of 1799

So far the Revolution had destroyed the old absolute Governments but had not given Italy independence. The provisional republican Governments were everywhere subject to

the dictates of the French Generals and of the Directory in Paris. Men's minds had been stirred out of the old lethargy, but were utterly confused by the sudden transformation and by the flagrant contradiction between the ideas of the Revolution and the manner in which it was being imposed upon Italy. Liberty and equality were in all mouths. The masses of the people were eager to be rid of Popes and Kings, but there was no co-operation, no plan, no understanding of the present nor aim for the future. The idea of a free and united Italy, so far as it existed, was borrowed along with other new ideas from Paris, and had as yet taken no firm root. Nationalism was made use of by the reactionaries in order to stir up feeling against the French invaders, while the progressives were patriots of France rather than of Italy. Such genuine nationalists as there were worked underground in secret clubs, their impossible ideal being to achieve the union and independence of Italy in an aristocratic republic after the pattern of Venice or Genoa.

To make the confusion worse, the next year brought a complete reversal of the position. The Second Coalition was formed in the winter of 1798-99, and Austria again declared war. In March Suvorov and his Russians came to the support of the Austrians in Italy and in April defeated the French Commander-in-Chief, Moreau, in the decisive battle of Cassano. Meanwhile in the south a fierce struggle had been going on between the Republic and the savage bands raised against it in Calabria by the reactionary leaders. The news of the new Coalition had swelled the forces of reaction, and the pacific idealism of the Parthenopean Government was ill-suited to deal with a critical situation. The *coup de grâce* was given to the Republic by the withdrawal of the French General MacDonald, ordered north to the support of Moreau. Naples was blockaded by sea and land. The republicans were overwhelmed. The Parthenopean Republic disappeared amid a disgraceful orgy of reprisals, ending in the restoration of the Bourbons. The part played by Nelson in these events reflects no credit on England.

As a result of the defeat of Cassano, all Lombardy and Piedmont were lost to the French. Rome was retaken and Tuscany restored to a vicegerent for the Grand Duke. Only Genoa, guarding the Col di Tenda, remained to the French. Everywhere the return of the princes was accompanied by fierce vengeance taken on the republican and Francophil middle-class. Some Italian citizens, who found a refuge in Paris,

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addressed to the Directory an appeal in which the claim of a free and united Italy is for the first time publicly formulated. The restoration was acclaimed with delirious delight by the masses—politically unconscious, religious in an ignorant and simple way and regretting the comfort and gaieties of the old régime, which by contrast with the sacrifices of goods and blood imposed by the French appeared as a golden age.

In Piedmont no restoration took place. The pusillanimous conduct of Carlo Emanuele gave Austria, who hoped eventually to consolidate the whole of Northern Italy under her own rule, an excuse for rejecting Suvorov's request that he should be recalled.

Napoleonic Italy and Napoleon's Fall

Napoleon, landing at Fréjus in October 1799, was acclaimed as the man of the hour who should rescue France from the embarrassments into which the Directory had fallen. The *coup d'état* of Brumaire (November 1799) placed him in the position of military dictator.

In May 1800 he crossed the Great St. Bernard and entered Italy, where Masséna had just been forced to evacuate Genoa. The crushing defeat of the Austrians at Marengo (June 1800) at once reversed the situation. The Austrians retired on Mantua and by the end of the winter were reduced to accept at Lunéville (February 1801) almost the same terms as those of Campo Formio.

Austria retained Venice alone, with the Adige instead of the Mincio for western frontier, and recognised the Cisalpine Republic.

The French were more completely than before the masters of Italy.

Napoleon now restored the Cisalpine Republic, putting up a French minister to supervise the Government. At this second coming his secret aspirations and changed attitude towards the Revolution were reflected in his public behaviour—in the deference shown to aristocrats, the snubbing of democrats, and frequent attendance at religious functions.

Moved by desire to conciliate the Tsar of Russia, who had made himself the protector of the King of Sardinia, Napoleon had after Marengo offered to reinstate Carlo Emanuele and even to cede to him the whole Cisalpine province on condition that he would renounce his claim to Savoy and Nice. This offer the King had refused to consider; whereupon Napoleon seems to have changed his mind, though for the present, in considera-

tion of Russia's feelings, he left the position of Piedmont undetermined. Under the arbitrary government of French Generals and administrators, its exhausted and divided condition went from bad to worse.

At Genoa, as at Milan, a provisional Government was placed under a French minister extraordinary. Modena was annexed to the Cisalpine, Francesco d'Este receiving Breisgau in exchange. The Grand Duke Ferdinand was deposed, and Tuscany was handed over as the "Kingdom of Etruria" to the Spanish Bourbon Duke of Parma. On his death, which occurred in 1803, his widow became regent.

The indomitable Queen Carolina, by inducing the Tsar Paul to intercede with Napoleon, succeeded in saving her dynasty for a time. Naples, which alone of the Italian States had remained at war after the Treaty of Lunéville, was in 1801 granted peace on condition of withdrawing its forces from Rome, closing its ports to the British, ceding certain strips of territory to France and accepting French garrisons in the Abruzzi and Calabria.

During the Austrian recovery Pius VI had died in exile and had been succeeded by Pius VII, a man of good character and kindly disposition. The imperial ambitions of Napoleon made him desirous of enlisting the very considerable moral influence and social prestige of Rome on his side. The Pope on his part saw that the Church was in danger of losing France and perhaps Italy also to the Jansenists, and was anxious to regain the recognition denied by the Revolution. Hence the French Concordat of 1801, arrived at after difficult negotiations, which left the Papacy only so much control of the Gallican Church as went with the right of investing the bishops. In return for this vestige of authority and the restoration of the cult in France, the Pope recognised the confiscation and sale of Church properties and the suppression of monasteries which had taken place. A concordat rather less unfavourable to the Church was concluded two years later with the Cisalpine, now the "Italian" Republic.

With this alliance between the Church, still in possession of the Italian principality, and a European Power which aspired to Imperial rights, ghosts of the Middle Ages began to rise from their graves. In 1802 the Consulate had been bestowed on Napoleon for life by a plébiscite. In 1804 the transformation of the Consulate into the Empire was ratified by an overwhelming popular vote; and in May 1804 Napoleon crowned himself Emperor in Notre Dame in the presence of Pope Pius VII.

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The Pope's participation in the coronation ceremony thus stultified all the historic pretensions, to which he nevertheless desperately clung. The old conflict between Empire and Papacy renewed itself inevitably on the old grounds. The Papal territory cut Italy in two and included important stretches of coast on east and west. Napoleon was more completely master of Italy than any of her previous conquerors. Frequent violations of the Papal territory became inevitable, and the Pope had to concede the right of transit, but refused to confine it to the Emperor. In the dispute between them Napoleon appealed to Charlemagne and the Pope to Constantine. But Napoleon was stronger than Frederick II, while the Papacy had been shorn of half its European authority by the Reformation. Moreover, in spite of Napoleon's snobberies, the Empire was only the Revolution in disguise.

The end came suddenly. In February 1808 General Miollis occupied Rome without opposition, whilst in the following month the Papal States were annexed to the "Kingdom of Italy" (alias Cisalpine, alias Italian Republic). The Pope meanwhile, shutting himself up in his palace on the Quirinal, maintained a passive protest. In 1809 Napoleon from Schönbrunn pronounced the doom of the Temporal Power. Rome was declared a free Imperial city, and the Pope's independence as a purely spiritual authority was assured along with possession of the palaces and an income of two million francs per annum. Pius replied in due historic form with a Bull of Excommunication against the Emperor. The Pope, removed from Rome first to Savona and later to Fontainebleau, held out obstinately against all the Emperor's efforts to induce him to repeal the excommunication and acquiesce in the abolition of the Temporal Power. Not until after Moscow did the Pope give way with the Concordat of Fontainebleau (January 1813)—which he shortly afterwards repudiated. In January 1814, when the Allies were converging on Paris, the Pope was released without conditions. In May he re-entered Rome.

In 1802 Carlo Emanuele abdicated, resigning the title of King to his brother Vittorio Emanuele I. In 1805 Genoa and Piedmont were absorbed in the "French Kingdom of Italy," which came to include practically the whole of Northern Italy.

At the end of 1801 a Congress of Delegates from the Cisalpine Republic had been summoned to Paris and had formally accepted a Constitution drawn up and imposed by the French Government. At the same time the republic was re-baptised as the "Republic of Italy." The change from Republic to

Kingdom was the natural corollary of Napoleon's assumption of Empire. In 1805 Delegates from the Republic went to Paris to lay the Iron Crown at the feet of the Emperor. He accepted the offer and was crowned with mediæval pomp at Milan in June 1805. Under Eugène Beauharnais, who was appointed Viceroy and obediently followed the directions of his stepfather, Northern Italy enjoyed the benefits of enlightened government and was consoled for the continuance of foreign domination by the increased importance which the presence of a Court conferred, the equal justice secured by the Code Napoléon, material prosperity and enlarged opportunities for education in school and university and in civil life.

Lucca, with Piombino (on the coast opposite Elba), was given as a principality to Napoleon's sister, Elise Bonaparte (married to an Italian named Bacciocchi).

The annexation of Tuscany to the Kingdom of Italy in 1808 aroused so much resentment among the inhabitants that the Grand Duchy was restored in the next year and given to Elise in addition to Lucca.

By the Treaty of Pressburg (after Austerlitz), Austria recognised the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy and ceded to it the Venetian territory including Ischia, Dalmatia, and Albania. These were ultimately (after Wagram in 1809) formed, along with the Austrian territory to the north of the Adriatic, into the Illyrian Provinces, to which the rule of Marshal Marmont, "Duke of Ragusa," brought the blessings of good government.

Out of the mainland territory of Venice Napoleon carved twelve duchies with which to reward his marshals. Benevento was made into a duchy for Talleyrand.

How completely the Emperor had displaced the Revolutionary Constructor in Napoleon in this high noon of his career is well seen in these arbitrary donations of Italian territory.

Ferdinand and Carolina had returned to Naples in 1802, where they were restrained by the presence of a French army of occupation from repeating the horrors of 1799. In 1805 Carolina's eagerness to join the Third Coalition was overborne for the moment, and in October Naples signed a treaty of neutrality. But the Queen would not be denied. In the following month the treaty was denounced, and British and Russian troops were admitted. The Queen, however, had been bold at the wrong moment. Austerlitz was fought in December; the Russian troops were recalled, and before the year ended Napoleon had pronounced from Schönbrunn that "the Bourbons of Naples have ceased to reign."

In January 1806 Ferdinand retired again to Palermo, whither the Queen shortly followed him.

In February Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples and at once under the Emperor's directions took up again the work of reform which Tannucci had been obliged to leave half done. Taxation was simplified and more equally distributed, the feudal privileges of the nobles curtailed, monasteries dissolved, roads built and schools provided. The introduction of the Code Napoléon in place of the tangle of existing codes brought justice and the belief in justice within grasp of a people demoralised by the caprices of absolutism.

But Joseph's beneficent work was hampered by the ferocious guerrilla warfare carried on against the French Government by bands of brigands supplied with money and arms and leaders by the Queen in Sicily and with military help by the British. Even Masséna failed to "pacify" Calabria completely.

Joseph was not popular, in spite of his good intentions. He was too much the tool of the Emperor, who had once brutally declared that "the peoples of the Two Sicilies belonged to him by right of conquest."

In 1808 Joseph became King of Spain and was succeeded at Naples by the handsome and vain-glorious cavalry leader (and ex-ostler) Joachim Murat. Less democratic in temper than Joseph, he repressed the democrats, withheld the promised "Constitution" and ruled despotically, relying on the feudal nobility and interrupting the education of the South in citizenship which had been happily begun. In resisting the insurgents of Calabria and the Abruzzi, in defending the country from a British attempt at invasion, and in his own counter-attack on Sicily, when the British acted as protectors of the Bourbon dynasty, his impetuous energy was seen to better advantage. He was popular with the Neapolitan crowd and, since he was known not to be on cordial terms with Napoleon, he came to be looked up to by the party of Italian independence—who during the Austrian recovery had stood in futile opposition between French and Austrians—as the hope of their cause. The "independents" of the North looked with less justification to Eugène Beauharnais, who, unlike Murat, was thoroughly loyal to his stepfather and subject to his authority. Murat had no head for politics, but even if he had been more than a "beau sabreur" the achievement of national union and independence at this juncture was even more impossible for the Italian than it was for the German States. The two great opposed forces of the Napoleonic Empire and the Allied sove-

reigns absorbed all that was vital in Europe. Italian independence would have had to be achieved with the help of one or the other. But since 1808 the rôles had been exchanged. Napoleon was the Absolutist whose portioning out of Italy among his dependents put union and independence out of the question. The Allied sovereigns waved the flag of Liberty, but Austria had borne the brunt of the fighting and would clearly insist on the restoration of the Grand Duke to Tuscany, while England had made herself the protector of the Naples Bourbons. The news of the Russian campaign put fresh heart into the friends of the old régime in Palermo, Vienna and Rome. Schemes of restoration had already been formed and there had been armed risings in the North as well as in the South. "The Catholic clubs assailed the Revolution in Napoleon, the democratic the counter-revolution of his military dictatorship; hence the necessities of combat drew the two parties together, while the rising in Spain seemed to justify so monstrous an alliance, teaching the Royalists how the Revolution might be twisted against Napoleon, and the democrats how to fight for the time being under the ill-famed banner of the old autocrats."

After Leipzig (October 1813) Napoleon's cause was hopeless. Early in 1814 Allied armies closed in on Paris from the north, while the British, victorious in Spain, were advancing from the south. On April 13, 1814 Napoleon abdicated and shortly afterwards retired to Elba.

Murat, deserting Napoleon on the return from Moscow, hastened to Italy anxious to secure his kingdom, and ambitious to absorb into it the fragments of the Napoleonic régime in Italy, whose collapse seemed imminent. Leipzig had followed in October 1813, and now Beauharnais also, forced to take thought for his own position, entertained the idea of an independent kingdom. Murat proposed that they should divide Italy between them, but Beauharnais vacillated, finding public opinion against him and still clinging to his faith in Napoleon. Murat thereupon made terms with Austria, occupying Rome and the Marches, Austrian armies entered Italy, and Lord William Bentinck landed at Leghorn, aiming at Genoa. The kingdom was threatened on all sides, and Beauharnais came to terms, stipulating that the kingdom should be allowed to stand until the Allies in Paris should have heard the Italian delegates and come to a decision as to its future. The French troops were to be sent back to France. Then it appeared that the Tsar Alexander was for letting Beauharnais retain the kingdom, and the question was reopened.

Italian opinion was divided, but finally it was determined in an unrepresentative assembly of citizens to declare the throne vacant and send commissioners to beg the Allies to respect the independence of the kingdom and to place it under the constitutional rule of an Austrian prince. The Austrian command temporised, but meanwhile it proceeded to reduce Lombardy and Venetia into Austrian provinces, and the *fait accompli* was accepted by the Congress of Vienna. Genoa was united, very much against its will, to Piedmont, where Vittorio Emanuele was restored. Francesco d'Este, kinsman of the Austrian Emperor, returned to Modena, Ferdinand III to Tuscany. Lucca was given to the Bourbon princess who had for a time been Queen and then Regent of the Kingdom of Etruria. Parma went to Napoleon's wife, Marie Louise of Austria, for her life. Pius VII recovered Rome and the Papal State.

The fate of Naples remained doubtful by reason of the jealousies which divided the Allies. Italy was filled with plots and counter-plots. Austria was for restoring the Bourbons; Russia supported Murat. In March 1815, after Napoleon's escape from Elba, Murat, protesting to the Allies and calling upon the Italians in a manifesto to assert their independence, continued his advance northwards. Recalled to defend Naples against the menace of the British, he was pursued and harried by the Austrians. Finally, before the threat of the British Commodore to bombard Naples, he gave way and went into exile in Corsica (May 1815), while the Austrians brought back the Bourbons. Then, after Waterloo, attempting, perhaps in imitation of Napoleon, to raise the kingdom against the restored Bourbons, he landed with a handful of men in Calabria, was taken prisoner, and was shot by Ferdinand's order.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS THE RISORGIMENTO, 1815-1848

THE work of the Congress of Vienna and the "Holy Alliance" was an attempt to arrest irresistible forces. The history of the next few decades is the history of its failure. The principle of the "sovereignty of the people" had been affirmed once for all in the French Revolution. Nationalism had sprung into life as a reaction against the Imperialism of Napoleon. The two conceptions are the master-forces of the nineteenth century.

Napoleon had enabled the absolute monarchies to exploit nationalist sentiment in their own interest. With the downfall of the Conqueror, the conception of nationality expanded and allied itself with that of popular sovereignty.

The Restoration of 1815 gave a direct denial to the latter principle and only recognised the nation in the person of the monarch. For the moment the military strength of the monarchies and the exhaustion and mental confusion of the peoples made it possible for the "Powers," headed by Austria, with Metternich as grand policeman, to hold back the course of history. But the tide was rising, each wave a little higher than the last, until with 1848 the whole antiquated structure finally crumbled.

The first wave culminated about 1820 with revolts or national uprisings in Spain and Greece and ineffective insurrections in Italy.

The French "July" Revolution of 1830 was followed by the insurrections of Belgium, successfully demanding national independence, by movements in Germany, and the revolt of the Papal States in Italy.

In 1848 the February Revolution restored for a time the Republic in France; in Germany revolution was general; in Hungary Kossuth headed a Liberal and Nationalist revolt; in Vienna itself the old régime had to surrender, and Metternich retired to Brighton; in Italy Sicily rose, the Austrian garrison was driven from Milan; in Venice the Republic was restored;

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constitutions were proclaimed in Sicily, Piedmont, Tuscany and Rome; the army of Piedmont invaded Lombardy, only to be defeated at Custoza; the Pope had to flee from Rome and take refuge in Naples.

Torpor

The restoration of 1815 gave to Austria an almost complete control of Italy.

Lombardy and Venetia were under her direct rule, members of the Habsburg family ruled in Tuscany, Modena and Parma, while the nominally independent dynasties of Piedmont and Naples were more afraid of the revolution than of Austrian domination, relied upon Austrian support and obsequiously courted the approval of Metternich. The Papacy and the Jesuits were the most zealous allies of Reaction.

Austria's policy in Austrian Italy was one of the velvet glove. Liberals and demagogues were carefully removed or suppressed through the agency of spies and police, who were unhampered by any excessive respect for the law and whose activities avoided publicity. At the same time the aristocracy and the masses were kept in their places, while the bourgeoisie was contented by a fairly intelligent and mild administration. Officials were polite, the military considerate, and conscription was practically abolished. The Italians were Germanised, no account being taken of national peculiarities or traditions. Not until her Italian subjects rebelled against this treatment did Austria's capacity for cruelty reveal itself.

But the restored princes, being less confident of their power to maintain themselves, were more violent in their resistance to innovators, and on several occasions had to be admonished by Austria to be less provocative.

Vittorio Emanuele in Piedmont proceeded to remove all traces of French rule—Code Napoléon, army organisation, administrative machinery—and to put things back as they had been in 1790. He even dismissed those who had been employed as officials in the French services. Ex-officers of the Napoleonic army were degraded in rank. The privileges of the nobles were restored with all attendant evils of corruption and perversion of justice. The privileges of the Church and of the Jesuits were not only restored but increased, and to them was given absolute control of all educational and charitable institutions. Here as elsewhere the Ministry of Police was the most important department of Government and superior to the law. The only ground of sympathy

between the King and the more intelligent of his subjects was his resentment of Austrian domination. But his wife was an Austrian princess, and his anti-Austrian feeling was kept within strict limits by his greater hatred of anything that savoured of French Revolution or tended to limit his absolutism.

In Naples the reaction was less systematic than in Piedmont but no less repressive. The royal Government was even more dependent on Austria. If Sardinia was actively retrogressive, Naples was decadent and senile.

In Modena, Francesco d'Este displayed the unscrupulousness of a mediæval despot and the ingenuity of a Jesuit in the persecution of Liberals and futile schemes of self-aggrandisement.

In Parma, Marie Louise, more interested in philandering than in politics, left the government of her duchy to Austrian officials.

In Tuscany the reactionary régime appeared in its mildest and least aggressive form. Ferdinand II, resisting Austrian pressure, gave an asylum to the proscribed from other States. But here, as elsewhere, the old régime of privilege was restored and political life stagnated.

The Papal States were characterised by a peculiarly odious form of inquisitorial priestly government, as reactionary as that of Piedmont and even more corrupt and senseless than that of Naples. The Pope became a petty prince dependent on Austria. The Church, weakened, impoverished and shorn of many of its immunities in spite of concordats, had recourse to shifty diplomacy and to the services of the Jesuits, everywhere invaluable agents of reaction. The population of the Papal State was bled to make up for the failing revenues.

The fermentation set up by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation of Italy might for the time be driven below the surface but could not be stopped. Association with the French soldiery in Italy and service with the Napoleonic armies had diffused French ideas and knowledge of what had been done in France, shaking the Italian mind out of its long torpor and its habit of accepting subjection as inevitable. The middle-class had learnt to value intelligent legislation and had obtained a certain training in affairs. Schools had been multiplied and improved, and the military service imposed by the French had given much-needed discipline. Finally, the national idea had been born; while the arbitrary rearrangements of territory and the goings and comings of armies had deprived the old frontiers and the old dynastic régimes of the sanctity of permanence.

Forces were at work in all classes of society which could not be reconciled with the return to mediævalism. But they were embryonic and confused. Parties had been disorientated by Napoleon's Imperialism. Democrats and *Carbonari* had taken the side of the autocratic Bourbons; the party of Independence had fought for Murat. Reactionaries had preached Nationalism.

If Italy was thirty years behind Spain in achieving her revolution, the fact is easily explained by the peculiar complications and difficulties of her problem.

Her territory was broken up into eight (or, if we count the little Republic of San Marino, nine) independent States, divided by customs-barriers and difficult conditions of travel. Her people were ignorant, the peasantry stupidly, the aristocracy bigotedly Catholic, and both (at any rate in Piedmont, Naples and Tuscany) from habit or interest or in reaction against foreign domination, loyal to the restored dynasties. It was only the middle-class and the more intelligent of the aristocracy on which modern ideas could take hold. The rulers of the eight States were only united in resistance to innovation. The one sentiment which could have overcome dynastic and regional jealousies and united the States for common action would have been resentment of Austrian domination. But to revolt against Austria would involve for the princes the arming of their subjects against themselves and against the power on whom they relied to keep them on their thrones.

Hatred of Austria was strong in the peoples, but Popular Sovereignty in the form of a democratic Constitution, though it might be wrested from an unwilling monarch in individual States, could not be permanently maintained against Austrian intervention and royal perfidy.

Thus neither national unification nor sovereignty of the people was possible under the existing régime, while, without the former, revolt against Austria had little chance of success. Even if unification were feasible, what form was it to take—a single Kingdom, a Confederation of Kingdoms or a Confederation of Republics? In presence of so vast and complicated a problem, it is not surprising if the best informed were the least sanguine, if opinions and feelings were divided and success slow in coming.

And even to the most enlightened Italians in the early years of the Restoration the problem did not present itself thus clearly. It required the education of experience to show them what aims were essential and by what methods they could be

achieved—that no reforms imposed from above, nothing short of representative institutions, could restore life to the people; that without national unity, Italy would always be at the mercy of some European Power; that it was vain to trust in the dynasties or in the Pope.

Again, before the work could even be begun, the mass of the people had first to be interested and then instructed. In 1815 they were indifferent and merely glad to be rid of the burden of a foreign military occupation, tired of the confusion and the endless discussion of ideas which they did not understand. They welcomed the return of the old autocrats. The aristocrats everywhere rallied round the throne as the source of privilege and power. Of the Liberals many were moderates and hoped to obtain Constitutional Government as a gift from the Crown. Regionalism was almost as strong as ever, Palermo hated Naples, Genoa hated Piedmont. The patriots of Italy were few. There were much discontent and much aspiration, but little revolutionary purpose.

Accordingly during the first twenty years only scattered and ineffective revolts witness to the reawakening of Italy.

Attempts at Revolution.

The secret society of the *Carbonari* had originally been a religious-political sect representing Christ as the arch-republican and arch-victim of tyranny. But in the confusion of the times its principles seem to have suffered adulteration. They had opposed Joseph Bonaparte and supported the Bourbons against Murat. After the Restoration the society, with cosmopolitan connections and vague Liberal ideals, made a rallying-point for all who were discontented or aggrieved, while the glamour of its secret ritual attracted romantic youth. The society had its lodges in all parts of Italy and was the inspirer of all the risings and partial revolutions of the twenties and thirties. Its headquarters were in the Southern Kingdom, and here the first rising of any importance took place in July 1820—an echo of the Spanish Revolution which had occurred in March of the same year. The Carbonari were numerous in the army, and the mutiny of a squadron of cavalry gave the signal for a general rising demanding the Spanish Constitution of 1812.¹

¹ Drafted at Cadiz in 1812 after the expulsion of Joseph Bonaparte. It "vested sovereignty in the nation," provided for a single-chamber parliament (the Cortes), placed the executive power in the hands of the King's ministers, suppressed the Inquisition, but maintained Roman Catholicism as the religion of the S. +

The large force so formed was skilfully led by General Guglielmo Pepe, who was in the confidence of the Government and held the chief command of the territorial militia. The King, sheltering himself behind the promise he had given Austria to make no concessions to Liberalism not granted in Austrian Italy, at first refused the demand for a Constitution ; but when the insurgent forces advanced on Naples flying the Italian tricolour,¹ he gave way, granted the Constitution and swore solemnly to abide by it. But Austria had still to be reckoned with. In October, while the new Constituent Assembly was meeting in Naples, the Powers, alarmed by recent events in Spain and Italy, met at Troppau to devise means for extinguishing the threatened conflagration. Austria desired a mandate to intervene, but the Western Powers were sufficiently imbued with Liberalism or jealous of Austria to discountenance the principle of intervention. The conference adjourned to Laibach in December, and thither Ferdinand got himself invited. He had been allowed to leave Naples on the strength of a solemn promise to defend the Constitution, but at Laibach he represented himself as the victim of popular violence and invited the intervention of the Powers.

Having overcome the not very whole-hearted resistance of France and Great Britain, Austria despatched an army to Naples. The new Parliament protested. The insurgents with Pepe at their head determined on resistance. Defeated at Rieti (March 7, 1821), and forced to retire behind the frontier, the army melted away. The Constitution was withdrawn and the King reinstated in his autocracy. Executions and banishments followed. Presently Ferdinand disbanded his army and entrusted the defence of the throne to four regiments of Swiss mercenaries and 35,000 Austrians.

In Sicily meanwhile the news of the rising on the mainland had produced a similar demand for a Constitution and for separation from Naples. After much street-fighting, destruction of property and bloodshed, the negotiations opened with the Neapolitan Government were frustrated by the mutual hatred of Palermo and Naples and the lack of concord between the capital and the other cities of Sicily. At the end of four months the insurrection was with difficulty suppressed by the troops of the Neapolitan Constitutional Government, and Sicily was forced to remain in the union with Naples and to

¹ Red, white and green. The colours were first used by the Bolognese on occasion of the revolt against the Papal Government in 1794 and given to the Italian army as their flag by Napoleon.

accept the Neapolitan Constitution. Punishment of insurgents and a partial Austrian occupation completed the triumph of reaction.

So ended the first attempt at revolution in Italy.

Beginning with pretensions to a national character, the movement had in fact been confined to the one kingdom, and within the kingdom it had squandered its forces in an intestinal quarrel instead of reserving them for resistance to Austria. Its foolish trust in the King's good faith and the King's influence had apparently blinded it to the necessity for assembling a force capable of resisting the power of Austria, such as could only have been obtained by a concerted rising in all the Italian States.

The rising in Piedmont followed that of Naples too closely to profit by the object-lesson, and repeated all its mistakes. No attempt was made to secure the co-operation of other States, and when the revolutionaries or Liberals (for their demands seem moderate enough to-day) offered to follow if Piedmont would lead, there were delay and hesitation. When the rising came, it was half-hearted and was suppressed almost before it had begun. The futility of the proceedings is accounted for mainly by the immature state of the public mind and the failure even of the leaders to understand that a Constitution could only be obtained by force, and that no single Italian State was a match for Austria. Like the Neapolitans, they hoped to get the King on their side, though it should have been clear enough that Vittorio Emanuele would sooner call in the Austrians whom he hated than abandon any fraction of his absolute power. The part played by Carlo Alberto, the heir-apparent, who sprang from a lateral branch of the House of Savoy, was contemptible, but the blame of failure cannot be laid wholly at his door. He had received a democratic education in Geneva, had served in Napoleon's army and was known as a Progressive. He was for that reason very unpopular at Court, and attempts had been made at the Queen's instance to get the succession altered in favour of the Duchess of Modena, Vittorio Emanuele's only child. He was taken into confidence by the conspirators a month before the outbreak. In some of the proclamations there is talk of making Vittorio Emanuele "King of Italy" and reference to a "National Parliament"; but in fact the objects of the conspiracy were limited to the obtaining of a Constitution and the expulsion of the Germans.

Having the greater part of the army with them the leaders,

encouraged by the apparent sympathy of the Prince of Carignano, hoped to carry the King with them. If the army took the decision into its own hands and demanded war with Austria, they imagined that the King's hatred of the Germans and desire to be independent might outbalance his strong dislike to constitutional government. But they made the fatal mistake of relying upon the Prince of Carignano to take the lead and of waiting upon his decision. The Prince was a man of divided mind. His Liberalism had penetrated only so far as his brain, while his subconscious nature was wholly possessed by loyalty to the family tradition in which the absolute sovereignty of the monarch was religious dogma.

The conspirators were probably mistaken in their hopes of the King—even without the vacillation and treachery of the Crown Prince.

The end of the matter was that, after uncertainties and postponements, the rising took place piecemeal, Alessandria leading and Turin and other military centres following. The King, averse from bloodshed or doubtful of the army's loyalty, made no resistance, but, refusing to grant the Constitution and too honest to follow the example of Ferdinand, abdicated. Carlo Alberto was to be Regent in the absence of the new King, Carlo Felice, Vittorio Emanuele's brother. Carlo Alberto reluctantly and equivocally consented to the proclamation of the Spanish Constitution "pending the orders of the new King," who presently from Modena proclaimed his intention to treat as rebels all adherents of the Constitution. The Austrians meanwhile were making effective preparations to support Carlo Felice, while the army of Piedmont was in no position to resist them, much less to undertake the contemplated conquest of Lombardy. Carlo Alberto, ordered on the one hand by the new King to go to Novara and there surrender his authority, on the other called upon by the insurgents to head their movement, evaded a choice by seeking refuge with the Austrians in Milan. Santarosa, one of the leaders whom the Regent had meanwhile appointed Minister of War, heroically decided to go forward nevertheless, issued a proclamation calling on the Piedmontese to join the movement and prepared to fight. But the army was divided in sentiment, the regiments which supported the revolution were scattered in different centres, the Lombards failed to rise, while the Austrians were already advancing. At Novara an encounter took place, and the revolution was at an end. There was the usual epilogue—return to absolutism, with police and clergy as its chief sup-

ports and with the Austrians in occupation of Alessandria, and death or perpetual imprisonment for the insurgent leaders.

Profound discouragement followed the failures of revolution in Naples and Piedmont, and it was not until in France the conflict between Royalists and Liberals opened the prospect of a restoration of the Republic that revolution again raised its head. The "Three Days" Revolution of July 1830 in Paris, which put an end to divine-right monarchy in France, was the signal for risings in Belgium, in Poland and in Italy. In Belgium, thanks to its contiguity to France and England, the Revolution was successful; in Poland, wedged between Russia, Prussia and Austria, it was from the beginning hopeless; in Italy, isolated by the Austrian block, it was merely another proof of the futility of regional revolts. In Piedmont and Naples the reaction was firmly established. Carlo Felice was entirely submissive to Austria. Until 1827 an Austrian army defended the throne of Ferdinand and of his successor Francis I (1825-30). From neither of the two kingdoms which should have been the champions of Italian independence was anything to be hoped. Central Italy had yet to make its experience.

The Clerical Government of the Papal States under the reactionary Popes Leo XII (1823-29) and Gregory XVI (1831-46) was antiquated, oppressive and vexatious. The fierce repression of Liberal opinion had produced a strong growth of Carbonarism. Fights between Carbonari and *Sanfedisti*—irregular bands of Papalists to whom the Government allowed a free hand—a survival of the anti-republican war in Naples—were as frequent and as fierce as the modern conflicts between *Fascisti* and Socialists. The encouragement given by events in France kindled the revolt. It began in Bologna where the Carbonari were particularly strong, and quickly spread, until all the cities of Romagna, the Marches of Ancona and Umbria, were in revolt. Modena was freed by the flight of its Duke. Parma joined the revolt, the Duchess retiring to Piacenza, which out of rivalry with Parma remained loyal. Altogether some two and a half million citizens were involved. The Revolution differed from those of Naples and Piedmont in that it did not begin in the army, but was of a distinctly civil character. A Provisional Government was established in Bologna. A Constitution was drawn up for the revolted provinces, which were to be known as the United Italian Provinces. At its head was a legal pedant with no grasp of politics. Like the similar Governments established in Parma and Modena, it trusted

implicitly in Louis Philippe's championship of the principle of non-intervention and made no adequate preparation for defence. Hence when it proved that Louis Philippe was not prepared to go to extremes and Austrian troops appeared on the scene, there was no common resistance, and the Revolution ended as those of Naples and Piedmont had ended, in ludicrous failure and capitulation.

Repressions and reprisals followed of so cruel a character as to bring upon the Papacy an admonition from the European Powers in the form of a Memorandum, which the jealousy of France and Austria enabled the Pope to ignore. Austria having occupied Ferrara, the French proceeded to land troops at Ancona. But the expected collision did not occur, and the occupations were maintained until 1837. The rising gave evidence of widespread discontent but not of any advance in political education. It had a certain value as one more demonstration of the futility of regional action, and it is memorable as the first movement in which the influence of Mazzini made itself felt. It is interesting to note that Louis Napoleon, afterwards the champion of the Papacy against Garibaldi, served with the revolutionary forces.

Mazzini's Gospel

The failure of the Revolution in the Papal State made the triumph of Austria and reaction complete in Italy. Repeated failure brought discredit on Carbonarism and emphasised the need for a more positive programme and a gospel capable of inspiring the new generation. The gospel and the programme were supplied by Giuseppe Mazzini.

Born in Genoa in 1805, the events of 1821 had occurred at a time when, as a young and highly intelligent student, he was most open to impressions. At twenty-three he founded a literary journal at Genoa, and, when that was suppressed at the end of a year, another at Livorno, in which, along with literary criticism, he expressed very definite and advanced political views. At the time of the 1830 Revolution he was imprisoned on a charge of Carbonarism and presently went into exile full of hopes for the Central Italian Revolution and of faith in French sympathy. He settled in Marseille, and the accounts which reached him there of the relapse of the country under a tyranny stronger and more crushing than ever fired him with the passion to achieve the liberation of Italy and drew from him the famous letter which, in the words of an

Italian historian, "descended like a flash of lightning upon the heavy atmosphere of Italian life, clearing the air and revealing a precise idea for its future." It was addressed to Carlo Alberto, who became King on the death of Carlo Felice in April 1831. Hopes were still centred on him in spite of past experience, and Mazzini only gave voice to the general thought of the Progressives in appealing to him to become the liberator of Italy. The letter contained a threat as well as a promise. Either the King will purchase for himself immortal fame as "the champion of the rights of the People, the regenerator of Italy," or he will be rejected by the People and his place will be with them who have made "*per viltate il gran rifiuto*." Carlo Alberto, in whom religious fanaticism and family pride were still uppermost, was deaf to the appeal and persevered in the reactionary policy and the subserviency to Austria of his uncle. Mazzini, provided with companions and disciples in exile by the persecutions of Gregory XVI and Francesco of Modena, founded the society—*La Giovane Italia*—which was to gather into itself as into a school of the prophets all the awakened youth of Italy, and the journal of like name which was to be the vehicle of the new doctrines.

Mazzini's position as an exile was no disadvantage. Not only did it make him conspicuous as one of the martyrs of the new patriotism, but it brought him into contact with exiles from all parts of Italy and other nationalities and enabled him to view objectively the disturbing actualities of life in Italy. This was the great merit of his "*Idea*"—that it definitely broke with the past, shook itself free of all the historical *impedimenta* by which the political consciousness of Italy was hypnotised—the Roman Imperial and the Roman ecclesiastical tradition of a unity made impossible by the birth of national States; the Italian federal tradition of the Middle Age and Renaissance; the historic divisions, racial differences and economic jealousies crystallised in the actual condition of the country; that it turned its face resolutely to the future, and looked forward to an Italy united as a single nation which should realise in independence the Sovereignty of the People. Mazzini's idea was to be entrusted to the young men of Italy, in whom his enthusiasm saw the children of the French Revolution, the crusaders of its principles. The past was for them a closed book. The new Italy would exist in and for the French Revolution, or would not exist at all. It would be Republican, since the Republic was the logical expression of the Sovereignty of the People.

It would also be religious. The idea of God as operating in the individual and in society lies at the very base of Mazzini's philosophy. *Dio ed il Popolo* was the motto of his *Giovane Italia*. The French Revolution had failed in his view for lack of religion. The atheistic materialism of Socialism, when it appeared upon the scene, was horrible to him. Thus his propaganda has the aspect of a religious mission. Nor was its gospel any narrow Nationalism. He desired to see his country free and prosperous, not in order that Italy might compete successfully with the great nations, but that, herself regenerated by a religious ideal, she might lead the way to a new, enlightened and democratic Christendom, substituting a holy alliance of peoples for the Holy Alliance of tyrants. Accordingly his *Giovane Italia* had its affiliations in other lands and tended to become a *Giovane Europa*. The very loftiness of this gospel and the unlimited demand for self-sacrificing heroism which it made upon disciples appealed with extraordinary force to a generation fed upon the literature of Romanticism. It provided first the impulse needed to raise the youth of Italy from the depression of repeated failures, uniting them in support of an ideal which, if it soared above actualities, was devoid of mediævalism and in harmony with the Spirit of the Age. Without the education of *La Giovane Italia* the resurrection of Italy would have been impossible, and it is no disparagement of Mazzini to admit that this education, and not the practical work of construction, was his contribution to the creation of the "Third Italy." Not only his doctrinaire Republicanism but his very virtues made him unfit for practical politics.

The Romantic and other Movements

By 1833 the hope of achieving independence with the aid of the princes had been extinguished. If Italy was to be freed, it must be by the effort of the people themselves. But the movement was only alive in the well-to-do and educated classes, while the poor remained indifferent and ignorant. Success in Mazzini's sense could only come when the passion for liberty was felt by all classes. Meanwhile, if only to keep alive the spirit of his followers and to satisfy their ardour, some action had to be permitted, and action now could only take the form of scattered and experimental risings—desperate defiances of the autocracies. Such were the Piedmontese Conspiracy of 1833, the "Expedition of Savoy" of 1833-34, and the adven-

ture of the Brothers Bandiera in 1844. The plot of 1833—a repetition of the drama of 1821 with the royal personages left out of the cast—was detected, and the savage revenge taken by Carlo Alberto gave “Young Italy” its baptism of blood. The invasion of Savoy by a body of some 700 exiles under the command of a quite untrustworthy ex-officer of Napoleon’s army was a ridiculous fiasco made memorable by the first public appearance of Garibaldi. The Bandiera enterprise, though equally foolhardy and disapproved by Mazzini, set a fine example of devotion in a hopeless cause. In 1834 Mazzini, hounded out of continental Europe, and renouncing the propaganda of arms, took refuge in London and thence carried on the work of “Young Italy.”

Meanwhile the excesses of reaction had brought recruits to the ranks of the Liberals from the aristocracy and the official classes. Towards 1840 a counterpoise to the uncompromising democracy of *La Giovane Italia* arose in the form of a party of Moderate Liberals who, while desiring national regeneration and independence, were repelled by the Republican and conspiratorial methods of Mazzini’s propaganda. Overawed by the overwhelming strength of Austria, in whose championship of reaction even France now acquiesced, many of them despaired of direct resistance and relied upon diplomatic combinations for the eventual emancipation of Italy. Impressed with the backwardness of the Italian populace, they had no faith in and no liking for the Sovereignty of the People, and clung to the old loyalties. The Nationalists or Albertists of Piedmont pinned their hopes to the dynasty of Savoy. In this sense Cesare Balbo, whose father Prospero had, as Minister of Vittorio Emanuele, endeavoured to introduce enlightened reforms, wrote his *Speranze d’Italia* (*Hopes of Italy*) and Massimo D’Azeglio, afterwards Prime Minister, his *Casi di Romagna* (*Recent Events in Romagna*).

The Romantic movement, reviving religious sentiment, encouraged the tendency to look to Rome as the historic centre of Italian unity; and one section of the Liberals dreamed of leading Italy back into the fold of the Church and of a federal union of kingdoms under the presidency of the Pope. This idea was elaborated by Gioberti in his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* (1842), a work which, prohibited in all the Italian States except Piedmont, was widely circulated and made a deep impression. “The purpose of the book,” says Minghetti, “was to prove that Italy, although it had lost all political value for the outside world, contained all the conditions of

moral and political revival, and that to effect this change there was no need of revolutions, invasions or imitations of the foreigner, since political revival is limited to three heads—unity, independence and liberty—the first two of which might be attained by a confederation of the various States under the presidency of the Pope, and the last by means of internal reforms in each State, effected by their respective princes without danger or diminution of their real power.” This plan of reconciling liberty with autocracy by graduated reforms, an idea encouraged by the Napoleonic precedent of modernising and enlightened Imperialism, was characteristic of the Liberal party.

Only by keeping in mind the hopelessness of the political outlook in Italy, the hold which the Church still kept on all classes and the deadening effect of long subjection, is it possible to understand how such works as Gioberti's, so fanciful and so utterly unconscious of the gulf created between past and present by the Reformation and the Revolution, could have excited enthusiasm or affected opinion. Still more strange does it seem that they should have been prohibited as dangerous to the established order. Yet so it was, and the fact throws light on the state of the Italian mind in the forties.

The poetry also of youthful enthusiasts and ardent patriots, such as Rossetti, Berchet, Belli, fed the flames. The music of Bellini, Rossini and Verdi contributed their quota, and not least the stirring ode “*Fratelli d'Italia*” by the poet-soldier Goffredo Mameli, sung to this day on every patriotic occasion :

“ Oh, brothers, your Italy
Wakes from her sleep.”

Nor must the immense activity of the secret societies be forgotten, above all the “*Carbonari*,” or the magic of Mazzini's name and influence, he who had taught that Italy could only be free and independent if united. Each and all conduced to render popular the conception of an Italy such as Dante and Machiavelli had dreamed, a regenerate Italy under a single head. In short, it was a spring-time of intellectual and emotional energy.

A delusive appearance of feasibility was given to Gioberti's dreams by the accession of Pio Nono to the Papacy in 1846. Eloquent but of no great intellectual force, pleasant-mannered, vain and fond of popularity, he was the victim of the reputation he had acquired for Liberalism. He is said to have been influenced by the works of Gioberti and d'Azeglio, but was not

really prepared to go even so far as those very moderate Reformers. However, the path of Reform was a moving platform. Having once stepped on to it he was carried along automatically. His first act—an amnesty to political prisoners—made Metternich uneasy. It was followed by the appointment of a Council of State to which laymen were made eligible, and which was presided over by a Liberal Minister. Thereupon Austria placed a garrison in Ferrara (August 1847) and succeeded in getting Guizot, the reactionary French President, to warn the Pope to be careful. His refusal to be intimidated—expressed in the creation of a Civic Guard, the grant of a municipal Government and revision of the Codes—made him the figurehead of an anti-Austrian Press campaign, while the towns offered to provide men and money if he would head a general movement of Liberalism.

The Papal example and the delirious enthusiasm called forth by it acted as cover for Liberal demonstrations in other States and immensely strengthened the pressure on the princes. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had to relax the Press Law, to promise an enlarged Council of State and freer municipal institutions, and to allow the enrolment of National Guards. The unmuzzling of the Press and the arming of the citizens in Rome and Tuscany were important steps on the road to freedom. In Piedmont Carlo Alberto, his ambition kindled by the suggestion of the Nationalists, whose eyes were fixed on Piedmont as the only power capable of organising a war of independence, hesitated, dismissed his reactionary Minister, and was drawn into the current of Reform—conceded the principle of popular election in the Communes, limited the power of the police and relaxed the Press Law. In the Customs Union established in November 1847 between the Papal State, Tuscany and Piedmont the "Neo-Guelphs" saw the first step towards that Federation of Italian States under the Pope in which their oracle, Gioberti, had taught them to believe.

With success, the spirit of the Progressives rose throughout Italy. The Pope, who already showed signs of wishing to draw back, was the slave of his own popularity. Liberal reforms led inevitably to the concession of a democratic Constitution.

CHAPTER VII

THE RISORGIMENTO

The Year of Revolution

. . . OÙ anno de' portenti,
Oh primavera della patria . . .

sings Carducci in his poem "Piedmonte." It was indeed a year that convulsed Europe. Though 1847 closed outwardly calm, nevertheless the political atmosphere was charged with revolutionary electricity. Events followed one another with incredible rapidity, uniting the most varied factions under the same banner. The preceding years helped to co-ordinate the living forces of the land. As we have seen, a wealth of literature had issued from the Press, comprising historical essays, novels and poems, whose aim was to awaken the self-consciousness of the nation that had fallen into a state of hopeless apathy, owing to the long years of foreign domination and oppression to which it had been subjected. Besides the authors already mentioned, we may refer to Manzoni, Capponi, Cantù, Niccolini, to name but a few of the most prominent. Treatises on social science, on methods of government, abounded. Many of these sought to harmonise revolutionary theories with existing facts.

The first shock of the political earthquake came from the volcanic soil of Sicily, and the "city of the Vespers lit the torch that set Europe on fire." At the beginning of 1848 Italy was divided into two parties proceeding along different paths: those hoping to achieve reforms by legal agitations, and those who recognised that only by revolutionary methods could they shake off the yoke of their Austrian and reactionary oppressors. The 3rd of January of '48 witnessed a sanguinary tumult in Milan provoked by a *mot d'ordre* issued by the Liberals begging everyone to abstain from smoking, tobacco being an Austrian monopoly: a self-denying order faithfully carried out in the face of terrible provocations on the part of the Austrians. On the 12th, the birthday of the King of the Two Sicilies, a serious

insurrection broke out in Palermo. The barracks were occupied by the infuriated populace, who had too long endured the malgovernment of the Bourbons, stigmatised by Gladstone as "the negation of God." The rest of the island followed suit, until they had confined the Bourbons in the citadel of Messina and forced Ferdinand to grant a constitution with representative members, freedom of the Press, and other Liberal measures—a constitution he never, of course, meant to observe. For after a severe struggle the islanders were again subjugated in the spring of 1849.

While the Sicilian events were at their height Naples also revolted, and Ferdinand in vain invoked the mediation of the English to bring his rebellious subjects to heel. A petition for the concession of a constitution, drawn up by Ruggero Bonghi and Pasquale Villari, two men who were later to render eminent services to science and politics, was subscribed to by all the citizens. A Constitution was hastily drawn up, modelled on that accorded to the French by Louis Philippe. Ferdinand swore with his lips to respect it. This was in February. Not many days later the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the King of Sardinia each promulgated a charter, given in the case of Carlo Alberto of Sardinia after sleepless nights and much searching of heart, for he was a Hamlet, vacillating in his decisions, and had indeed been dubbed King Waverer (*Il Re Tentenna*) by a young Piedmontese poet. But he himself declared he was always between "the dagger of the Carbonari and the chocolate of the Jesuits." In the Lombardo-Venetian provinces it was soon recognised, despite the studiously moderate demands of the popular leaders, that no liberty could ever be attained under the oppressive and harsh Austrian rule. An historic conflict took place in Milan. Thousands of barricades sprang up like mushrooms overnight in every thoroughfare. Every arm, however old, served as a weapon. For five days the struggle raged. Every street had its heroic episode. The fighting was prolonged and desperate, but at last the Tricolour of Italy floated from the highest spire of Milan Cathedral, and the citizens had expelled an army of 14,000 well-armed and disciplined troops. This rising became famous as the "*Cinque Giornate*," and caused the poet Manzoni to add a final strophe to his "*Ode, Marzo, 1821*," in which he sang "the day of Italia's glory."

The rest of Lombardy followed this example. The Austrian troops had to fall back upon the fortifications known as the Quadrilateral, i.e. the fortifications of Mantua, Peschiera,

Verona and Legnago, which covered the approaches to the Brenner Pass. Nor was Venice slow to copy Milan's example. On March 22 the fall of the Austrian dominion and the constitution of a Venetian Republic was proclaimed on the Piazza S. Marco and the presidency entrusted to Daniele Manin, a Jewish lawyer, who had a rare power of inspiring confidence, aided by the Dalmatian scholar, Niccolò Tommaseo.

Nor had Rome remained unaffected. The State was suffering keenly from the delusion provoked by Pius IX, who seemed about to realise Gioberti's ideal of a Pope—regenerator of Italy—on his nomination to the Holy See in 1848. Masses for the souls of the Milanese victims furnished the pretext for inveighing against Austria. The Pope was forced to form a lay ministry and to grant a constitution. In that same fateful month of March the small State of Lucca rid herself of her dissolute Bourbon Prince, Carlo Ludovico, who had been in his turn ruled by an English jockey. The rest of the small States also cast off their rulers, even Tuscany, where the dynasty, though Austrian, had ruled without ferocity and without scandal, and where their expulsion was conducted with a good-humoured courtesy.

In the districts known for so long as "unredeemed Italy" enthusiasts were found for the national cause and demanded to be united with the motherland.

Such, succinctly, were the conditions of the Peninsula when Carlo Alberto of Sardinia descended into the lists against her who has ever been "the eternal and implacable enemy" of Italy, and inaugurated what has been justly called "Italy's heroic age"—dating from 1848 to 1870.

The Fight for Freedom

The political conditions of Europe were so feverishly disturbed that to attack Austria seemed inevitable and imperative to Cesare Balbo, when in February 1848 he was nominated President of the first constitutional ministry of Piedmont. But in view of the fact that the Piedmontese forces were small and ill-organised, while the Austrians were strong and backed by powerful fortresses, he wished to delay the struggle until the army could be put into a condition of efficiency. But events were too many and too strong for him and would not accord this respite, much needed as it was. The people of the small State clamoured for immediate war when they heard of the Milanese uprising, of the formation of volunteer corps

throughout the Peninsula, of the pressure exercised by the populations of Naples, Rome and Florence to force their Governments to take the field. When the news was confirmed that Milan had shaken off the hated yoke, that volunteers from every part of Italy were marching towards the heroic city, the Lombard emigrants augmented their pressure upon the Piedmontese King, telling him how Milan looked for the advent of the Sardinian forces to aid them in further resistance. Hence it was no longer possible to procrastinate. At midnight on March 22 Carlo Alberto formally declared war on Austria from the balcony of his Turin palace, waving the Tricolour before a wildly excited multitude who acclaimed him as the liberator of Italy. A few hours after, the following proclamation was posted in all the streets of Turin :

“Peoples of Lombardy and Venetia ! The destiny of Italy is ripening. Happier times smile for the bold defenders of violated rights. For love of our race, seeing the conditions of the hour, by unanimity of votes, WE associate ourselves with the admiration that Italy accords to you. Peoples of Lombardy and Venetia ! OUR troops, which were already concentrated upon OUR frontiers when you anticipated the glorious liberation of Milan, are now coming to extend to your final efforts that aid which a brother expects from a brother, a friend from a friend. WE second your just desires, confiding in the help of God, Who visibly is on our side in that He has given Pius IX to Italy, in that God Who so marvellously placed Italy in a position to provide for herself [*in grado da fare da se*]. And in order yet better to show by external signs that Italy is united in sentiment, WE will that our troops on entering the territory of Lombardy and Venetia shall bear the escutcheon of OUR house of Savoy impressed upon the Italian flag.

“TURIN, March 23, 1848.”

Such was the origin of the famous and constantly-repeated phrase “*L'Italia farà da se !*”

This proclamation aroused intense enthusiasm at first, but after a while discouragement set in when it was realised that it contained an implicit admission that Piedmont could count on no allies, and that the condition of the other Italian States was not such as to enable them to follow the example of Piedmont. Thus the Sicilian Government could only send a body of one hundred men under the command of Colonel

Giuseppe La Masa, whose purpose was rather to demonstrate their national solidarity than to render important military aid. At Rome Pius IX, constrained by the popular demonstrations which the news from Piedmont had aroused, incited the Grand Duke of Tuscany to treat with Carlo Alberto and Ferdinand for the calling of a Congress, which with the intervention of the representatives of the various provisional governments could decide regarding their reciprocal relations. In this wise the Pope hoped that the Liberals would not perceive the snare hidden in the Pontifical proposal, and only remember that the small army of volunteers constituted a few days before was intended to represent Papal adherence to the war. Such was undoubtedly the view entertained by General Durando, the commander of the Pontifical troops who had started for the frontier with 17,000 men, when on March 27 at Bologna he addressed an order of the day to his forces, premising that every soldier might be "perhaps called on to carry out important duties and to make generous sacrifices in the name of the fatherland and of Pius IX, its sacred regenerator," concluding his address with the words, "The entire world has its attention fixed on you and says, 'Let us see the Italian militia at work.'"

This speech filled the Liberals with enthusiasm. They had not observed the little word "perhaps," which was so eloquent of the hidden meaning, and by continuing to send volunteers and by their inexhaustible enthusiasm they obliged the General to cast off every reserve and to publish on April 5 another order of the day, which was a veritable call to battle, while the Pontifical Government, without declaring war, seeing that matters were growing more serious, told General Durando "to regulate his conduct in such a manner as would best conduce to the tranquillity of the State."

He had certainly gone too far. Rome only contemplated a defensive war, supposing that she seriously contemplated war at all and was not merely acting with the usual ecclesiastical methods of currying favour with all sections. Certainly the internal conditions of Rome were far from favourable. Riots had occurred during April, and the cry of "Bread and Work" had echoed through the streets. In Romagna, too, which formed part of the States of the Church, there was active disquietude, for the people feared to see the Austrian troops arrive, and discontent was rampant also in the regular army. In these circumstances it was not surprising to read in the official portion of the *Gazzetta di Roma* the Government's cen-

sure of General Durando and to learn that he was called upon to justify his conduct. The Pope, who had never really consented to the idea of war, had indeed always shown that he desired to avoid it and was only disposed to accept it after a clear understanding with Carlo Alberto and the other rulers of Italy. On April 10, therefore, he sent Monsignore Giovanni Corboli Bressi to the Sardinian camp to arrange terms with the King—terms which in the end came to nothing. Meanwhile on April 21 General Durando crossed the frontier, and matters grew complicated for the Roman ministry. After many discussions and vacillations Pius IX, to calm his agitated subjects, issued on May 1 a proclamation in which he stated that he did not take part in the war, but at the same time protested that he was unable to hold in check those of his subjects who were animated with the same nationalist spirit as the other Italians. This proclamation, which to some minds seemed like a veiled adherence to the war, helped to calm the popular unrest. Much was also hoped from the new lay ministry constituted by Terenzio Mamiani, an ex-revolutionary who had been banished on account of his patriotic writings and his activities during the uprisings of 1831, and who had as his coadjutor another ex-conspirator, Luigi Carlo Farini. The latter, after his appointment, left for Carlo Alberto's camp for the purpose of placing the Papal regular troops and the volunteers under the protection of the Sardinian sovereign, in order that the Austrians might accord to them the guarantee of international rights.

In Naples the Liberals clamoured for war against Austria and an alliance with Carlo Alberto; but the King and his ministers were jealous of the prestige that would accrue to Piedmont in case of victory, and internal disorders and repressions on the part of the Austrian troops in case of defeat. Hence they proposed at first to assume a neutral attitude. King Ferdinand, early in April, had declared himself in favour of war and of a nationalist campaign under the protection of the Pontiff, and had sent a contingent into Lombardy commanded by General Guglielmo Pepe (a veteran of Italian Liberalism), as well as ships into the Adriatic. But the King's interest and enthusiasm, always of doubtful sincerity, speedily died out; indeed, he had given his generals orders to take the longest route and to waste as much time as possible. Especially did he waver after the Papal allocution in which Pius retracted his former probably assumed position, and frankly declared that as the earthly representative of the God

of Peace he could not favour war, and that his paternal embrace included Austrians and Italians alike.

The fact that Sicily was once more in open revolt helped to disquiet Ferdinand, and meanwhile disorder also increased in Naples; there were tumults and barricades in the city, and much blood was shed. A ministerial crisis led to the recall of the army from Upper Italy and the fleet from the Adriatic. However, the fleet stayed on, and a portion of the army did the same. Those under Pepe remained at their posts, taking part, though late, in the offensive operations.

Leopold of Tuscany, who had identified himself with the Italian cause with more sincerity than could be found in Rome or Naples, following the advice of his minister, Ridolfi, sent a body of 6,000 men to aid Carlo Alberto, among whom were the so-called *Sapientini*, students of Pisa and Siena University, as well as youths from other Italian and even non-Italian districts, led by some of their most eminent professors, who carried into the war their youthful ardour and beliefs.

Such were all too briefly the chief events that occurred in the rest of Italy when Carlo Alberto opened his campaign against Austria. He entered Lombardy and established his headquarters at Lodi, whence on March 31 he issued a proclamation to the Italians of Lombardy, Venetia, Piacenza and Reggio, stating that he had come without any pre-established pact and solely to aid, as a friend to friends, the great work so happily begun by the various peoples.

Unfortunately the campaign began with political as well as military mistakes, and much valuable time was lost. Nevertheless the first engagements on the line of the Mincio met with success; the army carried the bridge of Goito and then invested the strongly-garrisoned fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua. These measures were a mistake, obliging Carlo Alberto to spread his troops over too wide a field, troops that from the beginning were judged too few to take such impregnable fortresses. Possibly Carlo Alberto hoped for the promised reinforcements. What is certain is that he lost much precious time, allowing Radetsky, whose reserves at first were less than those of the King of Sardinia, to gain Verona in safety—where he found fresh troops. Carlo Alberto did not follow up his advantage with energy, and the enthusiasm of the population, upon whom they had to depend for supplies and who looked to them to liberate them from the hated Austrian rule, gradually diminished.

On April 30 Carlo Alberto, having received some reinforce-

ments, evicted the Austrians from Pastrengo, thus interrupting their communications between Verona and Peschiera. This success put fresh life into the army, but the attempt that followed to reach Verona failed on May 5 and 6, and Carlo Alberto's army was beaten in two places. Soon after came the news that the Irish-Austrian General Nugent was advancing towards them with fresh troops, and thus a situation that was already not too favourable was aggravated.

To oppose Nugent's advance Venice sent a contingent of volunteers, led by General Zucchi, and these were joined by the Roman troops under Durando and by others encamped in the various cities, but above all by those at and around Venice. All comprehended how needful it was to hinder Nugent from joining Radetzky, but despite their valour they failed in the attempt. On May 9 Nugent attacked the Venetian contingent and, by making a feint attack on Vicenza, reached Verona on the 22nd. The Austrians now poured in fresh forces from the Tirol, and then occurred the heroic episode of Pier Fortunato Calvi's resistance, when with a handful of men he held the enemy at bay for nearly a month, an episode sung by Carducci in his ode "Cadore." But since heroism alone does not suffice, Calvi was beaten in the end. Vicenza too resisted for a while, thanks to the valour of its citizens, but on June 11 was obliged to capitulate. It was not possible to victual Peschiera, and that city too succumbed, but not before it too had gained laurels for itself; for a small handful of students, most of whom were killed while others were made prisoners, by gallantly defending the town and delaying the enemy, rendered possible Carlo Alberto's second success at Goito. This episode is known as that of Curtatone and Montanara, and its anniversary is solemnly observed to this day. Of great human interest are the letters recently published, written by some of these prisoners, who met with enthusiastic acclamations and marks of sympathy as they were marched across the Trentino under the very eyes of their Austrian captors. It was thanks to their heroic self-sacrifice that Prince Ferdinand of Savoy could enter Peschiera in triumph on May 30.

It was on this occasion that the cry rang out for the first time "Long live the King of Italy"—a cry that displeased the Republicans and especially the adherents of Mazzini, who had in vain tried at Milan on May 29 to overthrow the Provisional Government, which consisted largely of adherents of Carlo Alberto; it was also a cry that dismayed the other smaller princes, who felt that their thrones were being endangered.

Unhappily from this time onwards things did not go well. The Austrian victories in the Cadore (Dolomites) had depressed the *moral* of the Italians. Fresh Austrian contingents arrived on the scene and Carlo Alberto was obliged to let his men rest awhile, awaiting fresh troops that did not arrive. His commissariat was ill-organised, the heat intense, malaria claimed victims. Furthermore, his strategy was defective; he hesitated where he should have acted, and acted where he should have been cautious. These errors have drawn down on him grave accusations and much enmity. His temperamental tendency to tergiversation and indecision once more gained the upper hand, and he resigned himself to be content with the offer of Lombardy, which England had proposed and to which Austria had at one time assented. To Lombardy he had now to join the duchies that considered themselves a part of Piedmont by popular will, as expressed by vote. But if earlier, when he hoped to reach the Adriatic, he would not hear of such a compromise, now that he wished to reopen negotiations his own ministry opposed the plan, which implied desertion of Venetia. The Liberals of each State demanded more insistently than ever that he should not desist until complete victory had been attained. But Carlo Alberto wished to swim with the current, and hence in July he broke off negotiations and hostilities were resumed. He was now, however, almost single-handed in the struggle, for the King of Naples's army had already retired, the Pontifical troops had capitulated at Vicenza, the Lombard volunteers who had invaded the Tirol had been repulsed, the Tuscan forces almost wiped out at Curtatone and Montanara, and Venice was clamouring for the aid she could not render, while the Piedmontese troops were dispirited and discouraged.

Between July 18 and 23 the fate of the campaign was sealed. A few fortunate encounters had fanned enfeebled hopes, but on the 25th occurred the defeat of Custozza, whence on the 24th the Austrians had been dislodged. Carlo Alberto saw himself forced to ask for an armistice. The Austrian conditions were severe. Radetzky demanded that the enemy should retire beyond the Adda, and should abandon the Duchies and Venetia. Even then, if Carlo Alberto had retired beyond the Duchies, he might still have resisted and obtained better terms: but he wished to fall back upon Milan. The city was exhausted and desperate and, far from being of one mind as to the best course to pursue, mistrustful of Carlo Alberto and war-weary. The retreat of the Italians under the

Austrian fire was disastrous, and when at last Carlo Alberto reached Milan he, who had vowed he would only enter the city if victorious, had to beg for a truce, which was accorded, though his troops were ordered to cross the frontier within twelve hours' time. The King was vilified and mobbed, the pitiless fury of the disillusioned population was hurled at him ; he was even accused of treachery and of cowardice, and an attempt was made on his life. In the darkness of the night on August 5 he succeeded in leaving the city on foot, guarded by a small company of Bersaglieri led by La Marmora, and recrossed the Ticino to re-enter his own State, a vanquished and disillusioned man, guiltless of any crime save the lack of talent necessary to master a difficult situation. The real cause of the disaster was simply bad generalship. A Napoleon would have saved the position, which at the outset was all in favour of the Italians. Had Carlo Alberto but accepted the offer of Garibaldi to aid him with his Legions, "not unused to war" as Garibaldi remarked, matters might have turned out very differently indeed.

For a moment Milan had contemplated a further resistance and a call to Garibaldi to their aid, but he, abandoned by his many volunteers, understood that the task was beyond his strength and halted at Como, whence he passed into Switzerland awaiting the right moment to intervene. Abandoned, saddened, hopeless, the Milanese surrendered on August 6, the Austrians re-entered the city, and an armistice was quickly concluded which stipulated that the Sardinian troops should re-enter their former confines, abandon all the fortresses occupied by them, and all the territory annexed to Piedmont by popular plebiscite, i.e. all Lombardy, the Duchies and Venetia, as well as the city of Venice, which would consequently be deprived of all means of aid by land or water.

In Rome the ferment was so great that the Pope considered discretion the better part of valour and fled the city on September 29, disguised and making for Gaeta ; the Chamber was dissolved, and the people were invited to elect a Constituent Assembly. It met in February 1849 and numbered among its members Garibaldi, Dell' Ongaro, and many other names of weight, carefully chosen by the various regions to give to the Assembly a markedly national character. The first sitting took place on February 5 and, with only ten adverse votes, regardless of the fact that the Pope threatened with excommunication all who took part in the elections, the Assembly decreed the downfall of the Temporal Power, at the same time

assuring to the Pontiff the free exercise of his spiritual functions; whilst the birth of a Roman Republic was proclaimed from the Capitol. The executive power was delegated to a Triumvirate: Armellini, Saliceti and Montecchi.

The proclamation of the Roman Republic created a great stir throughout all Italy and above all in Tuscany. The defeat of the Piedmontese had impressed the people deeply, discontent was general, and the Grand Duke was obliged to nominate a democratic ministry, of which Montanelli, the professor, and Guerazzi, the novelist, were the leading spirits—both honourable men and advanced Liberals. Leopold, who, though an Austrian, was also somewhat of an Italian at heart, would have accorded other concessions, but the Pope threatened to excommunicate him and his subjects; so as a devout Catholic he yielded to the Pontiff's threats—with the result that he had to join him in his Gaetan exile. Meanwhile a republic had been proclaimed in Florence—a Government which, however, succeeded in pleasing no one and led to dissensions with Naples and Piedmont, just at a moment when unity was imperative if Austria was not again to get the upper hand. And indeed in two months' time the Grand Duke was reinstated; unfortunately a less Liberal and Italian-minded Grand Duke returned after this stay at Gaeta, where he had come under the reactionary influence of the Pope and of the Neapolitan Bourbon.

Naples, too, fell a prey to reaction. Ferdinand dissolved the Parliament he had granted and stifled every form of freedom in the manner in which the Bourbons were ever past masters, measures that procured for him the nickname of King Bomba. He also declared his resolve to reinstate the Pope by force of arms, and he would doubtless have done so had not the disturbed state of Sicily obliged him to turn his attention to that island.

For Sicily, sick of Bourbon government, had offered its throne to the Duke of Genoa, Carlo Alberto's second son. But the Savoyard prince, on the advice of his father, refused the crown, alleging that his aid was needed in the new war of independence against Austria. Hence Sicily had to resist unaided, and the barbarities committed by the Bourbon soldiery were such that the English and French fleets, then in Sicilian waters, felt impelled to intervene in the name of humanity.

Venice, meanwhile, abandoned to herself and indignant at what seemed Piedmontese defection, yet protected by her

lagoons, struggled hard to maintain her freedom and independence.

Irritation and discord also reigned in Piedmont, when she saw her army return defeated and discomfited. In vain a new war was promised, and a search made for powerful allies ; it was even proposed by Gioberti, who had become Prime Minister in December 1848, to occupy the Roman State and restore Pius IX, who had expressed his willingness to crown Carlo Alberto King of Italy. It was all useless. In a few brief months the Italians had passed from high hopes to the depths of despair, and it was hard to rouse them to make fresh efforts. Still Carlo Alberto would not admit defeat. On March 12 (1849) he denounced the armistice, believing he could count on his reconstructed army, whose command he had confided to a Pole, a deplorable appointment ; for Chrzanowski knew neither Italian nor the theatre of the war, and the appointment was merely made to satisfy the outcry against the Piedmontese generalship that had shown itself so incompetent. Around Novara a terrible battle was waged : for a time success seemed to hang in the balance, but in the end Radetzky's troops gained the upper hand against the badly-led troops and bad tactics of the Piedmontese. The disastrous defeat of Novara was the result. All day long Carlo Alberto courted death ; but he escaped without a scratch, and on March 23, 1849 he was obliged to ask for a new armistice.

The Austrian conditions were terribly exacting and, since it seemed to Carlo Alberto that his personality was the obstacle in the way of obtaining better terms, he abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel, destined to be the first King of United Italy. And in order that even his presence should not cause embarrassment, he one night quietly and secretly left Turin and retired to Portugal, where a few months later, broken by many sorrows, he died.

The defeat of Novara carried terrible consequences in its train. Piedmont was agitated and seething with discontent, and Genoa was torn by factions ; but in Tuscany the Grand Duke was invited to return. Whereupon he asked for the support of Austrian troops, and, as though this measure was not a sufficient affront to the people who had reinstated him, Leopold re-entered Florence wearing the uniform of an Austrian general, displaying the usual Bourbon-Habsburg want of tact and comprehension of popular feeling. Ferdinand II re-occupied Italy. Austria was once more absolute mistress of Lombardy and Venetia. In the interim, however, her own

throne had changed occupants. Ferdinand I had abdicated in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph, a youth of eighteen, who became the hated "Cecco Beppe" of the whole Italian people until his death as an octogenarian in the Great War.

It certainly looked as if all were lost. But Italy's hopes, though crushed for the moment, were not dead. These princely restorations were more nominal than real. The people had learnt to know what it was they desired, and in martyrdom, in conspiracy, in suffering, they were preparing for the inevitable. This period proved to be the daybreak of an Italian Risorgimento whose dawn had been preceded by an aurora of blood.

Sicily, Rome, Brescia and Venice after the Restoration

We noted above that conditions soon after Novara returned to the normal *status quo*, but various episodes that occurred during 1849 cannot be passed over in silence.

The defeat of Novara occurred in March. Sicily since the January of 1848 had been in open rebellion and continued to resist until May 1849—and with such persistence and valour as to win the admiration and respect of the Powers, who had vainly offered to mediate, for the retaliations practised by Ferdinand's soldiers almost passed belief. Rome, too, wrote some splendid pages in the records of the time. The Republic was deeply disturbed when it learnt the news of Novara. It had carried out a frankly anti-Austrian policy without, however, on that account gaining the sympathy or support of the Powers, though it had striven in every way not to offend their interests in the city. Some hoped that France would furnish aid, others that some of the Italian States would rally round the Republic. A second Triumvirate was elected, consisting of Saffi, Armellini and Mazzini; for though the last named had but lately arrived he was already the idol of the Republicans; his name was one to conjure with, and he soon became the heart and the directing will of the whole. Mazzini's purpose was to prove to Italy and Europe that the aim of the Republic was to carry out a religious and moral work, to restore honesty in administration and order of every kind, and to maintain an army for the sole purpose of defence. Never, according even to hostile contemporary testimony, was Rome so well governed, so free and peaceful.

But this ideal state of things was not to endure for long. The enemy was at the gates, and the little army called into existence by the Republic was soon obliged to prove its mettle.

It consisted of ex-pontifical soldiers, of volunteers, of *carabinieri* and of many foreigners, and was joined in April, just when the French were nearing Rome, by the Italian Legion of Garibaldi. For Pius IX had invited the Catholic nations to restore his temporal authority, and Spain, Naples and Austria had responded loyally to the appeal. So apparently did France, but her secret aim, or rather that of her then President, Napoleon III, was to please the Catholic party and so get himself made Emperor. He played a double game, pretending to Mazzini that he wished to uphold Republican liberty, to the Pope that he wished to restore the Temporal Power. Hostilities were not long delayed, and a number of heroic encounters ensued. After a time the French were beaten and in full retreat. And complete victory might have continued on the side of the Romans had not the Triumvirate committed the error of refusing to assign the supreme command to Garibaldi—who knew how to couple audacity with caution. For they believed that France would repudiate her general, who had attacked instead of defending the Romans.

In the interim Spaniards, Neapolitans and Austrians were marching on Rome, the Austrians attacking Bologna and Ancona on their way, both of which cities, after a fierce resistance, had to cede to superior numbers. The Spaniards occupied some Umbrian cities, and the Neapolitans had already entered Roman territory when in May Garibaldi defeated them. The Romans performed prodigies of valour and much noble blood was spilt, but, alas! in vain. Among those who fell and immortalised themselves on this occasion were Mameli, the soldier-poet, Manara the valiant Lombard, Enrico Dandolo, and Giacomo Medici the brave defender of the house called the Vascello. But it was all useless. It was not possible for the few thousand men of the Roman army to hold their own against overwhelming numbers. On July 2 the Roman Assembly declared all further resistance to be futile; the enemy entered the city, and the Republican constitution was at an end. The Temporal Power of the Papacy was speedily re-established.

Garibaldi, sick at heart, weary and disillusioned, left Rome in July, before the enemy had made his official entry, together with his Legionaries and his faithful wife, Anita. His plan was to try to succour Venice, which still defied the Austrian power: but it proved impossible. He therefore disbanded his men, to whom he had promised nothing but "hunger, thirst, forced marches, battle, death," and embarked at Cesenatico,

a little fishing-village on the Adriatic, with the tiny remnant of men who would not quit him, pursued by the Austrians, distraught by Anita's illness and subsequent death, his lion heart almost broken. Finally in September he reached Sardinian territory with only one companion left of his four thousand, of whom most had fallen victims to Austrian bullets.

When the enemy had restored tranquillity in Rome at the point of the bayonet and by cruel reprisals, the Pope made his solemn entry into the Eternal City in April 1850; and soon the reign of theocratic absolutism was restored in full vigour.

At the end of 1848 only Brescia and Venice still held out against the enemy. Brescia from all time had been known as the Valiant, and amply did she justify her title in those days. The resistance of the inhabitants was heroic, a fight prolonged from house to house, from barricade to barricade. But at last they were overwhelmed. Then the bloodthirsty General Haynau, known as the Hyena, vented his vengeance upon them in so terrible a manner that the news thereof echoed through all Europe; and when in 1853 he visited London, the draymen of Barclay & Perkins subjected the torturer of women and children to the flogging he so richly deserved, for the redress of which Palmerston, when appealed to, blandly advised that he seek this "before the common tribunals."

On the morrow of the fall of Brescia, April 2, 1849, the Venetian Assembly voted that they would resist to the uttermost though they could no longer hope for aid of any kind. And under the strong sway of Manin Venice nobly kept her word. Her watchword was to hold out against Austria to the death. Nor did she capitulate until famine and cholera stalked abroad, until not a grain of corn remained in her granaries nor ammunition in her arsenals, and she only capitulated on August 22 in order to save her people and her art treasures from Austrian vengeance. On the 29th Radetzky made a solemn entry into Venice and heard a *Te Deum* at St. Mark's—but not a Venetian was present. Hatred of the Austrians was but fanned by this humiliation, to survive and burst forth anew in later and happier times.

Manin embarked for exile, and only his ashes returned to his beloved city—where they rest outside St. Mark's after that "redemption" was accomplished that he had so prophetically foreseen.

From Novara (1849) to the War of 1854

Peace with Austria was signed at Milan on August 6 of that sad year of disillusion, 1849, which saw the ruin of so many Italian hopes. This peace inaugurated the epoch which was called the "Restoration," because the various States returned to their former rulers. But though the rulers had returned, the people had heard words they could not forget, and men like Mameli, Cairoli, Manera and other heroes had left behind them a legacy of affection and duties. Imperishable pages like unto those written in Rome, Brescia, Venice and Sicily could not be obliterated from popular memory. A national conscience had been formed, and vain were all attempts to suffocate it, although the various Governments, in order to exist, grew ever more tyrannical. But their very foundations had been mined. The period of time that stretches between the first and second War of Independence was a period of painful preparation, that oscillated between continuous martyrdom, heroism and unquenched faith, a never-resting duel between, on the one hand, magnificent and suspicious Austria, weak and cruel Bourbons, feeble and despised Lorrainers, and a Pope who did not know how to govern or what side to take, and, on the other, a people inflamed with aspirations after liberty, inspired by men like Mazzini, Manin, and Quadrio, that gloried in remembrance of the deeds of the Red Shirts and were ready for action whenever they should be called upon to act.

Yet for some time still the history of Italy remained seemingly sporadic, confused and detached, and though the people aspired after liberation there was no cohesion in their efforts; there could be none, seeing the oppressive rule under which they all groaned. We must therefore follow events as they unfolded themselves in the various States, though they all formed portions of the gigantic struggle that Italians waged for their freedom.

To recommence where we left off it must be mentioned that after the events of 1849 the Austrian Government had lost in the Lombard-Venetian provinces a large portion of that moral force which, though it had not been great, it had held before the war. Insurrections and conflicts had shaken the confidence of the peasants and diminished yet more that of the well-to-do classes. The Austrian Emperor had perforce to acknowledge that he had few faithful subjects and yet fewer friends in the Peninsula, and that the opposition to his rule

did not proceed merely from a few ambitious men but from men of high integrity, inspired by noble ideals that could not be sneered at or ignored, even if they were not shared. Hence it was not easy to govern, and brute force and violence were the only methods that appeared to meet the case.

The men who had sought safety in Piedmont, France and England continued undaunted their work of conspiracy, bound together by the sacred ties of sacrifices endured in a common cause. And most worthy representatives they were, numbering in their ranks men such as Ugo Foscolo, Lacaita, Puerio and Panizzi (the creator of the British Museum Reading-room), to name but a very few. In September 1850 they constituted in London a National Committee, whose animating soul was Mazzini and whose purpose was to unite in one body all the national forces in order to secure for their fatherland the independence so ardently desired. Unhappily the characteristic, apparent at all times among Italians and alive to this day, of a strongly-marked individuality which hinders frank and unquestioning co-operation, soon manifested itself. Dissensions with regard to methods of action arose, discrepancies that weakened the work of the Committee and rendered union with the other democratic factions in Europe, especially that of the party headed by Kossuth, less efficacious.

Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December 1851 further contributed to the weakening of the Committee, for they were not agreed as to whether it was desirable, in the circumstances, to continue to work with the French. Mazzini, for instance, was strongly opposed to this view, and regarded the *coup d'état* as a triumph of materialism; others thought that it would help to unify the divergent French parties and strengthen the army from which Italy hoped for eventual support.

The counsels that prevailed in the end were that the emigrants should act independently of the French, and direct their efforts above all to the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, where the after-consequences of the war were most direly felt and the desire for liberation was most acute. For the inhabitants of those provinces lived under a veiled military rule with supreme authority in the hands of the stiff-necked Radetzky. Perquisitions, prosecutions, proscriptions, executions, were the order of the day, and the circulation of any anti-Austrian paper or flysheet was rigorously forbidden. They circulated nevertheless, thanks to the patriotism of the people and the cunning wiles of the emigrants, but many of these paid for their efforts with their liberty and even their lives. This

period gave many noble victims to the cause, among them being those known as the martyrs of Belfiore, prosecuted at Mantua in February 1853. This prosecution arose from the discovery by the authorities of a bond of the National Loan which the Italian Committee in London had issued in order to collect funds to promote a revolt in Italy. This discovery led to the further perception that there existed a well-organised and vast revolutionary association whose existence they had long suspected, and it enabled them to lay their hands upon various committees that were scattered throughout the Lombard-Venetian cities, whose purpose was to collect funds and arms, to study the Austrian defences, to suborn the soldiers of the garrisons, especially the Hungarians, who also longed for freedom, and thus to prepare for the fall of the Habsburgs. Priests, professors, rich proprietors, peasants, men of every rank, were members of the committees, proving how widespread and deep-rooted was the desire for freedom, and how far the national cause had progressed in every class. In Mantua the committee was headed by Don Enrico Tazzoli, an ideal figure of priest and citizen; and he, together with a number of other eminent and worthy citizens, was hanged on the bastion of Belfiore. The serene manner in which these many excellent men went to their ignominious death upon the public gallows did not enhance the prestige or influence of the Austrian Government with men of every grade, who combated them, not for the sake of personal interest, but because they regarded them as foes to their fatherland.

In the same month an insurrection broke out in Milan, fomented by Mazzini but not approved by his most faithful followers: for they deemed the moment chosen to be unpropitious and advised him to abstain from encouraging it throughout the peninsula—since the time was not yet ripe. And they were right. The Milanese revolt proved sterile; it was extinguished in blood, and the Austrian reins were drawn yet tighter.

In 1856, however, when the condition of Europe seemed more tranquil, Austria thought fit to inaugurate a milder régime, to see if thus she could at last win over her rebellious Italian subjects. The Emperor granted an amnesty to political prisoners and nominated his brother Archduke Maximilian as Governor of the subject provinces—a noble-minded man, who endeavoured to win the goodwill of the population. But, as Manin wrote from Paris, “we do not ask for Austria to become more humane; we want her to go away altogether.”

Nor did the underground hostilities cease. Patriotic propaganda flourished more actively than ever.

Quiet reigned in the neighbouring Duchy of Modena. Francesco II, restored to his domains, was chiefly occupied in sustaining the authority of the Church, was interested in sectarian education, and endeavoured to force his subjects to respect autocratic rule. And this was the easier as the majority were weary of struggling, and the ablest of his adversaries had escaped abroad.

Not so at Parma. Duke Carlo III, who had succeeded his father after the Restoration, repelled everyone by his extravagant and immoral conduct and by his infamous system of government. Hence in 1854 a republican rising occurred, quickly repressed, but which indirectly cost the Duke his life. His widow, Marie Louise of Bourbon, assumed the regency in the name of her son Roberto, who continued the absolutist régime, though in a more humane manner; but nevertheless Austrian influence continued to prevail, and the revolutionary movement never ceased its secret and successful propaganda.

The Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany lived a fairly tranquil existence after his return, though the continued presence for four years of Austrian troops annoyed the people. It must also be borne in mind that personally the Grand Duke was not unpopular, for he had *bonhomie* and was easy-going. Further, the Tuscans are ever inclined to be somewhat cynically indifferent to politics, and most of the hotheads and the discontented were in exile.

Pius IX after his return from his self-imposed exile put himself completely into the hands of the reactionary Cardinals and chose entirely to forget that he had ever held more liberal views or had favoured Italian aspirations. He now pursued a régime characterised by Lord Clarendon as "the opprobrium of Europe." His people, however, had not equally short memories. A dumb discontent reigned in the Eternal City as well as in the other Papal domains. Conspirators were secretly active—above all in Romagna, to this day a turbulent province.

After the forcible and cruel suppression of the Sicilian uprisings King "Bomba" of the Two Sicilies, unquestionably the worst of all the Italian rulers, believed himself to be firmly resealed on his throne. He too forgot that he had ever granted a Constitution, and he ruthlessly persecuted all who held, or were even thought to hold, Liberal opinions. The enemies of the Bourbon formed themselves into two committees,

of which one centred in Turin and one in Malta, and these conspired to undermine his rule. Some of Mazzini's adherents hoped to advance the cause of Naples by plots directed against the King. One such occurred in 1856, when Baron Bentivegna attempted to organise a revolt in Sicily, but his bands were broken up and he and his followers hanged. A few days afterwards a soldier attempted to stab the King, but he was caught and shot. After this Ferdinand deemed the air of Naples too unhealthy and retired to Caserta, while his Government tried to quench discontent by the wholesale banishment of all students, priests and every person they even remotely suspected of advanced views. Indeed banishment and sequestration of property were the mildest of the punishments inflicted for these presumed offences; death, torture, imprisonment for life were too often the verdicts pronounced, though often the authorities hardly troubled to go through the farce of a trial.

At Genoa the exiles had prepared an expedition which, if it had been better organised, might have met with some success. It has come down to history as the Expedition of Sapri and was led by one Carlo Pisacane, supported by a number of political exiles. They had compelled the captain of the ship on which they had embarked to change his course, they liberated the prisoners confined on the island of Ponza and disembarked at Sapri in the Gulf of Policastro. Unfortunately the very people they had set out to liberate mistook them for brigands and informed the police. Severe fighting ensued, but after a heroic resistance Pisacane and his followers were all killed or taken prisoners. Pisacane himself died wrapped in the folds of the Tricolour he had hoped to plant on Neapolitan soil. Soon after this Ferdinand "Bomba" died, to be succeeded by his weak and foolish son Francesco II. He disbanded his father's Swiss mercenaries, that had been enrolled to strengthen the native forces, and thus weakened his army, which should have been the prop of a kingdom that now more than ever needed support.

Piedmont, whither the eyes of all Liberals were directed, slowly but surely recovered from the blow inflicted by the defeat of Novara, thanks to its wise, prudent and far-sighted Government, which was in the hands of men like Massimo d'Azeglio, Cesare Balbo, and last but by no means least Camillo Cavour. They gave a vigorous impulse to industry and commerce, repaired the financial damages caused by the wars, maintained the separation of the civil from the ecclesiastical power, consolidated the dynasty, caused the Italian question

to be properly understood abroad, and thus prepared the way for Italian unity under the leadership of the house of Savoy. From November 1852 when, after a Cabinet crisis during which he had retired, he once more became the leader, until his most unfortunate death in 1861, Cavour was the arbitrator of all Piedmontese affairs. He was no dreamer, no idealist; he was, as has been ably pointed out, "an opportunist believing that though in politics you can choose your aim, you can very rarely choose your means." He wished to impress upon the Powers that Piedmont had no intention of disturbing the peace. But when France and England planned war against Russia he saw an opportunity for Piedmont to assert herself among the nations and resolved that his people should take part in the contest. Many persons looked on the proposal as an act of madness, for what aid could little Piedmont give to the big Powers? But Cavour looked farther ahead, and despite opposition he induced the Piedmontese Parliament to sanction the proposed alliance. Fifteen thousand Sardinian troops were despatched to the Crimea, where they nobly redeemed their flag from the shame of Novara. And not only this. Piedmont was now a land to reckon with, and though she had been excluded from the Crimean peace negotiations, she was admitted to the Paris Congress of 1856 for its ratification; and on this occasion Cavour induced the representatives of France and England to moot the Italian question. He pointed out how the kingdom of Sardinia alone among the Italian States had become independent of Austria and was a bulwark of liberty and good rule. He even went so far as to pronounce the name of Victor Emmanuel as a candidate for the Italian crown and was alone able to secure peace for Italy and to quench the discontent and revolutionary spirit that reigned elsewhere. In short, Cavour had achieved a great diplomatic triumph. The question of Italian unity was no longer a secret hole-and-corner affair. It had become of interest and was sponsored by all Liberal Europe. Some of the older Republicans, like Mazzini, did not support Cavour. They would not budge from their ideals, could not recognise that Italy was not ripe for such self-government as the Republic they dreamed of demanded. To put it colloquially, Cavour understood that half a loaf was better than no bread.

Cavour had tried in every possible way to impress upon Napoleon III that it was in the interest of France to aid Italian aspirations and blot out the memory of the treacherous French expedition to Rome against the Roman Republic. True, many

Italians regarded this sovereign as the greatest obstacle to their liberation, but not so Cavour, who hoped to play him off against Austria. In 1858 an Italian, Orsini, made an attempt on Napoleon's life, and Cavour feared that this would neutralise the Emperor's favourable disposition towards the Peninsula. But Napoleon showed no resentment towards Italy for this act and even permitted the publication of the letter Orsini wrote him, in which he asked for no clemency for himself but implored the Emperor to aid his beloved country. "Deliver my fatherland, and the blessings of twenty-five million citizens will be yours." Soon afterwards Napoleon and Cavour met at Plombières, and a formal alliance was drawn up between France and Piedmont. It was stipulated that France should help to liberate Italy from the Austrians, though the bitter price asked was the cession of the two provinces of Nice and Savoy, the latter the cradle of the Piedmontese dynasty. The conditions were hard, but they seemed the only ones possible to obtain.

The War of 1859

Piedmont had now become the lodestar of all lovers of Italy, and even out-and-out Republicans no longer opposed Victor Emmanuel's government. All through the autumn of 1858 preparations for war were in progress and its imminence and inevitability openly discussed. Prussia and England endeavoured to maintain peace, but their efforts were wrecked by Austria's obstinacy. Volunteers were openly recruited and admitted into the regular army. Garibaldi had constituted a corps named the *Cacciatori delle Alpi* (the Hunters of the Alps). The Piedmontese Parliament voted a credit of fifty millions of francs. Cavour made a memorable speech in which he fully explained and justified his policy for urging war on Austria and demonstrated how this policy had been neither hasty nor provocative. When leaving the Chamber, Cavour, with that extraordinary political prescience that was his, said, "I am leaving the last sitting of the Piedmontese Parliament. The next will be that of the Kingdom of Italy." In April, Austria presented an ultimatum to Piedmont demanding disarmament within three days. As this was contrary to the agreement arrived at by the Powers that both adversaries should disarm—which Austria had not done—Piedmont was able to show the world that the war was forced upon her.

On April 27 Victor Emmanuel issued two proclamations, one to his people and one to his army. "The independence of

Italy," he said, "is our war-cry." On the 29th the Austrians crossed the Ticino in order to march on Turin. The Piedmontese had flooded the territory, consisting of rice-fields and canals, and so delayed their advance, giving the French time to join the Italians by land and sea. Napoleon took supreme command. He planned a clever stratagem which blocked the way to Milan, while Garibaldi and his corps, a motley crew of men, drawn from all ranks and of all shades of opinion, proposed to attract the Austrians towards the Lakes. Napoleon's plan was completely successful, and the Austrians, though superior in numbers, were beaten at Montebello, Casteggio and Palestro. On June 4 was fought the memorable battle of Magenta, and on the 8th Victor Emmanuel entered Milan in triumph, the enthusiasm being such that it provoked from Napoleon the remark "How this people must have suffered!" On the same day Garibaldi had repulsed the Austrians at Melegnano and proceeded northwards to cut off the enemy's retreat towards the Trentino and the Alps. On April 27, a date still celebrated with rejoicings in Florence, the Grand Duke Leopold was forced to fly from his State, and a provisional Government was formed, with Peruzzi and Ricasoli at its head, which hastily raised a force of 8,000 men, who swore fidelity to Victor Emmanuel. The other rulers of the smaller States, such as Modena and Parma, found it impossible to remain now that Austrian protection was withdrawn, and their provisional Governments also voted for union with the kingdom of Sardinia.

The Papal legates, too, had to abandon the Romagna, whose inhabitants demanded union with Piedmont. The Marches and Umbria also revolted against the Pope, and the demand for Italian unity became universal. Meanwhile the Franco-Italian army marched from success to success, and it seemed as if at last the Italian hopes of expelling the foreigner were to be crowned with success, when after the bloody battle of Solferino (June 24) and S. Martino the incredible news was flashed through Italy that Napoleon, the victor, had asked Francis Joseph, the vanquished, for an armistice. Three days later the preliminaries of peace were signed at Villafranca, Victor Emmanuel not even being asked to attend the Imperial meetings. By this treaty Austria was to cede Lombardy to Napoleon, who was to give it to Piedmont, Venice was to remain under Austrian rule and the Italian States were to be amalgamated into a confederation under the presidency of the Pope. The rage, the disappointment, that this unexpected

turn of affairs aroused throughout Italy is indescribable. An echo can be found in E. B. Browning's poignant poem, "First news from Villafranca . . . peace did you say? What! with the enemy guns in our ears? . . . while Austria stands at bay, whilst Mantua and our Venice bears The hated flag of the yellow and black?"

The reasons for Napoleon's defection from his ally have not even yet been fully established. It is believed, however, that the prime motives were that Napoleon, like the French to this day, did not desire a strong Italy, that he had not gauged how deep and widespread was the desire for unity throughout the Peninsula, and further that his ultra-Catholic Spanish wife, who was Regent in his absence, brought her influence to bear in an adverse sense. Victor Emmanuel would have continued the war alone, but his army was not strong enough; for though the war was broken off, French troops were still in Italy and could no longer be regarded as friends and allies. The position was grave in the extreme, and might once more was right.

Therefore, despite Cavour's protests, the King signed the peace terms with this reserve, "*J'accepte pour ce qui me concerne*"—a reserve which left full liberty to the mutinous Italians, who placed implicit confidence in him, to continue the struggle.

Cavour had hoped that Napoleon would not insist on his "pound of flesh" in the shape of Nice and Savoy, since all Italy had not been freed; but the Emperor would not yield. That Nice, Garibaldi's native province, should go to France added to the universal grief felt when the news was known of this heavy sacrifice. A plebiscite was asked for and granted. It went in favour of France. Nice and Savoy did not yet believe in a strong united Italy. The die was cast. The bitter potion had to be swallowed.

By universal suffrage in September 1859 all central Italy voted for union with the monarchy of Victor Emmanuel II and his royal successors, and the Italian monarchy of eleven million subjects under the "*Re Galantuomo*" was established, though he was still styled King of Sardinia. In his opening speech to what was indeed the first Italian Parliament, as Cavour had predicted, the King said, "Our country is no more the Italy of the Romans, nor the Italy of the Middle Ages, no longer the field for every foreign ambition; it becomes henceforth the Italy of the Italians."

“ *I Mille* ”

Many of the events connected with the Italian Risorgimento read more like an epic than like modern history, and none more so than that episode known as the March of the Thousand. All manner of fables have circulated with regard to the Sicilian expedition; among others that it was backed by English banknotes, that it was engineered by Cavour. Neither account is exact, though Cavour may have turned a blind eye on the venture, whose importance, if successful, he fully understood. But the good understanding between him and Garibaldi had been embittered by Cavour's cession to France of Nice. Garibaldi accepted the leadership of the expedition when his fame was already at its height, had indeed assumed an almost legendary character; so that the simple peasants of Sicily and Calabria regarded him as a demi-god, an unconquerable hero. They had heard how the north of the peninsula had been freed from the hated Austrians, and they longed to be emancipated in their turn. Sicily had long been in a ferment, and it was felt by the northern patriots that aid should be proffered. That England alone of all the Powers was favourable to a united Italy was well known, although Queen Victoria herself, who had a tenderness towards the doctrine of the divine right of kings, as is now proved by her published letters, disapproved of the idea of displacing the Neapolitan sovereign and had little or no sympathy in favour of a united Italy. But, happily, in constitutional England the monarch's personal predilections cannot prevail. Certain it is that the scheme for the Sicilian revolt was concocted in London, while Francesco Crispi and Rosolino Pilo both visited the island to fan patriotic hopes. Garibaldi was proposed as leader of the enterprise. At first he would not accept; he was not afraid to face danger, but he knew how strongly Sicily was garrisoned, and he feared that the project might end in disaster and prove a set-back to the national cause. He yielded when he heard that insurrections had already broken out in the island and that his help and personal magnetism were called for. He resolved to take only a few men with him: “few but good,” he said. On the night of May 5, 1860, after pretending to take violent possession of two ships in the port of Genoa, which the owner, who knew of the plot, had already secretly accorded, he sailed from the now historic rock of Quarto with his thousand volunteers. La Bolina, from whose house Garibaldi started, states that the latter had arrived at

his house possessing only 7½ lire, that he had refused all money assistance from no matter what side it was offered, that he wished to return to the King the orders bestowed on him, deeply offended as he was that the King had sanctioned the cession of Nice, and that when begged to desist from this discourteous act he sent the orders to his daughter to convert them into earrings. Before ever he sailed from Quarto, as is proved for the first time by Bolina's letter (recently come to light), Garibaldi had all the plans for his campaign completed. He proposed to make himself dictator of the lands he conquered and then “ as sovereign to sovereign ” to cede them “ to his friend, Victor Emmanuel.” The letter further reveals that Cavour, whom Garibaldi never forgave for ceding his native province to France, though officially opposed to what was officially called a filibustering expedition, secretly accorded money and rifles to Garibaldi, and this though Garibaldi had written secretly to the King imploring him to rid himself of Cavour, “ who had sold the Italians,” a letter of which Cavour doubtless had cognisance.

At Telamone the Piedmontese commandant of the fortress provided him with rifles and ammunition. Garibaldi told his men that their war-cry must be “ Italy and Victor Emmanuel,” for he proposed to conquer the various provinces for the King, faithful to his unshaken belief in Italian unity under this sovereign. The company disembarked at Marsala, where two English men-of-war were stationed to protect British interests and, thanks to their intervention, under the plea that the buildings near the harbour were protected by the British flag, the Neapolitan cruisers did not fire upon them till there was nothing left to fire on but their empty vessels.

The Thousand now marched to Salemi, which had already risen against the Bourbons, and here Garibaldi in Victor Emmanuel's name assumed the dictatorship of Sicily. At Calatafimi occurred the first encounter with the Bourbon troops, and a desperate contest took place, where the Red Shirts, though outnumbered, scored an important victory. This victory put heart into the Sicilian insurgents, and Garibaldi's forces were much increased. By rapid forced marches and by arousing wild enthusiasm wherever they passed, as well as adding to their numbers and their rifle strength—for every Sicilian in those lawless days carried a pistol and a musket, no matter how antiquated in make—at early dawn on Whit Sunday, May 27, Garibaldi reached Palermo. Very sanguinary was the encounter with the Royalists, who held

Palermo strongly, but on the 30th victory was ensured, though it had cost the life of many a Red Shirt. But it was not until June 7 that the Bourbon troops finally evacuated the city, for they had still held the fortress, and their fleet was anchored in the harbour and bombarded the city. During this prolonged occupation the Neapolitan army committed untold atrocities. The English Admiral Mundy, who had placed his squadron quite close to the land for the alleged humane purpose of giving refuge to non-combatants, did all in his power to induce the Bourbon authorities to cease from the pitiless slaughter. The fleets of the other Powers, anchored farther out, merely looked on.

Meanwhile the rest of the island was in full revolt, and reinforcements for Garibaldi arrived from all quarters. The Bourbon soldiers were concentrated at Milazzo. Garibaldi gave them battle and was victorious (July), with the result that Messina was isolated and the rest of the island freed from its miserable thralldom under the Bourbons.

The King of Naples, in order to ward off further disaster, promised to grant a constitution and to ally himself with Piedmont—a proposal that embarrassed Victor Emmanuel not a little, for he knew that none of the Powers, except England, favoured Italian unity. Hence he wrote to Garibaldi begging him not to cross the Straits and attack the Neapolitan kingdom, a mere feint to please Napoleon, who had urged him to hold Garibaldi back, while Cavour, on the other hand, sent him word that it was no use leaving the enterprise half accomplished. Nor could the enterprise be arrested at Cape Faro; and further, if Piedmont continued a passive spectator of events, it was obvious that the dictatorship of Italy would pass into the hands of Garibaldi, the people's idol, despite his never-ceasing proclamation of loyalty to Victor Emmanuel.

Meanwhile Garibaldi had landed near Reggio in the province of Calabria, whose inhabitants gave nobly of their sons to the Thousand. The lands were aflame with Italian patriotism. They aided Garibaldi in every possible manner, and on August 30 30,000 Bourbon troops evacuated the strong position of Salerno, thanks in great measure to the ruse of an Englishman who had obtained possession of the telegraph and wired false news to Naples. Garibaldi and his Red Shirts now marched from success to success, acclaimed everywhere with joy, while the Neapolitan royalties once more fled to Gaeta, leaving Garibaldi free to enter Naples (September) as its master and conqueror. His first act was to consign the

Neapolitan fleet to the Sardinian Admiral, thereby again affirming his fidelity to Victor Emmanuel, whom he held up to all the people as their King and the father of his land.

But misunderstandings were still rife. At Turin fears had continued to be entertained lest the movement was assuming a republican character; but Garibaldi knew well how to rise above any predilections he might hold for this form of government, when the very fate of Italy was at stake. He was more clear-sighted in this respect than Mazzini, and recognised that Italy was not yet ripe for self-rule. Cavour, however, thought the King ought now to assume the leadership of the national movement, and the Piedmontese army, mobilised in two divisions, invaded the Papal States (August) under the plea of defending the inhabitants from the hideous outrages daily committed by the Papal troops. It was a bold step, for all the Powers, always except England, were opposed and had withdrawn their Ministers from Piedmont; wherefore rapid action, and above all success, were imperative. The Papal army, after losing Perugia and Ancona, was severely defeated at Castelfidardo in September; the Piedmontese were now masters of the Marches of Umbria, and Victor Emmanuel marched into Neapolitan territory, Garibaldi at the same time prepared to meet the Bourbon troops who were massed on the banks of the Volturno. It proved a very bloody encounter, and for a while the Garibaldians seemed routed; but after ten hours of the most desperate fighting Garibaldi was able to telegraph to his friends at Naples "Victory all along the line." He had lost many of his best, but Naples had been gained for Italy.

It had been Garibaldi's plan to march on Rome and to liberate that city from ecclesiastical rule, and afterwards to free the martyr city of Venice. From the moment that King Victor Emmanuel had joined the war he knew that he must, for the time at least, abandon this scheme, as he would not be backed up by the authorities. They held, and maybe rightly, that it was too soon. Even the change from a despotism of the most corrupt character to free institutions had brought difficulties in their train in the liberated districts. Garibaldi knew how to wed rashness to caution, which was what Mazzini never grasped. In October Garibaldi and his Red Shirts crossed the Volturno, and at daybreak of October 26 he came in sight of the Piedmontese army at Teano. He dismounted when he caught sight of the King, and walking up to Victor Emmanuel said, "I salute the first King of Italy."

The King held out his hand : " Dear Garibaldi, how are you ? " After this the two men conversed for a while, the King proposing that in the impending battle his men might occupy the first line : " Your troops are tired, mine are fresh ; it is our turn now." Garibaldi had to assent, but he remarked sadly to a friend, " They have sent me to the rear."

In November Capua was taken and Gaeta besieged. The French tried to create obstacles, but Victor Emmanuel pointed out to Napoleon that by so doing he violated his principle of non-intervention. Consequently the French fleet was withdrawn, Gaeta fell three months afterwards, and the Bourbon sovereign took refuge in the Papal States. On November 7 Victor Emmanuel entered Naples in triumph, with Garibaldi at his side, and next day the " Filibuster" (as his foes called him) handed to the King the plebiscites of the Two Sicilies that had almost unanimously voted for union with the house of Savoy.

After this Garibaldi felt that his work for the present was done. At dawn, on November 9, unattended, silently, almost furtively, after a farewell visit to the English flagship, whose Admiral had backed him so generously at Palermo, he sailed on board an American merchant vessel for his island home of Caprera¹ " to dig up the potatoes he had planted in the spring." Victor Emmanuel offered him a dukedom, the collar of the Annunziata, money. All was refused. He returned home as poor as he had left it—poor in money, but rich in fame and in the love of his countrymen.

The Kingdom of Italy (1860–1866)

The years that followed were years of internal conflicts, and not free from errors and discontent. Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy, and the first united Parliament was opened at Turin in 1861 ; but the kingdom had been formed almost too rapidly, and consisted of provinces diverse in customs and culture. The adherents of the old régime and of the Papacy intrigued and put difficulties in the way, and Rome and Venice were still " unredeemed." It needed all Cavour's great tact and diplomacy to override these impediments. Garibaldi too was dissatisfied because he held that his volunteers should be incorporated into the Piedmontese regular army, a proposal vetoed by the military martinets. Seeing that out of consideration for France Cavour had declared

that they would not attack Rome, Garibaldi desired to keep his legionaries intact, as he felt the task must eventually devolve on him. In short, dissensions and misunderstandings in all quarters were rife. In the meanwhile Cavour was endeavouring to solve the Roman problem pacifically, and in 1860, in a memorable speech in Parliament, he declared that the solution of the Roman question ought to be the outcome of the ever-deepening conviction that liberty is highly favourable to the development of genuine religious feeling, that the Church's independence would not be prejudiced, indeed it would be strengthened, by amalgamating Rome with Italy. He endeavoured by means of some trusted ecclesiastics to persuade the Pope to renounce the Temporal Power, promising him full spiritual independence and an adequate income, and pointing out how he would be safer defended by the affection and respect of 22,000,000 Italians than defended by 25,000 French bayonets, launching on this occasion his famous thesis of "a free Church in a free State." Doubtless, knowing the Papal mentality and the Papal traditions, Cavour did not entertain great hopes of persuading the Pontiff to solve the Roman question amicably, but he wished to show the Catholic world that he did not intend to have recourse to violence if the question could be settled peaceably. Rome must be the capital of Italy, of that there could not be any question, for, as he pointed out, the question of a capital is not determined by climate or topographical reasons, but by moral ones, and Rome combined all the historical, intellectual and moral conditions that must hold sway in the metropolis of a great State.

But neither France, influenced by the reactionary elements that surrounded the Empress, nor the Head of the Church would yield, and Cavour recognised, like Garibaldi, that the sword would have to cut the Gordian knot. Then suddenly on June 6, 1861 Cavour died, not without a suspicion that Jesuit poison had hastened the abrupt removal of this invaluable life, a loss from which it can be said that Italy has not even yet recovered, for many of her errors and misfortunes would have been avoided if that clear-sighted patriot had still held the reins. Cavour was succeeded by Ricasoli, nicknamed the "Iron Baron," an upright, honest man whom Cavour himself had indicated for the post; but he was no Cavour. Nor was his task an easy one. The country was in financial straits, and the thunderbolts of Papal excommunication had been hurled against the young edifice, thus making practising Catholics dubious as to what attitude they ought to assume

towards the kingdom. Further, Napoleon was intriguing and was above all opposed to Ricasoli, whose single-minded integrity he yet had to recognise.

Yet another difficulty arose from the circumstance that the Piedmontese laws as applied to the newly-annexed provinces did not suit the special conditions of the South or correspond to its very different mentality. Even to-day this discrepancy between Northern and Southern Italy, after so many years of union, still exists. Brigandage, the perennial scourge of Southern Italy, was rampant in all its evil strength and pretended to assume a political character. The exiled Bourbons called in pillage and rapine as their accomplices, and foreign adventurers, French, Austrian and Spanish, together with malefactors long wanted by the police, joined the bands who spread a reign of terror and of pillage through the whole of the late Neapolitan kingdom. A few of the leaders acted in good faith and really thought they were defending the Bourbon cause. The bands also received valuable assistance from the peasants, who looked on the brigands as the avengers of the wrongs from which they had so long and cruelly suffered, regarding them as liberators and heroes. The campaign against these brigands, whose political character was soon merged into pure lawlessness, gave Italy many a hard nut to crack, and only quite recently has brigandage completely died out in the South. In those early days the struggle lasted for over five years and needed the help of 100,000 men before it was comparatively rooted out.

Ricasoli was accused of not distinguishing the real brigands from the men who sincerely defended the legitimate cause; his prohibition of any preparations for military action against Rome also aroused enmity against him in certain quarters. He was a devout Catholic, but he disapproved of the Church's subordination of her spiritual to her material interests, and hoped to persuade the Pope to renounce claims that did harm to the spread of true religion. He was one of the few Italian statesmen who dealt with religious questions from a broad standpoint and with a deep religious faith, and this attitude was soon to cost him his ministerial position.

Garibaldi openly disapproved of him and even contemplated returning to America, since it looked as if the question of Rome was hopelessly shelved: for he did not believe that the Pope would yield, except to force. His friends restrained him. They pointed out how the so-called party of action was working in concert with Mazzini and also *sub rosa* with the King,

preparing bold measures for the conquest of Rome and Venice. Committees were formed in many cities to collect funds and to enrol volunteers for the cause of complete national unity; and every one of these committees was devoted to Garibaldi and looked to him as the liberator and leader. This agitation led to the fall of Ricasoli, who was succeeded by Ratazzi, a less able and upright man, who knew how to utilise all parties and preferred crooked paths to straight—though even he, in his crooked ways, was a patriot.

Garibaldi put little faith in him and was justified in his mistrust; for when, in 1862, growing impatient and hoping to repeat the glorious feats of the Thousand, he set out with the object of invading the Trentino and so liberating Venice, Ratazzi grew alarmed and ordered the arrest of the first nucleus of volunteers at Sarnico—for he had been intimidated by the hostile attitude of Austria. There is really every excuse for Ratazzi's action. The very young kingdom of Italy found itself between the devil and the deep sea, i.e. between the open hostility of the Catholic party and the secret but no less active hostility of France. Garibaldi protested energetically against these arrests, and the men were liberated. He himself retired to Caprera in high dudgeon. But he did not remain there long, and on June 28 he landed at Palermo.

It happened that Prince Humbert, afterwards King Humbert, was in the city, and the Prefect of Palermo seized the opportunity to propose a toast, saying that he hoped that Victor Emmanuel might shortly, arm in arm with Garibaldi, mount the steps of the Campidoglio and there receive from the people the crown of King of all Italy. Pallavicino, the Prefect, was recalled on account of this speech, but no other action was taken against Garibaldi, who went over much of the old ground he had covered in his glorious campaign, gathering a vast following of volunteers. At Marsala a voice in the crowd called out "Rome or Death" and Garibaldi forthwith took it as his watchword. With 2,500 volunteers he crossed to Calabria and took up a position on the heights of Aspromonte. Here he was surrounded by a force of Bersaglieri who demanded his surrender. Victor Emmanuel's Government had been forced to take this step because of the pressure brought to bear by France and Austria, who declared that if Garibaldi entered the Papal domains they should regard it as a *casus belli*. It was hoped that no shots would be fired, and Garibaldi forbade his men to attack their brothers. Unfortunately this order was not obeyed. Both sides opened a sharp fusillade, and

Garibaldi was wounded in the right foot. Whereupon he was made prisoner and sent to the fortress of Varignano, near Spezia, but was liberated a few months later, on the occasion of an amnesty, when he once more returned to Caprera, a saddened though not embittered man.

The nation was dissatisfied. Garibaldi was their idol, they held that his patriotism had been ill requited. The Government was in a fix. They dared not annoy the French, who still held Rome and supported the Papacy; the country was in a disorganised state, especially the newly-acquired South; revenue was diminishing, the deficit increasing. Ratazzi resigned, to be followed by Farini and Minghetti. Quintino Sella, the ablest Finance Minister Italy ever possessed, endeavoured to bring order into the disordered finances. The Roman and Venetian questions also kept the country dispirited. Garibaldi never ceased to agitate. Thus he issued a stirring appeal on behalf of the Poles, to whose aid he wished to rush, hoping thus to provoke an insurrection in Hungary and other provinces subject to Austria and thus facilitate the liberation of Venice and the Trentino from their clutches. To further his aims Garibaldi in 1864 went to England, hoping that the British Government would concede him support and money to carry on a war against Austria. He was received in a manner that has never been paralleled. The enthusiasm his person aroused was immense, the cheers that greeted him on his first arrival stunned him with amazement. He had never heard such a roar even from his own excitable countrymen. But fêted, revered and honoured though he was, he could not attain his end. None of the representatives of the Powers were friendly except the Minister of the United States, and after a while the English Government thought it more prudent to hint to him that his visit, welcome though it was, had better come to an end.

Meanwhile the Italian Government had opened negotiations with France concerning the Roman question, and these resulted in the compromise known as the September Convention of 1864. This stipulated that Italy should protect the Papal frontiers from all attacks from outside, and that France should gradually withdraw her troops: complete evacuation to take place within two years' time. Further, that Italy should waive her right of protest against the internal organisation of the Papal army, unless it enlarged to such proportions as to become a threat to the Italian kingdom; and lastly, that the Italian capital should be removed to Florence.

This latter proviso had been inserted at Napoleon's suggestion, who thought that once the seat of government was removed from Turin a number of local interests would combine to retain it where it was, and the dream of Rome as Italy's capital would be relinquished. This Convention roused general discontent. It was regarded as a virtual abandonment of Rome as the eventual capital. There were riots in the streets of Turin, which curiously enough began on the 20th of September, a date that was later to become so glorious in Italian annals. The Government had again to resign, and La Marmora, a Piedmontese, was called to office. He inaugurated many excellent reforms, among them, aided by the genius of Sella, a concrete programme for the restoration of the national finances on a better basis. This involved great sacrifices on the part of the taxpayers, including the restoration of the hateful Grist Tax, known as the Hunger Tax; but the tax did its work and brought millions into the national exchequer.

In June 1865 the capital was removed to Florence, on the six-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Dante, a fact that was regarded as of good augury, for Dante too had dreamed of a united Italy. During this time Garibaldi, Mazzini and, as is now known, even Victor Emmanuel himself, were plotting how to liberate Rome and Venice from their hated masters. The opportunity came in a somewhat unexpected guise, though Cavour's long-sighted vision had foreseen its feasibility. Bismarck proposed to La Marmora that Italy should ally herself with Prussia in case of a war waged by the latter against Austria. In April 1866 this secret treaty was signed in Berlin, according to which the Powers were to declare war upon Austria if within three months she did not accept the Prussian proposals regarding the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and the formation of a new German constitution, the contracting parties agreeing not to conclude peace until Italy had acquired Venetia, and Prussia a territory equivalent in population. Napoleon tried as usual to intrigue. He did not desire the aggrandisement of Prussia, and he obtained from Austria the promise to cede Venetia to Italy if the latter would abandon the Prussian alliance. But Victor Emmanuel never went back on his word or his signature.

In June 1866 war was declared on Austria. The Italian preparations seemed good and their troops were superior in number to the Austrians; but they were ill equipped and ill led, and on June 24 they suffered a severe defeat (for the second time) at Custozza. The Prussians meantime had won

one of the decisive battles of the world—Sadowa—and Austria, hoping to set free troops with which to avenge herself, proposed to cede Venetia to Napoleon, who should pass it on to Italy. The offer was refused. It was incompatible with loyalty to Prussia, and moreover Italy hoped to obtain the Trentino also, for Garibaldi, who had been sent to attack that district, was marching from victory to victory. Then on June 22 Prussia signed the preliminaries of peace with Austria without consulting her ally, who though loyal had been unfortunate. For before that date the young Italian fleet, from which so much had been hoped, had sustained a crushing defeat at Lissa and lost many ships and many men, owing largely to the incompetence of Admiral Persano. She was therefore once more a beaten nation whom victorious and arrogant Prussia could disregard. The Austrians, though defeated, were still strong and able to demand that the evacuation of the Trentino must precede the signature of peace. It was a cruel demand that aroused something like rebellion among Garibaldi's volunteers, who had sacrificed so much and fought so splendidly to "redeem" that province. But the order was explicit, imperative. "Obbedisco" (I obey) was the laconic telegram sent by Garibaldi. He was never greater than at that moment. A saddened, disappointed man, he marched his heroic band away from the lands that were still for so many years to groan under the hated Austrian yoke.

The comedy of ceding Venetia to Napoleon, who ceded it to Victor Emmanuel, was played, and on November 7, 1866, Victor Emmanuel entered Venice as her king, to the joy of all her inhabitants. "This is the greatest day of my life," said the King; "Italy is made, though not yet complete." Still, the victory was not without its sting. It was somewhat humiliating to the Italians that they had gained this success, not by the valour of their own arms, but by that of Prussia.

The Trentino, Venezia-Giulia and Dalmatia from 1848

While the rest of the Peninsula was gradually throwing off the Austrian yoke, the provinces known as the "terre irredente" (the unredeemed lands) felt bitterly disappointed that the campaign of Garibaldi which had opened so auspiciously was brought to so abrupt a conclusion. This question, hardly even yet quite fully settled, of "unredeemed Italy" has caused much ink to flow from diplomatic pens, has excited and still excites much controversy, has been the cause of much suffering, and has given occasion for much heroism.



MEETING OF GARIBALDI AND VICTOR EMMANUEL AT TEANO
(From the painting by Carlo Ademollo)

Istria had been marked out by Dante as the frontier of Italy :

“ Siceome Pola prossio del Quarnero
Che Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna.”

Still, many strips of coastland that lie opposite to the Peninsula were colonised by Rome and guarded for four hundred years by Venice. Venetian memorials are met with at every turn, miniature St. Mark's *campanili*, Venetian architecture is dominant. St. Mark's lion guards the entrance-gates to the cities. As has been truly pointed out, the political subjugation of this country to Italy dates from the time of Augustus, its political subjection to Austria from Napoleon I. It was bartered away at Campo Formio (1797), and the Holy Alliance did not restore it as it had vowed to do. True, the Italians are now everywhere on the whole in the minority, as far as numbers go, but the speech that goes there is largely Italian, and the culture above all is not Slav nor German. The Slav, if left to himself, is more drawn to the Italians than to the Germans, despite all the bad blood and the artificial nationalisation that has been created since the Great War. No less a person than Moltke in 1866 advised the Italians to make a descent on the Dalmatian coast, advice unfortunately not followed; and so the psychological moment to solve this burning question was lost and an open sore rendered yet more acute, while the Italians too grew yet more Italian in feeling and hopes.

As for the Trentino, it had already passed through a long period of cryptic conspiracies and agitations, and when the news of the insurrection at Vienna reached Trent on March 19, 1848, the inhabitants hoisted the Tricolour and demanded to be annexed to Venetian Lombardy which was rising against Austria. Next day the municipality sent fraternal greetings to Mantua, instituted a National Guard and issued a proclamation which stated that “the Trentino has long sighed for the moment when it can be conjoined to its own people.” The example of Trent was soon followed by Ala, Riva, Rovereto and other cities. The inhabitants wore tricolour cockades, ran up the Italian flag on their mountain peaks and gave other outward signs showing where their sympathies lay. The young men formed themselves into a Tridentine Legion, ready to rush to Italy's aid. Austria declared the city in a state of siege, and in April the forces met. Many a young Tridentine was made prisoner and hanged on the public gallows. They died to the cry of “Evviva

l'Italia," as did their successors Battisti, Sauro, Filzi and others during the Great War. Trent once more came under Austria's relentless grasp, but its inhabitants never ceased to keep alive their *Italianità*.

The news of the Viennese uprising had also been heard at Triest and evoked an imposing manifestation of joy. The city was illuminated and Metternich's portrait burnt to the sound of curses, whilst to the streets, cafés, theatres and squares were assigned Italian names in place of the Austrian. The Landgraf announced that a constitution had been granted, and at night the chief theatre was packed to hear the play *Disfida di Barletta*, which made a great appeal to the patriotic feelings of the audience.

But the demonstrations were repressed all too soon by Austria's iron hand. Still the national sentiment they had awakened was only smothered, not killed. Other Dalmatian cities followed suit and enrolled Civic Guards, and the cry of *Evviva San Marco* was echoing along the whole littoral when the news arrived that Venice was once more a Republic. But here too the movement was speedily repressed. Repressed but not killed, kept aflame too by the many Istrian and Dalmatian youths who studied at the Italian Universities, for Austria would not permit of an Italian faculty in any of her cities. And during the sieges of Rome and Venice the men from the opposite shore nobly gave of their aid in money and in blood.

At Trent and Triest the Germanic Confederation met with dogged opposition. The Tridentine delegates protested at Frankfurt against their arbitrary assignment to this body, and Triest went so far as to refuse to send envoys to Frankfurt. Their first deputy to the Vienna Parliament announced that he was "the deputy of the King of Italy." Istria too was opposed to the Germanic Confederation. But it was all in vain. Austria with cunning subterfuge and by means of her usual methods suffocated these voices. Indeed, she inveighed more than ever against the cities who had so openly shown their hostility to her. Nevertheless, during the years of gestation (1850 to 1858) patriotic fervour increased in volume and intensity and so did the persecutions, the rigours and the punishments. In short, the existence of these "unredeemed" Italians was a struggle carried on from generation to generation.

In 1858, when the trend of events showed that war was imminent, the flower of the Trentino youth flocked in num-

bers to enrol themselves under the Italian flag, overcoming all obstacles which the Austrian Government put in their path, for this large exodus displeased the authorities and caused them much anxiety.

In December 1859 Trieste presented a petition begging that she might at least be accorded the status of a free Italian-speaking city. "If the constitution of Trieste into a free city, the only means whereby our commerce with Germany and other lands can revive and flourish, is refused to us, at least it might be made a province together with the neighbouring Italian districts (Triest, Gorizia, Istria, Dalmatia) with Trieste as its capital, and that a representative government, with a national administration, be accorded to us, if we cannot be freed."

None of them lost faith in their ultimate redemption, though they recognised that it might be long and that the struggle would demand more sacrifices and new victims. The Austrian police increased their vigilance: arrests, perquisitions, reprisals, denunciations, were the order of the day. Their virulence increased as they grew aware that, notwithstanding their efforts, a large proportion of the people escaped their clutches and entered the Italian army, and that much money was diverted from the land to finance the Italian cause. The whole history of this period reads like a romance; the hair-breadth escapes across the frontier, the clandestine letters exchanged between the conspirators, the unquenchable faith in a better future, the adoration for Garibaldi, all speak in these documents that are shortly to see the light now that they can be published with safety.

In 1866 the hopes of the "Irredenti" rose high, for the victories of Garibaldi had inflamed them yet more. Further, they expected much from the fleet. Then followed Garibaldi's recall and the disastrous defeat at Lissa. All their hopes were dashed, and the lands subject to Austria remained subject to Austria still.

When Italy again took up her arms to obtain her capital, Istrians and Dalmatians contributed money and men to the cause, and when Rome was at last freed Trieste, though still enslaved, made an imposing demonstration of joy and of fraternal sympathy in the very teeth of her rulers. Their faith and courage were indeed indomitable and never quenched, though Austria poured a stream of alien immigrants into their lands in order to reduce the Italians' numerical superiority.

And many years had to pass, and much suffering to be

endured, until the Great War of 1914-18 brought light into their darkness.

The Twentieth of September, 1870

The years after 1866 were troubled. The internal difficulties were manifold. A serious insurrection had broken out at Palermo; there was much poverty in the land, with its inevitable accompaniment of unemployment and crime, and discontent was rampant in Catholic circles, owing to the Government's policy of suppressing religious houses and appropriating their property. The Roman question was still unsolved, taxation was onerous, no party was satisfied, and the defeat at Lissa still rankled. Ricasoli's project of leaving the Pope in possession of that portion of Rome known as the Leonine city in which the Vatican is situated, while retaining the Italian administration in Florence, so as to make the Eternal City merely Italy's moral capital, did not meet with favour from either party. Owing to these efforts to reconcile irreconcilable interests Ricasoli fell from office, and Ratazzi was again recalled; he secured to the State the property of the suppressed convents, a measure that very seriously offended the Catholics. Napoleon, according to the Convention, had withdrawn his troops from Rome, though he stated openly that he reserved to himself the right to act on behalf of the Pope should future conditions require it.

Garibaldi, in opposition to Mazzini, thought that a favourable moment had arrived for solving the Roman problem. For some time past he had been touring Northern Italy, addressing meetings and advising the need for action to free Rome once for all from Papal rule. After six weeks of this propaganda, Ratazzi suddenly had Garibaldi arrested. He feared the disapproval of France, though it is known that in his heart he sided with the conspirators. Garibaldi was shipped to Caprera but not guarded, so that he soon effected his escape and to the amazement of friends and foes turned up in Florence; here he continued his work of exhortation, while Napoleon, now more than ever in the hands of the French Clerical party, was forced to intervene; and once again French troops were sent to the support of the Pontiff. For bands of volunteers had marched into the Pontifical States, and Garibaldi had gone thither to put himself at their head. Ratazzi, feeling himself impotent to cope with the existing state of affairs, resigned, and during the ministerial interregnum Garibaldi had a free hand.

A revolution in Rome had been hoped for, but this was not possible. The various Committees were not agreed among themselves as to what course to pursue; they were short of arms, and the most ardent of their number were in exile or in prison. The brothers Cairoli tried to introduce weapons, but they were discovered and attacked by the Papal and French troops, who vastly outnumbered them and their followers. These were either killed or made prisoners.

Garibaldi with his men now advanced towards Rome, where he had hoped to find a revolutionary movement in full swing that would favour his plans. Instead of this, the Liberals were arrested, French reinforcements were approaching and, Menabrea having come into office, all aid to Garibaldi was strictly prohibited. Nevertheless Garibaldi determined to continue the struggle, and he actually defeated the Papal troops at Monterotondo, which left the road to Rome open to him; but on November 3, though he again routed them at Mentana, the French arrived in time to turn his victory into defeat. His band, armed with old-fashioned muskets, could not hold out against the French *chassepôts* employed for the first time. Garibaldi disbanded his men, many of them poor famished lads, and recrossed the Roman frontier, to be once again confined in the fortress of Varignano. He was, however, speedily released and sent to Caprera by order of the Italian Government whose instructions he had disobeyed. Thus ended the expedition of 1867.

It was after this that Rouher, the President of the French Ministry, uttered his famous outburst: "Never shall Italy take possession of Rome, never will France tolerate such insolence directed at her honour and at Catholicism. If Italy marches on Rome, she will again find France blocking her way. Am I explicit?" One wonders whether Rouher in after years ever remembered this famous *Jamais!*

In 1869 the country was still distracted by rival parties, Republican, Liberal and Clerical. Taxation weighed ever more heavily on the people, and yet Italy was forced to spend in order to combat the mediæval conditions of the new States that now belonged to her, and to supply their needs. Railways, roads, schools, sanitation, all had to be provided, and this out of a depleted exchequer. It was a Herculean task to reconcile progress with economy. The country was profoundly unsettled. Mazzini was working for a republic and, true patriot though he was, he thus put obstacles in the path of unity. Fortunately divided counsels among his followers

frustrated the fulfilment of his aims, but the dissensions hindered cohesion, and at last, when he was stirring up what might have proved a serious insurrection in Sicily, the Government had to take him prisoner and disband his followers. All these disturbances prevented the country from settling down.

Then on July 16, 1870 the thunderbolt of the Franco-Prussian war fell upon Europe. After the first defeat Napoleon asked Austria and Italy to enter into an alliance with him; but Italy saw no reason to offend Prussia, and had also a hundred reasons for not engaging in a new war. Napoleon, despite the outcries of the Clerical party into whose hands he had more and more fallen, felt it wise to withdraw his troops from Rome: for if things went badly he could not reinforce them. The withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome took place on August 19, and immediately deputies, populace, even the very diplomatic agents, felt that the hour had struck to wrest Rome from the Pope. Then came Sedan (September 2) and the fall of the French Empire, and even Victor Emmanuel, loyal as he was to his engagements and former ally, felt that Italy was no longer hampered by the agreement concerning Rome made with the French Emperor in 1864. The King wrote a filial letter to the Pope, imploring him to consider the state of Italy and to renounce the Temporal Power and rely only upon the love and protection of Italians in lieu of the support of foreign bayonets. The Pope replied that he would not yield except to violence. The die was cast. At the eleventh hour, when the Italian army already stood outside Rome, efforts were still made to solve the conflict in a pacific sense, but the Pope and his counsellors, who were in favour of war to the knife, carried the day.

On September 20 General Raffaele Cadorna, after a short encounter with the Papal troops, made a breach in the Imperial walls at Porta Pia. The Pope had given orders that resistance should cease if a breach were made. Thus fell that Temporal Power which, given by Pepin in 752, had lasted eleven centuries and had always stood in the way of Italian unification. And thus, as has been well said, "the third Italy drove the second off the walls of the first."

In December the Italian Parliament met for the last time outside of Rome. "With Rome as the capital of Italy," said the King, with just pride, in his speech from the throne, "I have fulfilled my promise and crowned the enterprise that twenty-three years ago was initiated under the auspices of my magnanimous father. Both as a son and a monarch my heart thrills



with solemn joy. . . . Italy is now united. It depends on us to make her great and happy."

Before removing the Government to Rome, the law known as the Law of Guarantees was passed whereby the Pope was assured the enjoyment of all his prerogatives and honours as a sovereign, thus safeguarding his independence and decorum; his palaces and villas were to be exempt from taxation, and an income was to be accorded him of 3,225,000 lire. The Pontiff refused to recognise the law or to accept the allowance, and thus established the intransigent policy that only now shows some slight signs of breaking up.

In July 1871 Victor Emmanuel entered Rome in state. "In Rome we are and in Rome we remain," said he as he entered its gates. And his people could echo the words of an earlier patriot, "*Salve Italia rediviva*." Nine nations had been welded into a united Italy in 1870; but the people had still to be welded.

"Now that we have made Italy we must make the Italians," said Massimo d'Azeglio.

"But that"—as Rudyard Kipling would say—"is another story."


CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST YEARS OF MONARCHY

1871-1876

THE war of 1870 occasioning the withdrawal of the French troops from Civita Vecchia had enabled the Italian Monarchy to recover for Italy Italy's historic capital—Rome (September 20, 1870). From a practical point of view this was perhaps not an unmixed advantage. Rome is neither the geographical nor the economic capital of the Peninsula, and it suffered and still suffers under the disadvantage of incompatible associations. Deserted by the civil it had been taken possession of by the ecclesiastical empire; and though the latter was no longer the redoubtable world-wide power it had once been in days when all countries were ruled by monarchs to whom excommunication was a real terror, it still had its faithful adherents, its hierarchic organisation and its diplomatic representatives, and through them wielded considerable political influence in many lands. Italian statesmen knew well enough that to lay hands on the Sacred City could bring a hornets' nest about their ears. But the name of "Rome" was too precious an heirloom to be renounced. It was the Crown of Italy's achievement and the symbol of her right to be accepted as one of the "Great Powers." So Rome was taken and the Sovereigns of Italy henceforth dated their official utterances from "The Quirinal."

The same circumstance which had made possible the capture of the city also mitigated the storm which inevitably followed. France and Austria, the only countries in which the Pope could hope to raise any formidable movement of indignation, were too weary of fighting to go beyond protests and pin-pricks. Of these, however, there were enough for some years to keep Italian statesmen in a continual state of nervous tension. By the "Law of Guarantees" passed during the last session of the Parliament of Florence in May 1871 they did all that could reasonably be expected of them to assure to the Pope the freedom and the means to exercise his spiritual powers.



GENERAL VIEW OF ROME AS SEEN FROM THE VICTOR
EMMANUEL MONUMENT

But Pius IX refused to acquiesce in the loss of his temporal possessions and powers.

The faithful in all countries were bound to regard as sacrilege the very gentle violence done to the Head of the Church. Sympathy with the Pope was, however, more conspicuous abroad than in Italy, where it had been cooled by the reactionism of Pius IX after 1849 and overshadowed by Nationalist enthusiasm. The appeal made by Pius IX to the Catholic Powers for intervention to restore the Temporal Power met with no official response. The Habsburg Government had recently annulled the Concordat established in 1855 and was on its defence against Church encroachments. The French Government had, like Napoleon III, to hold the balance between Clericals and Liberals. In private, Thiers (President 1871-73) and still more MacMahon (President May 1873-January 1879) might give countenance and encouragement to the agitations of the clergy for French intervention on the Pope's behalf, but in public both were obliged to disown and discourage it. Their Catholic sympathies were indeed less openly displayed at home than they were in Italy, where various of their official actions gave extreme offence to the new régime. Such were the accrediting of a full-blown French ambassador to the Vatican, whilst only a Minister Plenipotentiary was sent to represent the Republic in Florence, this official being in addition forbidden to accompany the King on his formal entry into Rome; and the retention of a French frigate at Civita Vecchia until 1874, for the nominal purpose of taking off Pius IX in case he chose to retire from Rome. The irritation caused by these and other incidents naturally found more or less public expression in the Chamber and elsewhere, and thus fresh irritation was caused. The election of the Monarchist MacMahon to the Presidency in May 1873, reviving as it did the hopes and the propaganda work of the Clericals, together with the improvement in the prospects of Monarchism produced by the agreement concluded in the same year between the Orléanist Comte de Paris and the Bourbon Comte de Chambord, further quickened Italian fears of a Catholic régime in France.

Under these circumstances it was natural that Minghetti, who replaced Lanza as Italian Prime Minister two months after the accession of MacMahon to the French Presidency, should think it necessary to look about for support for the infant kingdom, and no less natural that his thoughts should turn in the direction of the yet more lately established throne

of the Hohenzollern. Between the two royal families a personal tie had already been formed, and when in 1873 Victor Emmanuel received from Francis Joseph an invitation to visit the Great Exhibition at Vienna, the occasion was seized for entering into closer relations not only with Vienna but with Berlin also. Victor Emmanuel, accompanied by his Prime Minister Minghetti and by Visconti Venosta, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, was amicably received at both courts during September 1873. His reception at Vienna could be regarded as an assurance to Italy and to the world that desire for peace outweighed in the mind of the Habsburg his sympathies with the Papacy, and that intervention on behalf of the Temporal Power had not to be feared from that quarter. The visit to Berlin was proof both of the weakening of the gratitude, dependence and sympathy which had united Italy to France and of the readiness of Berlin to forgive Victor Emmanuel's known efforts to bring Italy in on the side of France in 1870. The return visits paid by Francis Joseph in the spring and by Wilhelm in the autumn of 1875 served to confirm these impressions. At the same time there were indications that the Powers whose friendship Italy was courting as a protection against the menace of French intervention were themselves not inclined wholly to ignore the Roman question.

During the King's visit to Berlin Bismarck, whose prime interest at that time it was to eliminate from the completely national Empire of his ideal a cosmopolitan and potentially anti-national element, namely, the Catholic or Centrum party, is said to have—paradoxically but no doubt sincerely—found fault with Italy for having, by the “Law of Guarantees” and by leaving to the Papacy no attackable territory, actually strengthened its position. At a later date he was to take a very different and a less sincere attitude towards the Roman question. In the entertainment of Victor Emmanuel at Vienna the scrupulous piety of the Empress Elizabeth did not permit her to take any part; and the consideration for the Pope's feelings shown by both Emperors in declining to make Rome the scene of their return visits—Francis Joseph with ostentatious magnanimity chose Venice and Wilhelm Milan—was a further reminder to Italians that the gap in their armour was to remain open.

Evidence of the *rapprochement* was soon afforded by the elevation to the rank of Embassies of the Italian Legations at Berlin and Vienna and of the German and Austrian Legations at Rome. The fact that a similar adjustment of diplomatic

relations followed shortly between Italy and France, taken in conjunction with other indications, such as the recall of the *Orénoque* frigate from Civita Vecchia in 1874, shows that the demonstration had not passed unobserved.

1876-1881

The accession to power in Italy of the Parliamentary Left in May 1876 was followed at a short interval in France by the pronounced victory of the Republican Party led by Gambetta with his famous cry of "Le Cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi!" Thus French-Italian friction was diminished and Italy's need of an Ally became less urgent. At the same time a *rapprochement* with the Central Empires was made more difficult by the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary and by her irritating treatment of her Italian subjects.

At the beginning of 1877 Russia, in order to buy off Austrian opposition to the contemplated war with Turkey (June 1877—March 1878), by which she hoped to recover the prestige and influence in the Balkans lost in the Crimean War, agreed, by the accord of Reichstadt (January 15, 1877), to leave Austria a free hand in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it was expected that Austria would take advantage of the Russo-Turkish War to occupy these provinces. The prospect was naturally alarming to Italian statesmen. The Dual Monarchy already held the gates of Italy in the Alps, through which it could at any time threaten Italy with the invasion of her richest province, as has been amply illustrated in the Great War. The occupation of Bosnia would have supplied the other jaw of a veritable pincers ready to close upon Italy.

But at the same moment the crisis of May 16 in France, by restoring a Clerical Ministry under the Duc de Broglie, again threatened Italy with a reopening of the Roman question.

Thus doubly menaced, the Italian Government was driven to look about for some escape from the isolated position in which the country was placed, and it again turned its eyes towards a German alliance. To Depretis (now Prime Minister) it seemed that to Germany the assurance of Italian support against France would be more than an equivalent for German support of Italian claims on Austria-Hungary. Accordingly in August 1877 Francesco Crispi, who then held the position of President of the Chamber of Deputies and enjoyed the confidence of the Government, started on a round of visits to the capitals of Europe, commissioned to feel the ground. The

impression apparently left on his mind by his conversations with French statesmen was that, though at the moment France was as much afraid of Italian as Italy was of French aggression, MacMahon might at any moment execute a *coup d'état* with the support of the Clergy and the Army. At Gastein, where he had an interview with the German Chancellor, Crispi explained the double menace with which Italy was confronted and proposed that Germany should enter into an alliance binding herself to support Italy in case of her being forced to fight either France or Austria. Bismarck replied that in case of a French attack on Italy Germany would be prepared to make common cause with the latter, but he refused even to contemplate the case of hostilities with Austria. Crispi introduced the subject of Bosnia and emphasised the strategic grounds for Italy's opposition. She could not possibly permit the occupation, he said, and urged the Chancellor to use his influence with Andrassy, to dissuade him from all idea of expansion in Ottoman territory. To this Bismarck replied that Austria was following a wise policy and would, he had reason to believe, persist in it. Her relations with Germany were friendly; if she changed her attitude, Germany would be with Italy; but there was no reason to expect that she would, and he was not going to give her any pretext for doing so. As to the Eastern question, Germany was not interested in it. If Austria took Bosnia, why should not Italy take Albania or some other piece of Turkish territory on the Adriatic? If Italy were to involve herself in opposition to Austria he would be sorry, but Germany would not go to war for that. "A Turkish province on the Adriatic is not what we want," said Crispi: "we should not know what to do with it. We have no frontier on the East; Austria is astride of the Alps and can enter the kingdom when she chooses. We want nothing from anyone else; we shall faithfully observe treaties; but we want to be safe in our own castle. Speak to Count Andrassy about it."

The interview eventually closed with the semi-official and provisional acceptance by Crispi of an alliance limited to the case of an attack on Italy by France, and a non-committal assurance from Bismarck that he would take the Emperor's orders in the matter. From his subsequent visits to London and Vienna Crispi reaped little fruit. Lord Derby gave him a general assurance of sympathy, would not commit himself in regard to "Compensation in the Alps," and, like Bismarck, suggested Albania as an alternative to the Trentino. From

Andrassy, whom he saw at Pest on October 20, he got nothing whatever. Triest was indeed mentioned by Andrassy as a possession which Italy might desire but in which she "could not maintain herself for a single day"; and it is noteworthy that Crispi deprecated the suggestion that Italy could desire Triest, going so far as to call it a "ridiculous imputation."

In October 1877 the French General Elections resulted in a complete defeat of the Clericals. The menace to Italy from this quarter was thus removed. There was therefore no such pressing need of the German support as to induce the Italian Government to accept an alliance which gave no guarantees of support as against Austria. The negotiations were dropped. Not so the hope of extracting concessions from Austria. If the Italian Government on two occasions during the spring of 1878 refused to take part in combinations with England to which Austria was also to be a party, with the object of defending their common interests in the Balkans, it was because they cherished the hope that Austria, if left to herself, might become involved in difficulties with Russia which would oblige her to be less unyielding in the matter of "Compensations in the Alps." The hope was not fulfilled and, at the Congress of Berlin (June 1878) while Austria acquired Bosnia-Hercegovina, England Cyprus, and France the concession of a free hand in Tunisia, Italy came away only with "clean hands." She might have had Albania, but to accept it would have been equivalent to renouncing her claims on the *terre irredente* and to acquiescence in the assignation of Tunisia to France.

The occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria and the right conceded to her by the Berlin Congress to police the Montenegrin waters of the Adriatic caused the Italian Government to reconsider its rejection of the Albanian proposal, and in 1880 there were rumours, denied by the Government, of an intention to occupy Albania. The years which followed the Congress at Berlin saw an awakening of interest in Albania and in Balkan politics generally, not only among Italian statesmen but in the Italian public at large. Italy's representative at the Congress was blamed for allowing Italy's rights to be ignored by the Powers. We might regard him rather as worthy of praise, if we could believe that his moderation was evidence of superior political morality or of a far-seeing judgment on the future of Balkan politics. The truth seems to be that the Italian Government was too deeply preoccupied with home affairs and problems and too conscious of the weakness and isolation of the country to have thought out or boldly to pursue

an independent foreign policy. Italy simply allowed herself to be treated as of no account at this turning-point in the evolution of the Eastern Question and of the European "Concert"; and she thereby placed herself in a position of permanent moral disadvantage in her relations with the Powers.

By the war of 1859 Italy had recovered Lombardy, and by that of 1866 Venetia. At the close of the latter campaign Garibaldi was already on the march for Trent and Cialdini for Triest when in deference to the interests of Italy's allies they were recalled. Thus the rounding-off of Italian unity was deferred for fifty years. The hopes of the Italian people and of the army had been set on the recovery of Trentino and Triest, and the baulking of these hopes just when success seemed to be within their grasp made an indelible impression. The "unredeemed provinces" (*terre irredente*) became the object of a national sentiment which the always irritating and sometimes brutal methods of Austrian administration never suffered entirely to die out.

This sentiment, though exploited by Chauvinists during the Great War, was essentially generous, spontaneous and worthy of respect. It centred round the names of the revolutionary and internationally-minded idealist Mazzini and of Garibaldi, the hero of the simple, and was always stronger in the Italian people than in the governing classes. It was compounded of disappointed hope, real sympathy with men of the same blood left under the heel of despots whom Italians had good reason to loathe, sense of national danger and growing national consciousness. The exact limits of the "unredeemed territories" have tended to vary with political conditions, but in the sixties and for many years afterwards it may safely be said that, both for the Italian people and for Italian statesmen, the phrase implied Trentino, the line of the Isonzo, Triest and Istria. It had been confidently expected that the incorporation of these provinces would follow naturally on the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy and the Veneto, and in the negotiation of peace the claim to the Trentino was expressly raised by the Italian Government but disallowed by Napoleon and Prussia on the ground that they had only pledged themselves to the recovery of Venetia.

Italy's claims to the Trentino were threefold. They were in the first place ethnographic and historical. As far north as a line drawn about halfway between Trent and Bozen the population showed and still shows an overwhelming Italian majority, the minority of non-Italians being actually smaller

than the corresponding element in the population of Milan. With the exception of a few years (1797-1806) during which by the whim of Napoleon I it was first united to Austria and then to Bavaria, the province had been Italian since Roman times, and its assignment to Austria at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was a mere matter of dynastic convenience. Of the strategic significance of the Trentino to Italy a French military authority writes: "Le plus grand avantage des Autrichiens en Italie consiste dans la possession du Tyrol, pays montagneux qui s'avance dans la plaine et la domine comme une citadelle. . . . Le massif des Alpes du Tyrol, ainsi jeté au centre même de l'Italie, a toujours fourni aux empereurs de l'Allemagne leur base d'opérations contre la péninsule et a été le grand obstacle à l'indépendance de ce pays," and we have already quoted the expressions used by Crispi in his conversation with Bismarck.

Economically the transference of the province to Austria was its destruction. Forming one political unit with the German Tirol, it suffered under a maliciously one-sided administration, which discouraged its industrial development and hampered its trade with its natural markets in North Italy. Its natural resources are by no means negligible. Its chief products are vines and mulberries with some cereals. It is rich in forests, and its mountains are said to contain lead, mercury, copper, silver, iron and coal. But of the greatest importance is its wealth in so-called "white coal"—the water-power with which Italy hopes to make good the Peninsula's almost complete lack of mineral coal and which she has already done much to develop. But under Austria its existing industries languished and its potentialities remained undeveloped. Its incorporation in Italy could not but confer a blessing both on Italy and on the Trentino.

To Triest and Istria Italy's claims were, at the date of which we are speaking, stronger and more obvious than they now are. Slav civilisation was undeveloped, and a Slav union had hardly been dreamed of. The ratio of Italian to Slav population and of Italian to Slav influence on the eastern border has continually decreased, partly from natural, but in a greater degree from artificial causes—Austria's deliberate policy since 1866 having been to promote Slav and discourage Italian expansion by every sort of administrative trick. We need not here discuss present Italo-Slav differences. In 1866 the *Italianità* of Triest and Istria was generally recognised, and if they had been recovered by Italy at that time no one could have raised any objection on the ethnographic score.

The disappointment of Italian hopes at the Congress of Berlin, by drawing the attention of Italians towards the position of their country in face of Austrian expansion in the South-east, revived the Irredentist agitation already stirred into fresh life by an incident to which the death of Victor Emmanuel (January 1878) had given occasion. The Italian population of Trieste were not to be restrained from doing honour to the Liberator of Italy, and paid his memory the tribute of a quasi-public mourning. A demonstration took place outside the Italian Consulate, and when the remains of the great King were carried to the Pantheon the ceremony was attended by a deputation from Venetia Julia carrying a wreath with the inscription "Triest to its King." The leaders of the Irredentist movement, among them the aged Garibaldi, had taken advantage of the occasion to remind Italian patriotism that its work was not yet completed. Irredentist clubs and propaganda sprang into renewed activity. At Venice the news of the occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary occasioned an anti-Austrian demonstration in which the Austrian arms were torn down from the Imperial Consulate. In July 1878 an Irredentist Congress was held at Rome under the presidency of Garibaldi's eldest son, which demanded by a unanimous vote the immediate occupation of the unredeemed provinces.

Sporadic demonstrations on the Italian side, answered on the Austrian by Press attacks, threats and even by Government action of a retaliatory character, continued during the following three years. The Italian Government was placed in the embarrassing position of having to disown, threaten with repression and apologise for an agitation with which it was really in sympathy, and the frequent recurrence of this necessity in the period which followed contributed not a little to create a breach of sympathy between people and Government which has become chronic in Italy.

Thus in the latter years of the decade under review, while Italy's relations with Austria were becoming dangerously strained, the establishment of the Republicans in power in the French Chamber, and presently in the Senate and the Presidency, had removed what had hitherto been the chief cause of estrangement between the two Latin nations. The Alliance concluded in October 1879 between Austria and Germany still further accentuated the isolation of Italy. An alliance between the two Latin Powers seemed natural and obvious, and might have been realised but for the statecraft of Bismarck.

Internal Troubles

The internal history of Italy during this period is "the history of a struggle for more liberal measures and more democratic government against the morbid conservatism and immobility of old parties, old States and old tendencies."

The Government of United Italy had a prodigious work to perform. The difficulties and expenses involved in the achievement of unity were in themselves a sufficient burden, but to these were added the *damnosa hereditas* of bad government, public demoralisation and neglect of public works taken over from the preceding régimes, the work of reorganisation and re-education inseparable from the unification of provinces which had a long history behind them as separate States, and the opposition between a universal Church and a national State.

Large expenditure of public money was urgently demanded on all sides and for a multitude of purposes—army and navy and national security generally, railways and communications, agriculture, education, public work. These could only be met by the vastly increased taxation of a population already burdened almost to the limit of endurance.

The evasion of taxation became a high art and the work of collection more and more difficult and costly.

At the same time the tide of political feeling was also rising. The Right—whose leaders were Sella, Minghetti and Spaventa—was felt to be representative rather of the traditions of Piedmont than of Italy. Its Liberalism had not kept pace with the times, and after the achievement of national unity and freedom had tended to sink into immobility.

In March 1876 Depretis formed the first Ministry of the Left, and in the autumn of the same year General Elections resulted in a crushing defeat of the Right.

The programme of the Left on its accession to power included "electoral reforms and extension of the suffrage; full liberty of conscience; freedom of speech, of the Press and of association; the renunciation in principle of all legislation against political opponents, with reservation of the right to repress subversive action, if necessary; in matters of finance, the abolition of the grist-tax, the redemption of the forced paper currency and the regularisation of the land tax; in public works an extensive development of State railways and the concession of their working to private societies."¹

¹ Stillman, *Union of Italy*.

In its composition the party was strongly progressive and democratic. By the Right, and in such monarchical countries as Germany, the accession to power of a party which included out-and-out Republicans was regarded as a most dangerous experiment. But self-confidence inspired by the overwhelming character of its victory at the polls soon led to disintegration. The party was split up into divergent groups. Personal and regional rivalries tended to take the place of political principles. Thus the years from 1876 to 1879 show a rapid succession of short-lived Ministries of the Left as one leader or one tendency gains the upper hand. As a consequence the reforms which the triumph of the party had seemed to make immediately realisable were delayed for years. Yet the need for them was urgent, and the agitation which centred round them absorbed the attention of the Government and the country to the exclusion of equally important external interests.

Thus is explained the feebleness of Italian foreign policy during these critical years. Failure to formulate to themselves in a practical spirit the essential interests of Italy in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and failure to seize the opportunity offered by the negotiations between the Powers which preceded and followed the Russo-Turkish War of placing them on a secure basis, were mistakes of which Italy is still feeling the effects. Her self-effacing conduct during these negotiations and in particular at the Congress of Berlin led to her exclusion from the new combinations into which the European Powers crystallised after 1878. Her friendship was not worth having. She was not wanted. The subsequent history of her foreign policy is one of feverish effort to catch up the occasion which she had allowed to escape her.

CHAPTER IX

FIRST PHASE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1881-1887

The Conclusion of the Alliance

WHILE the eastward-looking Powers—Russia and Austria, with Germany behind the latter since 1879—were occupied in pursuing their rival interests in the Balkan Peninsula, France and England were tightening their hold on North Africa, both as a field for commercial expansion and as providing further bases for control of the Mediterranean.

In a forward colonial policy Napoleon III had found a useful means of reconciling the missionary interests of Clericals with the commercial interests of the French middle class. Between 1864 and 1870 French rule in Algeria—established under Louis Philippe (1830-47)—had been consolidated by the work of Marshal MacMahon. After the disaster of 1870 the eyes of French statesmen again turned to Africa as a field on which the losses suffered in Europe might be partially retrieved. Geographically Tunisia is continuous with Algeria, and French expansion in that direction was perfectly natural. It was equally natural that Italian aspirations should turn to the same quarter. The Mediterranean is here but a narrow channel bridged by Sicily and forming an easy transit for Italian emigrants to a country where climatic and physical character differ little from that of their native land. The Italian colony in Tunisia greatly outnumbered the French. Commerce, education and communications with Italy had undergone considerable development. Economically and culturally it may be said that in 1880 the country was earmarked as Italian. Politically, however, the same lack of confidence and energy which had paralysed her action in the Balkans had allowed things to drift in regard to Tunisia. The action of the Government had been limited to lending support to a rather irritating economic competition with French enterprise and to indirect expressions of Italian pretensions to the possession of Tunisia. In 1877 Bismarck had taken means to let the Italian Government know that an occupation of Tunisia

by Italy would not meet with opposition from Germany, but Depretis had not acted on the hint. In the following year at the Congress of Berlin the same suggestion was made to the French Government by the British representatives as a set-off to the British acquisition of Cyprus. It is probable enough that the suggestion originated with or was at least approved by Bismarck. His Machiavellism would not shrink from the duplicity of such a simple means of providing a diversion for the enemy.

The French Government, irritated by Italian methods and having a good occasion offered them by border raids from Tunisian tribes, finally occupied Tunisia in 1881.

The conclusion of the Treaty of the Bardo (May 1881) aroused the intensest feeling among Italians, some of whom saw in the French action another step forward in a policy aimed at the encircling of Italy in the Mediterranean. The possibility of renewing the traditional friendship with France seemed to have been finally destroyed. At the same time Italy was more than ever conscious of her isolation. Her thoughts naturally turned towards an alliance. But with whom? From the statesman's point of view England was too powerful and too much aloof from Continental interests; Russia's military weakness had been betrayed in the recent war with Turkey, and alliance with her would create further difficulties with Austria. Anti-Italian feeling in Austria had been intensified by the recent outbreak of Irredentism, and Germany seemed to be the only possible ally. There was much to recommend an alliance with her, even though it should involve alliance with Austria. Germany was strong enough but not too strong. Pan-Germanism was not yet born. She was disinterested in the Balkans and presumably also in the Roman question. It might be hoped that the alliance would lead to a mitigation, perhaps to removal of the cause, of Austro-Italian differences. To Germany Italy's alliance would be of real value as a means of menacing France's southern frontier. Thus a strong case could be made out and was made out by Italian publicists, of whom the recent (1918) Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Sidney Sonnino, was one, for seeking an alliance with Germany. If the Italian public was induced to swallow the pill represented by alliance with Austria, it was helped to it by the desire, uppermost and very efficient at the moment, to be even with France, to give the insolent French a cold shiver.

Germany desired the alliance and took the first discreet

steps towards inviting it. But foreseeing that Italy, if she had a chance, would raise the question of concessions in the Alps and determined to "keep her in her place," Bismarck feigned indifference and succeeded in forcing Italian diplomacy into the position of suitor. Not only this, but he insisted that "the way to Berlin lay through Vienna." Worst of all in the preliminary manœuvring for position, Italy entered into negotiations at a disadvantage. She had to make the advances and dared not raise the question of the *terre irredente*. Indeed the original basis proposed by Mancini, the Italian Foreign Minister, was that of mutual support in maintenance of the *status quo*—a virtual renunciation of Italy's claims against Austria. Her attempt to secure acceptance of a clause by which the Central Empires would have been pledged to support Italy's Mediterranean interests in return for Italy's support in the Balkans was refused. Italy for her part declined to fall in with the German desire to insert a clause binding the Governments to pursue a strictly Conservative policy in home affairs. Thus the substance of the treaty reduced itself to the original ground of the *status quo*. There was much hesitation on the part of Italy. Depretis, her Prime Minister, Francophil, anxious to be friends with all the world and conscious of Italy's financial dependence on France, chose the moment when the way to the alliance was being opened by the visit of King Umberto to the Court of Francis Joseph (end of October 1881) for signing the long-discussed Treaty of Commerce with France. But a choice had to be made.

What finally inclined the balance was the threat of Bismarck to open up afresh the Roman question. Early in 1882 he sent a representative to Rome to offer the "prisoner of the Vatican" an "asylum" at Fulda. At the same time inspired articles in the German Press raised the question of the Temporal Power and suggested that it should be made the subject of an international discussion. It was an ingenious manœuvre. It touched Italy on the raw, it pleased Austria and it helped to conciliate Catholic feeling in Germany.

The treaty was signed on May 20, 1882. While Germany and Austria both gained solid advantages—the former a valuable support for her not yet assured military superiority, and the latter relief from the threat to her southern frontier—Italy, of the three practical objects nearest to her heart—support against France in the Mediterranean, recovery of the *terre irredente* and the closing of the Roman question—had only the last and least important to set against the serious losses

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represented by the final alienation of French sympathy and the renunciation of her national aspirations in the Alps. Thus the Alliance was, as it stood, a decidedly one-sided compact. Nevertheless, if its terms had been interpreted by the Central Empires with loyalty and goodwill, it might have worked out in such a manner as to provide Italy with the security necessary to her national well-being. In spite of the sinister auguries provided by the preliminary negotiations Italy could not certainly foresee that its ostentatiously defensive character would be abused by her Allies to screen an insidiously offensive policy in the prosecution of which Italian interests would be ruthlessly sacrificed and her susceptibilities only considered when there seemed to be danger of her breaking loose from an alliance which had become a bondage.

Italy in Africa

There is always an element in European civilisation which fails to find satisfaction in the normal civilised life of business and politics and which requires an outlet. Nowadays aviation satisfies the need. In the second half of the nineteenth century it was Africa which attracted all that was adventurous or enterprising, not only in Great Britain but in Europe generally.

As early as 1870 the private Italian Shipping Company of Rubattino had purchased from the local Sultan with money advanced by Government the bay of Asab and a neighbouring island—distant 40 miles from Perim and 150 from Aden. The Khedivial Government at once objected, claiming with doubtful right that Asab lay within the boundaries of Egypt. In face of these difficulties the Italian Government desisted from its plan of regularising the position of Italy's first African possession, which remained for the present a mere private trading settlement. About 1880 the Italian Government again took the matter in hand and was proceeding to act when the British Government intervened. Lord Salisbury objected to a military occupation, but was willing that the commercial settlement should be maintained subject to an agreement with the Khedive. In 1880 Mr. Gladstone succeeded Lord Beaconsfield, and in 1882 an agreement was come to between the British and Italian Governments. In July 1882 Asab was placed formally under Italian sovereignty. This was the beginning of official Italy's colonial adventures in Africa.

Meanwhile the insurrection of Arabi had occurred. France

and Italy, invited by the British Government to co-operate in putting it down, both refused. France was jealous of British influence in Egypt, now enhanced by Disraeli's purchase of the Suez Canal shares in 1875, and was not disposed to help the British out of difficulties which France had herself helped to create and of which she hoped eventually to reap the fruits. Depretis, the Italian Prime Minister, obstinately clinging to the hope of reconciling the German Alliance with the retention of French goodwill, and uncertain of the approval of the German Empire, let slip a precious opportunity of retrieving past errors and of harnessing the star of Italy to that of Great Britain in Africa and the Mediterranean. In signing the Triple Alliance Depretis had stipulated for secrecy. Noting Italy's efforts to conciliate French sympathies, Bismarck was not too scrupulous in his observance of the compact; and, although the text was not published, the conclusion of the treaty became common knowledge. French-Italian relations suffered in consequence; England, left to act alone, promptly suppressed the Nationalist insurrection under Arabi (1882) and became henceforth supreme in Egypt.

Blamed for their timid behaviour in regard to Tunisia in 1881 and anxious to give some satisfaction to popular aspirations in Africa, the Italian Government with the consent of England, then embarrassed by the Mahdist insurrections, decided to establish a second Italian settlement at Massawa, a point on the African coast immediately to the north of Abyssinia. Here a landing was made in January 1885. Having no value apart from its hinterland, its possession was bound to lead on to complications with the rulers both of Egypt and of Abyssinia. England, while willing to recognise occupation by Italy of the port of Massawa, refused consent to the hoisting of the Italian flag in place of the Egyptian.

In undertaking this second enterprise in the Red Sea Italian statesmen had at the back of their minds—but dared not formulate, still less affirm openly—a large scheme of African expansion. British abandonment of the Sudan would leave the basins of the Atbara and Upper Nile open to any Power which should establish a base on the neighbouring Red Sea coast, and subsequent penetration from the Red Sea via Kassala and Khartoum would not have to encounter the opposition of any European Power. This scheme would find its complement eventually in a second advance, either from the Mediterranean or from the posts occupied during the first, on Tripoli and its hinterland, the Lake Chad basin, Tibesti and Wadai.

Tripoli was already in 1885 recognised as Italy's reversion. Its occupation had been suggested to her by France as a satisfaction for her disappointment in Tunisia, but she had shrunk from acting on the suggestion for fear of raising the question of Ottoman territorial integrity. The settlement at Massawa looked not towards Abyssinia but towards the Sudan. It should have been the first step in the realisation of the grandiose but, at the time, not impossible design or dream which remained "Italy's final objective until England's new policy in the Sudan was recognised by the di Robilant Government in 1891." The Anglo-Italian protocol of 1891 forbade the Nile basin to Italy and so shut her down to an Abyssinian policy—the eventual linking-up of Eritrea and Somaliland—and made an approach from the Mediterranean her only means of realising the northern half of her scheme.

The actual Massawa enterprise, however, was not the outcome of any popular appreciation either of the practical and economic advantages of colonial expansion or of its moral value as a school of national character and a form of self-affirmation. It was undertaken impulsively to satisfy national *amour-propre* and was fitfully and timidly pursued. It was encouraged by the British Government, then in trouble with the Mahdi and anxious to find a counterpoise to French penetration from Obok. The Italian Government, in fact, relied on British co-operation, and when this failed and the victories of the Mahdi made an advance towards Khartoum a dangerous enterprise, it shrank from acting alone; Italian undertakings were minimised.

The idea of advancing to Kassala and the Sudan was first entertained and then given up. Yet Massawa without a hinterland was ridiculous, while to advance in a southerly direction would involve difficulties with the European friends of Abyssinia, France and Russia, who looked askance at the pretensions of Italy. The Negús was approached with a view to friendly co-operation, but the occupation of certain border positions by the Italians made it difficult to reassure him. His attitude was distinctly hostile. The advent of Lord Salisbury to power in 1885 made the situation still more menacing for Italy. Discontent and alarm at home shook the position of the Government. Mancini resigned and was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by di Robilant, who did something to restore confidence. He placed General Gené in sole command, giving him instructions to seize the first opportunity of affirming Italian sovereignty and control over the

territory occupied, but not on any account to think of extending it. The first order was carried out without opposition from Egypt or the Porte; but for reasons of security and health it was necessary to disobey the second part of the instructions. A fresh and more imposing embassy to the Negús was arranged for and actually despatched, but, in view of disorders in the country and the possibility of accidents to the expedition which might involve Italy in a war, was recalled by orders of the Government—a fresh offence to the dignity of the Negús.

The anxiety of the Government to avoid all appearance of aggression in Africa and to escape criticism at home led to the neglect of ordinary precautions, and the reduced garrison of Massawa was even left without direct telegraphic communications. Meanwhile various semi-official expeditions into Harrar and Gojam had ended calamitously and increased the hostility of the Emperor John. The Italian advanced posts were in a dangerous position. Reinforcements were asked for but refused. On January 24, 1887 the dreaded disaster arrived. A small force of Italian regulars with some fifty native troops, in attempting to relieve an advanced post besieged by the Abyssinian general, Ras Alula, was surprised and cut to pieces on the heights of Dogali. The extraordinary heroism shown by the Italian soldiers accentuated the indignation and excitement aroused in Italy on the arrival of this news. Various Ministers had to resign. War was declared against Abyssinia, and Italy was committed to the forward policy which she had dreamed of and desired, but had hesitated to embark upon.

Italy in Europe

No obligation was incurred by Italy under the terms of the Triple Alliance to increase her armaments. Indeed, the advice of the German General Staff was for a reduction in number accompanied by an increase of efficiency and especially of mobility. Nevertheless the partnership with militarist Germany acted as a spur to Italian *amour-propre* and led to a vastly increased expenditure on Army and Navy. In June 1882 a sum of more than 121 milliards was voted by acclamation in the Italian Chamber for national defences. The number of army corps was raised from 10 to 12 and the number of first-line effectives from 330,000 to 430,000.

Improvement in efficiency and mobility was not in proportion to the increase in numbers. Military interests were

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subordinated to political and social ones, and under Depretis Italy was in no danger of becoming "militarist." He had entered into partnership with Germany, but still clung to the hope of maintaining friendly relations with France. On the eve of the conclusion of the Alliance he had signed a long-discussed Treaty of Commerce with France (November 1881). In the following year he had, in order to please France, refused an invitation from the British Government for co-operation in Egypt. Even so late as January 1884 he assented to the abolition of consular jurisdiction in Tunisia, thus virtually recognising French sovereignty. These Francophil tendencies could not be welcome in Berlin, and when in 1884 Bismarck entered into the famous "Re-insurance" compact with Russia, Italy was not informed. As the fact of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance leaked out, the alienation of France became inevitable, and Italy, having failed to get from the Central Empires any definite promise of support in the Mediterranean, turned, apparently with Bismarck's consent, towards England. The landing at Massawa was undertaken only after the approval of the British Government had been obtained and in the hope of co-operation with the British in the struggle with the Mahdists of the Sudan. The last act of di Robilant before his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1887 was to secure an unwritten agreement with the British Government by which apparently the *status quo* in the Mediterranean was to be maintained and the protection of the British fleet was promised to Italy in certain contingencies. Italy's colony of Somaliland takes its origin from settlements effected at this period at the suggestion of England with a view to putting a check on French expansion from Obok.

In internal and Parliamentary affairs this is a crucial period of Italian history. It witnesses the first growth of what was known as *Trasformismo*—a disease destined with its *sequelae* to become chronic in Italian public life.

Even before 1876, when the Left came into power, the confusion of the characteristics which usually distinguish a Conservative from a Liberal party had begun. The Right, in spirit Conservative but at one with the Left on the question of the Church, preferred to be called "Moderate Liberals" or "the Constitutional party." The revolutionaries and republicans who gave the party of the Left its distinctive tone had by this time with few exceptions, becoming fewer every year, accepted the Monarchy as the condition of national unity and in many cases defended it as jealously as any of those

members of the Right whose traditions were inherited from the old Piedmont régime. They could with equal truth label themselves Constitutionals, differing from the Right not so much in programme as in temperament. While the Right, having accomplished unity and the "free Church in the free State," were inclined to rest on their laurels or to "ca' canny," the Left were in a hurry to create the ideal democratic State.

We have seen how their very preponderance had led to disintegration. Disintegration, along with the slight differentiation in regard to measures, led to amalgamation of first one section and then another with the more progressive groups of the Right, until party distinctions became obliterated and were replaced by transitory groupings dictated by personal preferences or interests. Deputies called themselves Depretini, Nicoterini, Cairolini, Crispini and so forth after the chief whom it suited them to support at the moment. This was largely the work of Depretis, who with short interruptions was Prime Minister during eleven years (1876-87). He was regarded as the only statesman capable of combining a sufficient number of the various groups to form a working majority and was again and again reinstated after resignation. He was cool, easy-going, and cynically-minded though personally honest, and he possessed a supreme knowledge of the element in which he worked. He gave every man his turn and set the pernicious example of using the funds and powers of which his position gave him control for the purpose of manipulating elections and securing adherents.

Italy, but not the Italians, had been united, and it was the task of the Government during this period (1876-87) to realise as far as possible the programme of reforms which had formed the party platform in 1876, without giving rein to the revolutionary and republican minority; to hold fast to the sheet-anchor of the Monarchy without calling in the aid of the extreme Right, who were still intriguing with the Vatican and the friends of the Vatican. Revolution was still a danger, and special measures of police were thought necessary at the time of Victor Emmanuel's death and the accession of Umberto I (January 1878). The death of Pius IX in the following month was made use of by the College of Cardinals to advertise the grievances of the "prisoner of the Vatican." They threatened to hold the Conclave outside of Italy, and only desisted in face of the dilemma with which Crispi (then Minister of the Interior) confronted them. The State would ensure absolute freedom to the Conclave if it were held in Rome; if the Cardinals preferred

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to go abroad, they would be protected on their journey to the frontier; but if the Church once abandoned the Vatican, the State would take possession and the new Pope would not be allowed to reside there. The Conclave was held in Rome.

The funeral procession of Pius IX provided another opportunity for attracting the world's attention to the Roman question. Owing to defects in the police precautions taken, hostile demonstrations were made and provoked loud protests from the devout and from the partisans of the Vatican.

It was clear that the ashes were still smouldering and might still be blown into a flame.

The disintegration and the infidelities of the Majority forced the Government into compromises and temporary alliances. The work of reform suffered in consequence. The extension of the Franchise in 1881—it had until then remained on the basis fixed by the original Statuto of 1848—was too sudden. The number of electors was, in consequence of the lowering of the property and educational qualifications, almost quadrupled. *Scrutin de liste* was adopted at a time when there were no organised parties to provide a basis for it. The repeal of the grist-tax in 1880 was a sop to popular clamour which crippled the finances for the time and brought very little benefit to the consumer. Public money was lavished by the Government on railways and public works with less consideration of public utility than of popularity and votes.

Nevertheless the country had freed itself from a régime which threatened to cramp its growth and had entered upon a period of extraordinary vigour and effort to affirm and to realise its position as one of the Great Powers of Europe. Commerce and industry advanced in spite of frequent crises. Genoa, partly in consequence of the opening of the St. Gotthard tunnel, was able to enlarge its port and to become a great Central-European emporium. Agricultural problems were thoroughly studied and improvements initiated. The multiplication of railways contributed to the obliteration of local distinctions. The Army and Navy underwent great development, and the system of recruiting was placed on a democratic basis. The extension of the franchise eventually did something to narrow the gulf between Government and People.

If her foreign policy was feeble, it has to be remembered that Italy as a Nation-State was at the opening of this period barely in her teens; that the task of building up and adjusting the institutions of the new State and of consolidating its heterogeneous elements had first claim on the Government and was

sufficiently complex to absorb most of its attention; that Italy came upon the European scene when the players had already grouped themselves, and, being on one side the child of Revolution and Republicanism, was looked upon with mistrust and suspicion by "Divine Right" Monarchists and Conservatives in all countries. When the old combinations broke up over the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Italy had the chance of finding her place, but, as we have seen, she was as yet too weak and undeveloped to take the independent line which would have gained for her the respect of the older Powers and caused her friendship to be sought after. As it was, the Berlin Congress left her out in the cold; and when the scramble for Africa began and she felt herself to be betrayed and threatened by France in Tunisia, her state of isolation was no longer tolerable. The Triple Alliance was the only escape which offered.

Fortified by this and by the prospect of support from England, and feeling that if she delayed longer there would be no place left for her in Africa, she had embarked with excusable haste upon the Massawa enterprise. It was an audacious undertaking for so young a nation and it was not a success; but it represented a foothold and had its value both as an act of self-affirmation and as an exhibition of Italian heroism. Dogali had shown that even in a hopeless cause the Italian soldier could fight valiantly and die at his post for Italy.

CHAPTER X

1887-1898

Relations of the Powers in 1887

THE revolution which united East Rumelia to Bulgaria in September 1885 had reopened the Eastern question and brought about a re-orientation of the Powers of Europe.

Austria, England and Italy were at one in opposing Russia's desire to undo the work of the Philippopolis revolution. So long as Bulgaria was willing to make itself an outpost of Russian influence in the Balkans they had found their interest in a limited Bulgaria. Now that it seemed determined under Stambulov to shake off Russia's domination, they looked on an enlarged Bulgaria with a different eye.

Germany, while at heart unwilling to see Austria overshadowed by Russia in the Balkans, was anxious to delay the Franco-Russian *rapprochement* already appearing on the horizon and therefore took up an attitude of formal but limited complaisance towards Russia in the international negotiations which took place over the Bulgarian question; and in November 1887 she renewed the secret treaty of "re-insurance" with Russia.

France supported the Russian contention, and entered upon the diplomatic movement which was eventually to lead to the Franco-Russian Alliance.

Italy thus found herself indirectly opposed to France in the Balkans and co-operating with England.

The same situation in respect of England, France and Russia was repeated for her in Africa and the Mediterranean.

In Somaliland the efforts of the French, established since 1881 in Obok, to extend their influence in these regions, and the aspirations of Russia to a "religious" protectorate over the Christians of Abyssinia, were equally distasteful to England and to Italy and provided the conditions for the collaboration of the two Powers in South-east Europe.

The Triple Alliance had already (on February 21, 1887) been renewed, and its scope enlarged in favour of Italy to the

extent that the *status quo* in North Africa was guaranteed against possible French encroachment, and that a clause was inserted (Article VII of the 1902 Treaty) by which Austria and Italy pledged themselves to respect the *status quo* in the Balkans and, in the case of either contracting party being compelled in self-defence to take action which should result in an alteration of the *status quo* to its own advantage, to recognise the right of the other party to compensations. The British-Italian Accord of February 12, 1887, to which Austria gave her adherence on March 24, assured to Italy the support of Great Britain also for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and connected seas.

Such was the general situation which Crispi found in existence when in the beginning of August 1887 he became Prime Minister.

The name of Francesco Crispi must always stand out prominently in the roll of Italian statesmen. Whether his policy be approved or condemned, it must be granted that he at least had a clear and bold conception of the part which Italy ought to play in the world. He had been a man of action from the beginning. In 1847 and 1848 as a young advocate of Palermo he had been the brain and soul of Sicily's struggle for independence and constitutional government. He had paid the price of a failure for which he was not responsible by eleven years of exile in England and France. In 1860 he had been Garibaldi's right-hand man first in Palermo and later in Naples. He had at that time opposed the, as he judged, premature annexation of Sicily to the United Monarchy, holding that a period of autonomy was necessary in order that the backward southern provinces might have time to educate themselves to the political level of the more advanced North. On this account and as the close friend of Garibaldi and political pupil of Mazzini he was always disliked and distrusted by Cavour, who nevertheless is said to have acknowledged that Crispi had in him the stuff of a great statesman.

He had been elected in spite of Government opposition to the first Italian Parliament (February 1861), had been a member of all the succeeding Parliaments and since about 1866 the foremost figure in the Parliamentary opposition, the so-called "Party of Action." He was Minister of the Interior in the second Depretis Ministry (December 1877) and did good service in the critical situation produced by the deaths of Victor Emmanuel and of Pius IX. He remained a member of the Government until, in July 1879, he had to bow to the

storm of scandal created by personal and political enemies out of a not very serious irregularity in his domestic relations. He had returned to public life and to the Home Office on the reconstruction of the Depretis Ministry consequent on the Dogali disaster of February 1887. Popular feeling, as a rule indifferent to colonial enterprise, had set strongly against the Ministry on that occasion. It refused to hear of a withdrawal from Africa and demanded that the affront to Italian military honour should be avenged. Thus Crispi, when on the death of Depretis he became Prime Minister (end of July 1887), found the Italian public in a mood which made possible the forward policy in all quarters which suited his ambitious temperament and his conception of Italy's destiny. He was recognised as the man of the moment. As Prime Minister, Home Secretary and the Minister *ad interim* for Foreign Affairs he was for the time more powerful than any Minister since Cavour.

It at once became apparent that the old policy of self-effacement in foreign relations would be abandoned, that Italy's position in the Triple Alliance was no longer to be minimised and as it were apologised for by attempts to propitiate France, but to be made the basis for a positive policy, which without departing from the defensive character of the Alliance should command instead of begging for the respect of other Powers.

In 1886 di Robilant, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, had declined an invitation from Bismarck to visit him from fear of giving offence in France. A similar invitation was accepted by Crispi without hesitation, and the visit to Friedrichsruhe, undertaken in October 1887, only a few months after his accession to the Premiership, had value chiefly as a demonstration of the more active interpretation he intended to give to the *Triplice* and of his intimacy with Bismarck. There was no special occasion for a consultation, and the only practical point discussed seems to have been Crispi's proposal to complete the treaty by a Military Convention. This was concluded during the winter, and there is authority for believing that it pledged Italy to send a certain number of army corps to Germany in case of offensive action by France, without securing any counter-pledge of German protection for the coasts of Italy in the like event. The Convention was labelled secret, but through "indiscretions" at the Italian Court it became known to the French Government and helped to embitter relations between Italy and France.

On his return to Italy, Crispi improved the occasion in his

public speeches by singing the praises of Bismarck—"the old friend of Italy"—and dwelling with almost truculent emphasis on the value of the Triplice as a bulwark of European peace. In February 1888 Bismarck obtained from the Reichstag a fresh increase in the Army vote and about the same time took occasion to make public the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879.

Crispi and France

These gestures on the part of Crispi were not intended as an actual challenge to France, but were merely his manner of proclaiming to the world and committing Italy to an abandonment of the old "peace-at-any-price" policy. But they were ill-received in France, and the tense state of feeling between the two countries found expression in a number of "incidents" of greater or less importance at points where French and Italian citizens came into contact with one another. The most important results, however, of the bad feeling were felt in the economic field. The former Franco-Italian Treaty of Commerce, signed in 1881 on the eve of the conclusion of the Triplice, had been denounced in December 1886, and the negotiations for a new Treaty, begun in December 1887, had been dragged out in consequence of the uncompromisingly Protectionist tendency prevalent on both sides. It was apparently in consequence of the Military Convention becoming known in France that the negotiations were suddenly broken off by the French delegates in May 1888.

Thus began the War of Tariffs between France and Italy which was for a decade to come to have disastrous effects on Italian commerce and agriculture, and which contributed to the success of Germany's economic penetration of Italy. This breach was followed by a fresh series of collisions between French and Italian citizens and officials in Florence and Modane, in Massawa and Tunisia. In some of these the Italian Government intervened with protests couched in rather hectoring language. Crispi seems to have been bent on showing the French that Italy could give as good as she got. A large increase of the Italian Army Vote in the Budget for 1888-89 was interpreted in France as another menace.

During the same year there were fresh advertisements of the growing intimacy between Rome and Berlin. In August 1888 Crispi was again at Friedrichsruhe by way of preparation for the already announced visit of Wilhelm II to Rome. Wilhelm I

had died in March. At the time of his father's death Frederick III was staying at San Remo, where the desperate condition of his health made him an object of interest to the sympathetic Italians. He had returned to Berlin to reign only for a few months and had been succeeded by Wilhelm II in June. The young Emperor was accompanied on his visit to Rome by his brother Prince Henry and by Herbert von Bismarck. The mere fact that he was the first sovereign to visit the King of Italy in his new capital made a great impression in Italy, which was strengthened by the gracious if rather self-conscious behaviour of one who could not forget that he was the successor of the Hohenstauffen. In the following spring (May 1889) the visit was returned by King Humbert, who was received at Berlin in great state. Crispi, who accompanied him, had conversations with Bismarck which make it clear that, while the Chancellor was seriously thinking of precipitating a war with France before the Franco-Russian friendship should have time to mature into an alliance, Crispi refused to be drawn into the scheme and even tried to interest Bismarck in pacifist proposals for a compromise over Alsace-Lorraine.

The advent of Crispi to power took place when the Boulangist movement in France was at its height. The French Army had remained a hotbed of Monarchism, and General Boulanger, who became Minister of War in 1886, had captured enormous popularity and a large following by Jingo talk of a "war of revenge." A wave of nationalist and anti-German feeling was passing over France. During the years 1888 and 1889 the excitement reached a dangerous pitch, and in July 1889 reports of an imminent French invasion of Italy by land and sea seemed to Crispi sufficiently probable to induce him to order special preparations to meet the danger.

The fall of Bismarck in March 1890 considerably weakened the prestige of Crispi. The years which followed were marked by a tendency to *rapprochement* between Germany and England and the beginnings of more friendly relations between England and France. The Republican reaction which succeeded the ignominious downfall of General Boulanger in 1889 led in its turn to a relaxation of tension between France and Germany. Italy, persevering in an anti-French policy, found herself unable to engage either the British or the German Government in the uncompromising resistance to French expansion in Africa which she desired. While French-Italian negotiations (July 1890) for the delimitation of their respective claims round Obok and Assab were broken off owing to Crispi's insistence on the recog-

dition of Italy's privileged position in Abyssinia, the British Government by its accord with France of August 5, 1890 had recognised French rights to a zone of influence in the hinterland of Algeria and Tunisia. The agreement caused alarm in Italy, where it was feared that the zone might be extended to include the oases of Ghadames and Ghat necessary to the caravan communications of Tripolitania with the Lake Chad basin. This recognition by the British Government was given in return for French recognition of the British Protectorate over Zanzibar, as compensation for which Heligoland had been ceded to Germany (July 1, 1890). Vain attempts were also made by the Italian Government to enlist the diplomatic support of Germany and England against France—in June and October 1890 in regard to the fortification of Bizerta by the French, and in July 1890 in regard to a report that the French Protectorate of Tunisia was to be converted into absolute sovereignty.

Red Sea Colonial Enterprise

Colonial expansion was the centre of Crispi's ambitions for his country, and it is clear that he nursed the hope of realising the large scheme to which reference has already been made—an Italian corridor from Eritrea via the Southern Sudan to Tripolitania. His policy in Europe aimed mainly at creating the conditions which would make it possible for Italy to compete successfully with the other Powers in Africa. In colonial enterprise he saw a means of increasing the prestige of Italy, a source of national wealth and a school of national character. His first concern therefore in taking office was to restore the position on the Red Sea coast compromised by the reverse suffered in January 1887. The Negús John had applied to Great Britain to intervene with Italy with a view to negotiating a peace; but Crispi refused to pledge himself to refrain altogether from further occupations. Italy had no intention of occupying any part of the territory of Abyssinia proper, but she must take the strategic steps necessary to secure her position. The suggested mediation came to nothing.

Already before the death of Depretis the Italian Government had been inclined to make approaches to Menelik, the King of Shoa, with a view to securing him as an ally against his suzerain, the Negús John. Depretis had shelved the question, but under Crispi this policy was adopted. The Negús, after advancing to a point, Ailet, lying within the territory occupied by Italy but claimed by him as part of Abyssinia according to the terms of

the British-Abyssinian Treaty of 1884, had retired again without coming into conflict with the Italian forces, and now turned upon Menelik, King of Shoa. Menelik applied to the Italians for aid. The death at this juncture of the Negús John made it easy for Menelik with Italian help to establish himself as King of Shoa and Tigre and as Negús Nagasti (King of Kings). In this capacity he in May 1889 concluded with Italy the Treaty of Ucciali, by which the frontiers dividing Abyssinia from the Italian colony were defined in a manner which gave considerable extension to the Italian possessions and which prepared the way for an Italian Protectorate over the whole Abyssinian country. In particular Article XVII of the treaty provided that the Negús should make use of Italy as intermediary in his dealings with other European Powers.

In August Ras Makonnen, the Governor of Harar, came to Italy at the head of an Abyssinian mission, which was received with a great display of honours and festivities. Details of the treaty were discussed and explained, and a further convention was concluded with Ras Makonnen by which a loan to the Negús of 4,000,000 lire was secured on the customs dues of Harar, which Italy was to have the right to administer if the interest were not paid regularly. Thus an economic penetration by Italy into the most profitable region of Ethiopia was foreshadowed.

In January 1890 the Italian possessions in the region of Massawa were by Royal decree constituted a single colony under the name of Eritrea (Red Sea Land), which was to have its own budget and administration under a civil and military Governor.

The Treaty of Ucciali had been hurriedly concluded, and the agents of France and Russia, who were jealous of Italy's growing influence over Abyssinia, were not backward in pointing out to Menelik that he had committed his country to a virtual protectorate of Italy. Article XVII (regarding Abyssinian communications with other Powers) was repudiated by him, and long discussions followed with the Italian envoy regarding its interpretation and on the question of boundaries. No agreement could be reached, and finally Antonelli, the Italian plenipotentiary, left Shoa and returned to Italy, leaving the treaty virtually in suspense.

Meanwhile Di Rudinì had replaced Crispi as Prime Minister (January 1891). He was at heart opposed to all colonial expansion. Italy's business, he held, was not in Africa but in putting her economy on a sound basis. He was inclined to

contract the boundaries of the colony to the narrowest possible limits. Difference of opinion also arose between the Government and the colonial authorities on the question of trying to retain the friendship of Menelik or of siding with one of his rebellious sub-kings.

Here we may anticipate a little, and recount briefly the end of the Abyssinian adventure.

In December 1893 Crispi returned to power, and the forward policy was resumed. War with Menelik began in the winter of 1894. The Italian arms gained several victories, the news of which was received with exaggerated delight in Italy. But in the following winter the tide of fortune turned. The vassals of Menelik rallied to his standard. The Italian General Baratieri, urged on by Crispi's taunts and anxious to snatch a victory before the arrival of Baldissera, who was on his way to supersede him, determined, with the approval of the majority of his staff—although his forces were ill-equipped and amounted to only 20,000 men as against nearly 90,000 of the enemy—to risk a decisive action. The Italian columns, fighting over difficult and insufficiently-explored ground, were attacked piecemeal and encircled by the superior numbers of the enemy. Two Generals were killed, there were 8,000 killed and wounded and more than 2,000 prisoners. Such was the disaster of Adua (March 1, 1896), the memory of which still casts a shadow on Italian colonial enterprise.

The news of it produced in Italy a violent storm of anger and consternation, and nothing was left to the Government but to resign. Long negotiations with Menelik followed, and peace was only concluded in October. Italy recognised the complete independence of Abyssinia and notified the Powers of the fact. The Treaty of Ucciali was thus abrogated and Italy's Red Sea colony limited to its present frontiers.

The Italian colony of Somalia, extending from Cape Guardafui to the northern back of the River Juba, had meanwhile (1889-91) been created in virtue of various conventions with local sultans.

In Crispi's conception the triangle based on the two Italian colonies and to be completed by the Protectorate of Abyssinia had been only one end of the corridor of which the Eastern Sudan (not yet reclaimed by England) and the hinterland of Tripolitania were to form the central portion, while the northern and more important end was to reach the Mediterranean. Crispi's insistence, in the discussions opened with the British

Government in October 1890 for delimiting the frontiers of Eritrea and the Sudan, on Italy's right to a permanent occupation of Kassala sufficiently indicates the direction of his thoughts. Di Rudinì, resuming these negotiations, abandoned the idea of expansion in the Sudan and signed the Agreement of April 1891, which set precise limits to the territory which Italy was to be permitted to occupy in the Eastern Sudan and stipulated that any points occupied should be given up to the Egyptian Government so soon as it was in a position to reassert its sovereignty. Thus Crispi's great scheme was reduced to nonsense, while the reverse suffered at Adua threatened with destruction the one fragment of it which had been realised. Nevertheless the idea lived on in a modified form in the minds of Italian publicists.

On the merits of Crispi's statesmanship Italian opinion has always been deeply divided. For Imperialists, whether of the German theoretic and nationalist, of the French "gloire," or the British "business" type, he is the Grand Old Man of Italy—the patriot who would fain have made his country great, and only failed because his country had not the wisdom to understand or the courage and constancy to carry through his policy. To the democratically-minded he appears as a hot-headed megalomaniac who, blinded by conceit and fancying himself to be the intimate when he was in reality only the tool of the Great Chancellor, quarrelled with the natural and traditional friend of Italy and, ignoring the political and economic immaturity of his country, hurried it into wild-cat schemes of colonial expansion of which the only fruit was a lasting burden on the nation and a pestilent heritage of imperialist hankerings.

The historian, who views things objectively and unemotionally, is concerned neither to exalt nor to condemn. He sees that, at the moment when Crispi rose to power, Italy was in danger of becoming a nonentity as a European State, that her policy of self-effacement could not but have a demoralising effect on national character, and that if Crispi did not make Italy respected by the other Powers, he at least made her a calculable quantity in international councils and gave her a definite policy and a definite attitude which were preferable to the non-committal opportunism of his immediate predecessors.

It is true that the Italian people was not ready to play the part for which he cast it and that the performance ended in fiasco, but it may be questioned whether even the premature and unsuccessful effort to realise a great national ambition

may not have done more at that juncture to consolidate national character than a continued acquiescence in self-effacement could have done.

In regard to the final failure of his plans, it should be remembered in justice to Crispi that he had for some time wished to recall General Baratieri, but had delayed doing so in deference to a Court clique hostile to his general policy, that the disaster of Adua might possibly have been retrieved had the spirit of the people been less mercurial, and that, at a time when co-operation with England in the Eastern Sudan was practical politics, realisation of his larger scheme may well have seemed an attractive possibility.

It may be added that in the eighties the temptation to take a hand in the general scramble for colonies was, especially for a maritime Power, very strong indeed. To renounce colonial enterprise was a confession of weakness, and Italy was at one with Crispi in claiming the rank of a Great Power.

What is undeniably true, however, is that Crispi, by his exaggerated distrust of France and by his pugnacious and provocative gesturing, did much to create the very dangers he dreaded. It was necessary no doubt to make it clear to France that Italy could no longer be her satellite, but less irritating methods would have been more dignified and equally effective.

To return. The Marquis di Rudinì, who in June 1891 had replaced Crispi, was a member of the Right and had been a severe critic of Crispi's policy, and we have seen that by signing the agreement with England of April 1891 he had done his best to put an extinguisher upon Crispi's larger scheme of African expansion. Under his régime colonial responsibilities and expenses were cut down, and French expansion whether in Ethiopia or on the Tripolitan frontier found little opposition either from his Government or from that of the Radical Giolitti who succeeded him in May 1892.

But, in spite of the reaction against Crispi's policy and in spite of the efforts made by a section of the Chamber to get the Triple Alliance denounced, Italy could not without incurring an isolation more dangerous than that of 1881 resist the pressure put upon her by the Central Empires to renew it. The renewal took place in May 1892 for a period of ten years, and a clause was now added to the Treaty to the effect that the *casus fœderis* should not bind Italy to take up arms against Great Britain. In November treaties of commerce were

negotiated with Germany and Austria by which fresh markets were secured for Italian exports, to compensate for the loss of trade with France caused by the tariff war which still continued.

Italy in 1891 returned to a policy of "peace and retrenchment" which added nothing to her prestige, but found its justification in the accumulation of financial troubles and irregularities which threatened to undermine her economic stability and her credit. Di Rudini did little to overcome these difficulties; while Giolitti, who succeeded him, was so far incriminated by the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into a series of bank scandals in which the Government was involved that in December 1893 he was driven to resign.

Under Crispi extreme Radical and Socialist propaganda had been fiercely repressed. Giolitti's Government relaxed the restrictions. Partly as a consequence of this relaxation insurrectionary movements broke out during the latter days of his Ministry in Sicily and in the mining district of Tuscany, which threatened to spread to other parts of the country. On the resignation of the Giolitti Government, public opinion was in such a state of alarm that it called for the return of the strong man Crispi. As Minister of the Interior Crispi rapidly suppressed the insurrection, while Sonnino, who went to the Treasury, was able so far to remedy the financial situation as to restore public confidence.

During his second tenure of power (1893-96) Crispi was too much preoccupied with internal colonial difficulties to pursue an aggressive European policy. Official relations with France were entirely correct, though the ill-feeling between the two people continued to express itself from time to time.

On Crispi's final fall in March 1896 Di Rudini was recalled to the Presidency of Council and resumed his policy of retrenchment and quiescence. His abandonment of Italian pretensions to a protectorate over Abyssinia has already been noticed. In occupying Kassala as an advanced post against the Dervishes in July 1894 Crispi had been obliged to recognise the conditions imposed by the Protocol of April 1891, and in 1897 the place was given up to the Egyptian Government. By careful economies and the reduction of the military expenditure the deficit in the Budget was greatly reduced.

In his foreign relations Di Rudini's aim was, in his own phrase, "while firmly maintaining the Triple Alliance, to interpret it in such a manner as not to disturb in any way Italy's good relations with Russia and France—relations which I propose

to render more and more cordially, sincerely, and I may almost say more affectionately, friendly."

It will be noticed that in this pronouncement England is not mentioned, while Russia is coupled with France. A shifting of position had taken place during the preceding few years. Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, had renounced the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, while the existence of the Franco-Russian Entente had been proclaimed by the visit of the French fleet to Kronstadt in July 1891. England, in conflict at several points with Russia and France, had drawn nearer to the Triple Alliance. But Italian friendliness with France from 1896 onwards and her dubious attitude towards England had produced a temporary coolness between the Italian and British Governments. In September 1896 a new convention in regard to the rights of Italian subjects in Tunisia was concluded, while Italo-Russian friendship was indirectly strengthened by the marriage in 1897 of the then heir to the throne and present King of Italy—Victor Emmanuel—with Helena of Montenegro.

The last days of Di Rudini's two years' Ministry were troubled by the outbreak of serious riots in Milan, in face of which he resigned office (July 1898).

CHAPTER XI

THE FAILING OF THE ALLIANCE

Inter-State Relations and Interests (1897-1908)

THE end of the nineteenth and the opening years of the twentieth centuries witnessed a process of readjustment going on in the relations of the Great Powers of Europe, determined by the growth of Germany into a World-Power in rivalry with French and still more with British colonial expansion and by the shrewd policy of M. Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1898 to 1905. When Delcassé came into power, the "Dual Alliance" between France and Russia was already in existence. But the energies both of Russia and France were being dissipated in competition with Great Britain for expansion in the East and in Africa. The combination was not strong enough to be a match for the Teutonic Empires nor to assure to France the attainment of Delcassé's cherished aim—the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. To obtain the friendship of Great Britain would therefore represent a double gain—an adversary the less and a friend the more. The way had already been pointed by the Franco-British Agreement of 1890 in regard to Madagascar and North-east Africa. But the friction had gone on increasing until in 1898 it reached a crisis in the notorious "Fashoda incident." Delcassé had the courage and the wisdom to sacrifice the lesser to the greater interest, and France gave up her pretensions in the Egyptian Sudan. A few years later negotiations opened for the liquidation of outstanding points of difference in various parts of the globe, and the "Entente Cordiale" was established. The subsequent understanding reached between Great Britain and Russia in Persia, Afghanistan and China (1907) enlarged the "Dual Alliance" into the "Triple Entente."

The effect of the new combination was not so much to restore the balance of power endangered by German ambitions as to divide Europe into two camps, between which it would be difficult for long to maintain peace—since neither could be

content with the *status quo*, France having her eyes on Alsace-Lorraine, while Germany was pushing steadily eastwards and beginning to be jealous of British naval supremacy.

Italy's interests abroad were threefold. She felt deeply the wound dealt to her national self-esteem and to her national prestige by the disastrous end of her precocious adventure in colonisation, and was obsessed by the desire to reassert her position as one of the Great Powers of Europe.

Her original scheme of African expansion had suffered mutilation. All that remained of it were the isolated and unremunerative colonies of Eritrea and Somalia and the hope persistently cherished of accomplishing in Tripolitania what she had failed to accomplish in Ethiopia. Tripoli and its hinterland had value for her not only morally and economically, as an appanage and a market, but strategically also as a means of strengthening her position as a Mediterranean Power, potentially threatened by the presence of the French in Toulon, Corsica and Bizerta, and of the British in Malta, Egypt and Cyprus.

A protocol of 1873, by which the Porte, under whose direct control the province had been since 1835, undertook to accord "most-favoured-nation" treatment to the consuls and subjects of all three nations alike, was interpreted as placing Italy on an equal footing in Tripolitania with France and England. Italian emigration had flowed into Tripolitania as into Tunisia, and already in the eighties the province was regarded by Italian and even by foreign publicists as destined eventually to be Italy's share of the "Sick Man's" heritage. From time to time rumours were heard of "rectifications" being undertaken or contemplated by France of the Tunisia-Tripolitania frontier, and on each such occasion the Italian Government was careful to revive its pretensions. In 1901 a formal agreement, to which the British Government adhered, was registered between France and Italy by which, in return for Italian assurance of disinterestedness in Morocco, the French Government declared its disinterestedness in Tripolitania, which thus came to be recognised as an Italian "sphere of influence."

The "territorial integrity" of the Ottoman Empire was still so near an interest of the Great Powers as to make it unsafe for Italy to attempt more than peaceful penetration, though her final aim was political and military occupation. Meanwhile she sought by diplomatic means to defend as far as possible from British and French encroachments the frontiers of the province and of its "hinterland" as defined by a Turkish

Note of 1890, which claimed as Turkish territory the whole area traversed by the caravan routes connecting the Tripolitan coast with the interior and the basin of Lake Chad.

Secondly, the Balkan Peninsula offered to Italy a convenient field for commercial expansion, in which she was brought naturally into opposition with any Power which attempted to set up a monopoly of influence. In 1877 Russia had threatened such a monopoly, and Italy had therefore made common cause with Austria, England and France in revising the Treaty of San Stefano, as she did later in defending the unification of Bulgaria. But now Russian influence in Bulgaria had diminished and Russia's expansionist ambitions had been diverted to the Far East, while, since the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878, Austrian influence in the Balkans had been steadily on the increase.

The effect of the shifting European relations during the opening years of the present century was to leave Italy unsupported and isolated in the Mediterranean. England had been ready to accept Italian co-operation in order to check troublesome French competition in Africa. But while the defeat of Adua exhibited Italy as a "broken reed," the eagerness of the Di Rudini Government in 1896 to recover the goodwill of France and the publication in a "Green Book" on Ethiopian affairs of documents likely to cause trouble between England and France had brought about a certain coolness in British-Italian relations. As French and British differences were composed, Italy's friendship with France, re-established during the years 1896-1904, led naturally to a restoration of more friendly, if never very intimate, relations with England, whose naval support became more than ever necessary to Italy in view of the juridical position of Tripolitania as part of the Ottoman Empire and the attitude taken up by Germany after 1898 as champion of Ottoman interests. Thus friendship with England and France became during this period the third and constant element in Italian foreign policy, while the less aggressive character of Russian influence in the Balkans made friendship with this partner in the Entente also possible.

The Triple Alliance was maintained, but, as Italy's Allies held aloof from Mediterranean questions, it could not be relied upon for the defence of Italy's position in the Mediterranean, and owing to renewal of tension between Italy and Austria it tended to lose ground in Italian estimation in comparison with her friendship with the Entente Powers.

But until 1910 her Mediterranean interests took a secondary

place, and her activities in connection with them were limited to diplomatic defence and affirmation of her reversionary claim to Tripolitania. During the earlier years of the twentieth century her attention was mainly fixed on Austria's "Drang nach Osten" with Germany behind it, which threatened not only to oust her interests from the Balkans and to make the Adriatic an "Austrian lake," but to place her on a level with Serbia as the object of Austria's active hostility.

From 1904 onwards the opposition of interest between the Central Empires and the Triple Entente became more and more marked, breaking out from time to time in a series of crises which only the general desire for peace prevented from kindling a European War. On each such occasion Italy's interests inclined her towards the side of the Entente, thus making progressively clear the incompatibility of her position in the Triple Alliance, which was to become still more marked when in 1911 she thought that the time had come for realising her long-nursed designs on Tripolitania.

But from 1897 to 1910 her attitude was essentially peaceful and defensive. In face of the general anxiety of the Powers to stave off war, she could not, even if she had had the inclination, be the first to upset the *status quo*. On the contrary, she clung to it to the sacrifice of her interests, remaining in the Triple Alliance until the events for which she was only indirectly responsible precipitated a general crisis and gave her the opportunity of breaking the chains which bound her to her worst enemy.

In 1882 Italy in entering the Triple Alliance had sacrificed her "Irredentist" claims and her Balkan interests to her interest in Africa and the Mediterranean. Many of her statesmen had never shared Crispi's Francophobia, and after the final breakdown of his African policy in 1896 the Francophil party in coming into power took steps to make Italian relations with France as cordial as was consistent with the permanence of the Triple Alliance.

In December 1896 the conclusion of a commercial and Maritime Convention with Tunisia implied the recognition of the French Protectorate of the Regency.

In November 1898 the discussions which had been going on since 1891 for a new Commercial Treaty between France and Italy were at last—thanks largely to the exertions of the constant friend of France, Signor Luzzatti—brought to a successful issue, to the substantial benefit of both countries, which had suffered from the Tariff War which had continued since 1887.

Meanwhile Italian trade had obtained fresh markets in the Central Empires, while German economic penetration had given an immense impetus to the development—to some extent artificial and dependent on high Protective duties—of Italian industry, which now entered on a period of rapid growth. The friendship thus formed was strengthened in 1901 by the agreement already referred to in regard to Tripoli and Morocco. The adherence of Great Britain at the same time opened the way to a renewal of the friendly relations interrupted in 1896. This virtual recognition of Italy's reversionary rights in the Tripolitanian region had the more value for Italy as standing in decided contrast with the reserved assurances given by France and England in 1899, when they had merely disclaimed all intention of undertaking in the present or the future any operations against Tripolitania, "*an integral part of the Ottoman Empire*," or of doing anything which could interrupt commercial communications between Tripolitania and Central Africa.

Friendship between France and Italy had been initiated during the last years of the reign of King Humbert; but this monarch did not live to see its consummation, for he was assassinated in the streets of Rome by a madman on July 29, 1900. The renewal of the friendship was, however, sealed and publicly advertised by the visit of his successor King Victor Emmanuel III to Paris in October 1903 and the return visit of President Loubet to Rome in the following spring. This visit of the President of the French Republic to the capital of Victor Emmanuel seemed to close the chapter of Italo-French friction in regard to the Roman question. It provoked protests from the Vatican, and the incident afforded the immediate grounds for the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See.

Italy and Austria

But Italy's friendship with France, Russia and England was still conceived as supplementary to the Triple Alliance, which was again renewed in 1902, apparently without the positive modifications which it seems certain that the Italian Government attempted to get introduced. It would appear, however, that the Military Convention arranged between Bismarck and Crispi in 1887 was now abolished. The nature of the modifications proposed by the Italian Government but rejected by her Allies is not certainly known, but there is reason to believe that they included an extension of Article VII of the treaty, which provided that in the event of any alteration of the *status*

quo in the Balkans to the advantage of Austria or Italy the other party should be entitled to compensations in the Balkans or elsewhere, and which pledged both parties to an exchange of views previous to any action in the Balkans. The clause had been conceived at a time when Austria and Italy were working together in the Balkans in opposition to Russian Pan Slavism. After the settlement of the Bulgarian question in 1885-89, and the diversion of Russian expansionism to the Far East, Austria was less afraid of Russian competition in the Balkans than of the building-up of a barrier to her own expansion by the solidification of independent Balkan States favoured by the Liberal Powers. Accordingly in 1897 she entered into an agreement with Russia for mutual respect of the *status quo* in the East, hoping to take advantage of Russia's preoccupations in other fields to secure the lion's share of benefit from the arrangement. This agreement, from which Italy was excluded and of which the Austrian Government gave her no previous information, raised doubts in the Italian mind regarding the effectiveness of Article VII of the Treaty, as a defence no longer against Russia but against Austria herself—the more so as Austria's policy in the Balkans, originally defensive, was since the occupation of Bosnia assuming a decidedly offensive character. It is likely therefore that the Italian proposals of 1902 took the form either of more precise pledges for the recognition and respect of Italian interests on the part of Austria or of a delimitation of zones of interest in Albania.

The fact, however, that these proposed modifications were rejected by the Central Empires, and that the latter would have nothing to say to the commercial concessions which Italian business men desired to have inserted in the commercial treaties with Austria and Germany, helped to bring home to Italians the diminishing value of the Alliance and the need for finding support outside of it. The impression was soon to be reinforced by unmistakable evidence from the unredeemed territories of Austrian ill-will towards Italy. This implacable resentment, which any sign of an increase of power or revival of national spirit in Italy roused to a vindictive heat, was, like the similar feeling of Austria and Hungary towards the Serbs, a result of the Dual Monarchy's consciousness of the internal malady which threatened it with disruption. Again, the Italians of the Dual Monarchy, however much divided geographically, were homogeneous in religion and civilisation both with one another and with the Italians of the Kingdom, while the Slavs were not only widely scattered but were kept apart by differences of

religion and of culture which Austrian and Hungarian statecraft, applying the principle of *Divide et impera*, had done its best to widen and to exploit in its own interest. Consequently, while Austria could hope on the one hand by means of her position in Bosnia and by the influence she could wield in Balkan affairs to check the growth of Serbia as a nucleus of Yugoslav Irredentism, and on the other to placate her own Slav populations by the grant of autonomy or by admitting them to partnership in a Trial Monarchy or in a Federal Empire, no such solution was possible in the case of Italy and the Italians of Austria.

Hence in the minds of orthodox Austrians, Italy was the enemy. "At Court, though not in the mind of the Emperor; in the Foreign Office, though not always in the mind of the Foreign Minister; in aristocratic Society; in the Army and Navy, and especially in the Church, there have always been, since the Unity of Italy was accomplished, influences and intrigues working for the chastisement of Italy and propagating the belief that only by fresh victories on the Lombard or Venetian plains can the Monarchy restore its prestige in Europe and gain a free hand in the Western Balkans."¹

This vindictive feeling in the minds of the Clerico-Military party in Austria, at this time headed by the Heir to the Throne Franz Ferdinand and the Chief of the Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, was roused to fresh activity by the signs of a *rapprochement* between Italy and the Powers which were presently to form the Triple Entente. It displayed itself in the Trentino in the multiplication of fortresses, in some cases with obviously offensive intent, of garrisons and of military roads, and in exaggerated precautions against Italian espionage. More generally it showed itself in the cutting-off as far as possible of communications, economic, political or social, with Italy and in an active propaganda, in which the Pangermanists of Germany worked hand-in-hand with the Germans of Austria, to suppress Italian and extend German culture by means of schools, touring-clubs and the like. In Triest, Istria, Dalmatia and the region of the Isonzo, where Slav and Italian populations were in contact, the policy adopted since 1870 had been that of using the rising tide of Slavism and the rapid growth of Slav population to overwhelm the Italian element. By the substitution of Slav for Italian labour in docks, arsenals and publicly controlled works, by readjustment of electoral districts and "revision" of census and electoral rolls, by the subsidising of Slav and starving of Italian schools and institutions and by police interference of

¹ *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, Wickham Steed. (Constable, 1913)

every sort, the position of predominance which the Italian element had enjoyed in the towns was threatened or destroyed and the Italian population driven to reduce itself by emigration.

But at the same time it kept alive the flame of Italian national sentiment on either side of the frontier and the desire of the "Irredenti" for reunion with the Motherland. This recrudescence of friction between Austria and Italy during the first decade of the twentieth century was only prevented from breaking out into actual war by the prudence of the Italian Government on the one hand—for they dared not enter of their own initiative on a war with Austria, in which they knew that they could not hope for the support of France or England—and on the other by the restraining influence of Germany, who had created the Triple Alliance on purpose that Austria and Italy might neutralise one another. Moreover, in the minds of Austrian statesmen, not always in harmony with Court, Army and Church, the desire for "revanche" was subordinated to considerations of policy. Their attention was mainly centred on the Balkans, where they had a double interest—resistance to Slav "Irredentism" as a growing menace to the cohesion of the Dual Monarchy and resistance to Serbian expansion as a barrier to the Austrian "Drang nach Saloniki." Neither in the Balkans nor in the Adriatic was Italian opposition so formidable as to demand other than diplomatic means to counteract it. Italy's only basis of resistance to Austrian supremacy in the Balkans and in the Adriatic were—firstly, her voice in European Councils and her participation in international action, and secondly the influence and diplomatic interest she had been able to establish in Albania.

In 1877 the occupation of Albania had, as we have seen above (p. 130), been suggested to Italy by Bismarck and by Lord Derby as a substitute for the Trentino, and this the Italian Government hoped to obtain by German mediation in compensation for Austria's contemplated occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the Berlin Congress Italy put in no claim, but was recognised as having "special interests" in Albania. In 1880 there was some talk in Italian Government circles of an occupation, but the idea was quickly abandoned: Italian public opinion was too much in sympathy with all national movements to tolerate such a "coup." The Government contented itself with engaging in a policy of peaceful penetration in competition with Austria, directing its attention primarily to the Moslem element in Southern Albania, and encouraging Albanian aspirations and Albanian "national" feeling in the hope of winning influence.

This policy, even if it had been consistently and actively pursued, had little chance of success in view of the superior position secured to Austria by the Berlin Treaty, which allowed her to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina and to police the coast of Montenegro. And it had the grave disadvantage of bringing Italy into antagonism with those Balkan States (Greece and Serbia) whose friendship was eventually to prove essential to the protection of her real interests in the Peninsula. For both Italy and Austria had an interest in encouraging Albanian nationalism to extend its territorial claims to the utmost limit—Austria with her eyes on the Vardar Valley, Italy to make space for herself in the event of a division of Albania into an Austrian and an Italian “zone of influence.” Albanian aspirations thus came into collision with Slavism to the north and with Hellenism to the south. As to the Albanians themselves—their interests were a secondary consideration, and national unity was not likely to be promoted by a rivalry which exploited tribal jealousies.

During the supremacy of Crispi, when Italy's attention and energy were diverted to Africa, Balkan interests fell into the background, and Austria gained a decided lead over Italy in Albania. When, after the abandonment of her former policy in Africa, the Balkans again became the centre of gravity of Italy's external interests, rivalry with Austria in Albania became so great that to avoid an open conflict the two Governments came in 1897 to an oral agreement to abstain from political and military action. This agreement was put into writing in 1903 and again confirmed in 1905. In that year the idea of erecting Albania into an “independent” State—originally put forward by Italy but realised on Austrian initiative and on Austrian lines in 1914—seems to have been discussed and provisionally accepted.

In 1906 Count Aehrenthal became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Austria-Hungary. Having failed in his efforts to arrest the development of the Triple Entente by bringing Russia and France into league with the Central Empires to the exclusion of Italy and Great Britain, and forced to make the best of the Triple Alliance and the increasingly subordinate place in it to which Austria was condemned by the growing power and ambitions of Germany, he found it politic to conciliate the Cinderella of the Alliance—Italy. In 1907 he paid a visit to King Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi, and on two occasions during the same year met and conversed with the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Tittoni. There is ground for

believing that in these conversations the design of Austria to proceed to the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was disclosed and the concessions arranged which she was prepared to make to Italy in compensation. These perhaps took the form not only of the concession eventually made, by which Austria gave up her right to police the Montenegrin waters of the Adriatic, but of a preliminary assent to the occupation by Italy of Tripolitania. In the same year (1907) the Triple Alliance, due to expire in June if not previously denounced, was automatically renewed for another five years.

Italy's relations with the Central Empires had been strained by her *rapprochement* with France and England, and in particular by her failure in January 1906 to give to German pretensions at Algeciras the whole-hearted backing which had been expected of her. They had been brought near to breaking-point by the menacing conduct of Austria in the frontier provinces. But though Signor Tittoni had been careful to cultivate Italian friendships with Russia, France and England, and though Austria's ambition to dominate the Western Balkans and the Adriatic and to push her way to the Ægean regardless of Italian interests was becoming progressively clear, the Triple Entente was not yet mature and did not appear to the Italian Government to offer sufficient securities to warrant the latter in breaking away from its dangerous allies. That Count Aehrenthal's advances were not the result of a real change of attitude towards Italy was made clear at the beginning of 1908, when he announced to the Delegations his project for a railway to connect the Bosnian system across the Sanjak of Novi Pazar with the line running from Mitrovica to Salonika.

The railway project, though it eventually proved impracticable, caused consternation in Italy not only as a step towards Salonika but as threatening to cut out the route via Brindisi to Suez and the East. Signor Tittoni, accused of having been gulled by Austrian blandishments, gave support to a counter-proposal put forward by Russia for a line running east and west and connecting the Lower Danube across Serbia with the Adriatic. A swarm of other schemes followed, and for some months the railway question absorbed public attention in the countries interested.

The autumn of 1908 brought fresh and more striking evidence of the worth of an alliance with Austria. In July the *status quo* of the East had been disturbed by the "Young Turk" Revolution. Austria at once took advantage of the general uncertainty to announce (October 8, 1908) her intention to

change the protectorate of Bosnia-Hercegovina granted to her by the Berlin Treaty in 1878 into actual possession. Bosnia-Hercegovina was to form another Slav province of the Dual Monarchy. The step, though it made little practical difference, had great moral importance. Not only did it affirm Austria's intentions to maintain permanently her *veto* on a junction between Serbia and her kinsmen of Montenegro and on Serbia's desire for an outlet in the Adriatic, but it was in its juridical aspect a challenge thrown down by the Central Empires—for Germany affirmed her solidarity with Austria in the matter—to the Concert of Europe and a proclamation of their intention to act independently in the Balkans. The signatory Powers could not do otherwise than protest against so clear a contravention of the Berlin Treaty.

Italian public opinion was surprised and outraged, and the Government, though its assent had apparently been already bought, joined in the protests and put in claims for compensation. Signor Tittoni was already on October 6 able to assure the Chamber that "Italy would receive all the satisfaction demanded by her national interests." When the actual extent of the compensations offered—Austria's abandonment of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and of her right of police in Montenegrin waters (nothing of course could be said about the Tripoli agreement, if it existed)—became known in Italy, public indignation was extreme and vented itself in violent anti-Austrian demonstrations. A debate in the Chamber which took place in December showed that some Italian politicians of first-rate standing had no illusions about the value to Italy of the Triple Alliance. Official Italy fell, not unwillingly, into line with the other Powers, and for the sake of peace accepted a disastrous compromise.

Nationalism ; and the War in Tripolitania

This last slight suffered by the country without the possibility of effective reaction finally kindled into flame in the minds of a section of Italian society the long-smouldering sense of shame and resentment at official Italy's repeated acquiescence in rebuffs and failures. The feeling presently took shape in a movement comparable to that which reaction against "Little Englandism" produced in this country at the time of the Boer War, and closely akin to that of which Maurice Barrès was the prophet in France. It began in Italy as an intellectual movement. Its principal standard-bearers were University lights of the younger generation, who found followers rather

influential than numerous mainly among the well-to-do and cultured classes. Its principles—the inevitable principles of a systematic and thorough-going nationalism: the Nation-State as supreme end and as source of spiritual fervour, the impossibility of any wider synthesis or wider allegiance, the consequent inference that, where national interests are concerned, *Might is Right*—were expounded at first in periodicals and lectures. As it grew in strength the movement tended to lose its original cultural character and to become more and more distinctly political. Here it stood for a strong military policy as the only means of affirming with dignity and success Italy's will to independence and greatness. But it was only after the war in Tripolitania, which it did much to bring about, that the movement resulted in a regular political party styling itself the Nationalist Party and having for its organ the now well-known daily paper *L'Idée Nazionale*.

Signor Giolitti, who since his return to office in 1901 had established the sort of Parliamentary dictatorship of which Depretis had furnished the model, was an obstinate believer in the German alliance as the foundation and best guarantee of Italy's economic prosperity, in which he was primarily interested. He had little sympathy with either the idealistic or the imperialist tendencies of the Nationalist propaganda and leaned for support principally on the business element largely represented in the Radical party, which was averse from adventures abroad and from anything likely to give an impulse to militarism. But the fire of patriotism, kindled by the Bosnian annexation of 1908 and fanned by the Nationalist movement and the eloquence of Gabriele d'Annunzio,¹ combined with the influence exercised by powerful business interests was too strong to be resisted.

France and Italy had by their internationally-recognised agreements of 1901 and 1903 established diplomatic interests, which they intended to make exclusive, in Morocco and Tripolitania respectively. France had now, since the Congress of Algeciras and the liquidation of the Agadir incident, definitely taken up her reversion, and Italy if she deferred action any longer might be judged to have allowed her claim to lapse. Moreover, the moment was favourable for a step on the part of Italy which might under other conditions have endangered her relations with Germany as the champion of Ottoman

¹ His drama *La Nave*, a lyrical appeal to his countrymen to redeem the Adriatic—Italian in virtue of the naval glories of Venice but fast becoming an "Austrian lake"—was published and staged in the year 1908.

“integrity.” The diplomatic setback which Germany had recently suffered in Morocco caused her to set greater value for the moment on the Italian Alliance. Accordingly we find her on the one hand in the interests of Turkey imposing moderation on Austrian ambition in the Balkans, and on the other acquiescing in the Italian enterprise—an acquiescence which did not prevent her from encouraging and stiffening Turkish resistance. Thus the foreign policy of the Marchese di San Giuliano, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1910 to 1914, which aspired to an impossibly loyal interpretation of the Triple Alliance, was saved from shipwreck. Moreover, it was able to give a decidedly “Triplicist” aspect to the enterprise in its character of a *riposte* to French action in Morocco and a limitation of French and British expansion in North Africa, an aspect which gained further reality from the strained relations with France and in a less degree with England produced by certain incidents of the war.

It was thus safe for Giolitti, anxious not to endanger his Universal Suffrage Bill by alienating public opinion, to give way to the popular demand. At first it was hoped that the Porte might be induced with the help of German diplomacy to accord to Italy willingly the freedom of action and the advantages she asked for in Tripolitania. It was only when negotiations in this sense had failed that an *ultimatum* was presented to the Turkish Government demanding its assent to the occupation of the Tripolitan province by Italy. The *ultimatum* was rejected, and Italy declared war (September 29, 1911). Immense popular enthusiasm greeted the military and naval activity preparatory to the despatch of the expedition. The depressing memories connected with Egypt, Tunisia, and Adua were to be wiped out and the “Third Italy” to prove herself worthy of the first.

At first all went as well as could be wished. Tripoli was evacuated after a bombardment and occupied by an Italian garrison. Various positions on the coast of Cyrenaica were successfully taken. But these successes were not promptly pressed home. The Turks were allowed time to organise the resistance of the Arab population. Enver Bey was sent out to take direction, and means were found to introduce rifles and trained officers into the country. A furious attack on their advanced positions obliged the Italians to make a partial withdrawal, which was represented by anti-Italian feeling in Europe and notably in Germany as a general retreat or worse. By occupying the oasis of Ain Zara the Italians more or less

restored the situation. The main Turkish attack was then transferred to the coast towns of Cyrenaica. So operations dragged on; the Turkish-Arab forces dashing themselves in vain on the entrenched positions of the Italians, the Italians never succeeding in becoming masters of the desert "hinterland"—the base of the Arab resistance.

A decisive result might have been indirectly attained if Italy had been free to use her naval superiority to strike the Turkish power in some sensitive and vital spot. But Italian preparations to bombard Préveza and San Giovanni di Medua in October 1911 were met by an absolute *veto* and talk of Article VII of the Treaty on the part of Austria, who seized upon Italy's entanglement in Libya as an opportunity for securing an exclusive position for herself in the Western Balkans. Opinion in Austria was divided between military and diplomatic action as a means to this end. The triumph of Aehrenthal and of diplomatic over militarist methods was marked by the forced retirement of Conrad von Hötzendorff from the post of Chief of the Staff towards the end of 1911. Italy had to give a formal undertaking to abstain from all action in the Adriatic and Ægean coasts of the Peninsula.

Further displays of naval force were made on the Red Sea coast of Arabia (February 1912), at Beirut, where they provoked a reminder from France of her Syrian interests, and in the mouth of the Dardanelles (April 1912). The island of Stampalia was occupied as a base from which to check the contraband in arms. Finally, in May the Dodecanese and Rhodes were occupied. Italy hoped by these means either to bring the Porte to terms directly, or to bring about international action in support of her war-aims. But the Porte, encouraged by the friendly attitude of Italy's Allies and aware of the strain put upon the originally benevolent neutrality of France and England by incidents of the war and by the signs of increased official intimacy between Italy and her Allies, refused to abandon its sovereignty over Tripolitania and continued its resistance.

In January 1912 two French steamers, the *Carthage* and the *Manouba*, bound for Tunis, were stopped by the Italian authorities and taken to Cagliari on suspicion of carrying, in the one case, military aircraft destined for the enemy and in the other Turkish officers disguised as members of the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross Society. The French Government protested, and both vessels were soon released. But the Turkish passengers were given up to the Italian authorities, who claimed

the right of determining for themselves the real character of the suspect persons. Over the question of this right a heated discussion arose in which public opinion on both sides became keenly interested, with the result that the matter was vastly exaggerated and the issues distorted. In Italy there was a revival of the old Francophobia, not perhaps unwelcome to the Government, which desired to renew and strengthen Italy's bond with the Central Empires. This incident and various cases of friction on the Egyptian and Tunisian frontiers occasioned a certain distrust of Italian policy on the part of France and England, which lessened Italy's chances of obtaining effective help from international diplomatic intervention. Thus a proposal made by Russia that the Powers should put pressure on the Porte was watered down and came to nothing.

The war in Tripolitania might have been prolonged indefinitely but for the sudden diversion created by the formation of the Balkan League. Since July semi-official negotiations had been opened in Lausanne between representatives of the belligerents. Under the stimulus of the peril in the Balkans peace was rapidly concluded and was signed on October 18, the very day on which Serbia and Bulgaria joined in with Montenegro and war became general in the Balkans. By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne the Porte, while avoiding formal recognition of Italian sovereignty in Tripolitania, agreed to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops. Italy's occupation of the islands was to cease when all Ottoman troops should have been withdrawn from Libya. Ottoman interests in the country were to be looked after by a representative of the Sultan, and the religious sovereignty of the Sultan as Caliph was to be recognised and represented.

CHAPTER XII

ITALY AND THE GREAT WAR

From 1912 to the Outbreak of War

ON December 7, 1912 the Triple Alliance was renewed for the fourth time. Its term was not due to expire for another year and a half, and the anticipated renewal was regarded as a success for the diplomacy of Italy's Allies. They had, in fact, chosen a suitable moment. For a dozen years at least the Alliance had been the object of increasing criticism in Italy, but this criticism had been all but stilled owing to the friction which arose between France and Italy during the Libyan War. The tendency of Italy to drift away from the *Triplíce* had been abruptly arrested, and those who believed in the necessity of the Alliance, in Italy as in the other two countries, took the opportunity to renew it at a time when an alternative seemed out of court. The drawbacks of the association with Austria and Germany were well understood in Italy, but the Alliance still seemed to make for peace.

Yet it was with some misgiving that Italy threw in her lot once more with her old Allies. The success of the Balkan League against Turkey, and especially the aggrandisement of Serbia, had struck hard at Austro-German policy. Young States, enlarged and vigorous, now stood athwart the path to the East, and the victories of Serbia had stirred to a new national consciousness the Southern Slavs within the Habsburg dominions. Austria saw the danger at once, and took prompt steps. The first of these was a proposal made to Italy in November 1912, that the extension of territory claimed by Serbia as a result of the victory against Turkey should only be permitted on condition that she should give certain guarantees to Austria-Hungary. Italy's answer to this proposal led to its being shelved. She gave her adhesion on the express condition "that such guarantees should not constitute a monopoly to the exclusive profit of Austria-Hungary, and that they should not diminish the independence of Serbia." In revealing the fact of the proposal, nineteen months later, Signor Tittoni, then Italian

Ambassador in Paris, said that "Austria-Hungary expressed the intention of studying these guarantees and communicating them to us, but she made no subsequent communication, perhaps because she was already preparing and substituting for this pacific plan the plan of aggression."¹

This incident, with its clear warning, was only the first of a series in which the policies of Italy and Austria-Hungary definitely clashed. The aims of the two countries were in fact irreconcilable. Apart altogether from the old, unsettled questions which all but precluded the establishment of cordial relations, the two nations were directly at variance in their views as to the Balkans. Italy desired to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans: Austria-Hungary was determined to alter it. Here was the radical difference in idea which made hearty co-operation impossible and led directly towards the final break. The twenty months which elapsed between the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the catastrophe of the European war saw Italy in continued opposition to the Balkan policy of her Ally. The warning given by the Austro-Hungarian proposal in regard to Serbia was more than realised. Before long Italy had to combat not merely the "pacific plan" for limiting Serbian development, but definite plans of "aggression."

During the discussions which followed the first Balkan War Italy gave a general support to the Austro-German policy which limited Serbian and Montenegrin expansion at the expense of the Albanians, a policy in itself just, though its motives may have been open to criticism. For it was scarcely devotion to the principle of nationality, or concern for Albanian liberties, that led to the establishment of Prince William of Wied on his uneasy throne. Italian support was given to this policy, but when Austria-Hungary endeavoured to push it farther and proposed a resort to military action, Italy replied with a fresh warning. In April 1913, while the Balkan discussions were still going on and the Powers had not yet made up their minds about the fate of Scutari, Austria-Hungary threatened to occupy Montenegro. Before answering this threat the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, telegraphed to Paris to ask the views of Signor Tittoni, suggesting as a counter-move, in the event of an Austrian attack upon Montenegro, that Italy should land troops on the Albanian coast, with or without Austria's approval. Signor Tittoni's reply was clear and emphatic, and gave in outline the basis of the policy subse-

¹ Speech at the Trocadéro, Paris, June 24, 1915.

quently followed by his country. After expressing approval of the Foreign Minister's suggestion, he continued: "There is no force in the quibbles to which the Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors have recourse regarding the letter of Article VII in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. The spirit of that article is clear, and for the rest, any disturbance of equilibrium between Italy and Austria would strike not only at Article VII, but at the whole Treaty of Alliance. The day on which Austria should claim to upset, in any way or to any extent, the equilibrium in the Adriatic, the Triple Alliance would have ceased to exist."

In the diplomatic conversations which took place at this time the results which would follow Austrian action were made sufficiently obvious, and the threatened occupation was not carried out. The Central Empires had other cards to play, for they saw in Bulgaria's growing discontent with the division of the Turkish spoils a promising means of putting a spoke in the wheel of Serbian development. It is not clear how far Bulgaria's attack upon Serbia was directly due to Austro-German encouragement, but the rapid defeat of the Bulgarian armies was a second severe blow to the policy of the senior members of the Triple Alliance. How severe it was may be judged from the fact that on the eve of the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest Austria-Hungary proposed that Italy should give her consent to an attack upon Serbia.¹ Italy declined the rôle of accomplice which was offered by this cynical proposal, and once again Austria-Hungary abandoned her plan of immediate action. For the moment, peace remained unbroken; but few illusions can have been left in the minds of those to whom the Austrian proposals were known. The attack upon Serbia was clearly a matter of time and opportunity.

During the year which elapsed before the opportunity was afforded, or manufactured, there was much to occupy Italian attention at home. In the autumn of 1913 the election for the Chamber of Deputies took place, under a new Franchise Law which greatly enlarged the electorate. Two noteworthy features of this election were the relaxation by the Holy See of the *non expedit* which had discouraged Catholics from participation in Italian political life, and the large number of votes, nearly a million, cast for the Official Socialist Party, who entered the new Chamber fifty strong. The Catholics played an important part

¹ The proposal was made on August 9, 1913, but the story was not made public till December 5, 1914, when Signor Giolitti recounted the facts to the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

in the elections. Under an agreement between the Prime Minister, Signor Giolitti, and Count Gentiloni, who represented the Catholics, the latter supported the Ministerial candidates in a great number of constituencies, and did much to ensure the return of the large majority which the new Chamber gave to Signor Giolitti. In return, Signor Giolitti pledged himself not to introduce, and to oppose if introduced by others, certain anti-clerical legislation which was feared by the Catholics. Government support, moreover, was given to a number of candidates who, if they did not stand officially as Catholics, were none the less the acknowledged representatives of Catholic interests. The "Gentiloni Pact," as this agreement was called, and the general activity of Catholics in the political theatre, marked an important development in Italian politics, and was a long step towards the formation of a definite Catholic party which came five years later. This was the more important aspect of the Gentiloni Pact, but it also had the immediate result of hastening the complete severance between the Socialist party and the "bourgeoisie." Signor Giolitti had been accused of trafficking with the Socialists during his previous term of office. His alliance with the Catholics for electoral purposes put an end to these manoeuvres, and there were many who went so far as to say that he had never intended to commit himself, not even when he offered Signor Bissolati, and subsequently Signor Turati, a portfolio in his Cabinet. In any case the Socialists as a whole were indignant, though the extremists must have been secretly content, and they immediately proceeded to translate their feelings into action.

The early months of 1914 constituted a difficult period for the Italian Government. The Socialists were aggressive in Parliament and out of it; strikes took place and were accompanied by riots and bloodshed; and the Socialists defined their attitude very clearly at the Congress of Ancona, when important decisions were taken. It was decided that Freemasonry and Socialism were incompatible. The various sections of the party were invited to expel Freemasons from their ranks, and among those expelled were the well-known deputy for San Remo, Signor Raimondo, and the revolutionary Socialist leader, Giovanni Lerda. It was also decided to pursue a policy of uncompromising hostility towards all the other political parties and groups in the municipal elections. The left wing of the party were now in a great majority over the Reformist or moderate section, who believed in co-operation with the "bourgeoisie" as a means to their end. The controlling power was now in the

hands of those who believed in declared warfare against the bourgeois régime.

Signor Giolitti, with his exact sense for domestic politics, was early alive to the difficulties of the situation, and decided that he required a rest. In March 1914 he resigned, and Signor Salandra was called upon to take his place. It was not the first time that Signor Giolitti had abandoned power in face of difficulties in the country, although assured of a strong parliamentary majority. On each occasion he had got rid of his successor when it suited him to resume office, and his plan was doubtless the same when he handed the reins to Signor Salandra. The new Premier had a small following in the Chamber. His Cabinet included some members who had won their political spurs in the ranks of Signor Giolitti's followers and others who had passed under the same banner at a later stage of their career; and it did not include the man who had been Signor Giolitti's chief opponent, the recognised head of such opposition as had survived his long domination, and Signor Salandra's own political chief for many years—Baron Sidney Sonnino. It was a stop-gap Cabinet, which appeared to lie at the mercy of Signor Giolitti.

The new Ministry was soon face to face with a very serious situation. In Emilia and the Marches, the headquarters of extreme Socialism, the unrest culminated at the beginning of June in what became known as "the Red Week." For at least a week the King's writ did not run throughout a great part of the two provinces. The authority of the prefects and sub-prefects ceased to exist; police and *carabinieri* were powerless, and administration was taken over and conducted by the Socialist organisations. So far as the ordinary life and work of the affected districts went on, it was at the pleasure of those who seized and maintained authority until the arrival of reinforcements of troops put an end to the week-old Socialist administration.

The political atmosphere in Italy was clouded and threatening while the storm was blowing up which burst over the Danube in the summer of 1914. No doubt the knowledge of these troubled events had much to do with the fact that Germany and Austria acted altogether independently of their Ally. Italy, like England, was supposed to be too closely beset by internal dissensions to count as an active factor in the international situation. Her Allies judged that they could disregard the terms of the Triple Alliance with impunity. They had little hope of Italy's co-operation, which was not taken into their calculations, but they

believed that she was condemned to inaction and ignored their obligations under the Treaty. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was sent without previous consultation with, and without even any notice to, the Italian Government. Yet such consultation was definitely laid down as essential by the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

Article I of the Triple Alliance Treaty pledged the signatory Powers to an exchange of ideas regarding all general political and economic questions which might present themselves. It follows that the failure of Austria-Hungary and Germany to communicate their intentions to Italy struck at the whole spirit of the Treaty. In any event the action of Austria-Hungary was a specific violation of Article VII of the Treaty. As this Article formed the basis for the long discussions which preceded Italy's final denunciation of the Triple Alliance, it will be well to quote it in full :

“ Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Ægean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.”

The ultimatum to Serbia was a clear violation of this Article, and when the declaration of war followed Italy defined her position at once. Already she had done all in her power to put a drag upon those who were making straight for war. She had given warm support to Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a conference, and she had urged upon Germany, whose complicity in

the Austrian move was not then known although it was suspected, the necessity of working for peace. On July 25 the Italian Premier, Signor Salandra, and Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, had a conversation with the German Ambassador, Herr von Flotow, and the substance of their discussion was immediately telegraphed by the Foreign Minister to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, the Duke d'Avarna. It is evident from the *résumé* that the conversation was plain-spoken :

“ Salandra and I called the special attention of the Ambassador to the fact that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made at Belgrade without previous agreement with her Allies. Austria, in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived and from the demands she makes—demands which are of little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly offensive to Serbia and indirectly to Russia—has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war. We therefore told Flotow that in consideration of Austria's method of procedure and of the defensive and conservative nature of the Triple Alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever will be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation on the part of Austria.”

The Italian view as to the action of Austria-Hungary was indicated plainly, and when the ultimatum was followed by a declaration of war against Serbia the Italian Government took a step further in pointing out the possible consequences of Austria's independent move. On July 27 and 28 respectively formal Notes were sent to Berlin and Vienna, calling the attention of Italy's Allies to Article VII of the Treaty, and pointing out that if Italy did not receive adequate compensation for the disturbance of the equilibrium in the Balkans due to Austrian action “ the Triple Alliance would be irreparably broken.” In these Notes, moreover, was indicated the nature of the compensation for which Italy looked. They broached the question of the cession of the Italian lands still under the Habsburg dominion.

Events marched on inflexibly to the catastrophe of the European War, to the gulf towards which all feet had tended for long, but from which all eyes save those of Germany and Austria had been religiously averted. One after another came the declarations of war, and among them came Italy's de clara-

tion of neutrality. On August 2, a day after Germany's declaration of war upon France and two days before Great Britain's declaration of war upon Germany, a telegram was sent to Vienna pointing out that the *casus fœderis* had not arisen, and that in consequence Italy proclaimed her neutrality. This decision was communicated to France, and a day later it was published to the world. France was able to detach her covering troops from the Italian frontier, and the Entente obtained unquestioned control of the Mediterranean.

Negotiations ; and the Treaty of London

Italy declared her neutrality in full accordance with the terms of the Triple Alliance, and at this moment there was no question of breaking loose from her Allies. It was not to be expected that the policy of thirty years should be abandoned in a few days, at a time when the established circumstances of Europe seemed all to be crumbling. The Italian Government made an energetic protest against the action of Austria-Hungary and accompanied it by a formal warning. But protest and warning alike appealed to the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

The declaration of neutrality came as a profound relief to the great majority of the Italian people. The actual terms of the Triple Alliance were secret, and there were many who feared that its obligations might involve active intervention on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. During the first days of crisis the small Nationalist group advocated the step, partly in the belief that honour demanded it, and partly because it seemed to them that Italy's interests coincided with those of Germany. Others held the same conviction, though they did not express it openly, but the great bulk of Italians were resolutely opposed to sharing in the enterprise of Italy's Allies, which their instinct and good sense alike condemned. The declaration of neutrality was in full accordance with the national will, and the question of intervention on the side of Germany and Austria fell at once to the ground, never to be raised again in serious quarters.

There followed a long period of uncertainty, during which the advocates of neutrality and of intervention on the side of the Entente conducted vigorous Press campaigns in support of their respective causes. It was some time before the Italian Government took the next diplomatic step. Its position had been defined in large at the outset, and during the weeks which

followed there was little opportunity for diplomatic action. In the first rush of success there was no prospect that Germany and Austria would consider the claims of their Ally. They knew that the Italian Army had been left by the outgoing Government in a very serious condition as regards munitions and general equipment. They calculated, no doubt, that the war would end in victory for themselves before Italy could be in any position to back her demands by force. Further delay was caused by the breakdown and death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who, when he was attacked by his last illness, had in preparation a Note which was to state the Italian case in detail and reaffirm the position taken up on the eve of war. San Giuliano died on October 16, and there was a short interregnum before Baron Sonnino accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. A further period was necessary for the new Minister to master the details of the situation and resolve upon the exact line of action to be followed, and it was only on December 9 that Baron Sonnino took up the question again, drawing the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to their infringement of Article VII of the Treaty, and pressing for an immediate exchange of views which he hoped would lead to definite negotiations at an early date. After an attempt on the part of Count Berchtold to evade the Italian contentions by a series of remarkable quibbles, the point was yielded and the general Italian argument accepted. But this first step was almost immediately retraced. Count Berchtold left the Ballplatz, and his successor, Baron Burian, revived all the old objections and, generally speaking, took up a much more intransigent position, in spite of the fact that German approval of the Italian point of view had been conveyed to Vienna. Germany had realised that Italy meant business, and Prince Bülow had arrived in Rome as Ambassador shortly before Christmas to play the part of honest broker. His long residence in Rome, where he had lived since his dismissal from office in 1909, rendered him specially fitted for his task, but he had a difficult part to play. He had to combat not only the determination of Salandra and Sonnino, but the refusal of the Austro-Hungarian Government to realise that determination.

Before actual negotiations could be opened Baron Sonnino insisted upon acceptance of the principle that the basis of discussion in regard to compensation should be "the cession of territories actually in possession of the Monarchy." In his first conversation with Prince Bülow he stated clearly that "a stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy could

not be effected except by the complete elimination of the Irredentist formula, 'Trent and Triest,' and this demand seemed to make an agreement impossible. Prince Bulow replied that Austria would prefer war to the cession of Triest, and said that he thought he "could succeed with the Trentino, but not with anything more." It was long before Baron Burian could be brought into line even with Prince Bulow's position, and on February 12, 1915, tired of conversations which seemed to reach no point of contact, Baron Sonnino withdrew his proposal for discussions and warned Vienna that any military action against Serbia or Montenegro, without previous agreement with Italy, would be regarded as an infringement of Article VII, and would justify Italy in resuming her own liberty of action in defence of her interests.

Meanwhile the discussions in Italy between "Interventionists" and "Neutralists" grew ever keener. The bodies of opinion described by these two names were far from representing the whole nation. They did, however, represent its most active elements, in politics, journalism and the other manifestations of a civilised society. Discussion continued uninterruptedly all through the winter and the spring, and it was often very heated. Slowly the Interventionists gained ground, and a new feeling arose, a feeling of anger against Germany. The argument that Italy's intervention was demanded, not by her own interests alone, but by those of civilisation, won new supporters. On February 2 Signor Giolitti addressed a letter to one of his closest political friends, Signor Peano, in which he expressed himself as being unfavourable to intervention, and said that in his opinion Italy might secure "a good deal" (*parecchio*) by diplomatic means. This letter gave much encouragement to the Neutralists, who made great play with the opinion of Italy's ablest "parliamentary hand." But the question, as far as public opinion was concerned, was no longer confined to the Irredentist problem. It had taken on a far wider aspect.

From the first there had been a strong feeling that the action of Germany and Austria had been essentially immoral, and as the story of the German invasion of Belgium became known in its details, this feeling grew ever stronger. Slowly the conviction spread that the struggle was in effect a struggle between two moralities, from which Italy could not refrain. This feeling, moreover, was reinforced by the practical argument that to stand aside meant, in the end, isolation, whatever the outcome of the struggle. For those who held this view Italy's

whole future was bound up with intervention on the side of England, France and Belgium. Her unity depended upon it, her political status and her moral position. In opposition to this view stood a strong body of opinion which was definitely opposed to Italy's participation in the world-struggle, and it must be admitted that this opinion was based upon powerful arguments. There was a reluctance, in the first place, to break the long connection with Germany. Although the Triple Alliance had never been popular owing to the difficulties with Austria-Hungary, it had certainly been beneficial to Italy. Politically, it had safeguarded her position in Europe, and above all it had enabled her to speak with France on something like equal terms, and such approach to equality was a necessary prelude to satisfactory relations between the two "Latin sisters." During the period of the Alliance, moreover, Italy had made great progress economically, and much of the new prosperity was due to the co-operation of German money and German enterprise. Another factor was the conviction that association with Germany and the acceptance of German influence and German ideals, as they had been understood before the war, gave to Italy what Italy lacked in herself. Germany stood, essentially, for organisation and order, for social discipline and attention to detail, for those very things which critical Italians felt that Italy required for her continued progress. These seemed good reasons for not breaking away from "the German orbit." Others of the Neutralists founded their objection to intervention on the belief that victory would inevitably be with the Central Empires, and that it would be madness for Italy to join the forces against them. Others again, while believing in the possibility of victory for the Entente, felt that for Italy even victory would be too dearly bought. They maintained that Italy was not rich enough, and not sufficiently developed, to carry the immense burden entailed by modern war. Even if war ended in victory, they argued, it would bring financial ruin and might bring social revolution. This was perhaps the most widely felt argument in favour of neutrality. Once more, as so often in history, the battle was between those who dreamed and those who feared, those who dreamed of a greater Italy and those who feared to pay the price.

Throughout the whole winter and spring the question was threshed out by argument and counter-argument, while the two Governments, with Prince Bülow intervening, pursued their slow discussions. These discussions were supposed to be

kept secret, and no word of their progress came from the Italian side. They were not so kept secret by the other disputant, and when, at the urgent instance of Germany, negotiations were resumed, or, rather, when Baron Sonnino consented to take up again what were only preliminary conversations, the Italian Foreign Minister insisted upon secrecy as a first condition. Another condition was that if an agreement were reached its terms should be immediately carried out; and Baron Sonnino also suggested that if no agreement were arrived at within two weeks all proposals should be withdrawn. This was on March 10, and it seemed at first that Baron Sonnino's second condition would be an insuperable obstacle to any negotiations. Baron Burian refused to accept it, and the reason for his refusal may be found in the cynical explanation subsequently given by Count Tisza, that the negotiations with Italy were not seriously meant, but were undertaken in order to gain time. Germany stepped in once more, and though Prince Bülow was unable to move Baron Sonnino from his position, Vienna was induced to take the initiative. Baron Burian made a vague offer of "the cession of territories in South Tirol, including the city of Trent." Putting aside for the moment the question of immediate cession, Baron Sonnino stated plainly that the offer would not satisfy any of Italy's requirements. It did not meet the Irredentist demands. It did not sufficiently improve Italy's military frontier. It did not give adequate compensation for the freedom of action which would be granted to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. On April 2 a more detailed offer was made by Vienna. Baron Burian suggested a line which cut the valley of the Adige a few miles north of Trent, a line which left under Austrian rule a considerable Italian population, and definitely reserved to Austria important strategic positions such as that of Madonna di Campiglio. Baron Sonnino did not reply to this offer, which failed to meet any of the objections raised in his previous answer, and on April 6 Baron Burian asked for counter-proposals. These were sent on April 8, and it was at once apparent how far apart were the Italian and Austrian views.

In the Trentino Baron Sonnino asked for the boundaries fixed in 1811 for the short-lived Kingdom of Italy established by Napoleon, which extended north of Bozen. A new eastern frontier was also demanded, to include the so-called "Malborghetto triangle," and to run thence by Plezzo, Tolmino, Chiapovano and Komen, down to the sea near Nabresina, thus taking in the Bainsizza plateau and the western section

of the Carso. Triest and its neighbourhood, including Nabresina and the districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, were to be formed into an autonomous State, completely independent of Austria-Hungary, and Triest was to be a free port. Another claim was the cession of a group of islands off the coast of Southern Dalmatia, of which Curzola was the most important. In regard to Albania, Italy demanded the recognition of Italian sovereignty over "Valona and district" and the renunciation by Austria-Hungary of any claims in Albania. All the ceded territories were to be occupied at once by Italy, and Triest and the neighbourhood were to be evacuated immediately by Austria-Hungary. Italy was to pledge herself to maintain neutrality throughout the war, and renounce any further claims under Article VII.

The Austrian reply to these proposals showed no tendency whatever to meet the Italian claims. On only one essential point was there any further concession. A more northerly line of frontier was offered in the Trentino, a line, however, which, as Baron Sonnino pointed out, did not "repair the chief inconveniences of the present situation either from the linguistic and ethnological or the military point of view." In point of fact, Vienna was determined that the military inferiority of Italy's position on the frontier should not be redressed. The refusal to admit the principle of immediate cession was repeated, as was only natural in view of the subsequent avowal that the negotiations were not genuine.

Baron Sonnino's last Note to Vienna was on April 21. Now that an agreement with Austria-Hungary was proved impossible he turned to the Entente Powers, resuming that freedom of action which both he and San Giuliano had pointed out would be restored to Italy if her Allies failed to meet her claims. England, France and Russia were already aware of the nature of Italian aspirations. They had been indicated in diplomatic conversations, so that formal negotiations were quickly concluded. Agreement was reached the more speedily owing to the fact that the military position of the Entente was far from satisfactory. There was urgent need of added strength, and much was hoped from Italian intervention. On April 26 the Italian claims were stated in a Memorandum presented by the Marquis Imperiali, Italian Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Cambon, the French Ambassador, and Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The Italian demands were accepted by the Allied representatives, and the document

known as the Treaty of London was duly signed (April 26, 1915).

Under this Treaty¹ Italy was to receive large accessions of territory, which included all the "unredeemed" Italians save those of Fiume and the small and scattered communities in Southern Dalmatia and a few islands, and gave her strong military frontiers. The new northern boundary ran from the Swiss frontier above the Reschen Pass along the watershed of the Oetzthal and Zillerthal Alps, cutting the Brennerpass at its highest point, to the Gross Venediger, or Vetta d'Italia. Here the line turned southward to reach the watershed between the Rienz and the Drava near Toblach in the Pusterthal, and thence to the old frontier near the Drei Zinnen. The old line was followed for some distance eastward but was extended towards Tarvis, and thence followed the watershed of the Julian Alps down to the pass east of the town of Idria. From here the line was to turn south-east towards the Schneeberg, so as to exclude "the basin of the Sava and its tributaries," and from the Schneeberg was to run down to the sea east of Volosca, i.e. near Fiume. Italy was also to receive the islands of the Quarnero, with the exception of Veglia, Pervicio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe.

In Dalmatia Italy was to receive the northern part of the province as far as Cape Planka (between Sebenico and Trau). The land boundary was to be drawn in such a way as to include the valleys of the Kikola, Kerka and Butisnjica, with their tributaries, up to the watershed east and north of these streams. To Italy were assigned also all the Dalmatian islands from Pago to Meleda, with the exception of the group immediately off Spalato—Brazza, Solta and a few small islets.

All the islands not assigned to Italy were to be neutralised, together with the whole Dalmatian coast between Cape Planka and the southern point of the peninsula of Sabbioncello. From ten kilometres south of Ragusavecchia to the mouth of the Vojusa in Albania the coast was also to be neutralised, except for the existing rights possessed by Montenegro. Fiume and the coast between Volosca and the Dalmatian frontier were assigned to Croatia, and the coast between Cape Planka and the River Drin to Serbia and Montenegro.

In Albania Italy was to receive Valona and district, with the island of Saseno, and her possession of the Ægean islands known as the Dodecanese was recognised. Another clause,

¹ The maps in this volume are on too small a scale to show all the places mentioned

Article VII, dealt further with Albania, and as the wording of the clause is important it is given in full:

“ Art. VII. Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article V, and the Bay of Valona (Article VI), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (see Article VI) up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralised.

“ Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers.

“ Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida.”

Another clause (Art. IX) provided for “ the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean ” by making Italy a co-heir with France and Great Britain in the event of the breaking-up of the Turkish Empire, or in the event of the Empire being maintained and spheres of influence being assigned to the Powers. Italy's share was roughly defined as “ a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia.” A further clause (Art. XIII) provided that “ in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany,” Italy might claim “ some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement, in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.”

An immediate loan of fifty million sterling was to be granted to Italy by Great Britain, but the Treaty contained no other financial provisions.

France, Great Britain and Russia undertook to support Italy in the event of her opposing “ any proposal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy See in any peace negotiations or negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the present war.”

The Treaty provided that a military Convention should be drawn up, which should determine “ the minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia against Austria-

Hungary." Italy on her part undertook "to use her entire resources for the purposes waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and Russia against all their enemies." The Treaty was to be kept secret, and Italy's adherence to the Declaration of September 5, 1914 (which bound each Allied Power not to conclude a separate peace) was to be made public "immediately upon the declaration of war by or against Italy."

Upon the acceptance of the memorandum Italy declared that she should "take the field at the earliest possible date and within a period not exceeding one month" after the signature of the Treaty.

On May 3, a week after the conclusion of the Treaty, a Note was sent to Vienna denouncing the Italo-Austrian Alliance.

It was about the same time that the main provisions of the Treaty, which was supposed to be secret, began to leak out both in London and Paris. From the first there was strong criticism of the Treaty, and, as the Yugoslav movement gained ground, the number of the critics, and their vehemence, increased. It was natural that the Yugoslavs should be strongly opposed to the Treaty of London, for under its territorial clauses more than 600,000 Slavs were included within the promised frontiers of Italy. It is not so clear why the provisions of the Treaty drew down upon Italy so much moral condemnation at the hands of British, French and American critics. Certain provisions of the Treaty undoubtedly infringed the principle of nationality, which came to be, though it was not in the earlier part of the war, one of the standards which were flown by the Allies. On the other hand, these provisions were largely supported by two other principles, those of historical right and strategical necessity, which were also invoked by the Allies in the case of other territorial problems. The Treaty may have been impolitic, and persistence in its claims may have been against the best interests of Italy—here there is ground for fair argument. To follow those who inveighed against the Treaty as politically immoral would involve the condemnation of too many other solutions of difficult problems, or, in the sole alternative, would annihilate any defence against a charge of hypocrisy. In any event, the fact remains that in a time of urgent need the three Powers of the Triple Entente affixed their signatures to the Memorandum presented by Italy.

The Campaigns of 1915

The Treaty with the Entente Powers was signed and the Alliance with Austria was at an end, but Italy was to go through

a great crisis before taking the field. The denunciation of the Alliance spurred Germany and Austria to further efforts.

Feeling had grown stronger during the month of April, and the country as a whole was ready to accept war, even though it was only a minority that insisted upon the necessity of intervention. In the first days of May popular enthusiasm was stirred by the preparations for the unveiling of a memorial on the rock of Quarto, whence Garibaldi and The Thousand had started for Sicily. Although the result of the long conversations with Vienna was not yet public property, both Austrians and Germans had paid so little regard to the pledge of secrecy that the wide difference between the Italian claims and the offers of Vienna was known to a considerable number of people. In political circles, from the middle of April, the feeling that war was inevitable grew steadily, and the Neutralists were plainly discouraged. The denunciation of the Treaty was the sign for a sudden change in the attitude of Vienna. The German and Austrian Ambassadors in Rome were authorised to negotiate a new treaty based on further concessions, but Baron Sonnino declined to listen. The die had been cast, and as far as the Government was concerned Italy was already committed. When it was clear that this door was closed a final attempt was made to secure a reversal of Italy's decision by appealing to other forces. Three months previously Signor Giolitti had expressed an opinion unfavourable to intervention; the great majority of the Chamber were supposed to be faithful to their old leader, and some of his lieutenants were in close touch with the German and Austrian Embassies. It was decided by Prince Bulow and Baron von Macchio to go behind the back of the Government and deal directly with the Opposition. A list of the new concessions was circulated in haste among those to whom it was thought they would make an appeal, and on May 9 Signor Giolitti arrived in Rome from his country retreat in Piedmont. In an interview with Signor Salandra the ex-Premier declared that he was still opposed to Italian intervention, and when sent for by the King he expressed the same opinion. The new Austrian proposals, which offered to Italy "that part of Tirol inhabited by Italians," the "purely Italian" districts on the right bank of the Isonzo, together with the town of Gradisca, and suggested that Trieste should be "an imperial free city" with an Italian university, may be held to have corresponded with the "*parecchio*" which had seemed to Signor Giolitti an adequate inducement for the maintenance of neutrality, but it is not clear how he could

defend the breaking of the engagement which had been made with the Entente. It must be assumed that he was moved by his conviction that Italy should remain neutral at all costs, that war would be her undoing. He was not deceived by the argument that the war would end in speedy victory for the Entente if Italy intervened. He was convinced that the struggle would be prolonged and ruinous, and that his country could not stand the strain.

For a moment it seemed that Signor Giolitti was master of the situation. His followers in the Chamber rallied to him, and it was evident that the Government would be defeated if he could maintain his position. Late on the evening of May 13 the resignation of Signor Salandra was announced, and by next day Italy was in an uproar. Popular feeling had been deeply stirred by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The story of Belgium, told to the people of Italy, from north to south, in the moving utterances of the two Belgian deputies, MM. Jules Destrée and Lorand, had made a great impression. But there was still a feeling that the worst stories might have exaggerated the truth, that provocation might have been given, and that in any event "war was war." The sinking of the *Lusitania* was altogether different. The crime was open and flagrant, and not defensible by any appeal to the usage of war or the doctrine of reprisals. Anger blazed in the streets of Italy. On the rock of Quarto, d'Annunzio had made an oration which was effective from the point of view of language but was too "literary" to make a wide appeal. His greater opportunity came a week later, when all that was best in Italy was stirred to wrath by German brutality and by the attempt on the part of foreign diplomats to influence Italian policy by intrigue with the Opposition. During the long neutrality period one of the arguments used successfully by the Interventionists was that the German connection had led to Italian subservience to Germany. When the Bulow-Giolitti manœuvres were disclosed, Italian resentment flared up at once; when they led to the resignation of the Government the country rose in protest.

It was only for two days that the issue of the crisis seemed uncertain. The King sent for Signor Giolitti to take his opinion on the situation created by the resignation of the Government, and the leader of the Opposition recommended that the task of forming a Government should be entrusted to the President of the Chamber, Signor Marcora. Signor Marcora declined the task and advised that Signor Salandra should be confirmed in office. The same advice was given by Signor Carcano, Signor

Salandra's Finance Minister, who was also summoned by the King. Meanwhile it was becoming even more clear that the country would not tolerate any other solution. D'Annunzio's burning indictments of the Bülow-Giolitti intrigues were reinforced by the efforts of a great part of the Press ; demonstrations were held all over Italy, those in Rome and Milan being specially noteworthy. It was not a war-fever that came over Italy in those days ; it was a wave of just anger against the intrigues of the foreigner and those who were playing his game, an expression of the will to be free from the domination of Germany and what Germany represented.

On May 20 the Chamber and Senate, by overwhelming majorities, passed a Bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government "in the event of war." Signor Giolitti had left Rome three days before, and his followers had fallen away from him, partly under the influence of popular pressure, but partly also because they were now in full possession of the facts regarding the situation. On May 22 the order was given for general mobilisation, and on May 23 the formal declaration of war was delivered at Vienna. The state of war began on the following day.

It must be admitted that those who opposed Italian intervention on the grounds that the country was unprepared for war had compelling facts upon their side. Italy had already proved unable to stand the strain of competition in armaments, and for years the requirements of the army and navy had been refused. Both services had been "run on the cheap." The Libyan War had imposed a drain upon inadequate material which had left magazines and depots empty, and when the European War broke out these deficiencies had not been made good. Much was done during the neutrality period, but in the meantime every standard of requirement had changed. Modern war had increased its demands beyond all calculations, with the result that when Italy took the field she was, relatively to material requirements, not greatly better off than in the summer of 1914. The following figures are witness to the fact :

The number of field and horse batteries (4-gun) was 373, of heavy field batteries (6-inch field howitzers), 28 ; there were 40 batteries of siege guns (largely improvised from the coast-defence and fortress artillery), including 14 heavy guns (8- to 12-inch) ; the total number of machine-guns ready for use was 600. Even these figures do not give fully the weakness of the position. There were three types of field-gun : the old "rigid" Krupp 75 ; the Krupp 75 quick-firer, with which a part of the

artillery had been re-armed in 1909; and the Deport 75, which had been adopted in 1911, but of which only a limited number were ready; of these, moreover, many had only recently been distributed to the batteries, which were not yet accustomed to the new weapon. The heavy field-howitzer was a good weapon, but deficient in range. Many of the siege-guns were obsolete, some of them being of bronze or iron. There were three types of machine-gun. Italy had decided upon the Maxim, but delivery of the weapon was impossible during the neutrality period, as the full output of the firm was absorbed by British requirements. It was necessary to fall back upon the French Saint-Etienne, of which a certain number could be obtained, and upon a new type brought out by the Italian Fiat Company. This meant also the provision of two types of ammunition. The 600 machine-guns had to be distributed among nearly 600 battalions of infantry, but when war was declared only half the number had been given out, and during the early weeks of the campaign many regiments went into action without any machine-guns at all. There was a totally insufficient reserve of rifles. The first-line troops were adequately armed, but the reserve formations and new drafts had to train either with the old Vetterli-Vitali rifle or, in many cases, without rifles. There was a great shortage of all kinds of ammunition. The allowance of shells per gun was tragically inadequate to the requirements of modern war, even to the requirements of the year 1915, which were soon to be far surpassed. There were no trench-mortars and no bombs. Transport was very deficient.

To sum up: in August 1914 the Italian Army, handicapped by years of cheeseparing and drained of munitions and equipment by the Libyan campaign, was unfit to take part in modern war. In May 1915 the equipment was still far below the pre-war standard of her immediate enemy, Austria-Hungary, who had in the interval made great additions to her armaments.

Italy had to tackle her military problem with means that were obviously insufficient for warfare on the new scale, and her problem was in itself exceedingly difficult. One glance at the map is enough to show the great inferiority of Italy's strategic position in regard to Austria-Hungary. The frontier drawn in 1866 left Italy almost at the mercy of her north-eastern neighbour. The Trentino came down like a great wedge into Italian territory, opening a wide gate through the mountains into the rich plains of Lombardy and Venetia. This gap in Italy's natural line of defences was in itself serious enough,

but its importance was increased by the fact that it lay so far west. A successful attack from the Trentino would have meant the abandonment by Italy of the Venetian and Friulian Plains and the mountain regions of Carnia and Cadore. It was on account of the fatal weakness due to the Trentino gap that many military writers held that Italy's true defensive line lay on the Piave, while others would have drawn it as far west as the Adige, or even the Mincio and the Po.

The situation was changed by the fact that Austria-Hungary was already engaged in war with Russia, so that only a portion of the forces of the Monarchy could be employed against Italy. It was thus possible to plan an Italian offensive on the eastern frontier, in the hope that sufficient enemy troops would not be available to take advantage of the Trentino wedge. There was another alternative: to make the main effort in the Trentino. A concentration of the main Italian forces in this region would have undoubtedly led to the elimination of the wedge and the barring of the gateway from the mountains. But it could scarcely have led any farther. The passes north of Bozen could hardly have been forced. By this route it was not possible to strike at a vital spot. A drive eastward promised very different results. Although the natural obstacles in the way of an advance were serious enough, they did not compare with the barriers that blocked an advance to the north. And an objective of first-class importance lay comparatively near. The occupation of Triest by the Italians would have been a crushing blow to the Monarchy, and might well have been only the first step to further military success.

There was this added drawback to an offensive towards the east, that every mile of progress made in this direction increased the danger from the north. It was therefore necessary to combine with the main operation, if this were to be the drive to the east, a "defensive offensive" in the mountains. There were a number of gates to be shut before the main action could be developed with a reasonable chance of safety.

The more ambitious plan was chosen, and the scheme of operations was roughly as follows. The main attack upon the Isonzo front was entrusted to the Second and Third Armies, the former, consisting of eight divisions, on the left, the latter, of six divisions, on the right. The First Army, of five divisions, was to secure the position in the Trentino. The Fourth Army, of six divisions, operating from Cadore, was to advance upon the Pusterthal, with the double object of threatening the Austrian communications with the Trentino and of combining

with an advance farther to the east. This was to be undertaken by an independent force operating in the Carnic Alps towards the Gailthal, with Malborghetto and the Predil Pass as first objectives. The Carnia force consisted of 29 battalions, of which 16 were Alpine troops. Ten divisions were to be held in reserve at the disposal of the Commando Supremo, five in the northern and three in the eastern sector of operations. These were not yet completely assembled on the outbreak of war.

There were thus available for the general movement all along the frontier some 400,000 men, which gave to General Cadorna, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, a great initial superiority in numbers. At the moment when war was declared the Austrian troops actually in position on the frontier did not number more than 80,000 rifles, with something over 200 guns. It had been proposed by General Conrad von Hötzendorff, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, that the Italian advance to the east should be allowed to develop towards Laibach, when a heavy counter-attack should be launched against the invaders by a Austro-German force to be concentrated in the Sava Valley. This plan did not commend itself to the German General Staff, which refused the co-operation of German troops, and by the time that war was declared the situation was changed. The invading Russian armies were being driven headlong eastwards, and the Dual Monarchy, so lately hard-pressed, had been able to detach large reinforcements for the Italian front. The Italian advance, moreover, had been delayed by the political crisis. A fortnight after the declaration of war the Austro-Hungarian armies in the Italian theatre of war had been increased to twenty-four or twenty-five divisions.

During that fortnight the Italian armies had made considerable progress. They had greatly improved the situation in the Trentino; they had advanced some distance in the Ampezzano¹ district; they had seized several important positions in the ranges south of the Upper Gailthal, where the enemy were found in unexpected strength; they had occupied a certain amount of enemy territory on the left bank of the Upper Isonzo; they were in front of Gorizia and under the Carso. But the advance made, especially in the sectors where a quick offensive was most important, had fallen far short of expectations. The Fourth Army, operating from the Cadore district, had been handled with undue caution by its commander; and

¹ North of the Cadore

the advance of the Third Army, between Gorizia and the sea, had been delayed by a combination of bad luck, hesitation and lack of means.

The check in the advance eastward was the more important. A cavalry force had been detached to seize the main bridges over the Lower Isonzo, and push on to the southern half of the Carso Plateau. The movement was not carried out with the requisite promptness, and the bridges were blown up. In ordinary summer weather the Lower Isonzo would have presented no great difficulties to an advancing army, but on May 27, the day on which the infantry were preparing to cross, the river came down in a roaring flood. Equipment for bridging or rafting was altogether inadequate, and the Italians were held up for six days. In the meantime the Austrians had blown up a section of the Sagrado-Monfalcone Canal, and flooded most of the low-lying country between the Isonzo and the Carso. When the Italians eventually reached the foot of the plateau, the arrival of Austrian reinforcements had changed the situation altogether. The enemy entrenchments, prepared long before, were adequately manned, and backed by a sufficient number of guns. The hope of a war of movement had all but disappeared.

If the Italian armies had been adequately supplied with munitions they were still so greatly superior in numbers that they might have quickly broken through the enemy lines. Their deficiency in practically all kinds of war material has already been indicated, and it follows that they were in no condition to carry through an offensive of the kind required. A number of gallant attacks were made which established the Italian line a little way under the western rim of the Carso, and slightly reduced the Austrian bridgeheads at Gorizia and Tolmino. In July a sustained effort was made but broke down eventually with heavy loss, against the strong entrenchments of the enemy and his superiority in artillery, bombs and machine guns. Several important positions were occupied, and nearly 20,000 prisoners were taken. But it was now fully evident that successes could only be won by the patient operations of trench warfare.

The rest of the summer and the early autumn were spent in preparing for an offensive on the grand scale. After demonstrative actions on the northern lines a general offensive on the Julian front was launched on October 21. The Second and Third Armies both attacked along the greater part of their respective fronts, but the fighting was soon concentrated on

the enemy lines between Monte Sabotino, north of Gorizia, and the sea. The fiercest struggle was that for the heights of Sabotino and Podgora, the main bastions of the Austrian bridgehead opposite Gorizia, and for the ridges near Oslavia that lie between them. Ground was gained here and in the region of San Michele on the Carso, but in spite of the persistent renewal of attacks all through November the fighting was inconclusive. The struggle died down in the early days of December, when the Italian armies were worn out by the prolonged and costly effort. The gallantry of the troops could not compensate for the shortage of munitions.¹

The Italian casualty list for the first seven months of war, exclusive of sick, was as follows: killed in action or died of wounds, 66,090; wounded, 190,400; prisoners, 22,520. More than half of these losses were sustained in the big autumn offensive. The numbers in themselves are grave enough, but the loss cannot be calculated in figures alone. The flower of the first-line army was gone, and the toll upon officers had been especially heavy. The gaps which had been made were hard to fill.

Italy's entry into the war had made an immediate, all-important contribution to the Entente cause by diverting large masses of Austro-Hungarian troops from the Russian front, and as time went on her power of engaging and absorbing the efforts of the Monarchy steadily increased. On the sea also her intervention was of first-class importance. Thanks to the Italian occupation of Valona, which took place in the autumn of 1914, Italy's intervention enabled the Allies to control the mouth of the Adriatic, except for the sallies of enemy submarines. An "active" naval policy was not to be expected, in view of the fact that the Austrian ships could no more be "dug out of their holes" than those of the Germans. And by the physical conformation of the Adriatic coasts Italy was at a great disadvantage. The silent work which went on unceasingly,² a work in which invaluable assistance was given by British light craft and drifters in the Lower Adriatic, held the Austrian fleet in check throughout the war.

In the early part of 1916 a task of great difficulty was performed by the Italian navy and merchant marine: the rem-

¹ The guns were insufficient in number and quality for the work they had to do, and the allowance of shells per gun per day during the offensive was only 25 to 30.

² The closeness of the watch kept may be judged by the fact that the Austrian Dreadnought *Szent Istvan* was torpedoed the first time she attempted a cruise, two and a half years after completion.

nants of the Serbian army which had survived the terrible retreat through Albania were rescued and transported to safety. Owing to the proximity of the Bocche di Cattaro, the work of embarking and transporting the Serbian troops was extremely hazardous, but it was performed with great skill and the minimum of loss.

1916

During the first months of the Italian campaign, while attention was concentrated upon the battlefields, it was natural that there should be a lull in open political discussion and criticism. When active military operations were suspended for the winter, discussion was reopened and quickly became acute. There were three main points of debate: the attitude of the Government towards the country, the conduct of the war, and the equivocal position caused by the absence of a formal declaration of war between Italy and Germany. The position of Italy in regard to Germany gave rise to much discussion at home; abroad, in the Allied countries, the question bulked still more largely and had a permanent effect upon opinion.

When Italy declared war upon Austro-Hungary, it was expected that Germany would at once reply with a declaration of war upon Italy. Prince Bulow had warned Baron Sonnino that war with Austria meant war with Germany; not that such a warning was necessary, for no one in Italy seriously considered the possibility of a "separate" war. The Treaty of London was signed, and the Italian Parliament voted for war, in the full belief that the break with Germany would be immediate and complete. Germany refrained from taking the obvious step, though a few German troops appeared in the Italian theatre of war and German submarines made no distinction between Italian shipping and that of England and France. Soon it began to be asked why Italy did not declare war. In France and England the impression gained ground that Italy desired to make the best of both worlds, and rumour became busy regarding a "secret treaty" which was supposed to preserve a bridge between Italy and Germany. Rumour had only this justification, that on the eve of Italy's entry into the war a special agreement had been signed between Italy and Germany. It was not secret, however, nor was it of the tenor suggested. When Italy's intervention was decided, the Italian Government proposed both to Germany and to Austria-Hungary that in the event of war each country should

(1) respect private property belonging to the subjects of the other within its own borders, (2) permit the repatriation of the other's subjects, and (3) continue to recognise the existing claims of the other's subjects against the respective Governments. The first provision was to the obvious advantage of Germany and Austria, whose nationals had large interests in Italy. The second and third, on the other hand, favoured Italy. There was a large number of Italians, chiefly of the working-class, resident in Germany and Austria, and in Germany many of these had pension claims on the Government. Vienna refused the Italian proposal; Berlin accepted it, and an agreement was signed three days before hostilities began. Obviously such an agreement gave no foundation for the criticisms made. It was merely an attempt to reaffirm principles which had formerly won general acceptance. It was based, moreover, upon the supposition of hostilities between the two countries. But the fact that rumour made it a ground for criticism in France and England shows how the absence of a formal declaration of war prejudiced Italy's position *vis-à-vis* her new allies. This, no doubt, was what Germany desired. To begin with, it is probable the German Government hoped to encourage further effort on the part of the Italian "Neutrals." If Italy had no intention of leaving a bridge, Germany did not at once abandon the idea. The hope must have dwindled with the announcement (on December 1, 1915) of Italy's adhesion to the Pact of London, which bound its signatories not to make a separate peace. But it was still worth while to delay the open break, if such delay could help the growth of suspicion in the Allied camp.

Alike in Italy and in the Allied countries, the publication of Italy's adhesion to the Pact of London put a temporary stop to criticism, which, however, soon revived and increased. Abroad, Italy was criticised for not taking part in the Allied expeditions in the Near East, and some Italian critics joined in this complaint. In point of fact, as events were soon to prove, Italy's military strength was far from justifying any dispersion of her forces in *petits paquets*, and General Cadorna was right in refusing to allow political considerations to override the clear demands of the military situation. A very real ground for criticism, however, existed in the fact that, in the absence of formal hostilities between Italy and Germany, a considerable amount of trade was carried on between the two countries by way of Switzerland. Italy was not the only offender against the Allied blockade, but it was not until the spring of 1916 that

the Italian Government definitely forbade any commerce, direct or indirect, with Germany, and meanwhile this delay had given Italy's Allies a just cause for complaint. The Italian critics of the Government were mainly concerned with the undoubted fact that until the position in regard to Germany was "regularised" by a formal declaration of hostilities, there would always be grounds for misunderstandings, and true Allied solidarity would be impossible. In February and March 1916 the "Interventionists of the Left," who had been largely responsible for turning public opinion against Germany and Austria, joined the Nationalists in a movement against the Government, and one of the main grounds of their action was the equivocal position in regard to Germany. They stayed their hands on receiving assurances from the Government that there was no thought of a double game, and that it was hoped to force a declaration of hostilities from Germany. The malcontents accepted these assurances, but they had other grounds for complaint, which they pressed strongly.

In the first place, they argued that the Government had failed to keep in touch with the country, to be outspoken with its supporters, and to enlist the co-operation of all available forces. Their complaint was justified—perhaps, also, in a wider sense than they intended. The Government was too secret in its methods. Isolation from public opinion had always been a characteristic of Baron Sonnino's political life, but Signor Salandra seemed now to be following his example, and lost ground accordingly.

Another item in the indictment against the Government was based on the shortage of munitions. It was fully realised that the amount of leeway to be made up had been immense, but it was felt strongly that the Government had been slow to realise requirements, and slow to take measures to meet them when they were once realised. This fault was common to the whole Entente, and Italy's industrial capacities were immeasurably below those of the other Powers; but the facts could hardly be questioned, and the Government suffered accordingly. It was argued that they had shown lack of forethought, not only in regard to industrial effort in Italy but in making adequate arrangements in regard to coal and raw material, for the supply of which Italy had to depend upon agreements with her Allies. The question of grain was also becoming acute, and that of freights, which largely governed the whole problem of supplies from abroad, gave rise to much discussion.

Italian preparations for a renewed offensive on the Isonzo

front were well under way when it became evident that the enemy intended to forestall the Italian effort by an attack in the Trentino. The Austrian Command had calculated that operations could not begin on the Russian front until the summer was well advanced, and the early months of 1916 saw a gradual concentration of forces in the Trentino. Once again German assistance was refused for the initial operations, and the attacking force consisted of fifteen Austro-Hungarian divisions, three more being held in reserve on the Trentino sector. The Austrians had a vast superiority in artillery, especially in heavy guns, and some of the Italian positions were not well adapted for defence. There had, moreover, been a lack of spadework in preparing the positions, and the General in command of the First Army was removed from his command on the eve of the attack. General Cadorna was confident of holding his own, but the weight of the enemy offensive, especially in guns, exceeded his calculations, and the Italian centre, between the Val Lagarina and the Upper Astico, was driven in by the attack which was launched on May 15. The wings stood fast, thanks to the magnificent fighting qualities of the Italian infantry, although the enemy came again and again to the assault. The Austrians pushed out a big curved salient into Italian territory and came very near the plains, but the Italians held firm as a rock on the lines chosen by General Cadorna for his definite stand. Try as they would, the enemy could make no more ground.

Early in June General Cadorna announced that the enemy attack was held: his defensive line was established; his reserves were ready in the plain, and he was preparing his counter-stroke. Heavy fighting went on for a long fortnight, positions being lost and won several times, but the *Strafexpedition*, as it was termed by the future Emperor Charles in an address to his troops, seemed already doomed to failure when General Brusilov, answering an appeal for co-operation, threw in his offensive before the enemy had thought it possible. Before General Cadorna could fully develop his counter-attack, the Austrians withdrew, steadily and in good order, to a strong line well in advance of their starting-point, having suffered very heavy losses without any definite result.

The *Strafexpedition* as such had failed. The only immediate advantage gained by the enemy was this: that the ever-present threat to Italian communications formed by the Trentino salient was slightly increased by the advancement in the Austrian line. The secondary object of the attack, to paralyse the Italian offen-



THE GREAT WAR

A concealed Italian machine-gun assisting an advance under heavy shrapnel fire

sive power for the summer, was also unattained. While the guns were still thundering in the Trentino, General Cadorna was making ready for his delayed attack upon the Isonzo front.

In the meantime the Government had fallen. The military situation seemed still uncertain when Parliament met on June 6, and Signor Salandra was not tactful in dealing with a Chamber whose tendencies, already critical, had been sharpened by the initial failure to hold the Austrian attack. He was defeated on a vote of confidence, more than half the majority against him being made up of those who had been most vigorous in pressing for Italy's intervention, and, latterly, for the formal declaration of war against Germany and a closer co-operation between Government and country. Signor Boselli, the *doyen* of the Chamber, succeeded to the premiership (June 19) and was able to form a Cabinet which had a wide basis in the Chamber. It was a near approach to a National Government, including as it did representatives of all the groups except the Official Socialists and the thick-and-thin Giolittians. The Interventionists of the Left, who had combined for action under the name of the Democratic Alliance, had five representatives in the Cabinet. Of these by far the most important was the leader of the Reformist Socialists, Signor Leonida Bissolati, who had from the first proclaimed the necessity of Italy's intervention, and had always looked upon Germany as the essential enemy. Baron Sonnino was persuaded to remain at the Foreign Office. Although his aloofness had given rise to criticism, and was to do so again, the general confidence in his great abilities and upright character outweighed all other considerations and easily defeated a movement in Parliament and the Press in favour of Signor Tittoni, who was considered, especially by the Democratic Alliance, as having been too closely associated with Signor Giolitti to take charge of foreign relations at such a moment. The new Government quickened the march towards a complete rupture with Germany, and on August 27 a communication was sent through the Swiss Government, declaring a state of war "as from August 28."

The situation was now cleared up, and if the facts are duly weighed it will be found that the chief sufferer from the delay in the declaration of war against Germany was Italy herself. The reason for the delay was not political, but military. In consideration of Italy's military weakness during the first year of the war, and in view of the fact that France and England could spare her no help, it was clearly to the general advantage that she should not be called upon to face any additional weight

of attack. Germany's game was to go for the weaker adversaries, and it was well that Italy should have extra time for preparation. The Entente gained by the delay, but Italy's position in the Entente was prejudiced, to her great subsequent disadvantage.

The delayed offensive on the Isonzo front was begun on August 6, after a demonstrative action in the Monfalcone sector two days previously. The two main objectives were the Sabotino-Podgora bridgehead in front of Gorizia and the San Michele ridge on the Carso. Preparations had been carefully made; the artillery strength had been largely increased, and the Italian armies were now provided with a considerable number of large trench-mortars (*bombarde*), which threw a heavy and most destructive projectile, capable of clearing a way through the wire upon which so many gallant lives had been lost the previous year. The *bombarda* had defects, and was a *pis aller* devised owing to the impossibility of turning out a sufficient number of heavy guns, but it was to prove very useful. Sabotino and Podgora, which had resisted so many attacks, were at last torn from the enemy, the attack on Sabotino especially being carried out with great skill and small loss. At the end of two days' hard fighting the Austrians had lost the whole of the bridgehead, and on the evening of August 8 Italian detachments crossed the river. Gorizia was occupied in force next day, when patrols pushed forward east of the city found the enemy entrenched there on a new line. Meanwhile the struggle on the Carso had resulted in a heavy Austrian defeat. The western section of the Carso, which is separated from the main plateau by the deep cut known as the Vallone, was evacuated by the Austrians after four days' hard fighting. The enemy retired across the Vallone, but the Italians, continuing their attack, established a footing on the farther side. Here, however, they found themselves faced by a new line, strongly held. It was evident that further preparation was necessary, and by the evening of August 15 the offensive was definitely checked.

Three more attacks on the Carso were made in the autumn, and in each of them important gains were made. The Austrian defence was very highly tried, but there was not sufficient weight behind the Italian attacks to secure more than local successes. General Cadorna was still handicapped by shortage of guns and ammunition, and he had to confine himself to limited objectives on a narrow front. These resulted in the occupation of a considerable extent of ground on the Northern Carso and the capture of some important positions east of

Monfalcone, while over 20,000 prisoners were added to the 19,000 taken in the August fighting. Other minor gains were made on the mountain front, notably in the Fassa Alps, and there were many who thought that a further effort in this direction and elsewhere in the Trentino would have paid better than the continuance of "cut and come again" tactics on the Carso. But General Cadorna kept his eyes on the main objective.

Meanwhile the repulse of the Austrian offensive in the Trentino and the increase in the output of war material had made it possible for Italy to join in the Allied enterprise that was based on Salonika. A division reached Salonika on August 23, and this force was subsequently increased to the strength of an army corps. Two months later an Italian force, advancing from the Albanian coast, established contact with the left wing of the Allied army operating from Salonika.

The winter of 1916-17, which saw the opening of the "political offensive" decided on by the Central Powers, was also witness to the development of the idea of the "single front" on the side of the Allies. There was a fuller realisation of common aims and a more continued attempt to secure common action. The Allied answer to President Wilson's Note to the belligerent Powers was framed at a political and military conference, held in Rome in January 1917, between representatives of the four chief European Allies. There was no difficulty in reaching unanimity regarding the political answer to the German move. It was less easy to agree upon the details of the military reply. To the old difference between Easterners and Westerners (the claims of the Salonika front were strongly pressed by the Rome Conference) there was added the new suggestion that a big joint effort should be made against Austria-Hungary on the Italian front. Mr. Lloyd George expressed himself as favourable to this idea, and though the spring programme, already decided upon, was not modified, the plan remained open for further consideration, and it was decided in the meantime to assist Italy with Allied artillery. General Cadorna put his requirements at 400 guns, and the British Premier agreed to support this demand. Within the next few weeks visits were paid to the Italian front by Generals Nivelle and Sir William Robertson, the first visits of Allied commanders since those of Marshal Joffre and Lord Kitchener in the autumn of 1915, but it was found impossible to spare the guns requested. France sent a certain number of medium-calibre guns which were manned by Italian gunners, and England sent ten batteries of 6-inch

howitzers. The great effort against Germany was to be made in France, and it was necessary to have the most abundant reserves of men and material. Judging from the experience of the previous year, and taking into account the greatly increased strength of both Italy¹ and Russia in the way of munitions, it was calculated that Generals Cadorna and Brusilov between them should be able to account for the armies of the Habsburg Monarchy. When the Russian Revolution broke out, this view still prevailed. For the change in régime for a moment appeared as though it would add to Russia's offensive power.

1917

When the campaigning season of 1917 opened, the situation in Russia seemed still uncertain to the Allies; but the Central Powers were better informed as to conditions on the eastern front, and they decided early that a transference of men and guns to the west could be effected without too much risk. An Austrian offensive on the Carso was planned for the middle of May, but General Cadorna got his blow in first. On the morning of May 12 the Italian artillery opened fire along the whole front from Tolmino to the sea. On this occasion the main offensive was planned for the middle Isonzo, and when the infantry attack was launched important gains were made on the mountains north of Gorizia, on the left bank of the river. When the objectives were secured in this region, guns were rapidly transferred to the Carso front, and a second blow was struck. Here, too, much ground was gained. On the Carso proper considerable headway was made, and between the plateau and the sea the Italians smashed right through the front-line system of defences and swept on until they were half-way up the Hermada Ridge. Here, on May 27, a check had to be called. The supply of shells was running low and it was impossible to continue. The enemy strength, both in guns and men, but especially in guns, was much in excess of anticipation. For this reason the limited number of guns and shells which the Italians were able to detail for counter-battery work were insufficient to keep down the enemy fire, and the infantry suffered very heavily. At the end of the fortnight's fighting the Italian casualty list was close upon 130,000 men. The enemy also were very severely punished, mainly in the

¹ By the end of 1916 Italy had mobilised nearly half a million munition workers; and though there were grave difficulties owing to shortage of coal and raw material, the output had been enormously increased.

counter-attacks by which they endeavoured vainly to recover their lost positions. Their losses were calculated at over 80,000, including nearly 24,000 prisoners.

There was a week's pause, and at the end of this breathing-space the Austrians, strongly reinforced, made a fierce counter-attack from the Vipacco to the sea. On the Carso proper they gained some initial success, but the end of three days' continuous heavy fighting, during which the line swayed backwards and forwards among the shattered rock-trenches, found the position unaltered. Between the Carso and the sea the Italians were driven off the lower slopes of the Hermada, which were not well adapted for defence, and their counter-attacks were unsuccessful. The original attacking units were worn out; some of the fresh troops failed to come up to the standard of their comrades, and there was always the weakness in artillery.

The battle died down on the Julian front, but General Cadorna turned at once to the mountains. A brilliant little action on the Adamello glacier,¹ unique among battlefields, was entirely successful and wrested an important position from the enemy. An equal initial success attended an endeavour to improve the line among the mountains north of the Asiago plateau, but the positions reached were dominated by the enemy, and a heavy counter-attack resulted in most of them being lost. The picked Alpine troops who were engaged in this operation suffered very severe losses, and the feeling was general in the Army, but especially among the *Alpini*, that the attack was a mistake. The casualties in this fight brought the total Italian losses, from May 12 to June 27, up to 205,000 men.

When Parliament resumed work on June 20, the situation of the Government seemed nearly as uncertain as that of its predecessor a year before. To begin with, there was dissension in the Cabinet. For some time past it had been felt by several members of the Cabinet that the Minister of the Interior, Signor Orlando, had been lax in dealing with the anti-war campaign, mainly inspired by the Official Socialists, which had been making its way in Italy as in other countries. General Cadorna had complained that new units and drafts had sometimes shown signs of being affected by these influences, and he urged the necessity of taking more energetic measures against those who preached peace when peace was impossible. His complaint was supported strongly by a section of the Cabinet.

Another cause of dissension was Baron Sonnino's increasing isolation. He remained aloof even from his colleagues in the

¹ In the Dolomiti

Government, who complained that decisions in regard to foreign policy were made by him alone. The climax came with the proclamation of "the unity and independence of Albania under the ægis and protection of the Kingdom of Italy," which was published on June 3. The step would have been popular in Italy but for the fact that Baron Sonnino acted without the previous approval of Italy's Allies or the knowledge of his fellow-ministers. Discussion and explanation smoothed over the difficulty, and when Parliament met Baron Sonnino's colleagues were agreed that his step, and even the manner of it, had been necessary. In point of fact, the political single front between the Allies was less solid than it appeared to be. Attempts were already being made to establish a bridge between France and Austria-Hungary, and some time previously Baron Sonnino had been startled to find that in 1916 an Asia Minor agreement had been negotiated between Italy's allies without Italy's knowledge. This agreement was made before Italy had formally declared war upon Germany, which was no doubt the reason for Italy's exclusion. It was not, however, till April 1917 that this agreement was supplemented by the Treaty framed at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, near Modane, where Mr. Lloyd George, M. Briand, Signor Boselli and Baron Sonnino drew up an agreement, under which, subject to the approval of Russia, the Italian share of Asia Minor should be the southern portion of the peninsula westward from the zone allotted to France, up to and including Smyrna.

Baron Sonnino appeased his critics, but Signor Orlando had a harder task. It was only after prolonged discussion that the malcontents decided that they would continue to support the Government; but the latter had been badly shaken, and only continued in office on the understanding that the war problems which were crowding upon the country, and particularly the anti-war propaganda, should be dealt with more firmly.

Conditions were becoming very difficult in Italy, and it was not surprising that the strain was beginning to tell. Earlier than in any of the Allied countries, and to a far greater extent than they ever felt, there was shortage of food—a shortage that meant more than scarcity, that caused widespread hunger. Food was lacking and coal was lacking, so that industries languished. There was little or nothing in the way of counter-propaganda to answer the suggestions of those who argued that in an early peace lay the only salvation from ruin and famine. The good sense and patriotism of the Italian people

resisted these suggestions to an extent that won the admiration of all who lived through the difficult days. They were soon to triumph over a still greater test of their mettle.

At the Allied Conference held in London early in August the Treaty of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne was confirmed, and the question of a joint offensive on the Italian front was once more discussed. Though Russia had now gone out of action, it seemed too late to change the plans agreed on. The offensive in Flanders had been launched. There were high hopes of success, and to General Cadorna's suggestion that the Italian offensive which was already prepared should be delayed until Allied troops could be sent to the Julian front it was replied that these could not be sent till October. The Italians feared that the season might then be too far advanced for an offensive on the grand scale, and the decision was taken to carry out the plans already made. The Italian task was enormously more difficult than had been allowed for: Austria-Hungary had now, practically speaking, only one front to consider.

It was on the very eve of the Italian offensive that Pope Benedict XV issued his appeal for peace, which seemed to place the belligerents on the same moral level, and which suggested that the enemies of the Entente were ready to satisfy "the aspirations of the peoples" in regard to certain territorial questions, and called for the cessation of "useless slaughter." The Italian Clerical Press amplified the vague references to territorial aspirations and conveyed the impression that Trent and Trieste might be had for the asking. The effect upon popular feeling was profound.

In the early hours of August 19, after a bombardment all along the line from Tolmino to the sea, Italian troops crossed the Middle Isonzo above Plava and after hard fighting smashed through the Austrian lines guarding the Bainsizza plateau. By the end of a week they had occupied the greater part of the plateau, after capturing many prisoners and guns. On the Carso, where a simultaneous attack was made, much ground was gained and many prisoners taken, but the main effort was made by the Second Army with the object of turning the Tolmino bridgehead and the enemy positions east of Gorizia. On the north little progress was made from the start. There were not enough guns to support this particular attack, which was suspended after two days, when the first onset had failed. South of the Bainsizza, on the ridge of San Gabriele which flanked the Gorizia position, a terrible struggle endured for three weeks, but in the end the Austrian resistance prevailed. The

worn-out troops faced each other on the long hill-crest that had become a waste of broken rock and broken bodies. During the long struggle the enemy losses exceeded 100,000 men, including 34,000 prisoners. The Italian casualty list for the month's fighting reached 155,000.

General Cadorna intended to renew his attacks as soon as he could remake his shattered units and amass sufficient ammunition; and twenty-six batteries of French heavy guns were hastily despatched to the Italian front. When he had taken stock of the position, however, General Cadorna decided that he could not proceed with the offensive. The two big actions on the Julian front and the fight in the Asiago Highlands had cost him 360,000 men. The daily wastage, including sick, brought the total casualty list for the summer to over 700,000. There had been much malaria among the troops in the low ground near Monfalcone, and an epidemic of intestinal disease had been prevalent in the Natisone and Judrio Valleys. His armies were greatly weakened, and he had information that the enemy was being largely reinforced. He could hope for little from a new offensive, and in view of the fact that the defection of Russia would swing the balance still more strongly against him in the future, he judged it essential to conserve his forces and prepare for a big effort in the spring. When the change of plan was announced he asked that the Allied guns might be left to strengthen his defence, but the French guns were withdrawn, and of the British force, which had been increased to sixteen batteries for the August offensive, eleven batteries were despatched to Egypt.

Some mutual ill-feeling was caused by a misunderstanding between General Cadorna and the French and British Commands. Owing to a failure in *liaison* work General Cadorna's reasons for the suspension of the Italian offensive were not fully communicated to the Allied commanders, and those which reached them were not regarded as sufficient. The misunderstanding was quickly cleared up, but the incident emphasised the difficulties caused by the absence of any central body to deal with the military problems arising on the different fronts.

Meanwhile Signor Boselli's tenure of office was approaching its end. The Socialists seemed to have been inspired to new effort by the Papal Note. Serious riots which took place in Turin at the end of August were due initially to lack of bread, but the Socialists fanned the discontent due to hunger and staged an anti-war demonstration. The Socialist leader, Signor Claudio Treves, had declared that in the coming winter

"no one must be in the trenches," and the members of his party echoed his words. Signor Orlando had dealt firmly with the Turin troubles, and criticism was now directed less against him than against the Premier, who was, in fact, unequal to the task of directing the Cabinet and leading the Chamber. The Government fell on October 25, the day on which it was announced that the Austrian armies, strengthened by German reinforcements, had opened an offensive on the Middle Isonzo. The Minister of War had declared his confidence in the result, and Italy, too, was confident.

The Italian attacks in August and September had brought the *moral* of Austria-Hungary very near the breaking-point. The armies of the Monarchy had been tried to the uttermost, and the German High Command saw the necessity of giving immediate help, which was all the more urgently needed in view of the fact that the Habsburg peoples were growing ever more restless with the ill-success of the Habsburg arms. The cry for peace was growing insistent, and the Vienna Government had indicated its difficulties to Berlin. Germany took prompt action. Nine German divisions were despatched to the Isonzo front, under the command of General Otto von Below, who was entrusted with the attack now planned against the Italian Second Army. It was thought at first on the Italian side that the enemy counter-blow would be struck against the newly-occupied positions on the Bainsizza plateau, which had not been fully consolidated, but it soon became evident that the attack was being prepared farther north, from Tolmino to Plezzo. Dispositions were taken to meet the attack, which was awaited without misgiving.

The main thrust was delivered on October 24 by a mixed German and Austrian army (containing six German divisions) under General von Below, which attacked along the line between Tolmino and Caporetto. The attack was successful beyond all expectation. It was carried out with great resolution and skill, by the new method of "infiltration" which was to win great results five months later, at Saint-Quentin, and good use was made of the mist which filled the Isonzo Valley. The Italian defensive arrangements were faulty. There were too many men in the front lines, too few in the "battle positions," and the immediate reserves were badly disposed. There was, moreover, a lack of co-ordination between the Commands. In more than one instance the general instructions for the defensive battle had been disregarded locally. In one case, in particular, a bold stroke was played which

ended in disaster. And some of the troops put up only a feeble resistance against an artillery fire that was more destructive than any hitherto known in that sector, and against the surprise of unfamiliar infantry tactics. The Italian line was pierced in many places on the heights fronting the Tolmino bridgehead and on the left bank of the river between Tolmino and Caporetto. By the evening of October 24, after a long day's fighting, it was clear that the enemy had won a big local victory. Here the reserves might have been expected to hold up the advance. But the reserves were not well placed, and as they attempted to come into line they were hampered by the broken troops retreating before the enemy attack. Communications were very difficult in the broken mountainous country, and the Commands lost hold of their units. By the evening of October 26 the left wing of the Second Army had crumbled and by the gap made the enemy had turned the whole line from the north. A general retreat was ordered to the line of the Piave, while rearguards were detached to fight off the advance of the enemy and delay them as far as might be possible, especially on the line of the Tagliamento. This decision meant that the Fourth Army had to retreat from Cadore, and come down through Feltre to the Middle Piave. The greater part of the Second Army had to be counted out for the time being, and the Third and Fourth Armies had to link up on the shortened line.

By November 1 the retreating Second and Third Armies, with the exception of those who had been captured by the enemy, were across the Tagliamento; a week later they were standing on the west bank of the Piave, in touch with the Fourth Army. The right wing of the Second Army had kept its cohesion throughout the desperate circumstances of the retreat, and was now attached to the Third Army. Other troops which had lost order in the retreat were already being re-formed behind the line chosen for defence, but the position was still critical in the extreme. The losses in men and material had been enormous. Close upon 300,000 prisoners, including a large number of men from labour battalions, fell into the hands of the enemy, and more than 3,000 guns were lost, together with great quantities of ammunition and stores of all kinds. Some two-thirds of the guns abandoned had been rendered useless, and a large proportion of the stores and munition depots had been destroyed; but though spoil was thus denied to the enemy, the Italian armies were left in a most perilous condition as regards munitions and equipment of every kind.

There was a few days' breathing-space before the pursuing forces attacked the new positions. Meanwhile an Allied conference had been held at Rapallo, and British and French reinforcements were already on their way to Italy, for the Allied commanders had seen at once the critical nature of the situation. The discussions at Rapallo resulted in the establishment of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, which it was hoped would ensure the close co-operation of military effort which, even after three years of war, had frequently proved to be lacking. General Cadorna was appointed Italian military representative at Versailles, and was succeeded by General Armando Diaz, the commander of the XXIII Army Corps.

Allied reinforcements arrived in Italy with all speed, but before they could come into line the enemy had been practically fought to a standstill. When the French and British troops began to arrive in Italy it was decided that they should not be sent in unit by unit, as they arrived, to stiffen weak points, but should be held in reserve, under their own commanders, until they were all on the spot. This was the more necessary, as at first it seemed doubtful whether it would be possible to hold the new front. In the early days of November the possibility of further retreat had to be fully considered. All through November the enemy hammered at the new Italian line—in vain. He attacked on the Piave, at the "hinge" where the line left the river and turned back into the mountains, on Monte Grappa between the Piave and the Brenta, and in the Asiago uplands. He gained ground here and there, but by the end of the month it was clear that the new front was established.

The Allied divisions came into line at the beginning of December. Three British divisions took over the positions that had been held by the extreme left wing of the Third Army. A similar French force occupied the "hinge" mentioned above, hitherto defended by the right-hand corps of the Fourth Army.¹ Both positions were considered critical, and attacks were expected both in the plain and among the mountains. These expectations were not realised. The enemy swung his attack farther west, against the mountain positions on both sides of the Brenta Valley. For nearly four weeks Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorff, who commanded the Austrian forces in the Asiago uplands, and Marshal Krobatin, who was in charge of

¹ Reinforcements were still arriving, and by the middle of December there were six French and five British divisions in Italy.

the mixed Austrian and German armies between the Brenta and the Piave, strove to break through to the plains that lay so near. Success would have turned the Piave line, as the break-through from Caporetto and Tolmino had turned the old line ; but success was denied, though local gains were made at various points. The weary troops of Italy, outnumbered and outgunned, held fast upon their mountains. When the winter snows put an end to military operations on a large scale, the enemy had lost the initiative. On both sides of the Brenta the Italians were counter-attacking with success.

1918

If the military success obtained by the Austro-German break-through on the Middle Isonzo went far beyond expectations, the result of the moral effect was a blow to the calculations of Berlin and Vienna. Certainly, the great victory of Caporetto and the occupation of a vast extent of Italian territory, together with the capture of much spoil, restored to some extent the failing spirits of the Habsburg peoples, and carried them through the privations of another winter. But the result upon Italian *moral* was exactly the reverse of that upon which the enemy had counted. The shock of Caporetto fell upon a people that was war-weary, doubtful of victory, growing, like all the peoples, less disinclined to peace by negotiation. Defeat came out of the blue, and invasion, and the threat of worse disaster. They acted like cold water on a healthy organism. The people of Italy put aside their questionings: the will to victory was re-born.

When General Diaz succeeded General Cadorna, the task which awaited him was heavy indeed. Not only was it necessary to deal with the pressing danger of the enemy's continued attacks ; there was the additional problem of reorganising a large proportion of the combatant forces of Italy. The magnificent recovery of the troops who held the new front has already been briefly indicated. In the interval which elapsed between the stand on the Piave line and the enemy offensive of the following summer a remarkable feat of reorganisation was accomplished. The Italian Army was practically reconstructed, and many important changes were made which lightened the strain upon the *moral* of the soldier. The task carried out by General Diaz closely resembled that which fell to General Pétain after the French failure on the Chemin des Dames and the subsequent crisis in *moral*, and it would be

difficult to over-emphasise the importance of the service rendered by these two leaders to the cause of the Entente.

The task of the political leaders was no less onerous than that of the military chiefs. At first, during the long weeks of crisis after Caporetto, the support given to the Government of Signor Orlando, who had succeeded Signor Boselli in the premiership, was all but universal. When the new front was established, opposition began to take shape and criticisms began to be heard. An attempt to induce the acceptance by the Government of a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the French model, was defeated, but a strong Opposition was formed on the platform of a more efficient Parliamentary control of Cabinet action. Baron Sonnino's methods of handling foreign policy began to be questioned more openly and more continuously, and a notable stimulus to this movement came from the declarations made by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, early in January 1918, on Allied "war-aims." Both these statements seemed to differentiate strongly between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and seemed, moreover, to foreshadow the possibility of coming to terms with the lesser adversary. Such a prospect could hardly commend itself to Italy; and that Italian uneasiness was justified was fully proved later, when the facts regarding negotiations with Vienna, particularly those conducted by France through Prince Sixte of Bourbon, were revealed to the world. It had been one of the strongest arguments against Baron Sonnino's critics that so long as he remained at the Consulta Italian interests were sure of the fullest consideration at the hands of Italy's Allies. The declarations of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George and other indications of a *tendresse* for Austria-Hungary on the part of both England and France appeared to weaken this argument. It was hard on Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that immediately after the Italian Government and its supporters had pledged themselves to a firm war-policy and the closest co-operation with the Allies, the spokesmen of two Allied countries should indicate a policy which could not be welcome to Italy.

Italy's Allies appeared to shrink from a serious anti-Austrian programme, and it required a new alliance to ensure its adoption. The summer of 1917 had seen the inception of an unofficial attempt to find a ground for agreement between Italy and the Southern Slavs over the vexed question of the Adriatic lands. A number of Italians had always advocated such agreement, but there had been little response from the Yugoslavs,

to whom the Treaty of London remained as a stumbling-block. A further difficulty arose from the fact that the different sections of the Yugoslav race were slow to come to an understanding among themselves. It was not until July 20, 1917 that the representatives of the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee agreed upon a programme of Yugoslav unity and embodied it in the Pact of Corfu.

The publication of the Pact of Corfu led at once to a strong movement in Italy in favour of an agreement with the Yugoslavs that should permit close co-operation and minimise grounds for future friction. The task was not easy, for the Italians who were "imperialistic" in their view of the situation had their exact counterpart among the Yugoslavs. An unofficial exchange of views seemed to indicate the possibility of a *via media* which would satisfy moderate men on both sides, but discussion had not gone very far when the disaster of Caporetto intervened. This brought a pause in the movement, from the Italian side at least, and when conversations were resumed it was found that the importance of an agreement had impressed itself more urgently than heretofore upon the Yugoslav leaders.

Events marched quickly, under the auspices of an Italian Committee "for the Entente between the nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary." The chief obstacle to united action lay in the difference of view between Italians and Yugoslavs, but after prolonged discussions in London between Signor Andrea Torre, representative of the above Committee, and Dr. Ante Trumbić, President of the Yugoslav Committee, a formula of agreement was found. Shortly afterwards the anti-Austrian movement was solemnly affirmed by the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome, in the Capitol, on April 8, 9 and 10. The work of the Congress was embodied in (1) a resolution unanimously voted, which declared the right of the subject peoples to complete independence, and affirmed the necessity of common effort; (2) a special agreement between the Italian and Yugoslav delegates¹; and (3) a declaration by the Poles that Germany was the principal enemy of Poland.

The kernel of the Italo-Yugoslav agreement, which repeated the terms drawn up by Signor Torre and Dr. Trumbić, lay in

¹ The Italian delegates were not, of course, official, but were chosen from among those who had taken a lead in the anti-Austrian movement. A semi-official sanction, however, was given by Signor Orlando's expression of approval of the work of the Congress.

Clause III, which dealt with the territorial difficulty, and ran as follows :

" They [the Italian and Yugoslav delegates] pledge themselves to settle in an amicable manner, in the interest of future friendly and sincere relations between the two peoples, all particular territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and the right of peoples to decide their own lot, in such manner as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, which shall be defined at the moment of peace."

It will be clear that this agreement made no real attempt to settle the practical issue between Italy and the Yugoslavs. The fact was clearly stated by Dr. Trumbić in his speech at the final sitting of the Congress, and it was emphasised by his refusal to indicate, even in private conversation with those Italian delegates who wished to outline the terms of a compromise,¹ what concessions might be expected from the Yugoslav side. It was obvious that Dr. Trumbić could not well be explicit. His "mandate" was insufficient, and he had to be careful not to discourage the Slovenes, upon whom the main sacrifices for the general interest would necessarily fall. For this reason he would not even pledge himself to the abandonment of the Yugoslav claim to Trieste. The Pact of Rome, and the conversations which took place during the period of the Congress, did nothing to further the solution of the territorial questions which divided Italians and Yugoslavs. On the contrary, the decisions taken deliberately deferred an attempt at solution until the end of the war. The formula devised to admit of co-operation was so vague as to leave ample liberty of interpretation. Under it the Italian Nationalists did not surrender their hopes of securing part of Dalmatia for Italy ; and a few weeks after the publication of the Pact of Rome, Father Korošec, President of the Yugoslav National Council within the Monarchy, from which body Dr. Trumbić held his mandate, publicly claimed both Trieste and Fiume for the Yugoslav State that was to emerge from the destruction of Austria-Hungary.

The Pact of Rome, however, did provide a basis for co-operation, and the news of the Congress gave encouragement to the forces of disintegration within the Monarchy. It was also of assistance to the work of propaganda and appeal to the soldiers of the subject races which had recently been instituted

¹ The proposal made by these delegates was, roughly, that Italy should surrender her claims in Dalmatia, but should receive the town of Fiume. This was the programme of Signor Bissolati and those who thought with him—the programme, that is, of the most moderate section of Italian opinion.

on the Italian front, though as a matter of fact the results of this propaganda scarcely came up to expectation. Already, during the previous year's fighting, there had been defections of some importance, especially on the part of the Czechs, and the enemy Command had reorganised its units so that the doubtful elements were mixed among those which were faithful to the Monarchy. Still, there were some desertions which were of great use to the Italian Intelligence Department.

By the middle of February the reorganisation of the Italian Army was completed. A magnificent effort on the part of the manufacturers and munition-workers had gone far towards making up the deficiency in all munitions due to the Caporetto disaster. The productive power of Italy's factories had been largely increased, and gave the assurance of a greater artillery strength than had hitherto been attained. When the great German offensive on the Western Front became evident and imminent, four French divisions and two British were recalled from Italy to France, and they were followed shortly afterwards by the Italian II Army Corps (two divisions). The Austrian offensive was planned at Bozen, towards the end of February, at a conference where the principal military leaders of Austria-Hungary were joined by General Ludendorff. A double attack was prepared, against the Piave front and on the mountains east and west of the Brenta.

Fifty Austro-Hungarian divisions were collected on the front between Arsiero and the sea, 27 in the mountains and 23 in the plains, 15 being in line in each sector. To these the Italians opposed 44 divisions (including 3 British and 2 French), of which 25 were in line. In the mountain sector the forces in line were roughly equal; on the Piave the enemy had a superiority of 6 divisions. But the advantage of interior lines lay with the Italian Command, which held its ample reserves at hand in the Venetian plain. The enemy had some 7,500 guns on the battle-front, and his artillery superiority may be calculated at about 40 per cent.

The general attack was opened in the early hours of June 15. The enemy's preliminary fire and the assemblage of his troops were much hampered by the fact that the Italians anticipated his move by heavy counter-battery fire and a destructive barrage directed upon the front-line trenches and routes of communication. In the mountains the attack was quickly held up. The first rush penetrated the lines of the Italians and their allies (two British divisions and one French held the front opposite Asiago) at various points, but at the end of a day's

fighting it was clear that the defence had the upper hand, and in another twenty-four hours the attack was definitely checked, except at one point where a local struggle lasted a day longer. By the evening of June 16 the enemy were back in their original lines, except for a few advanced positions gained in the Grappa sector and immediately west of the Brenta. Nor was the offensive resumed.

The attack across the Piave met with greater initial success, and the struggle lasted longer; but the ultimate failure was no less complete. The river was crossed and bridgeheads formed at three points, and after three days' fighting the two southern bridgeheads were joined, so that the enemy were established on a wide front west of the Lower Piave. The defending troops, however, were disposed in ample depth, and the farther the enemy advanced the more difficult his progress became. As the Italian reserves came into action the advance was definitely held. By the evening of June 18 Marshal Borojević had thrown his reserves into the fight to no purpose, and at this moment, when failure was already practically assured, the river came down in sudden flood. Next day the flood was heavy, and the increasing counter-pressure of the Italians put the attacking troops in a critical position. The struggle lasted a few days longer, while the quick-risen flood-waters ran down to the sea, but on the night of June 22 the enemy began to withdraw his troops across the river, and two days later he had completed the operation, which was carried out with heavy loss. During the battle the Austro-Hungarian casualties were enormous, more than 200,000 men being put out of action. Nearly 25,000 prisoners were taken by the Italians, and 70 guns, together with a great quantity of other war material. The Italian losses exceeded 90,000.

The question of an immediate counter-offensive on a large scale was considered by General Diaz, but the situation did not justify such a move, and the Italian counter-attacks were limited to rectifications of the line in the mountains and at the mouth of the Piave.

The results of the Battle of the Piave, as it was officially named, were of first-class importance. The Italian victory came after a long series of defeats, and its moral effect was the greater for this fact. Practically speaking, it settled two questions upon which much depended: it showed that the Italian Army had been well re-fashioned, and it put an end to the offensive power of Austria-Hungary. Its influence upon the hopes of the Central Empires has been testified to by General

Ludendorff himself, and the discussions which it aroused within the Monarchy showed how heavy a blow was dealt by the defeat. The last hope of a victorious peace was gone; and the power of the Habsburg Government over the Habsburg peoples, already sorely shaken, dwindled rapidly.

The anti-Austrian movement which had been affirmed by the Pact of Rome grew stronger and gained ground, but the beginnings of a *rapprochement* between Italians and Yugoslavs did not lead very far. Both sides were responsible. Baron Sonnino remained doubtful as to the reality of the movement for Yugoslav unity and independence, and was naturally opposed to any action which might seem to compromise the vital interests of Italy as he understood them. It was for these reasons that he at first objected to the recognition by the Allies of "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," and that he stood firm against the suggestion that Italy should announce herself willing to revise the Treaty of London. Thanks to the insistence of Signor Bissolati, who had throughout taken a leading part in the attempts to pave the way to a friendly solution of the Adriatic question, the Italian Government agreed, in September, to recognise the Yugoslav State; but Baron Sonnino, in communicating this decision to the Powers, pointed out that Italy none the less maintained her claims under the Treaty of London. This persistence was much criticised both in England and in France, and it increased the diffidence on the part of the Yugoslavs which the Pact of Rome had failed to remove. It was at this time, and in consequence of Baron Sonnino's attitude, that the champions of Yugoslavia's claims put forward the suggestion that Italy should be forced to a revision of the Treaty of London by the threat of cutting off supplies unless she abated her claims. This amazing proposal naturally found no favour in official Allied circles. It remains a matter for surprise that it should have been backed by some of the signatories of the Pact of Rome, which had specifically declared that the settlement of the territorial controversies should be deferred until the end of the war.

The criticisms of Italian policy which were current during the summer of 1918 grew sharper as the year went on, and the quiet which had fallen upon the Italian front after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian armies remained still unbroken. Early in September General Diaz came to Paris to discuss the situation. He pointed out that his reserves would suffice only for normal wastage, that the enemy was still superior in numbers and had an immense advantage in position, and an offensive, therefore,

would be very costly, the more so as Italy had to attack without two very important aids (the Allied military authorities considered them essentials) to an offensive—tanks and *ypérite* gas. He urged, therefore, that, in view of the great American armies now in France, a strong force of Americans might be sent to Italy as a reserve. His request was not favourably considered, and he was pressed to carry out, with his own forces, the attack which had already been prepared. At the time General Diaz declined to take what he considered an undue risk, and the murmurs in the Allied camps increased. Events marched quickly, however, and before the end of September General Diaz felt himself justified in making the move which had seemed imprudent three weeks earlier. His plans had already been worked out, and on September 25 orders were given for a speedy concentration of troops and guns in the region of the Middle Piave. The first idea was to open the battle with a demonstrative action between the Brenta and the Piave, and then, with every available man and gun concentrated on the Piave above Ponte di Piave, to attack across the river and attempt a breakthrough by way of Conegliano to the town of Vittorio Veneto. Bad weather and heavy floods delayed the Italian attack, and the improvement in the general situation of the Allies decided General Diaz to strip the rest of his front still further; the action in the Grappa sector, while retaining its function of diverting the attention of the enemy from the main attack, was also to be a serious attempt to break through, towards Feltre. The Austro-Hungarian armies on the whole front were still superior in numbers to the troops under General Diaz—the official figures were 63½ divisions to 57 (51 Italian, 3 British, 2 French and 1 Czecho-Slovak), 1,070,000 combatant troops against 912,000; but General Diaz had concentrated 41 divisions on the battle-front, in line and reserve, against 33½, of which 23 were in line or immediate support. For the first time the Italians had a larger number of guns on the whole front than the enemy, and the actual superiority in the battle-area was about 100 per cent. On the Middle Piave the superiority was still greater, for the enemy did not expect an attack in this sector, and had massed his artillery in anticipation of a push in the mountains between the Brenta and the Piave.

Early in the morning of October 24, the anniversary of the Caporetto disaster, the Italian Fourth Army attacked in the Grappa sector, and British troops forming an advanced guard of the Tenth Army, a mixed British and Italian Army which had been entrusted to the command of General the Earl of

Cavan, occupied the island of Grave di Papadopoli, which lay beyond the main current of the Piave. The forcing of the river-passages was to have taken place the following night, but the waters rose again, and on the front of the Eighth Army, which lay on the left of the Tenth, the stream was running at from seven to nine miles an hour, with a depth of over five feet at the fords. The attack had to be deferred, and the delay drew more enemy troops to the Grappa sector, where a hard struggle was taking place. It was not until the night of October 26-27, when the flood had slightly gone down, that the attacking armies attempted the passage of the river. By dawn on the 27th three bridgeheads had been established, by the Tenth, Eighth and Twelfth Armies,¹ opposite the Grave di Papadopoli, north of the Montello, and near Pederobba, where the river leaves the mountains. The right wing of the Eighth Army, however, had been unable to effect a crossing east of the Montello, where the river flowed swiftest and deepest, and where the bridges were exposed to direct fire from the enemy's guns. There was a gap of six miles between the two southern bridgeheads, and the troops of the Tenth Army, which had made more ground than the others, were dangerously exposed to a converging attack. General Caviglia, commander of the Eighth Army, who directed the general attack, detached one of his own corps to cross the Piave by the Tenth Army bridges, and, under Lord Cavan's command, to push northward and clear the front for the right wing of the Eighth Army. The manœuvre was entirely successful. By the evening of October 28 the Tenth Army had widened and deepened its bridgehead, and the right of the Eighth Army was crossing the river in force, while its left wing was moving forward in the Sernaglia plain. The enemy line was pierced, and next day his resistance cracked. A day later he threw up the sponge. On the evening of October 30 the Austrian communiqué announced that the troops of the Monarchy would "evacuate the occupied region." The retreat began all along the line, but in many places it was already a rout. The troops between the Brenta and the Piave, who had opposed a vigorous resistance to the Italian Fourth Army, lost order as they went back. In another forty-eight hours the breakdown was general.

On the evening of October 30 the formal request for an armistice was made by Austrian *parlementaires*, who were conducted to a villa near Padua. The terms were fixed after consultation with the Supreme War Council which was sitting at

¹ The Twelfth Army contained one French division, and was entrusted to General Graziani, commander of the French troops in Italy.


THE ITALIAN FRONT

1915 - 1918

Natural Scale 1:1,000,000

0 5 10 20 Miles

Legend: Roads, Battle Front, Sept. 1917, Battle Front, Sept. 1918



Longitude East of Greenwich

Latitude North

Versailles, and they were commensurate with the severity of the defeat which had been suffered. The armies of the Monarchy were to be retired behind the Treaty of London line, which was to be occupied by the victors, but before the armistice came into force more than half the enemy troops were prisoners in Italian hands.¹

Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist. As the battle-line was cracking, the subject peoples had declared the independence which they had already claimed, and the municipality of Fiume had asserted its demand to be included in the Italian Kingdom. The two cities whose names had made the formula for Italian Irredentism were both occupied before hostilities came to an end. A flying column entered Trent on the afternoon of November 3, and about the same time troops which had come by sea from Venice landed at Triest. The armistice was signed at 6.30 on the evening of November 3, and came into force at 3 p.m. the following day. Half an hour earlier a handful of Italian troops had landed at Zara, the administrative capital of Dalmatia.

While Austria-Hungary was being broken in pieces, the Supreme War Council of the Allies was sitting at Versailles, debating its reply to Germany's request for an armistice and subsequent peace based on Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points and later declarations. In the course of these discussions Signor Orlando twice stated formally that Italy could not accept Point Nine (which dealt with the question of new Italian frontiers). On each occasion M. Clémenceau and Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion that Signor Orlando's objection was not pertinent to the discussion, which had to deal only with Germany. No objection to this view was taken by any of the Allied or American representatives, and Signor Orlando agreed to delay his reservations till the Peace Conference. It was unfortunate that the Italian objection to Point Nine was not published at the time it was first formally made, as Italy's critics subsequently made great play with her alleged acceptance of the Fourteen Points in their integrity, with the sole exception of the claim for the Freedom of the Seas, which the Allies agreed to refuse.

A year after the disaster of Caporetto Italy's effort was crowned by a victory overwhelming in its completeness. Yet

¹ Over 600,000 prisoners were taken in all, with about 7,000 guns. The Italian losses were 33,000, of which over 20,000 were sustained by the Fourth Army in the Grappa sector. The British troops of the Tenth Army lost about 2,000 men.

it was in those days of triumph that Baron Sonnino said to a friend: "Now comes the hardest fight." They were few in that moment of victory who realised with the Foreign Minister that so hard a trial still awaited a country which had suffered so much and made so great an effort. During the latter part of the war the conditions of living had been far more pinched in Italy than in any Allied country. There was, indeed, no sort of comparison. Italy's financial effort had also been enormous, relatively to her resources. She had come to the edge of ruin. Throughout the war she had suffered from lack of raw materials and specialised industrial development. Above all she suffered from lack of coal. In the critical years she received on an average, for all purposes, about the quantity that is assigned to the British miners as their yearly quota, about one-seventh of the amount that was annually consumed in the domestic hearths of Great Britain prior to the war. Lack of coal and lack of raw material meant lack of munitions, and till the end Italy never had enough shells or guns. Even at the end her production of "75" shells was only one-sixth that of France.

All through the war Italy fought with limited material resources, but she accomplished great things—at a great cost. In all, she lost half a million dead, and the percentage of dead to population is practically identical with the proportion which the British total of dead (excluding natives) bears to the white population of the British Empire. It was only by paying the price to the full that victory had been won.

CHAPTER XIII

ITALY AFTER THE WAR

At the Armistice of 1918

FOR Italy the war ended in a far more spectacular and apparently decisive manner than on the Western Front. This fact should be emphasised, as it had a very important psychological effect on the Italian people. The sight of the Austro-Hungarian army crumbling before the Italian offensive, begun on the anniversary of Caporetto, October 24, the comparatively easy occupation of Trento and Triest and the Italian threat to Bavaria, which had an obviously disturbing effect on General Ludendorff's plans in France and no doubt contributed much to the final embarrassment and surrender of the German Great General Staff—all this made a deep impression on the mind of the average Italian, and encouraged him in the belief that his army had been the principal factor in the defeat of the Central Empires, and that without it the war would have been prolonged, or even have ended in a stalemate for the rest of the Alliance.¹ It was in the mood brought about by this belief that Italian claims at the close of the war began to be put forward.

A second fact that should be remembered, if we would elucidate the Italian attitude at the time of the Armistice of November 1918, is that in spite of the declaration of war against Germany and a growing realisation on the part of the Italians that Germany was the main enemy and that the Italian front could not be considered apart from other theatres of war—either politically or militarily—in spite of this, to the very end the Austro-Hungarian armies, and above all the Croatian units in them, remained the chief enemy in the Italian mind. The official *communiqué* of November 5, issued two days after the Armistice of the Villa Giusti, referring to the triumph of Vittorio Veneto, laid considerable stress on this

¹ During the war the Italians mobilised about 5,615,000. Of these they lost about 600,000 killed (or died), the wounded totalling about twice that number.

point. It asserted that in the war against the superior Austro-Hungarian forces the Italian army had for forty-one months carried on a continuous struggle, and that on October 24, fifty-one Italian divisions, three British, two French, one Czecho-Slovak and one American regiment had engaged seventy-one Austrian divisions and destroyed them. The undisguised weakening of the *moral* of the Austro-Hungarians was underestimated, and the Italian Press contrived to give the impression that by defeat in battle alone had the Revolution in Austria-Hungary been produced. Signor Orlando went so far as to declare in a public speech in Rome that there had never been so complete a victory as the Italian except perhaps in ancient Roman history.

In view of the Italian preoccupation with the fate of the Dual Monarchy, very close attention was paid to President Wilson's reply to the appeal which Austria-Hungary had made to him. The President's refusal to compromise on the question of the subject peoples and his plain hint that the federal solution proposed by the Emperor Karl would not meet with acceptance both gave intense satisfaction in Italy. There was some doubt as to whether President Wilson would uphold the Treaty of London, but this was lost sight of in his approval of Italian claims on the northern frontier, and in the general excitement of victory. On the whole it may be said that President Wilson's reply to Austria, in spite of the hesitation of the Nationalists, set Italian doubts at rest for the time being.

Italian views on the Peace were at first expressed with considerable moderation. Signor Schanzer, for example, who later became Minister of Finance in Signor Nitti's Cabinet, in an interview in the *Epoca*, before the end of the war, advocated a bold acceptance of the Wilsonian programme. Similarly the Deputy Raimondo entered a powerful plea in favour of an *entente* of the Adriatic between Italy, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. Finally Signor Salandra, the Foreign Minister, gave in outline his views of the Peace which, he said, would need first to regulate the succession of the three great empires, Russia, Turkey and Austria-Hungary, and secondly to set up simultaneously with itself a Society of Nations. It is clear that before the startling victory of Vittorio Véncto, Italy was well-disposed to a moderate and statesmanlike peace.

With the sudden collapse of Austria-Hungary, however, and the dazzling triumph of the Italian armies, there were signs of a new movement. A strong Nationalist propaganda was again

set on foot and the more moderate section of Italian opinion gradually silenced. The Pact of Rome, it was urged, although unofficially approved by the Italian Premier, had no binding force; and the prospect of a compromise with the Yugoslavs, which had been powerfully advocated by leading organs of Italian public opinion, seemed to be receding.

It was at this time that the Fiume difficulty first arose. By the terms of the armistice concluded at the Villa Giusti, Fiume was left outside the area to be occupied by the Italian force. It was also known that Fiume had expressly *not* been assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London. The Nationalist agitation therefore took the line of demanding the Treaty of London plus Fiume. Telegrams were despatched to King Victor and to leading members of the Government and elicited sympathetic replies. Very shortly after the Armistice Italian warships anchored off Fiume and Italian sailors were landed. This move was rapidly countered by the dispatch of Serbian troops, and only prompt Allied intervention prevented an encounter between the opposing forces. Subsequently there was effected a regular Italian occupation of both Fiume and Pola, which met with the approval of Italian public opinion—this having been much agitated in the case of the first by the numerous telegrams from the inhabitants, and in the case of the second because it was in that harbour that just prior to the Armistice (October 31) the Emperor of Austria had decreed the handing over of the Austro-Hungarian fleet to the Yugoslavs.

It was not only concerning Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, however, that the Nationalist sentiment began to make itself felt. On the northern frontier an even more extensive Italian occupation was demanded than that contemplated in the Treaty of London, the approval of which by President Wilson had, to tell the truth, somewhat surprised the Italian advocates of self-determination, in view of the fact that by it 200,000 Tirolese Germans would be brought under the Italian flag. In more extreme Nationalist circles the entry of Italian troops into Innsbruck was greeted with enthusiasm. But on this side demands were not pressed; it was clear that, apart from a few demonstrative publicists, Italy as a whole would be content with the security offered by the Brenner frontier.

Albania and the Balkan settlement in general, as well as Ottoman claims, were in a different case. As regards the first it was recalled that Italy had been promised Valona by the Treaty of London, but that she had in 1917 proclaimed a protectorate—a situation in which she was brought into con-

flict with both Greeks and Serbs. The Nationalist party urged the consolidation of Italy's protectorate, and satisfaction was expressed at the opening of numerous Italian schools and the steady approach of the completion of Italian public works.

It appeared to be intended that Valona should form the keystone of an ambitious programme of economic penetration of the Balkans. Between Brindisi and Valona there was to be a ferry-boat service, and from the latter a railway to Constantinople by way of Monastir and Salonika, which would have had the effect of attracting Balkan traffic into the Italian sphere of influence. On the side of moderate Italian opinion this scheme was not disapproved. The only stipulation was that such an Italian penetration of the Balkans should be carried out by agreement with Yugoslavia and Greece. Only by a policy of peace and conciliation could such a programme be realised, and Italy at once secure to herself the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and prevent the resurrection of the Dual Monarchy in the form of a Danubian Confederation or otherwise.

The Italian Nationalist claims in regard to colonies were directed chiefly to the possession of the Dodecanese¹ and Rhodes, Smyrna, and the territory in Asia Minor between that port and Alexandretta; in Northern Africa frontier rectifications were claimed in regard to Cyrenaica and Tripoli, while in East Africa the cession of the port of Jibuti or at least of part of French Somaliland was claimed from France with the object of assisting Italian possessions on the Somaliland coast. The "compensation" promised to Italy in the Treaty of London was later held to cover Jubaland, and this was discussed between Great Britain and Italy at considerable length from 1919 onwards. In regard to the Islands and Smyrna there was opposition from Greece; in the last case it was the French who were expected—vainly as it proved—to make the sacrifice. The only important territory expressly mentioned in any Allied agreement concluded during the war as destined to be assigned to Italy was (as we have already seen), Adalia.²

Thus it is possible to tabulate, in distinction from the claims put forward by the Nationalists, what one may call the undisputed demands of Italy. These amounted on the Italian borders themselves to the possession of the Trentino with the Upper

¹ A number of islands off the west and south-west coast of Asia Minor.

² On the Gulf of that name in the south-west of Asia Minor.

Adige as far as the Brenner, Istria, Triest and Venezia Giulia ; farther south there were accorded a portion of Dalmatia and a protectorate over Albania ; in Asia Minor there was Adalia, the exact delimitation of which was left to be decided later. The controversy aroused by those who went farther than this programme was the outstanding fact of the period from the victory of Vittorio Veneto to the opening of the Peace Conference. The effect which questions of foreign policy were capable of producing on home politics was very soon to be seen.

One of the results of the end of the war was a tendency to conduct political discussions on party lines once more. A most important event in Italian party politics was to come at the opening of 1919 with the removal of the Pope's ban on Catholic political activities and the formation of the Italian Popular Party, composed of Catholics. But the full effect of this was not to be seen until much later.

There was a crop of resignations from the Government in December ; and on December 27 a great sensation was caused by the resignation of the Reformist Socialist, Signor Bissolati. His reasons, although widely canvassed in the Press, were not given at the time, as a visit by President Wilson to Italy was imminent. The necessary " united front " was secured in time for this visit by the substitution of the Reformist Socialist Bonomi for Dari, the late Minister of Public Works, and the transference of the office of Signor Bissolati, that of Pensions, to the Ministry of War. For the duration of the President's stay, which was marked by great cordiality on the part of the Italian Government and people, scarcely a discordant note was uttered, and although Signor Orlando must have heard of President Wilson's views on Italian claims, no word of criticism was uttered.

On the President's departure, however, Signor Bissolati let it be known that he had resigned because of his failure to convince the Government to adopt a less far-reaching policy, notably in regard to the Dodecanese, the Brenner and Dalmatia, before the Peace Conference should meet. The result of this disclosure was a tremendous amount of recrimination in the Press which lasted well into the first session of the Paris Conference. Just before this took place the reconstruction of Signor Orlando's Government, which had been foreshadowed for some weeks, was carried through, the principal change being the substitution as Minister of Finance of Signor Stringher, head of the *Banca d'Italia*, for Signor Nitti, of whom it was expected that he would quickly gather the opposition parties around him.

Italy at the Peace Conference

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 opened on January 19. Italy was represented by a delegation led by Signor Orlando (who had managed to reconstruct his Cabinet and return to Paris just in time for the principal deliberations), by Baron Sonnino, by Signor Salandra and by the Republican Signor Barzilai. From the beginning it was clear that the Italian delegation would be considerably embarrassed by the raging Press campaign they had left behind in Italy.

On the foreign side the most serious feature was the way in which the advocacy of far-reaching Italian national claims threatened to develop also into hostility to the Allies. In the first weeks the main burden of criticism was against the French. France was accused of being friendly to the Yugoslavs, and there was in point of fact, in addition to the collisions between the Italian and Yugoslav troops at Laibach and Spalato, one serious encounter between French and Italians at Fiume, which had fatal results and at the time was the cause of intense bitterness. The necessity for counteracting the effect of such incidents and the criticism to which they gave rise was strongly felt by the Italian Peace Delegation, which by interviews and published messages did its best to emphasise the necessity of close Franco-Italian understanding.

Italy's official case at the Peace Conference was presented by Signor Barzilai in a 5,000-word memorandum. Italy's two aims in the war were: first, the redemption of the oppressed Italians living outside her borders; and second, the securing of her frontiers both by land and sea. In terms of territory this meant the attaining of the Alpine frontier, including the Alto Adige, the Trentino and Venezia Giulia, with the object of preventing the Germans from again becoming masters of the mountain-frontier of Northern Italy. In the Adriatic Italy demanded an improvement of the situation which, while not prejudicial to the legitimate aspirations of the Yugoslavs, would allow her to escape from the perilous position of inferiority in which she found herself in that sea. Trieste, Fiume and Pola were claimed as cities of predominantly Italian population, while the territories behind them, although admittedly containing a large number of Slavs, were asserted to be largely Italian in culture, and in any case assignable to Italy in order that the economic unity of the territories in question should not be impaired. Thus Italy claimed not only the frontier of the Julian Alps, including Istria from Pola to Fiume, but also

“an adequate part of Dalmatia.” The concluding part of the Memorandum dealt entirely with the question of Fiume. The assertion was made that, in addition to the danger of competition with Triest, if Fiume did not become Italian, it would leave one point open for German infiltration in the Adriatic; Fiume was not necessary to Croatia, and the only reason it was not assigned to Italy in the Treaty of London was the fact that at that date the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy was not foreseen.

It very soon became clear that Fiume was to be the all-important question at the Conference from the Italian point of view. Comparatively little interest was to be taken in the settlement with Germany, and what comment there was on French claims was in general neutral or even distinctly unfavourable. Apart from Fiume, in fact, it may be said that there was, in the first months of the Conference at least, practically only one other question which excited Italian public opinion in any considerable degree. This was the question of a Danubian Confederation. In this connection it may be mentioned that as a result of the Peace discussion in Paris Article 80 was inserted into the Treaty of Versailles, and also Article 80 into that of Saint-Germain, with a view to preventing the union of Austria and Germany. Newspapers varied in their comments, but the one possibility which the great bulk of Italian opinion refused to contemplate was the resurrection, in the form of an economic federation or otherwise, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

On Fiume there was even more general *intransigence*. Signor Orlando took a firm stand against President Wilson's views that Fiume with Sebenico should remain Yugoslavian, and that Zara should be autonomous; and early in February refused both a suggestion that a Yugoslav Delegation should be admitted to discussions before a Special Commission, and also that President Wilson should arbitrate in the matter. The result was a deadlock, and in the middle of the month President Wilson returned to America, while Signor Orlando went back to Rome.

The Italian Chamber reassembled on March 1. The session was marked by an important and well-received speech by Signor Orlando on national claims. It was evident that the Italian Delegation would carry the Parliament with them in their stand on the Fiume question. Before the session ended a resolution of the Socialist Turati embodying Electoral Reform was postponed by a vote giving Orlando a majority of

114, and by the middle of the month the Italian Delegation was back in Paris.

The Adriatic question came up for discussion again in Paris at the beginning of April. The Yugoslav representative, Monsieur Trumbić, was called before the Council of Premiers, but Signor Orlando absented himself from the hearing. The proposal to hold a plebiscite in the areas under dispute was rejected by the Italians. The British and French Prime Ministers respectively let it be known that they were willing to apply the Treaty of London, but as this would not have given Fiume to Italy, and as moreover President Wilson declared that he was no party to the Treaty, its application became practically impossible. The Italian Press became more and more indignant against Great Britain and the United States, and much excitement was caused by the spread in Italy of a rumour—which was categorically denied by the Company in question—that the Cunard Company had acquired interests at Fiume. On April 23 Signor Orlando, breaking off the direct discussions between the Italians and the Yugoslavs on the partition of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, addressed a message to the British and French Prime Ministers and to President Wilson laying down a basis for a compromise. This was answered the following day by a message signed by all three heads of Governments agreeing in the main to what Signor Orlando proposed, but excepting Fiume. Shortly afterwards President Wilson's Memorandum was published, refusing Fiume to Italy and stating that the cession to Italy of Dalmatia and the Islands for strategic reasons had no justification in view of the Constitution of the League of Nations. Immediately the storm broke. President Wilson's declaration was regarded as an appeal to the Italian people over the heads of their accredited representatives, and Signor Orlando, after publishing a protest against President Wilson's procedure, left Paris.

The enthusiastic manner in which Orlando was received even before he reached Rome left no doubt that the action of President Wilson had united Italy in support of her Premier, whilst in the Chamber his action was approved by representatives of all parties. Having thus secured the complete confidence of the Chamber, Signor Orlando in a few days returned to Paris for the purpose of participating in the concluding ceremonies in connection with the Treaty with Germany.

In general it may be said that the Treaty of Versailles was not well received in Italy. This arose to a large extent from

the fact that by the great bulk of the Italian people Germany was not regarded with great hostility—at least as compared with Austria. There was also great bitterness at the way in which French claims to German territory had been accepted, while Italian claims to Austrian had not, it was asserted, been allowed to be placed on the same level. And behind it all was the feeling—assiduously cultivated in certain quarters—that the crushing burden laid on Germany would react unfavourably on Italian interests, and tend to replace Prussian domination by a joint Anglo-American hegemony.

The prevailing discontent soon translated itself into hostility against Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino, whose failure to secure Italian interests at Paris was ascribed to unskilful handling of the situation. At the same time a crisis was approaching in domestic affairs. As early as March the official Socialist Party had effected a *rapprochement* with the Moscow International, and this had the effect of stimulating social and industrial action of a somewhat extreme character. Shortly afterwards there was a strike at Genoa with the object of preventing the despatch of munitions to be used against Russia, while at the end of May and beginning of June there were strikes in various centres, particularly at Naples, Milan and Rome. The strike in the last-named very nearly became general. Discontent was increased by the prevalence of unemployment and the very high price of food, and when Signor Orlando returned to Rome on June 14 he found the social situation very disquieting and the political situation unstable. His Minister of Food had resigned, and after an unsuccessful attempt to reconstruct his Cabinet and to discuss the Peace Conference, Orlando gave in his resignation to the King. He was succeeded by Signor Nitti, with Signor Tittoni as Foreign Minister and two prominent Giolittians, Signori Schanzer and Tedesco, as Ministers of Treasury and Finance respectively.

From Nitti to Giolitti

Just as Signor Orlando's fall was due in a large measure to the difficulties of the domestic situation, so the policy of his successor was to a great extent to be directed to home affairs. Signor Nitti's training¹ predisposed him to concentrate his attention on social and economic problems.

With regard to his attitude to Foreign Affairs one may

¹ Born in 1868 at Melfi, Apulia, he was originally a lawyer, but later entered upon an academic and literary career, ultimately being elected to a chair of political economy in the University of Naples.

fairly sum up the whole matter by saying that Signor Nitti was inclined to leave them in the hands of his Foreign Minister. One of the first facts ascertained by him was that the Treaty of Versailles, or at least its strict application against Germany, had become generally unpopular; the second that the isolation of Russia from the rest of Europe was arousing great hostility and threatening to deprive Italy of certain of her prime necessities. In the councils of Europe, therefore, Signor Nitti became a protagonist of the moderate attitude towards both countries.

On the formation of the new Government, Signor Tittoni received a note at the end of June from the other Allied representatives calling his attention to the fact that although Fiume was assigned to Croatia under the Treaty of London, laws in the city were being passed in the name of the King of Italy. To this the Italian Foreign Minister replied that the Italian Government assumed no responsibility for the Italian National Council at Fiume. There was apparently no way out of the deadlock.

Early in June there was a fatal conflict at Fiume between the Italian and the French troops. This caused intense excitement both in Italy and in France. An Allied Commission of Enquiry, which was sent to investigate the affair, recommended that an Inter-Allied Commission should be placed in control of the administration of the town, but before this step could be carried out the place was occupied on September 12 by the poet Gabriele d'Annunzio and a small band of followers. This made the *impasse* complete, since, although Signor Nitti—much to the indignation of the Italian Nationalists—condemned and disavowed the exploit, it was quite obvious that to move loyal Italian troops or to acquiesce in the sending of Allied forces to dislodge the usurper was likely to be attended by serious disorders in Italy.

The Italian domestic position, in fact—both by reason of the unrest over the Adriatic question and from purely economic causes—had been growing worse since Signor Nitti's advent to office; and only that statesman's handling of the situation averted a catastrophe. When, however, the d'Annunzio crisis came, Signor Nitti anticipated attack by asking the King to dissolve the Chamber, and the General Elections took place in November.

These resulted in the return of 100 members of the Popular Party and 156 of the Socialists, the Liberals securing 129 seats. The strength of the positions held by the Popular

Party and the Socialists was a most important factor; and it was evident that no Government was likely to have a stable majority without the co-operation of either the one or the other. Signor Nitti's political future, therefore, came to depend to a large degree on the attitude of the Italian Popular Party. The formation of this party, shortly after the Armistice as already mentioned, signified the full entry of Italian Catholics, with the approval of the Vatican, into Italian political life. On its social and political side the party's programme might be described as advanced Democratic. It stood for proportional representation, universal suffrage and land reform. In these and in other points it was practically as advanced as the Socialists.

The difficulty of bringing together a compact majority was, in fact, Signor Nitti's principal embarrassment; and a reconstruction of the Government took place in the following March.

The programme of the new Ministry was unfolded in a speech by Signor Nitti on March 20, advocating the economic re-establishment of Russia and Germany, supporting the policy of the Supreme Council's memorandum on these lines, and pleading for the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between Italy and Yugoslavia. A later speech asserted that Italy would claim equal representation at Constantinople and in the Straits, and it became obvious that Italian public opinion was largely opposed to the decisions contained in the Treaty with Turkey, particularly those which assigned certain territory of the former Ottoman Empire to Greece.

During May the fall of Signor Nitti's Government was brought about by the transference of the votes of the Popular Party to the Opposition; but by forming a new Ministry in which two of the portfolios were held by members of the Popular Party opposition in that quarter was neutralised. In less than a month, however, a new crisis arose on the question of the price of bread. The result was hostility from all parties except the Popular Party, and Signor Nitti's Government fell.

The character of its successor had been foreshadowed for some time. On all sides the name of the veteran statesman Giolitti was to be heard; all remembrance of his neutralist policy of the months preceding the War seemed to be obscured by the conviction that his was the strong hand which alone could control the situation; and the inclusion in Signor Nitti's last Government of two prominent Giolittians confirmed the belief that Giolitti's influence was growing and would culminate in his being invited to form a Government.

Signor Giolitti, in fact, succeeded in constituting his Ministry by the end of June. Perhaps the most interesting personality in it was the new Foreign Secretary, Count Sforza, who had been Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Signor Nitti; and Radicals, Popular Party and Liberal Democrats, Signor Giolitti's own party, were all duly allotted places.

The first problem of the new Ministry was that of Albania. Italian troops were in considerable difficulties there, and as the call for reinforcements had led to serious opposition—there were particularly grave riots at Ancona—it was only to be expected that Signor Giolitti would carry through his own policy. This he did by sending a plenipotentiary, Baron Aliotti, to treat with the Albanian Government at Tirana, and at the beginning of August a treaty was arrived at by which Italy recognised the independence and unity of Albania, as defined by the Ambassadors' Conference in 1913, and renounced Valona; but she retained the island of Sasseno opposite the port.

The tension in Italian domestic politics was not much lessened by this settlement. In point of fact the riots over Albania were significant of a general state of unrest, and during the summer and early autumn of 1920 there were numerous other manifestations of discontent. In the northern industrial districts it came to a head in September with the metallurgical strike. In nearly all the most important industrial undertakings the works were suddenly taken over by the employees, who hoisted the red flag and posted armed guards to resist any attempt at expelling them. But the Government only took up an attitude of neutrality, and nothing was done beyond instituting a stronger guard on banks and public buildings.

Meanwhile the workers in the factories were demanding to be given a share in the control of the business of the companies who employed them. This caused a deadlock which was only overcome when the Government intervened and secured a compromise, by which both parties were to agree on a scheme ensuring the workers' participation in the control of the factories, such a scheme to be embodied in a law which would be submitted to the Chamber by the Government.

In the early winter of 1920, in fact, a decided reaction against irresponsible extremism made itself felt. It was greatly assisted by the unfavourable accounts from Russia brought back by leading Italian Socialists and was most strikingly shown in the results of the Communal elections during November. In the South, too, where a peasant movement, aiming

at the seizure of land, had created a certain amount of alarm, a solution was attained by a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Government. The way was clear for a reconsideration of questions of foreign policy; and among these by far the most pressing was the problem of the Adriatic.

Signor Nitti's fall had caused the direct Italian-Yugoslav negotiations at Pallanza to be broken off. In November Signor Giolitti found an opportunity of reopening them. Count Sforza and M. Trumbić met at Santa Margherita Ligure and there concluded the Agreement called the Treaty of Rapallo (November 12). The settlement was reached by a certain amount of yielding on both sides. Italy gave up the Dalmatian Coast and accorded certain rectifications on the frontier. Zara came under Italian sovereignty; Fiume was made an independent State with Italian territory touching on one side and Yugoslav on the other. Finally, the Agreement provided for the establishment of an Italian-Yugoslav Mission with the object of discussing means of promoting a political, economic and intellectual *rapprochement* between the two countries.

In Yugoslavia there was a certain amount of hostility, but ratification of the Agreement was obtained. The Italian opposition was extremely small, only a handful of uncompromising Nationalists voting against ratification in the Chamber. The most serious problem was the attitude of d'Annunzio, against whom force had to be used to compel his evacuation of Fiume and acceptance of the terms of the Treaty. With the coming into effect of the Agreement, however, an important step towards peace between Italy and Yugoslavia had been taken and one of the most serious embarrassments to Italian foreign policy successfully overcome.

Recent History

The great European War, terrible experience though it was, could hardly be said to have been either a complete or an absolutely convincing test of any nation, of Italy least of all. For her the two years that followed the Armistice, more than the amazing years of war, tested and revealed those national qualities which had, in the eyes of the Western world at least, been partially dormant and obscured during the period of Italy's participation in the Triple Alliance. The most remarkable feature of this post-Armistice Italy was, one might say, her youth.

Italy was young—not more than 50 years old—in the complete attainment of her national unity. From this followed a

certain persistence of regional differences, a certain rivalry between North and South that at times seemed to threaten her stability. The reasons for this are given in the following chapter; but particularly, the cause of difference between the two regions during the post-Armistice years was the fear that the North might drag the whole country down into Bolshevism; with the return of more stable conditions in the North, however, this danger passed.

A second factor that threatened Italian moral, if not territorial and political, unity was to be found in the religious question. The makers of Italian unity in 1870 brought themselves into conflict with the Papacy and as a result caused the withdrawal of the great majority of Catholics desiring to remain loyal to the Pope from participation in the political life of the country. During the war the disadvantages that accrued from this were largely overcome. In spite of the neutral attitude of Italian Catholics before Italy's entry into the war, it is fair to say that once Italy had taken up arms, Catholics in general stood together with their fellow-countrymen as a whole and were not discouraged from doing so by the Holy See. The Papacy as an institution had of necessity itself to remain neutral, but it did not oppose its adherents—of Italian any more than of any other nationality—in the fulfilling of what they conceived to be their patriotic duty. Italian priests took their normal place in the army as chaplains, high dignitaries of the Church, even Cardinals, assisted at patriotic functions, and the logical culmination arrived at was the formation, immediately after the Armistice, of the Popular Party, which, although independent of the Vatican, nevertheless represented the full entry of Italian Catholics into public affairs. The stabilising effect of the Papal Encyclical "*De Pacis Reconciliacione Christiana*," published on June 1, 1920, should also be mentioned. Since 1871 the heads of Catholic States, above all Spain and Belgium, had not visited Italy and were thus cut off from direct communication with the Italian Monarchy. This disability was now withdrawn, contributing not a little to the moral strengthening of the Monarchy and Government.

It was by ways such as these that at least an approach to equilibrium in Italian domestic politics was made. As regional jealousies were smoothed over, party rancour overcome and the disintegrating influence of extremist doctrines neutralised, the country began, before the end of the winter of 1920-21, to settle down to reconstruction. In internal affairs there were

four most urgent questions with which Italy was faced in the months following the Armistice. These were the demobilisation of the army and the absorption of soldiers into industry, the reconstruction of the invaded districts, the incorporation in the Kingdom of the new "redeemed" territories and, lastly, the composing of the difficulties caused by lack of coal, by the high rate of exchange and by the shortage of grain. All these were faced and to a large extent, in spite of tremendous obstacles, ultimately overcome. The price of bread was the cause of more than one Government crisis, and it seems probable that until the complete development of Italian water-power, Italy will be dependent on foreign countries for her coal supply. The two essential remedies for most of her other troubles were, firstly, the regaining of the confidence of foreign business men and financiers and, secondly, the reconstruction of Central Europe and the reopening of Russia.

It seemed not unlikely that the first would come once the crisis had been passed and the fears of a social upheaval removed. As for the second, its realisation may fairly be described as the logical end of Italy's political development. At first, in her attitude to foreign affairs, Italy again betrayed her youth—a quality which, at the outbreak of war, showed itself in a magnificent *élan*, but towards the end of the war and during the first stages of the Peace Conference was transformed into over-confidence. "La più grande Italia" was for a time a popular cry; and it was felt that Italy could play a part in world politics which most outside observers would have declared out of proportion to her economic resources. But the various conferences closed without the attainment of many of the imperialists' demands.

The first feelings which prevailed in Italy were disillusionment and a certain amount of jealousy. Comparisons were made with France, whose claims to Alsace-Lorraine had been practically uncontested; with Greece, who seemed likely to extend her national territory to an enormous degree. Then, gradually, sober reflection produced a feeling of resignation, and there grew up a desire on the part of Italians not to undertake an imperialist policy far beyond their strength, but to take upon themselves the rôle of mediators in the movement of reconstruction and reconciliation in Europe. Particularly during 1920, when the policy of Great Britain and France towards Russia, Turkey and Germany was most actively discussed, was this to be the chief characteristic of Italy's foreign policy. She decided—and she has kept to her decision—that she would

not break loose from her Allies of the War, but she would also not perpetuate hostilities; she would lead where she felt able to do so, as in her action in encouraging the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, but she would know her limitations and remain within them, maintaining peace and setting herself to the most urgent task of all—the reconstruction of her economic life and the preservation and peaceable extension of her national culture.

So far, so good. But the latest development of Italian nationality is of such a surprising character that we must devote the final chapter of this history to tracing the growth of different social movements in Italy during the last fifty years in order to show how the present overwhelming Fascista movement has come about.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT (1860-1923)

1860-1915

THE territorial and political unification of Italy (1859-70) created only the framework of national unity. The States absorbed in the new Regno had been divided for centuries. Each of them—Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Tuscany, the States of the Church, the Two Sicilies—had a long history of its own, during which its people had acquired distinctive habits of life and thought resulting from varieties of racial composition, dissimilar geographical, dissimilar political conditions. Between the various regions of Northern and Central Italy these differences were far from being so marked as between these regions collectively and the South. The former, though from the time of the Roman Empire to that of Napoleon never united but forming a patchwork of various régimes, had nevertheless a certain political and social homogeneity based on the common mediæval development of the independent township. Lying near to Central Europe and the main stream of European history, North and Central Italy had moreover gained a considerable degree of economic and political experience and were progressive and democratic in character. The South, on the contrary, had ever since the eleventh century been under a régime of feudal monarchy, which had denied it the education of Communal self-government: it did not even develop a commercial and industrial middle-class before the end of the eighteenth century. The land was in the possession of barons, who quarrelled perpetually with one another and with the various monarchies. In social and political development it was in 1860 generations behind Upper Italy. In economic organisation and habit of mind it was still in the feudal stage.

On a population so heterogeneous and so unevenly developed a rigidly uniform system of government was suddenly imposed. There were good reasons at the time for the adoption of such a régime. Unity had been achieved by an unnatural alliance

between the Sardinian Monarchy and the revolutionary forces inspired by the Republican Mazzini and the knight-errant of democratic revolt, Garibaldi. For European reasons the Monarchy had been accepted as figure-head and director of the struggle, in large part a diplomatic struggle, for national union and independence; but the fundamental opposition was not removed, but rather accentuated, by collaboration and reappeared after the establishment of the Regno in the Parliamentary opposition of Right and Left. So far as the people of Italy were not indifferent—and the Risorgimento was the work of a minority—it was for Mazzini banished and Garibaldi flouted and treated as an enemy by the Monarchy that its enthusiasm was aroused. Piedmont was hardly felt as Italian, and Monarchy was associated in the popular mind with tyranny and exaction.

Regional feeling—"Regionalismo"—was naturally strong. Between North and South especially there were little sympathy and little mutual understanding. To allow any real power to local governments or to retain the old administrative divisions would have imperilled both Monarchy and Unity. Accordingly a Constitution and administrative system of French model was adopted, grafted neither on the Commune nor on the Region, but having for its most important unit the artificially created province, within which the municipalities hold a subordinate position. The organs of government in each Province are presided over and controlled by a prefect, appointed by and dependent on the central government and expected to uphold the political principles or tendencies of his superiors—especially at election-time.

With these new and strange institutions and a strictly limited franchise it was not likely that a population long used to confine its attention to purely local interests would quickly develop an interest in national affairs. The mass of the people were very poor and very ignorant, the middle-class selfish and narrow-minded. To them the Government was a distant *Deus ex machinâ* who demanded heavy tribute, but from whom it was possible to obtain material benefits through the mediation of a Member of Parliament. The Deputy's popularity was in proportion to his success in obtaining such favours. Hence much waste of the time and energy both of deputies and Government offices and a bureaucracy swollen to quite unwieldy proportions. Moreover, as "big business" came into existence, the door was open to a most pernicious corruption.

During the first fifteen years of the Regno the Right, repre-

senting the monarchical principle, was in power, confronting the Left, comprising various shades of revolutionary and democratic opinion. The Ministry was fully occupied with constructive work—the completion of national unity, the questions of Rome and Venetia, the creation and operation of administrative machinery, public works, education, etc. Its government was frankly “*de haut en bas*.” When in 1876 the Left came in with the classical conception of Parliamentary sovereignty, representing the will of the people expressed through political parties, it soon found that the people had no will, no political consciousness, and that no parties existed—only shifting groups representing local or sectional interests. The “*Trasformismo*” of Depretis erected the fluidity of these groups into a principle of government. In the absence of stable parties, Prime Ministers were driven to rely upon a personal following, in the formation of which a variety of motives—not always of a presentable character—played their part. The Parliamentary Dictator—Depretis, Crispi, Giolitti and now Mussolini—has become a normal feature of Italian political life. The Dictator controls the electorate by means of the Prefettura and the Police, and Parliament by manipulation of group interests and rivalries. The system is thus an obstacle to the formation of large, permanent parties representative of wide national interests and therefore of value to the political education of the nation. Parliament has become discredited, and a gulf established between governing classes and people.

The Italy of the governing classes was ambitious to play the part of a “Great Power.” The Italy of the people desired principally more food and less taxation. Crispi, supported by the Protectionist Industrialists and by the mediævalism of the South, launched the country on a vast scheme of colonial expansion which could only have succeeded if the country as a whole had willed it. The final failure still further discredited the Government and widened the gulf between classes and masses.

Social distinctions are, it is true, less marked in Italy than in most other countries, by reason perhaps of the mediæval fusion of bourgeoisie and nobility, of long years of subjection to foreign rule, of comradeship in the struggle for liberation, of the gracious manners common to all classes. But as the well-to-do Italian prefers as a rule to live in town except for a few months’ “*villeggiatura*” in the summer, the friendly intimacy between landlord and cultivators of the land, which

is so common in England, is in Italy rarely seen. And as the vast majority of the Italian population is agricultural and large estates (*latifondia*) common, this fact has serious social importance.

In Sicily and the South *latifondia* is especially prevalent, and it was in Sicily that the discontent of the workers first took the form of organised resistance. The general depression of trade which prevailed in Italy at this period (1887-98), and which was felt most acutely in the South, was brought about by a variety of causes. There was an immense burden of public debt with a corresponding burden of taxation, ill-adjusted and vexatious. At the end of the eighties came disastrous Bank failures, resulting from over-speculation in building. In the nineties the colonial adventures of Crispi added largely to expenditure and undid in part the financial recovery effected in the seventies and eighties. Finally in 1887 began the tariff war with France, which lasted for a decade and reacted disastrously on the agricultural trade of the South.

The demonstrations of the Sicilian labourers were amply justified by the conditions, but were repressed by the Government with extreme severity under pressure from the land-owners. The propertied classes were alarmed by the first appearance on the scene of Socialist organisers. The "Fasci," or leagues of labourers, had been formed and supported in their resistance by young men, some of them belonging to noble families, who had embraced the new doctrines with almost religious enthusiasm. In its earlier stage at any rate there was nothing revolutionary about the movement. The Fasci "were religious, almost clerical in their tone; they opened schools and aimed at developing co-operative societies and popular libraries; in their club-rooms sometimes hung a crucifix, and by the side of Karl Marx and Mazzini were portraits of the King and Queen."¹ But the Government's unwise use of the police and military presently (1893) produced collisions and bloodshed. Giolitti, then Prime Minister, seems to have recognised that the right was not all on the side of the owners and made tentative efforts to improve the condition of the peasants. In December 1893 he was replaced by Crispi, and the movement was stamped out for the time. A veritable persecution followed under legal forms, which were directed especially against Socialism in all its varieties and against the Labour organisations which it had promoted.

By this time the Socialist movement had grown to consider-

¹ King and Okey, *Italy To-day*. (1901.)

able proportions and had organised itself (1892) as a regular party with a programme based on Marxist principles, excluding from its ranks the scattered Anarchistic groups, representing what survived, chiefly in Southern Italy, of the followers of Bakunin. The purely destructive gospel of the Russian visionary, who had resided for some years during the sixties in Florence and Naples, had with the progress of Industrialism been driven from the field by the much more actual theories of Marx, which, if inspired by a one-sidedly materialistic interpretation of history, were based on a careful study of economic fact and provided Socialism with a definite programme and a gospel to preach to the working-classes.

Under Crispi's successor, Di Rudinì, repression relaxed, but the inefficiency and corruption of Government were too deep-seated to be reformed in a moment. The persecution of Socialism was continued in a rather milder form. Promised reforms failed to materialise; the Bank scandals were not cleared up, and among the governed feelings became dangerously exasperated. In the winter of 1896-7 a rise in the price of bread led to riots in the South, which became more general after the new year. The Government reverted to force, but the riots continued, and in the spring spread to the North. At Bologna there was a general strike of agricultural labourers. The unrest reached its climax at Milan in what are remembered as the "Fatti di Maggio," or "the Events of May." Here a question of extending the city boundaries had created a difference between the industrial population of the suburbs and the Municipal Government. Nervousness and mistakes on the part of the authorities led to violent collisions, and for three days the streets of the city were a battlefield. When it came to fixing responsibility, the Government theory was that the riots both in the South and in Milan were the results of a revolutionary movement planned by Socialists, Clericals and Republicans. But they failed to produce at the trials which followed any convincing evidence in support of this contention. However, the tide of Reactionism rose. The real alarm felt by the comfortable classes, who knew no more of Socialism than that it meant disturbance, was encouraged and exploited by the Industrialists, who saw a chance of breaking up the nascent combinations of Labour. Labour and Socialist Associations—Chambers of Labour, Friendly and Co-operative Societies, village banks—were broken up and their funds seized on any excuse. Convictions of individuals were obtained in defiance of justice.

But reaction had overleaped itself, and there was soon a revulsion of public feeling. In deference to an extensively-signed petition an amnesty was granted to a number of the condemned. Filippo Turati, the apostle of Revolutionary Socialism, who had been condemned to twelve years' imprisonment, was in 1900 re-elected to Parliament and allowed to take his seat, though technically, as a consequence of his sentence, ineligible. The revolt against Reactionism was accentuated and made articulate by the Parliamentary conflict of 1899 and 1900. In June 1898 Di Rudinì resigned. General Pelloux, who succeeded him as Premier, in spite of an undertaking to use only the existing law for the purposes of public order introduced measures designed to give the Government almost unlimited power to suppress the right of meeting and association. Over these a memorable struggle took place in Parliament which united Radicals and Republicans with Socialists in a solid and obstinate resistance to the Government. The outcome was a doubling of the strength of Socialism in Parliament and a change of Government which implied a change of régime.

The Government abandoned its attitude of champion of the classes against the masses, which no Ministry has since dared to resume. Giolitti, who formed his first Government in 1902, was the first Italian Prime Minister definitely to proclaim that Labour had an equal right with Capital to have its organisations respected and protected by Government, and that Government should, within the limits imposed by the duty of preserving public order, remain neutral or only intervene as peacemaker in disputes between employers and employed. To this principle he has consistently adhered, and it is his effort to open the eyes of the Italian Bourgeoisie to the "arrival of the *quatrième état*" which forms the most respectable feature of Giolitti's career as a statesman.

Meanwhile the years of Government persecution had had permanent effects. They had vastly increased the popularity of Socialism and had cemented the alliance between Socialism and Labour. As the process of industrialisation proceeded (mainly in Northern Italy), organised Labour in town and country came to be penetrated by Marxist doctrine and tended to take the position of an enemy of the State within the State.

But with the rapid extension of Socialism and Labour organisation divergences of doctrine and tendency continually and increasingly threatened the unity of the party. There were revolts of the proletarians against the supremacy of the intel-

lectuals, differences of opinion as to the limits to be set to collaboration with bourgeois parties and to Parliamentary action generally, differences as to the infallibility of Marx, differences between revolutionaries and "reformists" and between revolutionaries and revolutionaries, there was friction between the party and the General Confederation of Labour. The first actual split occurred in 1912 with the expulsion of Bissolati, Bonomi and others, who presently formed a distinct "Reformist Socialist party." The extremists were henceforth supreme in the party directorate and set themselves to magnify the authority of that body and to impose upon the Parliamentary representatives of the Party a strict discipline in conformity with their own intransigent policy.

Whether because their violent programme was attractive to the younger men of the working class or as a result of the wide extension of the suffrage carried by Giolitti in 1911 and the unpopularity of the Libyan War, the numbers and influence of the party increased rapidly at this time. At the elections of 1913 more than fifty Socialist Deputies were returned to the Chamber (an increase of sixteen) and the Socialist vote rose to something like a million (in 1904 it had been a little over 300,000). At the municipal elections of the same year 400 communes were captured, including such great cities as Milan, Bologna and Alessandria.

The War

The war divided Italy into two camps. On the one side were the Neutralists—Giolittian Radicals, Clericals and Socialists; on the other the Interventionists—Liberals, claiming succession from the supporters of Cavour but actually what we should call Conservative; Nationalists, wielding an influence among the well-to-do educated classes out of all proportion to their Parliamentary strength; and Radicals, whose sympathy with the French Republic, with Democracy and Irredentism, made them natural enemies of the Triple Alliance. This ill-assorted war-party was never a majority of the nation, and in order to keep Neutralism in check and create a war spirit the Government gave free rein to the Jingo press of the right-wing Interventionists, while that of the Radical Left was strictly censored. The autocratic methods of the war Government and the imperialism of the Nationalist press deepened the cleavage between Interventionists and Neutralists. In particular the Socialists took up an exaggeratedly international—almost anti-national—position and did their utmost to instil into the working classes

and the peasants (assisted in this latter field by some of the Neutralist clergy) the idea that the war was a Capitalists' war in which they had no interest. The wave of democratic feeling which swept over Europe at the news of the Russian revolution (March 1917) encouraged them to still bolder action, and it can hardly be doubted that Socialist propaganda played its part in producing the disaster of Caporetto (October-November 1917).

The shock of that event roused strong feeling against the party and emboldened the Government to stronger counter-action. Leaders were arrested, tried and condemned to longer or shorter terms of imprisonment. With the recovery and final victory of the Italian arms the flood of patriotic feeling rose to a great height and carried with it the great mass of the nation.

On this fevered state of feeling the disappointments of the Peace Conference and the sufferings and dislocations caused by the war poured a douche of cold water. The national temperature fell, and the series of Ministries which succeeded one another during the years 1919 and 1920—Orlando, Nitti, Giolitti—represented the progressive recovery of Neutralism coinciding with the re-emergence of Democratic Interventionism. The attitude of Socialism after the war was peculiarly insolent and galling to patriotic Italians. It pointed triumphantly to the verification which the Peace provided of all its warnings regarding the futility of war, the exploitation of the masses by the classes, of small Powers by great. The enthusiastic sympathy of Italian Socialists was given not to Italy but to Russia. Lenin was their hero and saint. After Caporetto the party had suffered repression from the Government, but with the return of Neutralism to power it came out into the open and succeeded in winning over to its gospel of revolution *à la Russe* large numbers of the industrial workers and peasants disgusted with the immediate results of the war.

At the General Elections of November 1919, 156 Socialist Deputies were elected on a vote of about three millions, after the General Socialist Congress of October had pledged the party to the establishment by violence of a "dictatorship of the whole proletariat" as a step towards a complete Communist régime. Out of the 8,000 communes of Italy, 2,000 (including great cities like Milan and Bologna) were in the hands of Socialists, who proceeded to enrich the workers at the expense of the middle-class officials and to the complete ruin of the municipal finances. Something like a quarter of the country was under the Red Flag. Strikes were of daily occurrence and

were declared on the flimsiest pretexts, until the life of the country was utterly disorganised. There were local experiments in Soviet rule. Landowners were expropriated and the land handed over to their peasant employees. Officers and non-Socialist soldiers and ex-soldiers were insulted in the streets. A veritable terror was established, and "a state of mind became general which inclined people to accept the outbreak of the social revolution and its triumph as the lesser evil and an escape from the existing situation." Meanwhile the Government took no action—perhaps could take none, since it had very imperfect control of the Departments of State, whose personnel had not conformed to the leftward movement of the Ministries, while the rank and file of the army was largely in sympathy with the revolutionary gospel and had been demoralised and unsettled by the amnesty which Orlando had granted to the deserters of the war. Nitti, who succeeded Orlando as Prime Minister in July 1919, was no more willing or able than his predecessor to employ the forces of the Crown against Socialist excesses. Giolitti, the grand Neutralist, who became Premier in May 1920, having suppressed d'Annunzio, was preparing to take action against the Maximalists, but when Fascismo appeared upon the scene he welcomed it as a reaction which might lead to a settlement without the use of the army. Accordingly he permitted it to develop without interference by either the civil or military authorities into a great private army.

Fascismo


The first "Fasci di Combattimento" were enrolled in March 1919, while Nitti was Prime Minister. Their originator, Benito Mussolini, was born in 1883 in Romagna. He imbibed Socialist doctrines from his father, who was a blacksmith. The story of his youthful struggles for education against difficult circumstances gives proof of unusual vigour and determination. As a very young man he migrated to Switzerland, but was banished thence for preaching Marxist doctrine in a paper of which he had become editor. He returned to Italy and continued his career of Socialist journalist. Having made his mark at the Socialist Congress of 1912 as a champion of the extreme revolutionary tendency, he became a member of the party executive and presently editor of its official organ *Avanti*. But in 1914, when Italy had to choose between intervention in the war and continued neutrality, he was one of a small minority of Socialists in whom patriotism proved

stronger than political faith. He broke away from the party and founded the *Popolo d'Italia* as an Interventionist and anti-Neutralist journal which, while going to all lengths in combating and denouncing the theory and practice of Maximalism, continued until 1918 to label itself "Socialist," and though strongly Nationalist, even Jingo in tone, regarded the war as a war of democratic ideals, destined to lead to the emancipation of the proletariat. When Italy declared war on Austria, Mussolini volunteered and went to the front, was severely wounded, and on his recovery devoted his energies to the editing and writing of his paper.

The Fasci of March 1919 were organised by Mussolini at Milan as a political group formed of ex-combatants and other like-minded young men to protest against the "mutilation of the victory" by Maximalists and Neutralists and representing the disgust inspired in the patriotic soldier by the contrast between the democratic ideals for which he had fought and the actual results, and by the wealth and ostentation of the war-profiteers. The programme elaborated at their constituent meeting is a curious blend of romantic nationalism and advanced social reformism. It included demands for the full exploitation and valuation of Italy's victory, a revision of the Constitution, the creation of professional and technical councils with legislative powers, an eight-hours day, a levy on capital, revision of war-contracts, etc.

Some of these Fascisti took part in an attack on the offices of *Avanti* in April, and a contingent accompanied d'Annunzio in his march on Fiume in September 1919. Otherwise they did not attract much attention. With the occupation of the iron and steel factories in August-September 1920 the Socialist Revolution seemed actually to have arrived; but it is noticeable that in that affair Mussolini took up a position of benevolent neutrality towards the workers' organisation which refused to follow the extreme counsels of the Socialist executive. The failure to use this opportunity of accomplishing the promised Revolution exposed the impotence and inactuality of Maximalism. Its decline in influence dates from this point, and was only hastened by the Fascist assault, for which the murder by Socialists of a municipal councillor at Bologna (October 1920) gave the signal.

The campaign once opened, there was no lack of recruits. In the great cities the great mass of these came from the youth of the poorer section of the middle-class, whom the war had stirred out of the political apathy characteristic of the Italian



MARCH OF THE FASCISTI (MUSSOLINI inset)

bourgeoisie into ardent and romantic patriotism. With these were sons of rich merchants and manufacturers, students and young men from*the liberal professions. They were full of patriotic idealism and regarded themselves as called to be the saviours of the State. In the agricultural districts, on the contrary, those who donned the Black Shirt belonged in the main to the land-owning class or that of the tenant-farmers, out to destroy the Socialistic unions of agricultural labourers and recover the position they had lost in local administration—actuated therefore by motives anything but idealistic or romantic. The composition of the Fascist army thus has a curious analogy with the mixture of reactionary imperialism and reforming enthusiasm characteristic of Mussolini and his school. The antithetical elements may collaborate for purely destructive ends, but for constructive work one must cast out the other. It is this double nature which makes the future of Fascismo so hard to forecast.

The result of the struggle was not long in doubt. The Black Shirt outdid the Red Flag in brutality and violence; it had the tacit encouragement of Government. Not only were the forces of the Crown not employed against it, but important commands in the Fascist fighting bands were held with impunity by Generals of the Regular Army. The plutocracy naturally supported the destroyers of its enemies. The Socialist Revolutionaries, on the other hand, had by their anarchic procedure alienated the sympathies of all who had anything to lose, and when their impotence to produce anything but chaos had been demonstrated, middle and working classes alike, recovering their courage, turned against them. Whole Unions—especially of agricultural workers—forswearing the class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat, deserted to the Fascist camp and enrolled themselves in the “National Corporations” formed by Fascismo to replace the Socialistic Labour organisations. The campaign was carried out relentlessly and methodically until the Communes had been wrested from the enemy, the party membership reduced from some three millions to about sixty thousand, and its fighting spirit thoroughly broken. Socialist club buildings, the offices of Socialist Co-operative Societies and Chambers of Commerce, were burned, private houses destroyed, individuals deliberately put to death, not to mention killings in hot blood, systematic bludgeonings, dosing with castor-oil, and the like.

In less than a year the destructive work of Fascismo was practically complete, and the movement, though it retained

its semi-military organisation and continues up to the present to be sporadically active, entered upon a new phase. Mussolini seems to have perceived that unless he could build up as well as destroy, Fascismo would fall under the same condemnation as the Socialism which it had destroyed. The troubles from which Italy was suffering were not all the work of Socialism, but were the result partly of the war, partly of the deep-seated and long-standing defects in the political and social development of Italy already described. A revision of the Constitution had figured in the original political programme of the Fasci, and when Mussolini declared for Intervention and broke with Socialism he did not cease to be a revolutionary.

In the spring of 1921 Fascismo organised itself as a political party and returned some thirty members to the Parliament elected in May, allying itself there with the Nationalist group. But the party had as yet no programme and no consistent principles, only negative ideas, enthusiasms, and aspirations—the latter as heterogeneous as the elements composing the Fascist body. In Parliament it was of little account except as swelling the opposition to Giolitti and helping to make his position untenable. Outside Parliament the strength of Fascismo was irresistible, while the task of securing a majority became for each successive Government more impossible. Fascismo in its active phase had been a volunteer police force defending the State willy-nilly against Maximalist revolution. It now aspired to reconstruct the State, in a sense as yet undefined, except in the one matter of the elimination of Maximalism. Under the Bonomi and Facta Ministries (July 1921–October 1922), in which Fascismo was not represented, on various occasions and whenever the solution given by the Government to certain questions did not meet with its approval, it took upon itself to interfere, mobilising its local force, occupying cities or provinces, and refusing to disarm until the Government gave way or modified its action. It was rapidly developing into a state within the State. The Fascist Congress, which met at Naples on October 24 and was attended by some forty thousand adherents, was chiefly a demonstration against the neutrality and incompetence of the Government. On October 27, 1922 the Fasci were mobilised all over Italy and marched in force on Rome. The Ministry, who had already on the 26th determined to resign, proclaimed a state of siege, but civil strife was averted by the action of the King, who ordered the revocation of the proclamation, which had been published without his signature. The attempt to form at

the eleventh hour a Salandra-Mussolini Ministry having failed, owing to the refusal of Mussolini, the Fascist leader was sent for by the King and invited to form a Ministry. Thus, half by revolutionary, half by constitutional means, Fascismo has become master of the State.

The first declarations of the new Government—or rather of the new Dictator, for by conferring on the Premier the full powers which he in fact already possessed, Parliament and Ministers at once acquiesced in their own subordination—were of a reassuring character and showed no trace either of Jingoism or class hatred. On condition that Italy's position of equality should be fully and practically acknowledged, she would co-operate cordially with France and Great Britain in the work of peace-making. Italy's foreign policy would aim in the first place at the advancement of Italian interests, but would do so in a pacific spirit on a basis of *Do ut des*. Her power must be built up not by militaristic adventures but by peaceful economic expansion. Treaties once made must be carried out. These promises have been confirmed by the attitude taken by Mussolini in his recent visit to London and by the action of the Italian representatives at the Conference of Lausanne. Moreover, the Treaty of Rapallo between Italy and Yugoslavia and the Washington Treaty have now been ratified by the Italian Parliament. In internal affairs Mussolini has shown great courage in at once facing the question of public peace and order, involving as it does the risk of alienating the force on which his power is founded. The Fascist "squadre" are not disbanded, but demobilised *sine die*, and they have received strict orders to desist from all violence. In certain regions these orders have been flagrantly ignored, but in most parts of the country tranquillity has been restored. The reorganisation of the Army and Police forces, already in progress, and the formation, also begun, of a National Militia out of the most trustworthy elements of the Fascist troops, seem to indicate Mussolini's intention to return as soon as possible to normal methods, at the same time keeping in the background a force on whose absolute loyalty he can rely in case his position should be seriously menaced. The Government has shown exemplary energy and industry in attacking without any delay the reorganisation of the Departments of State, the cutting-down of expenditure, the readjustment and extension of direct taxation, and other reforms too long delayed. But the success of the Fascist experiment depends on more fundamental issues

than these. It can only succeed by giving to the "popolo minuto"—the workers in town and country, the small shopkeepers and artificers—who have so far, in spite of universal suffrage, remained outside of, indifferent or hostile to the national life as represented by Parliament and Government, the place in political life to which their economic status, which in the case of the workers has been vastly improved by the war, entitles them. Can Fascismo do this? Will Mussolini be able to stand up against the reactionary forces of Nationalism and big businesses in close alliance? There is no doubt of his desire to do so or of his proletarian sympathies, but he is compromised by the relations of mutual support established between Fascismo and these forces, and unless he revolutionises the whole industrial system he will have great difficulty in maintaining even the partial and rather illusory ascendancy over organised Labour which Fascismo at present exercises.

Giolitti, the last and in some ways the ablest of Italy's Parliamentary Dictators, tried hard to induce the governing classes to admit the arrival of the "quatrième état." He failed. Socialism thereupon attempted to incorporate the nation in the "quatrième état." It failed. It is left to Fascismo to incorporate the "quatrième état" in the nation. Success in this task cannot but give to Italian national life a health and vigour which it has never yet enjoyed; what would be her condition in the case of failure we prefer not to contemplate.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES

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| <p>A.D.</p> <p>284. Diocletian's reorganisation of the Empire.</p> <p>330. Constantine makes Byzantium capital of the Empire.</p> <p>379. Theodosius the Great, Emperor</p> <p>395. Final division of the Empire—Honorius Emperor of the West with Ravenna for capital, 395-423; Arcadius Emperor of the East, 395-408.</p> <p>410. Sack of Rome by the Visigoths under Alaric.</p> <p>440-461. Leo the Great, Pope.</p> <p>452. Attila and the Huns enter Italy.</p> <p>455. Rome sacked by the Vandals.</p> <p>475-489. Ottokar, First Barbarian kingdom.</p> <p>476. End of the Western Empire.</p> <p>489. Theodoric the Ostrogoth enters Italy.</p> <p>495-555. Second Barbarian kingdom; capital, Ravenna.</p> <p>527.-565 Justinian, Emperor.</p> <p>535-555. Destruction of Ostrogothic Kingdom by Belisarius and Narses.</p> <p>568. Lombards enter Italy under Alboin.</p> <p>568-774. Third Barbarian (Lombard) kingdom; capital, Pavia.</p> <p>717-741. Leo the Isaurian, Emperor.</p> <p>726. Iconoclast edict.</p> <p>715-731. Gregory II, Pope.</p> <p>739. Pope Gregory III appeals to Charles Martel for help against the Lombards.</p> <p>754. Meeting of Pope Stephen II with Pepin, King of the Franks, at Ponthieu. Donation of Pepin. Death of Boniface, Apostle to the Germans.</p> <p>c.754. Probable date of forged "Donation of Constantine."</p> <p>773-774. Charlemagne conquers Lombard kingdom.</p> <p>772-795. Hadrian I, Pope.</p> | <p>A.D.</p> <p>795-816. Leo III, Pope.</p> <p>800. Charlemagne crowned Roman Emperor. Birth of the Holy Roman Empire.</p> <p>814. Death of Charlemagne.</p> <p>814-840. Louis the Pious (third son of Charlemagne), Emperor.</p> <p>843. Division of Frank realm by Treaty of Verdun.</p> <p>822-855. Lothar I (son of Louis the Pious), King of Italy and Emperor.</p> <p>844-875. Louis II (son of Lothar), King of Italy and co-Emperor.</p> <p>951-973. Otto the Great, King of Germany 951-973, Emperor 962-973.</p> <p>966-983. Otto II crowned Emperor in his father's lifetime; married Theophane, daughter of Eastern Emperor; in Italy, 980-983</p> <p>983-1002. Otto III, born 980; crowned Emperor, 996.</p> <p>996-999. Gregory V. (Bruno, cousin of Otto III), Pope.</p> <p>999-1003. Gerbert, founder of new learning in France, Pope as Sylvester II.</p> <p>1016. First appearance of Normans in Italy.</p> <p>1046. Three Popes deposed by Henry III (Emperor, 1039-1056).</p> <p>1046-1057. Succession of four German popes.</p> <p>1054. Final separation of Eastern and Western Churches.</p> <p>1058-1061. Nicholas II (Gerard, Bishop of Florence) Pope; Hildebrand, Archdeacon of Rome.</p> <p>1059. Decree of Lateran Council establishing independence of Papal Elections.</p> <p>1053-1106. Henry IV crowned in Germany, 1053; Emperor, 1083.</p> |
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- A.D.**
 1073-1085. Hildebrand Pope as Gregory VII.
 1077. Henry IV at Canossa.
 1080-1090. Norman conquest of Sicily.
 1101. Death of Roger I.
 1096-1099. First Crusade. Recovery of Jerusalem. Godfrey de Bouillon.
 1105-1125. Henry V. Emperor
 1122. Concordat of Worms.
 1125-1137. Lothar II (the Saxon), Emperor, does homage to the Pope for the lands of Matilda of Tuscany, 1133.
 Roger II, King of Sicily and S. Italy.
 1138-1152. Conrad III (Staufer), Emperor; Struggle of Waiblinger (Ghibellines) and Welfen (Guelfs) in Germany.
 1147-1149. Second Crusade. Bernard of Clairvaux. Rise of Universities — Paris, Bologna, Salerno.
 1152-1190. Frederick I Barbarossa (Staufer).
 1154-1183. Struggle with Lombard cities.
 1183. Peace of Constance.
 1186. Marriage of Henry VI with Constance, daughter of Roger II, heiress of Sicily and Naples.
 1187. Conquest of Jerusalem by Saladin.
 1189-1192. Third Crusade. Frederick I, Philippe Auguste, Richard Cœur de Lion.
 1190-1197. Henry VI, Emperor.
 1193-1194. Struggle for Sicily between Henry VI and Tancred.
 1198-1216. Innocent III, Pope.
 1198-1216. Philip of Swabia, brother of Henry VI (Staufer), and Otto IV of Brunswick (Welf) rivals for Empire.
 1201. Capitulation of Neuss.
 1209. Otto crowned Emperor.
 1202-1204. Fourth Crusade. Crusaders take Constantinople.
 1204. 1261. The Latin Empire. Baldwin, Emperor.
 c.1220. Foundation of Mendicant Orders; St. Dominic died 1221; St. Francis died 1226.
 1221-1250. Frederick II (Stupor Mundi), Emperor, crowned King of the Romans, 1215.
 1216-1227. Honorius III, Pope. Universities founded: Padua 1221, Naples 1224 (Oxford 1229). Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274.
 1227-1241. Gregory IX, Pope.
 1227, 1239. Excommunications of Frederick II.
 1228-1229. Fifth Crusade. Frederick II gains Jerusalem by negotiations with Sultan.
 1250-1273. Interregnum in Germany.
 1237-1250. Struggle between Frederick II and Lombard cities.
 1241-1254. Innocent IV, Pope.
 1245. Excommunicates and deposes Frederick II at Synod of Lyon.
 1250. Death of Frederick II.
 1248-1254. Sixth Crusade. St. Louis prisoner in Egypt.
 1250-1254. Conrad IV (son of Frederick II), Emperor and King of Sicily.
 1254-1266. Manfred (half-brother of Conrad), King of Sicily.
 1261. Michael Paleologus. End of Latin Empire.
 1261-1453. Paleologus dynasty.
 1254-1261. Pope Alexander IV.
 1261-1264. Urban IV (a Frenchman), Pope. Calls in Charles of Anjou, brother of the French King, St. Louis IX.
 1261. Charles of Anjou, King of Naples and Sicily.
 1266. Battle of Benevento. Death of Manfred.
 1268. Battle of Taghacozzo. Defeat and execution of Conrad. End of Staufer dynasty.
 1272-1298. Marco Polo's travels in China.
 1270. Seventh Crusade. Death of St. Louis at Carthage.
 1273-1291. Rudolf of Habsburg, Emperor.
 1282. The Sicilian Vespers. Kingdom of Sicily to Pedro III of Aragon. House of Anjou retains Kingdom of Naples.
 1294-1303. Boniface VIII, Pope. Quarrels with Philippe le Bel, King of France.
 1305-1378. Popes in France (after 1309 at Avignon).
 1309-1433. Robert, King of Naples. Ascendency of Parte Guelfa in Florence.

A.D.

- 1311-1313. Henry VII (of Luxemburg) comes to Italy.
 1313. Visconti established at Milan.
 1327-1330. Emperor Louis of Bavaria comes to Italy.
 1341. Potrarca receives laurel crown at Rome.
 1343-1382. Joanna I, Queen of Naples.
 1347-1378. Charles IV (Luxemburg-Bohemia), Emperor.
 Crowned in Rome 1355.
 1347. Cola di Rienzi, Tribune of the Romans.
 1348. The Black Death.
 1353-1367. Cardinal Albornoz restores Papal power in Italy.
 1378-1415. The Great Schism. Popes both in Rome and Avignon.
 1382-1386. Charles of Durazzo, King of Naples.
 1386-1414. Ladislaus, King of Naples.
 1409. Council of Pisa. Three Popes deposed.
 1410-1437. Sigismund, Emperor.
 1414-1435. Joanna II, Queen of Naples.
 1414-1418. Council of Constance. End of Great Schism. Election of Martin V (Colonna).
 1428-1464. Cosimo dei Medici rules Florence.
 1442. Kingdom of Naples conquered by Alfonso of Aragon.
 1450-1466. Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan.
 1453. Constantinople taken by the Turks.
 1455. Treaty of Lodi.
 1458-1464. Pope Pius II (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini).
 1469-1492. Lorenzo dei Medici rules Florence.
 1489. Venice conquers Cyprus.
 1492-1503. Pope Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia).
 1493-1519. Emperor Maximilian I.
 1494-1500. Lodovico il Moro, Duke of Milan.
 1494-1495. Charles VIII of France invades Italy. Temporary conquest of Naples. Piero dei Medici's surrender. Republic restored at Florence.
 1498. Savonarola burnt at the stake.
 1499. Louis XII of France takes Milan from Lodovico il Moro.
 1503-1513. Pope Julius II.
 1503. Louis XII's army defeated at Garigliano. House of Aragon in Naples.
 1504. Naples joined with Aragon under Ferdinand the Catholic.
 1508. League of Cambrai against Venice.
 1511. The Holy League (for expulsion of French from Italy).
 1512. Victory of French (Gaston de Foix) at Ravenna. Medici restored at Florence.
 1513. Victory of Swiss at Novara. French expelled.
 1515. Battle of Marignano. François I (1515-1547) recovers Milan.
 1516. Death of Ferdinand the Catholic. His grandson, son of Philip of Austria and Joanna, heiress of Spain, King of Spain as Charles I (Emperor Charles V).
 1513-1521. Leo X (Giovanni dei Medici) Pope.
 1517. Luther's Theses.
 1519-1556. Charles V, Emperor; crowned 1529.
 1521. Luther before the Diet of Worms.
 1525. Victory of Charles at Pavia. François I taken prisoner.
 1522-1523. Pope Hadrian VI.
 1523-1534. Pope Clement VII (Giulio dei Medici).
 1527-1529. Second war of Charles V and François I.
 1527. Sack of Rome by Imperial troops.
 1529. Coronation of Charles V at Bologna.
 1530. Siege of Florence. Alessandro dei Medici, Duke of Florence.
 1534-1549. Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese). Counter-reformation.
 1536-1538. Third War of Charles V and François I.
 1544. Peace of Crespy. France renounces claims to Milan and Naples.
 1540. Philip (son of Charles V), Duke of Milan and Vicar-Imperial in Italy. Jesuit Order—Ignatius Loyola.
 1542. Inquisition established at Rome.
 1545-1563. Council of Trent.
 1556. Abdication of Charles V.
 1559. Peace of Cateau Cambresis.
 Emanuele Filiberto reinstated in Piedmont and Savoy.

1573. Venice loses Cyprus to the Turks (her last possessions in the Morea had been lost in 1540).
- 1555-1559. Paul IV (Caraffa), Pope.
1600. Giordano Bruno burnt at the stake.
- 1618-1648. Thirty Years' War.
1648. Peace of Westphalia.
- 1685-7. Venice recovers the Morea. Francesco Morosini.
- 1701-1714. War of the Spanish Succession.
1706. Turin saved by Prince Eugene.
1713. Treaty of Utrecht. Savoy gains Sicily and other territory.
1714. Peace of Rastatt—Naples, Sardinia, and Milan to Austria. Venice loses the Morea finally to the Turks.
1720. Austria exchanges Sardinia for Sicily. Dukes of Savoy become Kings of Sardinia.
1738. Grand Duchy of Tuscany on extinction of Medici line given to Francis Stephen of Lorraine, husband of Maria Theresa and afterwards Emperor Francis I. Austria gives Naples and Sicily to Spanish Bourbon, Don Carlos.
- 1740-1748. War of the Austrian Succession.
1748. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Extension of Savoy territory; Parma and Piacenza to a Spanish Bourbon, Philip, brother of Don Carlos.
- 1759-1825. Ferdinand, King of Naples.
1773. Jesuit Order dissolved by Pope Clement XIV.
- 1789-1804. The French Revolution.
1793. Sardinia and Naples adhere to First Coalition.
1796. Napoleon in Italy.
1797. Peace of Campo Formio.
1798. Republic of Rome.
1799. Parthenopean Republic at Naples. Battle of Cassano.
- 1799-1801. The Second Coalition.
1800. Napoleon crosses Great St. Bernard. Battle of Marengo.
1801. Peace of Lunéville.
- 1800-1823. Pope Pius VII.
1801. Concordat with Napoleon.
1804. Napoleon, Emperor of the French.
1805. Napoleon crowned King of Italy at Milan. Eugène Beauharnais, Vice-King.
1806. End of the Holy Roman Empire. Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples.
1805. Treaty of Pressburg. Austria recognises Kingdom of Italy. Birth of Giuseppe Mazzini.
1808. Murat, King of Naples. Papal States annexed to the Kingdom of Italy.
1815. Napoleon's escape from Elba and defeat at Waterloo. Murat's landing in Calabria and death. Restorations in Italy.
1820. General Pepe heads rising in Naples. Constitution demanded. Revolution in Sicily.
1821. Rising in Piedmont. Abdication of Vittorio Emanuele I.
- 1821-1831. Carlo Felice, King of Sardinia.
- 1823-1829. Pope Leo XII.
- 1825-1830. Francis I, King of Naples.
- 1830-1859. Ferdinand II, King of Naples.
1831. Rising in Papal States. Exile of Mazzini. *La Giovane Italia*.
- 1831-1846. Pope Gregory XVI.
- 1831-1849. Carlo Alberto, King of Sardinia.
1833. Young Italy's conspiracy in Piedmont.
1834. Expedition of Savoy. First appearance of Garibaldi.
- 1846-1878. Pope Pius IX.
1848. Revolt of Sicily. Promulgation of Statute of Sardinia. Tuscan Statute. The "Five Days" in Milan. Insurrection in Naples. Army of Sardinia invades Lombardy.
1849. Radetzky beats Carlo Alberto at Novara. French take Rome.
1852. Cavour, Prime Minister in Piedmont.
1855. Piedmont joins in Crimean War.
1859. War of Liberation. Napoleon III and Victor Emmanuel defeat Austrians. Peace of Villafranca. Austria retains Venetia. Central Provinces' Alliance.
1860. Insurrection in Sicily—Garibaldi beats Neapolitans. Piedmont

- A.D.
- these defeat Pope's troops at Castelfidardo.
1861. First Italian Parliament. Victor Emmanuel King of Italy.
1862. Garibaldi's fruitless rising in Sicily.
1866. War with Austria. Italians beaten at Battle of Custoza. Austria cedes Venetia.
1867. Garibaldi defeated by French at Mentana.
1869. Infallibility of Pope decreed by Vatican Council.
1870. Italian troops enter Rome. End of Papal Temporal power.
- 1873-1877. Italy makes advances to Austria, Germany, etc.
1878. Death of Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX. Berlin Congress.
1882. Triple Alliance Treaty signed. Asab under Italian sovereignty.
1885. Massawa occupied.
1887. Dogali. Crispi, Prime Minister.
- 1888-1898. Tariff war with France.
1889. Treaty of Ucciali.
- 1891-1893. Rudini, Prime Minister.
- 1894-1896. War with Menelik.
1896. Disaster of Adua.
- 1896-1898. Rudini again Prime Minister.
1900. King Humbert assassinated (July 29), Victor Emmanuel III succeeds.
1901. Giolitti, Prime Minister.
1902. *Triplice* renewed.
1904. Austrian ill-will. *Triplice* begins to fade.
- 1911-1912. War with Turkey in Tripolitania.
1912. *Triplice* renewed.
- A.D.
1914. Salandra, Prime Minister. Outbreak of Great War. Italy declares her neutrality.
1915. Treaty of London (April 26). Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary (May 23). Offensive on Eastern frontier, etc.
1916. Austrian attack in Trentino (May). Boselli, Prime Minister. Italy declares war on Germany (August 28). Occupation of Gorizia (August). Offensive on Carso (autumn).
1917. Treaty of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne *re* Asia Minor (April). Offensive on Eastern front (May); on Bainsizza (August and September). Disaster of Caporetto (October 24). Orlando, Prime Minister. Enemy held on Piave.
1918. Yugoslav Pact of Rome (April). Battle of the Piave (great Austrian attack repulsed—June). Allies attack across Piave (October 24). Austrian rout. Armistice (October 30). Italy occupies Trentino, Trieste, etc.
1919. Difficulties *re* Fiume. Peace Conference. Nitti, Prime Minister (June). Socialist "Terror"; Fascista movement started.
1920. Giolitti, Prime Minister (June). Treaty of Rapallo (Nov. 12).
1921. Bonomi, Prime Minister (July); Fascismo destroys Socialism.
1922. Fascismo in the ascendant; Mussolini, Prime Minister (Oct. 30).

***B*—ECONOMICS**

THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF ITALY

Historical and General

THE modern development of Italian economics dates from the achievement of political unity. It started in difficult conditions and was particularly successful in its achievements.

Before the Risorgimento the seven small Italian States (or provinces of foreign States) were economically barricaded against each other. The traditional skill of the Italian worker and trader was then unable to overcome the artificial obstacles created with political aims by the rulers, foreigners or supported by foreign interests. The industries could not widen their scope within limited closed markets nor feed a national and international trade on a large scale. The accumulation of wealth and the formation of the big capital which characterised the Industrial Revolution in older nations politically independent and united for centuries before, like Britain and France, were brought about in Italy either by a slower process or at a later stage.

Few reliable statistics are available as to the conditions of agriculture immediately after the Risorgimento (1870). From the figures of the import and export trade it appears that at that time Italy was practically self-sufficient so far as agricultural products were concerned. But the standard of living was much lower and the population less numerous. The progress of agriculture has not precisely followed the exceptional increase of population nor its tendency in the direction of greater material welfare. Some reason for this deficiency is to be found in the ignorance of the agrarian population and their dislike to innovation—and in the far-reaching crisis developed after the promulgation of the new laws of the Kingdom and the liquidation of the estates belonging to the Church. Other causes are probably the imprudent development given to vine-culture without securing a solid basis for the wine trade—and the American competition in the corn market. The still large amount of emigration is also partly caused by this com-

parative stagnation of agricultural progress, as well as by the formation of great urban centres and the development of different industries.

The new kingdom started its economic life (1871) in a world which was already dominated by stronger competitors. Its effort has been as considerable as that of Germany; but, unlike Germany, Italy was deprived of the principal elements of modern economic success—coal and iron. In the Middle Ages, when the individual skill of the artisan secured the success of the various industries, and trade was carried on across the sea by small sailing-vessels, Italian harbours were the meeting-places of all the Mediterranean trade, and the goods manufactured in the Peninsula had almost no competitors in the markets of Europe and of the Near East. But when machinery propelled by steam replaced handicraft, and large steel steamers crossed the oceans carrying thousands of tons of goods cheaply and quickly manufactured, Italy had—although seriously handicapped—to follow the new line of development.

Italy is chiefly an agricultural country. However, while the products of the soil still remain the most important item in the economic life of the nation (the profits from agriculture rose from £120,000,000 in 1880 to £280,000,000 in 1913), the industrial output increased in a much larger proportion (£24,000,000 in 1881 to £126,000,000 in 1913). The amount of coal imported in 1911 was twenty times greater than that imported in 1862. The import of raw materials as well as the export of manufactured goods has increased in much greater proportion than the export of the former and the import of the latter.

There is, however, a rapid growth of industrialism which has improved the Italian position in international trade. Since the late nineties an era of welfare has seemed to open for the nation, corresponding to the general European prosperity and showing a more marked tendency towards improvement than in most other countries of Europe.

When the war broke out, the weaknesses of some fundamental elements in Italian economics made their influence heavily felt. The communications on land and sea as well as the heating, lighting, and industrial motive-power were all dependent upon the import of foreign coal, and the supply of British coal, covering nine-tenths of the Italian requirements, became exceedingly difficult owing to the ever-increasing crisis in tonnage. The call to the colours withdrew labour from the fields, reducing the already insufficient production of food and mak-

ing the country more and more dependent for its daily life upon the imports from abroad. Yet the Italian merchant fleet was not in a position to carry more than one-third of the foreign goods unloaded in the Italian harbours—and the Allied resources were pooled only gradually and slowly. The privations of the population grew more acute than in the other Western Allied countries.

The financial difficulties were even greater. During the preceding fifty years Italy had been able to settle her liabilities abroad, but not to create assets in foreign countries which could be converted into money in times of need, as had been possible for France and Britain. The gold reserves were naturally very small compared with the credits required for the war expenses. Loans were demanded from the British and afterwards from the United States Government for the purchase of coal, iron, and grain; in many urgent cases credit was sought and obtained at any price through private channels. Very considerable sums (£240,000,000 or 6 milliards gold lire) had to be paid to foreign shipowners, chiefly outside the Government credits. Such a tremendous effort brought about a strong reaction in the exchanges. At the end of the war the buying-power of the Italian money was reduced by 60-75 per cent., retarding the imports of raw materials and delaying the normal resumption of industrial life. It largely contributed to the upward movement of the cost of living and swelled the expenditure of the State to a limit which no sacrifice by the taxpayer could easily meet.

So that, while Britain has already recovered from the most critical phase of the post-war crisis, Italy is still in the throes of it. Suffering caused by the War and the exceptionally high cost of living, besides purely political factors, have bred social unrest. Agriculture and industries, trade and finance, are still under the influence of abnormal conditions. But as soon as the world-position is improved it is logical to suppose that Italian economic activities will begin to flow again according to natural tendencies already developed before the war. It is now difficult to judge whether some important changes brought about by war-conditions in certain branches of Italian economics will be permanent or not. Moreover, the vicissitudes of the currency and of the exchanges and the abnormal conditions of the commercial markets have upset the statistical indexes, making a correct judgment of the latest economic events very difficult. We will try, however, to sketch rapidly the main pre-war features of Italian economics, adding what has been

possible so far to ascertain concerning the changes brought about by the war.

Agricultural Resources

The Italian climate differs greatly according to the region. The climate of the cold regions of the north, where the slopes of the mountains covered with resinous woods are situated next to the low-lying valleys, may be compared with that of the plains of Central Europe. The Riviera, the Gulf of Naples and the Sicilian coast on the other hand have the benefit of the warm cloudless weather of the Mediterranean belt similar to that of North Africa. In some provinces no rain falls all the year round to moderate the tropical heat and to quench the thirst of the land; in others heavy fogs rise from the marshes and humidity prevails at all seasons.

The same variety is to be found in the nature of the soil. About one-third of the area of the Kingdom is mountainous and unfit for tillage. The waters are not equally distributed. One-tenth of the land is absolutely sterile, three-tenths are very fertile, and the rest produces very little. Generally, however, the conditions of the soil can be improved. Wherever intensive culture yields most, bearing comparison with the most fertile lands in the world, this result is largely due to technical progress and to the patient work of generations. In this field also it is easy to find the traces of the political divisions of sixty years ago. Italian agriculture grew up under various social, juridical, and economic conditions which made it difficult afterwards to develop the different regions under a unified scheme.

The country is not self-sufficient so far as the production of foodstuffs is concerned. Efforts have been made, however, to improve the productiveness of the soil, and these efforts must needs tend in various directions: the draining and filling-up of the marshes (as in the Tuscan Maremma) and the irrigation of waterless plains (like the Tavoliere delle Puglie, the "heel of the boot" of the peninsula) are problems peculiarly connected with single regions. Afforestation is a truly national problem, for practically everywhere a greater extension of woods on the slopes of the mountains would better regulate the flow of torrential waters and eliminate the sudden alternatives of drought and floods. General problems are also those connected with technical improvements, namely, a wider use of fertilisers and of agricultural machinery, the higher



TRANSPORTING WINE IN THE STREETS OF TIVOLI

education of labour, and an accurate and scientific selection of seeds.

Considered at its face-value and also proportionally to the production of other countries, the *vine* forms the most important item in Italian agriculture. A yearly average of about 71 million quintals¹ (7,100,000 tons) of grapes was produced (1909-13) on an area of 4,355,700 hectares (11 million acres), or about one-third of the total cultivated area of the kingdom. More than 46 million hectolitres (1,012,000,000 gallons) of wine were made in each vintage, worth about £52,000,000.

Piedmont is renowned for its *wines*, which are similar to the French produce, especially that of the Burgundy brand. Tuscany produces the "Chianti" wine known the world over. In the Lazio, the light wines of the "Castelli Romani" are chiefly consumed on the spot and are appreciated by foreign visitors. Sicily, besides producing many a good brand of wine for local consumption, sells in all countries its "Marsala." Apulia yields every year very considerable quantities of a cheap and strongly alcoholic wine which is sent to other Italian provinces and abroad in order to be mixed with other wines. It is reckoned that about one-third of the wine produced throughout the world comes from Italy, the Italian production being second to France only by a small margin.

However, the cultivation of the vine and the wine industry are not in Italy an asset of such great importance for national economics as they are in France. The wine exported from Italy does not find favour enough in foreign markets and does not exceed 6 per cent. of the total production. This is due not so much to the quality of the grapes, which is good and has been continuously improving, as to the conditions of the wine industry, which has progressed little from the technical point of view, and fails to supply the foreign markets with the *constant* types of wines that they require—the Piedmontese Vermouth and the Sicilian Marsala being conspicuous exceptions. If a certain measure of stability of the brands could be reached, Italy could not only compete with France for the world-supply of expensive wines, but also become the purveyor to the populations of half Europe of good and cheap table wines. At present almost all the wine produced is consumed within the

¹ The metric measures more frequently recurrent in Italian statistics are the quintal (about 220·5 pounds), being one-tenth of the metric ton; the hectolitre (22 gallons); the hectare (2½ acres); the kilometre (of which about 8 go to 5 miles). The money unit, the lira, is normally worth about 9½d.

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kingdom. Its low price encourages an excessive consumption (29 gallons per year per head), which includes a certain amount of transformation into other produce and of sheer waste.

Broadly speaking, the staple food of the Italian population is bread. The cultivation of *wheat* is the most vital among the agricultural resources of the country. The cultivation is extensive (hectares 4,743,600—nearly 12 million acres) and the average yielded is low (44 tons per acre). The crop is insufficient for the needs of the population, the average crop in the six years prior to the war being about 5,000,000 tons, in addition to 1,500,000 tons imported from abroad. Yet, proportionally to the extent of the national territory, the Italian production of wheat, owing to the extension of the cultivation, is the highest in Europe (30 tons per square mile).

Wheat is grown in every region of Italy, north and south, on the plains and on the hill and mountains, often in the latter case under exceptionally unfavourable conditions, and this is why the general average is low. But wherever intensive culture is possible, wonderful results have been achieved. In the provinces of Ferrara, Rovigo and in the lower Veronese up to 40–50 quintals per hectare (2 tons per acre) have been lately harvested, a fabulous result which has not been achieved anywhere else, except perhaps on a few German estates. In 1913 over 100,000 hectares yielded more than 24 quintals and 470,000 hectares (three-fourths of the wheat-sown area of the United Kingdom) yielded 20–24 quintals per hectare, while the average for Great Britain is 21 quintals. Wheat-growing has been lately improved under the intensive system of cultivation. Experts agree that in order to increase the production of this national necessity of life to the level of the consumption, the cultivation should be *intensified*, as its area can hardly be further extended. It is a problem of technical improvement and of public works. The protective tariff (lire 7.50 per quintal) has not brought the solution any nearer.

Maize comes next to wheat in order of importance. It is chiefly grown in the well-irrigated plains of Lombardy, Venetia and Emilia. The average crops for 1909–14 amounted to 25,683,000 quintals (over 2½ million tons). The “*polenta*” made with its yellow flour is a substitute for bread, widely used especially by the populations of the northern provinces. The use of maize as human food is however, since the war, declining, while the consumption of bread is increasing.

Italy is the greatest producer in Europe of *rice* (5 million quintals—500,000 tons—p.a.). It is grown almost exclusively

in the Po Valley, and the crops supply, in addition to what is consumed in the country, a considerable amount for the export trade (to Argentina, France, Switzerland, etc.). Only the Asiatic countries can compete with Italy in the European markets so far as quantity is concerned—and in most cases the quality of the Italian produce is superior. The area of cultivation is undergoing a progressive reduction, as the difficult working conditions keep away the labour. But the intensification of the culture keeps the production almost at the same level as before.

Barley (200,000 tons) is chiefly produced in Sicily and Sardinia. It used to be consumed as food: but it is now absorbed by the Italian breweries, replacing the imports from Austria-Hungary. *Oats* (500,000 tons) and *rye* (130,000 tons) are chiefly used as fodder.

Potatoes (1,550,000 tons) are grown in the mountainous regions of the Abruzzi, Campania, Lombardy and Piedmont. Their use as human food is not of such importance as it is in Germany and Britain; their production, however, shows a considerable tendency to increase.

Beans, haricots, peas, chickpeas, and lupins are minor items among the herbaceous plants. Besides being consumed as food, many of these vegetables, which have the peculiarity of absorbing in large proportions and condensing the nitrogen from the air, are utilised in the very old practice of green manuring (*sovescio*). These and other greens are grown in the gardens adjoining almost every country house in Italy. Sometimes they occupy wide areas (*ortaglie*) round the villages and towns, supplying their inhabitants and growing a surplus for the national and even foreign markets.

Tomatoes, cabbages and cauliflower are grown in great quantities in these large *ortaglie*, besides *artichokes, onions, asparagus*, etc. Great improvement is expected in this culture, which potentially is a real asset for the national trade. An estimate which is not very optimistic puts the value of these products at eight million £ p.a.

The cultivation of *hemp* and *flax* used to be prosperous in olden times. Now, under the competition of Russia, Ireland, Holland and Belgium, it is declining. The production of flax is reduced to almost nil.

Tobacco is grown under the supervision of the State, which controls its manufacture. The production (6,000 tons) covers only about one-fourth of the consumption.

The culture of *beetroot* has developed lately under the stimulus

of the heavy tariff protection granted to the national industry of sugar. It is chiefly grown in Venetia and in Emilia. Before the war it used to supply all the national requirements of sugar. But the protective tariff on the one hand and the taxes imposed upon the industry on the other have unduly limited the consumption of sugar by raising its price and reduced the possibility of development of these branches of agriculture and industry.

Other industrial plants are the *sumach tree* (used for tanning and dyeing); the medicinal *manna* grown in Sicily, of which Italy is the greatest producer in the world; *cork*, of a low quality, grown in Sardinia; and the *mulberry-tree*, the leaves of which feed the silk-worm and form an all-important accessory of the silk industry.

We also find striking figures under the item *fodder*. The face-value of the crop is the same as that of corn and its weight three times greater. This considerable production is explained by the fact that in most parts of the peninsula and of the islands drought prevails in the summer and natural grazing lands are scarce and poor. So that the cattle are mainly dependent on cultivated fodder. It is evident that the figures of the production of fodder have a significance only if considered in connection with the situation of the live-stock market.

Fodder is mostly grown on the rotation system. But permanent fields exist in the Roman "Campagna," in the Tuscan Maremma, and above all in Lombardy, where the well cared-for *marcite*, irrigated during the winter by the warm waters of the sub-Alpine lakes, yield from 6 to 9 crops per year.

The extension of the culture of the *olive-tree* forms one of the main characteristics of Italian agriculture. The beautiful olive plantations climbing up the hillsides of Liguria and Tuscany yield the finest known quality of vegetable oil. Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily also produce olive oil in great quantities. The total annual production is (average 1909-13) about 40,000,000 gallons, which is the highest figure reached by a single country. The cultivation of the olive-tree, however, owing to the spreading diseases of the plant and to the ravages by the fly (*Mosca olearia*), is rapidly decreasing.

Italy occupies the first place among agricultural countries in the production of *oranges* and *lemons*, which are chiefly grown in Sicily. The crop exceeds the requirements of national consumption and, the export trade being not properly organised, the consequence is an almost permanent crisis in over-production. Essences for the perfumery trade are also manufactured on the

spot and largely exported; citrate of calcium and citric acid are produced on a smaller scale. Orange and lemon peel is exported to the United States, Britain, Germany and France for the benefit of the perfumery industry of those countries.

Other *fruits* of scores of kinds are grown all over Italy, generally on ground occupied also by other plantations. They form the basis of the newly-born industry of jam and preserves—which is, however, limited by the artificial price of sugar. Apples used to be exported (110,000 tons) chiefly to Germany, to be converted into cider or jam. The transport situation now makes the fresh-fruit trade difficult—while dried fruit is still exported in increasing quantities (34,000 tons, worth £3,000,000, in 1918).

The Italian soil is generally suited for the production of most kinds of *medicinal herbs*. *Safran* and *liquorice* are produced and exploited industrially, but only in one or two districts. Some plants like *mint* and *belladonna* are neglected, although their medicinal properties or flavour are superior to the same plants produced in other countries. Not only scientific method is wanting in this branch of agriculture, but the species spontaneously growing in some districts have been destroyed by sheer carelessness. Foreign experts, especially German, used to come before the war to Sicily, searching for medicinal plants which could form a precious monopoly for an advanced chemical industry.

Flowers are profusely grown in every Italian garden. Their cultivation is of a real commercial importance during the winter only on the Western Riviera, whence special trains used to fetch them for the Austrian, German and Russian customers. The war has greatly injured this trade.

The conquest of the woodland by agricultural expansion has not been profitable for Italian economic resources. The soil tilled on the hills and mountains in place of the felled forests has not yielded enough to compensate for the damage caused by the distribution of the waters. The area covered by *forests* (11,500,000 acres) is still dwindling. During the war it was largely ravaged by the enemy in the invaded provinces, and in the rest of the Kingdom many woods had to be cut up for the needs of the population, owing to the lack of coal.

Groves of *chestnut-trees* occupy wide areas and their fruit is used as a nourishing human food. The plantation of the *poplar* is extending, owing to the demand of wood-pulp by the paper industry. The most common kinds of trees, e.g. willow, poplar, pine, larch, beech, fir, oak, ash, or alder, do not yield sufficient

timber for the national requirements. Before the war timber used to be imported from Croatia and the Tirol. It is probable, however, that the wooded provinces newly acquired, Trentino and Istria, will assist in eliminating this deficiency.

Livestock

The position of the livestock market is not very fortunate. The number of *cattle* per head of the population is one of the lowest in Europe. Six million head of cattle, two and a quarter million *pigs*, twelve million *sheep* and three million *goats* were not enough (1918) to supply the meat, cheese, butter, fat, wool, and hides needed by a dense population rapidly increasing and tending to a higher standard of living. The consequence has been a continuously increasing rate of import of some of the above-mentioned items, especially meat and fats. So far as *horses* are concerned (990,000), the position is even worse. The large number of *mules* and *donkeys* is no compensation.

The figures of the census of 1918 do not show the remarkable depletion of livestock during the war. The number of head of cattle has not diminished, but a census taken by weight would show that a great proportion of full-grown animals has been replaced by newly-born stock. This point is of considerable importance, especially in a country like Italy, where animal traction in the work of the fields has not been replaced to any great extent by modern machinery. Another couple of years will be required in order to bring the existing livestock back to the same level of efficiency as before the war.

Miscellaneous Products

Two of the greatest drawbacks of Italian agriculture are malaria and drought. *Draining* and *irrigation* have always been intended to fight these and to widen so far as possible the ploughing-area of the country.

Many of the most fertile Italian lands lie now where once were marshes, ponds and lakes, now drained by canals or filled in. In many cases, e.g. the Fucino Lake, the Paludi Pontine, the Piombino Marshes and the Valley of the Liri, the area reclaimed to cultivation is fairly extensive. In the province of Ferrara the modern drainage works are dependent on electrical bilge-pumps; and the whole of this science shows great engineering skill.

Irrigation by canals is an older custom. It dates from the Middle Ages and has gradually developed, chiefly in the Po

Valley and in the sub-Alpine Plains. It forms the main source of the agricultural wealth of Lombardy, Venetia, Emilia and Piedmont. The total irrigated area in Italy reaches 4 million acres, and is capable of expansion to twice that amount. An important step in that direction will be made through the gigantic "Acquedotto Pugliese" now nearing completion, which will bring to dry Apulia the waters of the River Sele from the western watershed of the Apennines across the Peninsula, and by the works of the Sila (Calabria) and the Tirso (Sardinia) recently begun, which are intended to form artificial lakes from torrential waters and thereby distribute regular supplies of water for irrigation and electrical energy to regions at present without them.

The traditional use of animal *manure* has been extended and technically improved in the last sixty years. "Green manuring" is widely practised in the semi-arid zones of Central and Southern Italy. The use of *mineral fertilisers* has been introduced and has largely increased during the last twenty years, the raw materials (nitrates and phosphates) being imported from abroad and chemically treated by the national industries. *Potash* used to come from Germany, but in small quantities, being uneconomical.

The initiative in utilising *nitrogen* from the air in the manufacture of fertilisers has been a privilege of Italian industry, which now directs its efforts to producing synthetic fertilisers capable of efficiently helping Italian agriculture, while freeing it as far as possible from the expensive foreign supply. Electrical energy helps a great deal towards this end.

The use of *machinery* in agriculture has largely increased of late, although handicapped by the mountainous character of the soil, by the ignorance of the rural population and by the scarcity and dearness of fuel. Wherever the subdividing of the land into small holdings proved an economic drawback to the use of machinery, the difficulties have been eliminated by co-operative methods. The import of machinery from abroad had been on the increase up to the war; and during the war the Italian engineering factories developed their plant to the extent of supplying most of the national requirements, besides stimulating the demand for agricultural machinery. It is reckoned that in a few years' time this industry will be able to export its products to the "natural" Italian markets, namely the Balkans, the North African colonies and Southern Russia. Machinery is used now to a certain extent also in the agrarian regions of the South, where even animal traction was limited.

The selection of *seeds* has been and is being carefully studied by experts. In different stations created by the Government experiments are being carried out in order to find the seeds fittest to stand drought and to profit from intensive culture. The research is chiefly made on the lines of hybridism, and experimenting with new kinds of seeds formed by grafts. This conception is different from that of the "in-breeding" prevailing in Britain, which tends to improve the existing species by the selection of their best types. A great deal is expected by the experts from these experimental stations, if only they could be better utilised and co-ordinated. Seeds of beetroot, fodder, etc., are exported abroad to a considerable extent.

The struggle against *noxious insects* has been intense and successful in the case of the parasites of the vine. The same cannot be said of the parasites of the olive plantations. Far-reaching improvements are expected in the future through a better education of the agrarian class either in the country schools or by means of mobile teachers, who already bring directly to the knowledge of the workers of the land the most recent advances in modern technology.

The dominant question is to-day how to increase the *supply of native wheat*, as the purchase of foreign corn imposes heavy sacrifices on the national resources, owing to the high freights and the low rate of the exchange. The 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons imported yearly cost the consumer and the State (Italy is still under the war régime of requisition of wheat and rationing of bread) from £160,000,000 to £240,000,000. Foreign wheat is twice or three times as dear as the national product. Its cost accounts for about two-fifths in the adverse balance of Italian external trade. Owing to the general financial situation it becomes a question of supreme urgency.

There are no new wide areas of land to reclaim, and in any case the drainage works cannot be completed in a short time. The new irrigation works in Southern Italy are not yet finished, and their influence cannot make itself felt for several years to come. But some considerable areas in the "Agro Romano," poorly managed by their rich landowners, and in Sardinia, could be transformed from rough pastures as they are now into comparatively rich cornfields. Legislative measures to this effect are in course of execution, and their results may be satisfactory if labour displays goodwill and the system of transport is improved. The injury which livestock might suffer thereby could be avoided by the intensification of the culture of fodder which has already proved so successful. Anyhow, however

unsatisfactory the position of industries deriving their materials from livestock (e.g. wool and hides) may be, their claims are not so urgent as the necessity of helping to restore the trade balance by reducing the imports of wheat.

But the main improvement in the production of wheat is rather to be expected from a greater intensification of the culture than from a further extension of it. The chemical industries, which have received a great impetus from the war, are in a position to supply artificial fertilisers to a more considerable extent than before. It is mainly on the latest developments of the electro-chemical industry that Italian agriculture builds its hopes for the near future.

Food and Agricultural Industries

In another paragraph we have dealt with the Italian production of wine, which is one of the most important economic activities of the country. The export trade, though not considerable as compared with the production, is still an important item in the trade balance. Switzerland and South America are important customers in this direction; and the reopening of the German market is likely to compensate to a certain extent for the loss of that of the United States, closed by Prohibition.

There is room for improvement in the distillation of *alcohol*, thus contributing to the solution of some aspects of the complex problem of fuel. Spirits are distilled for national consumption and also for export (especially the "fernet," an aromatic liqueur). The use of *beer* is increasing in Italy as well as the output of the breweries (over 14 million gallons in 1914-15).

The making of *bread* is largely a domestic industry. Large bakeries, even in the great cities, are exceptional. Home and foreign wheat used to be ground by the mills of the country (gas, steam, hydraulic and electric mills) even for export purposes. But since the war, owing to the convenience of transport, the imports of flour have shown an enormous increase.

The manufacture of *food pastes*, comprehensively known as "macaroni," is a remarkably active industry in Italy. "Pasta" bears an important rôle in the feeding of the population, in some regions almost as important as bread; this industry is, however, dependent on the imports of hard wheat, which is little grown in Italy. At present the activity of this industry is relaxed. Government restrictions have put an end to the export trade in pastes, which was prosperous before the war, being chiefly directed to those countries to which Italian emigration is con-

siderable. The wheat difficulties have lowered the qualities produced, and strong competitors have arisen, especially across the Atlantic.

Before the war, Italy used to be self-sufficient so far as the production of *sugar* is concerned. The protective tariff, lately raised to £35 4s. per ton, almost closes the Italian market in normal times, and the beetroot crops are intended to supply all the raw materials needed. During the war, however, the cultivation of the beetroot decreased owing to lack of labour, and the activity of the sugar-factories slowed down also on account of the scarcity of fuel and the irregularity of transport. Italy thus participates in the world-crisis of sugar, her production being reduced by more than two-thirds. The imports have reached comparatively high figures, notwithstanding the protection, but there is no compensation. The refining plants are idle, the use of saccharine compounds is extending, and the consumption of sugar by the population stands now much lower than before the war. This peculiar shortage of sugar-foods should go far to explain the considerable consumption of wine, which has again increased since the war.

The production of glucose, the main substitute for sugar—made out of tuber *fecula*—has been reduced by five-sixths, syrup and treacle by three-fifths.

Confectionery, jams, marmalades, preserves, liqueurs, are or course directly interested in the conditions of the sugar industry and suffer correspondingly.

Honey is little produced in Italy. Its culture was, however, being extended prior to the war, and the qualities produced are excellent owing to the abundance of flowers and their peculiarly fragrant nectar.

The *olive-oil* industry is also in a rudimentary state. Oil making being localised in small centres or being purely a domestic affair, there is no incentive to develop the economical processes which could increase the output and utilise the by-products. These conditions increase the already serious situation created by the decline of the olive-tree culture and could be improved only by a continuous propaganda, by a further diffusion of co-operative methods and by an improvement in transport. Olive oil was an important item in the Italian export trade, but since the war it has disappeared as such owing to Government restrictions, which are still in force.

Similar measures limit also the *cheese* trade. Cheese used to be exported to the extent of 33,000 tons (1913), worth nearly £3,000,000, the kinds most required abroad being the Parmesan

and the Gorgonzola varieties. The latter tastes very much like Stilton and was chiefly exported to Great Britain. The cheese industry is strongly organised under the co-operative system, and even in normal times, when it is not automatically protected by the rates of exchange, it can easily stand the foreign (Swiss and French) competition, and not on the national market alone.

The *preserving of vegetables* (tomatoes, peas, haricot beans, etc.) has been industrialised of late and has given rise to comparatively important factories. This industry has been and is being handicapped in its development by the scarcity of tin brought about by the war.

Meat is not tinned on a large scale, although an effort has been made during the war in that direction. "*Bologna*" *sausages* (salamis) are, however, an important Italian speciality and are very popular, almost as much so as bacon is in Britain.

Fish are still abundant in the Italian lakes and rivers. But fishing with explosives and poisonous drugs has reduced their numbers; the scourings of the factories have banished them from certain waters; and increased inland navigation disturbs their breeding in some of the rivers and in the canals. To counteract these disadvantages, measures are taken to keep some species alive, so that trout, sturgeon, pike, eels, barbel and carp, still populate Italian fresh waters for the entertainment of the angler and the delight of the *gourmet*.

In the lagoons and marshes fish are even more plentiful, and are preserved on a large scale, the fish being bred in the so-called "fishing-valleys."

On the other hand, *sea-fishing* is an exceedingly poor pursuit. More than one hundred thousand people are engaged in it and live miserably by it. Though employing a larger number of men and craft than those used for the same purpose in British waters, the total Italian harvest is not worth more than 5 per cent. of the British. It is true that there are no shoals of cod and herring; but the exclusive use of sailing craft by the Italian fisherman limits the fishing-area and exposes the fish to deterioration. No up-to-date freezing-plants exist at the landings, and the transport of the fish to the cities of the interior is not properly organised. The ignorant fisherman sticks to his old practices and is shamefully exploited by the trader—and fish remains a luxury-food hardly seen on an Italian table.

The Messinese fishermen hunt the *sword-fish* in the Messina Strait; *sardines* and *anchovies* are caught on a large scale in the northern Tyrrhenean Sea; and *tunny-fish* are taken in the

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imposing "tonnare" of the Sicilian and the Sardinian coasts. Both tinned sardines and tunny-fish are, however, imported in considerable quantities from Spain, Portugal and Tunisia, and this although the industry of preserved fish is fairly active in Italy. Cod and kippers are imported from Norway, France and Britain.

Regarding other products of the sea, Neapolitan and Sicilian divers fish for *sponges* off Lampedusa Island and the Libyan coast; whilst *coral* is brought up along the coasts of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Italian islands.

The *salt* industry is a monopoly of the State throughout the kingdom, except in Sicily, where the produce and trade in salt are exempt by an ancient privilege from any interference. Nine-tenths of the salt consumed in Italy (more than half a million tons) is extracted from sea-water by evaporation in the *saline*. The rock-salt mines of Sicily and Calabria and the saltish springs of Volterra and Salsomaggiore supply the rest.

Fuel and Electric Energy

Italy has always been and is essentially an agricultural country. But the industrial transformation of Europe and the new needs created by contemporary civilisation have compelled her to develop the industries already existing when her national unity was achieved and to build up new ones of all sorts. This process of growing industrialism corresponds with the tendency towards a higher standard of living, the industrial output being more remunerative than the agricultural one. In 1912 9 million persons were still engaged in agricultural work, but their average individual profit was estimated at lire 780 per head as compared with lire 1,500 per head earned by the 2,300,000 persons employed in the industries.

Lack of fuel and scanty initial capital have been serious obstacles in the way of this development. The quick growth of the population has helped to counteract these difficulties by supplying the Italian market with comparatively cheap and highly efficient labour. The technical skill displayed in many branches of industry by manufacturers and engineers has largely helped in overcoming the natural drawbacks.

Scientific evidence is to the effect that the geological formation of the Italian soil is comparatively recent, and the strata of vegetable origin are not in an advanced state of fossilisation. Different types of *lignite* are plentiful; but *lithanthrace* or *industrial coal*, which is the outcome of a much longer geological process,

is not formed. In any case, the search for it in Italian territory has been so far entirely unsuccessful.

Italy depends, however, on foreign countries for this all-important modern fuel, and the whole of her industrial activity is consequently at the mercy of almost any international crisis. In 1913 practically 11 million tons of coal were imported, 9 million of which came from Britain. In 1919 these imports were reduced to a little more than 6 million tons, dangerously reducing in this way the vitality of the country.

The mining of lignite was uneconomical before the war. Its heating power is very low, and the topographical position of most lignite beds helped to reduce its exploitation. No other industrial fuel worth mentioning is available in the Italian soil. The industries, however, took to adopting British coal as a standard fuel, and this was unloaded at a cheap rate in the Italian harbours by British and other foreign cargo-boats.

The lowering of the output of coal and the shipping crisis brought about by the war have stimulated the mining of lignite, and the exceptionally high prices due to the high freights and low exchange have made its utilisation economically possible. Mixtures of lignite, coal and tar have proved successful in many industries and on the railways; and the distillation of gases from lignite and the use of the latter as fuel in the chemical and electro-chemical industries have achieved promising results. The mining of lignite has increased threefold during the war, and it is almost certain that this increased output will be maintained in the future.

There are a few beds of *anthracite* in Italy, but they are not extensive; the seams are thin and the heating-power is low. Turf-digging is increasing, the turf being utilised in the fertilisers industry. As regards mineral oil, the supply from the small oil-wells in the province of Parma is almost nil as compared with the imports. Charcoal is in some cases industrially used, and to a certain extent imported. A successful attempt has been made at Lardarello in Tuscany to utilise the natural gas springing from the "soffioni" as motive power for industrial purposes; and the future may possibly witness a further exploitation of the tremendous volcanic forces latent in the peninsula.

But no actually efficient substitute for coal exists in Italy, except "white coal" or *water-power*, which is rightly estimated as being the most considerable asset in the Italian industrial outlook.

The exploitation of water-power as generator of electricity for

industrial purposes is of very recent date. In fact there is no trace of it before 1900. But since that date the statistical figures are striking. The number of electrical plants grew from 2,286 in 1899 to 6,683 in 1911, and the motive power employed increased, during four years only (1907-11) from 115,000 h.p. to 586,000 h.p. or more than one-third of the total motive-power used by Italian industries. In this way electric energy brings about a growth of the industrial output which would have required the importation of an additional 2 million to 3 million tons of coal per year. Since 1911 and during the war the number of plants and the motive-power employed has again increased, while a more efficient utilisation of the energy has been achieved. The actual power exploited by the existing plants is estimated now—no official figures are available—at 1 million h.p.

By the middle of 1918 water utilised for the generation of electricity produced 1,552,000 h.p.; and many other demands were under examination at that date. There is no shortage of water-power. Official statements put the resources of the kingdom (without the provinces annexed during the last war) at a round figure of 3,000,000 h.p., reducible during the periods of ordinary drought to 2,500,000 h.p.

Electric energy is much used in industry. Its first clients were the textile industries, which still remain the most important consumers of energy. In the last ten years a considerable amount of power has been absorbed by the metallurgical, chemical and mining industries. Heating by electricity is also being extended wherever the energy is produced at a low cost.

New possibilities are open by *electric heating* applied to the metallurgical industries. The 250,000 tons of pyrites, being the yearly residuum of the manufacture of sulphuric acid (fertilisers industry), could be treated in electric furnaces with a power of 130,000 h.p. and then supply 120,000 tons of cast iron. Casting iron from iron ore by the use of electric furnaces is economically a more difficult problem; but this has been already solved in Sweden and Norway. By the same means cast iron and scrap can be economically transformed into steel.

Even more important results can be achieved in the fertilisers industry. There are no longer commercial or technical difficulties in the way of extracting nitrogen from the air, and nothing but new capital is wanted to assist Italian industrial enterprise and help to improve the agricultural production.

In the agricultural field *electric motive-power* is used in Pied-

mont for various farming operations such as ploughing, reaping, binding, rice cleaning, manufacturing butter and cheese, etc., and there is no reason why this profitable system should not be extended to most of the Italian agrarian districts. Irrigation and draining are also within the scope of future developments of electric energy.

Special attention has been given to the problem of *electric traction* on the railways. Many short State lines (220 miles) and one private railway (45 miles) had been built prior to the war and have been successfully worked since then. They are generally lines crossing chains of mountains, climbing high gradients and running through long tunnels: this is a character common to many sections of the Italian railways, on which the steam engine proves expensive, slow and unsatisfactory. A tri-phase electric locomotive drawing a 500-ton train can easily keep up a speed of about 20 miles an hour on a gradient of 30-35 per cent., and does not produce smoke in the tunnels.

It is estimated that the electrification of the cross-mountain lines (1,200 miles, or a little more than one-tenth of the total length of the Italian railway system) should bring about an economy of about 40 per cent. of the coal consumed on the whole railway system. The cost of this transformation was estimated before the war at between £6,500 to £13,000 per mile, plus the cost of several generating plants (300,000 h.p.). The four hundred millions of lire which have been appropriated by the Government as an initial fund for this transformation have proved thoroughly inadequate, but even if sufficient financial means were available, the work could not be completed for another twenty years.

Attempts are being made to collect *torrential waters* in artificial lakes or reservoirs and to use them for the generation of electricity and for irrigation purposes. It is estimated that 40,000,000 h.p. is the potential energy of the torrential waters throughout Italy; but in practice it will be possible to utilise only a small portion of it. An important scheme is now being carried out in Sardinia, by which an artificial lake of 450 million cubic metres generating a constant power of 20,000 h.p. will be created in the Tirso basin. This scheme is intended to help the exploitation of the mineral resources of Sardinia and to irrigate some waterless districts of the island. Even more ambitious is the scheme proposed for the Sila in Calabria, which is intended to develop 100,000 h.p.

The inter-connection of the electric plants of the country is also a most important problem. Since the drought occurs in

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different parts of the country at different periods of the year, a network connecting the electrical districts could secure a perfect continuity of work. This result will be soon on its way to achievement, thanks to the technical progress made in the transmission of energy over long distances.

The enterprise and boldness of Italian engineers form a striking characteristic of this industry, and are very well known abroad.

It is certain that for some years to come the high price of coal, and freights, together with the rates of exchange, will encourage and stimulate the expansion of electrical industry. The capital of the existing companies reached in 1918 the remarkable figure of £80,000,000 (almost entirely Italian capital, free from German interference), and it is still increasing.

Iron, Steel and the Mining Industries

The *iron* industries, which are in all civilised countries the basis of industrial progress and prosperity, have in Italy a very poor market. Here the consumption of *steel* does not amount to more than 35 kg. per head of the population, comparing with 135 kg. per head in France, 162 in Britain, 301 in the United States. The Italian consumption of steel was in 1913 1,500,000 tons, 1,000,000 of which were produced in Italy. The forged raw materials were two-thirds scrap-iron and steel, and one-third cast iron. The latter is chiefly supplied by the iron ore of the Italian mines, whilst the former are mainly imported from abroad. Altogether the steel industry gets from within the country only 40 per cent. of its raw materials and supplies only two-thirds of the national requirements in steel. The fuel required by the industry (2,000,000 tons of coal p.a.) is entirely imported. In these highly unfavourable conditions it is a matter of surprise that the steel industry should reach even comparatively modest results; but these enabled it throughout the war to supply the Army and Navy almost entirely with guns and ammunition made in Italy.

The art of forging steel and iron is a very ancient one in Italy, but it has never been important. After the Risorgimento, many small forges existed, and the iron ore was treated there with primitive processes, charcoal being used as fuel. They were built, however, in the vicinity of the meagre iron-ore mines of the Alps and Apennines, and of the woods supplying the fuel. But soon the scarcity of wood made itself felt, and

at the same time foreign competition based on coal and modern machinery asserted itself. The transformation of the existing factories on a modern basis was difficult, as coal could not be economically transported to the mountainous localities. No tariff could protect them; so that they had either to close down or to limit their activity to purely local needs. New factories rose in their stead at the landing-places of foreign coal or near the sources of electric energy, and they grew rapidly with the general growth of Italian industry. A great impulse was given to them by the war; their producing power, which was of 900,000 tons of steel p.a. in 1913, rose to 1,300,000 tons in 1918. But a world coal-crisis strikes at this industry first, and the Italian steel output went down again in 1919 to about 800,000 tons, with a marked tendency to further reduction; while the national requirements, especially for reconstruction purposes, began to grow and are now estimated at about 2,000,000 tons of steel p.a.

Prior to the war the capital invested in the metallurgical industries did not amount to much more than £4,000,000, but during the war it went up to, and well above, £40,000,000. After making allowance for the depreciation of currency and the general rise of expenditure, this increase of capital is not in proportion to the output of iron and steel which was the primary object of this industry. In fact it reveals a tendency which may mark an epoch in Italian industrial life and which requires a great deal of watching. With the capital earned or concentrated in their hands during the war the metallurgists have created new branches in their concerns, and they have bought important interests in others. They have expanded their engineering activities and formed shipbuilding companies. On the other hand, engineering firms have set up metallurgical plants of their own on a large scale, with a view to controlling all the manufacturing stages, from the mining of the iron ore and the generation of motive-power to the making of the finished goods and the running of the trains and ships. In theory such a form of concentration under present conditions is natural, as it allows a more economical and organised utilisation of all the by-products—and it corresponds to similar developments in other countries some time ago. But some economists are critical, and they find that this hasty organisation has been too expensive and is inadequate from the technical point of view. To what extent this remarkable experiment will succeed, the next few years alone can tell.

Meanwhile the metallurgical industry is threatened with

lack of *iron ore*. The mines of the Island of Elba, which are exploited free by Government grant, yield easily 800,000 tons per annum of high-grade iron-ore, but they will be exhausted by the end of the grant, or within the next ten years. It is possible that the Elban seams extend beyond the area of the island and under the sea; but working them under those conditions, although technically feasible, is probably unpracticable from the economic point of view. Comparatively little is expected from the poorer iron-ore of Sardinia, even when the transport situation in that island allows of a fuller exploitation; whilst the mines of Cogne in Piedmont, although producing high-grade ore, are not expected to suffice for a large steel industry.

This position is recognised even by the strongest supporters of the metallurgic development in Italy. But their opinion is that all economic difficulties in the way of applying electric energy to melting and forging the metals will gradually be overcome, in the same way as the other technical problems have been lately to a great extent solved. The capacity of the electric furnaces is now estimated at 10 per cent. of the total Italian output of steel as compared with 1 per cent. before the war. Although there is no real hope of ever suppressing the use of coal altogether, the growing utilisation of electric heating may bring about a situation similar to that of other industrial countries which are rich in fuel and have built up a powerful steel industry chiefly based on the imports of foreign iron-ore. In this case neighbouring countries, like Spain, Tunis and Morocco, might economically supply the required iron-ore.

Closely connected with the industries covering the first manufacturing stages of iron and steel are the *engineering industries*.

Besides the progress achieved within the activities of the predominantly metallurgic concerns, engineering undertakings have greatly profited by the war. The Italian *motor-car* industry had already won a world-wide reputation for the finishing of its products. It followed its own lines, creating unique types of motor-car. The American system of building low-price cars unfit for prolonged service has been ignored. Yet the "Fiat" Company possesses now the largest motor-car plant in Europe. It builds cars of any size, motor-boats and submarines. After the close of hostilities its carefully planned organisation quickly turned its war effort into peace work, especially by building agricultural machinery on a large scale, lorries for commercial transport and small touring-cars.

No effort worth mentioning has been made to promote the *aviation* industry after the cessation of hostilities, although it has succeeded, both as a branch of the motor-car industry and as a separate undertaking, in creating many types suitable also for commercial purposes. Temporary postal services by air have been opened with success between Rome and Naples and between Sardinia and the Continent. There are no regular lines for passenger traffic.

The actual *rolling-stock* of the Italian railways has been built up with the help of foreign industry, owing to the quick growth of the traffic. But stocks are now being kept up and increased exclusively by internal industry, both in the State workshops and in the private metallurgical and engineering firms.

The production of *industrial machinery* has given less satisfactory results, and Italy has been dependent for these articles upon German and British imports. The late development of Italian industries has forced them to submit to foreign patents which are the property of older industries—and the influence of German capital invested in Italy has made itself felt especially in the hydro-electrical industry, 88 per cent. of the machinery working in the electric plants bearing a mark of German origin.

Mining Industries. Besides the iron-ore and lignite dealt with above, sulphur, zinc, and marble form the main activities of the Italian mining industry.

Up to 1900 Italian *sulphur* (drawn almost exclusively from the volcanic regions of Sicily) kept its supremacy in the world-trade, followed at a great distance by the Spanish produce. Since then the Louisiana mines gradually took over the American market, and Japanese sulphur partially replaced the Italian exports to Russia. Italian sulphur however still predominantly supplies the European markets.

The output of sulphur (400,000 tons in 1913) was already declining before the war, and the position has since grown steadily worse. The United States competition grows stronger as new mines are operated, especially in Texas. The American industrial methods are more advanced, and the yielding of the sulphur-ore (only 15 per cent. in the Sicilian mines) is thereby higher. The typical and primitive transport by carriers (*carusi*) has almost disappeared in Sicily during the last twenty years, giving place to more up-to-date mechanical transport. The melting of the ore has improved as well, being carried out by new technical means. Yet the avoidable loss of raw sulphur in the different processes is still considerable, and a thorough

reorganisation of the industry on modern lines is needed as soon as the international market again becomes normal. These improvements are closely connected with the wider utilisation of the water-power resources of Sicily which are now being studied. Heavy royalties exacted by the landowners weigh severely upon the prices of the Italian sulphur. These also can be eliminated to a great extent so as to render this all-important industry more economical—and legislative measures to this effect are already in course of execution.

The industry concerning the by-products of sulphur, apart from sulphuric acid (see *Chemical Industries*), is poor. Sulphur oil, obtained from olive husks treated with carbon sulphate, is used by the French and Italian soap factories for the manufacture of "Marseilles soap." Copper sulphate, widely used to fight the typical disease of the vine, mildew, is produced only to the extent of about one-half of the consumption, the rest being chiefly imported from Britain.

Zinc-ore (150,000 tons p.a.), mainly drawn from the Sardinian mines, has a poor market in Italy, and almost the whole of it is exported abroad in a raw state, owing to the considerable amount of coal required in the industrial processes. It forms, however, a very small percentage of the world-production of zinc. Here again the latest developments of the electrical processes applied to metallurgy may transform the basis of the zinc industry, which is very susceptible of improvement, as the grade of the Italian zinc-ore is remarkably high.

The war has greatly affected the *marble* industry, the finest kinds of which are an Italian world-monopoly. The export trade (300,000 tons, worth £1,360,000 in 1913) has gone down by four-fifths, whilst marble mining has been correspondingly reduced. Great Britain is the main customer of this industry, the United States coming next.

Quicksilver is extracted from the mines of Monte Amiata, and the beds extend down to the Monte Argentaria on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The average production (1,000 tons a year), already considerable as compared with the world's output, was increased during the war, owing to the demand by explosives factories. The ore is refined on the spot; the metal used to be almost entirely exported to Germany, evidently through the agency of the German capital largely invested in the Italian mercury-mining companies.

The *copper* mines now working in Italy yield very little, and the ore is of low grade. Researches are now being carried out in Italian soil, as richer beds are likely to exist.

Lead is mined to a limited extent in Sardinia, mixed with small proportions of silver. *Aluminium* is extracted from bauxite, and the output follows the progress of the motor-car and aviation industries, which have multiplied the uses of aluminium and brought about, especially during the war, a remarkable increase of prices. *Manganese-ore*, the output of which was almost nil in 1913, went up to 30,000 tons in 1918.

So far as metal ores and fossils (*lignite* and *peat*) are concerned, the mining industry has improved during the war, and, although a considerable decline of output has marked the post-war period, some improvements are likely to be permanent and much more is to be expected in the future. The Italian subsoil has never been methodically and thoroughly explored; and on the other hand, the progress of modern industry makes possible and economical the utilisation of minerals hitherto neglected.

Shipbuilding and Merchant Fleet

At the end of 1914 the Italian merchant fleet consisted of 644 steamboats with an aggregate tonnage of about 1,535,000 gross. Three hundred and thirty-six ships, displacing 900,000 tons, were lost during the war, being partially replaced by 182,000 tons built in the Italian shipyards, 70,000 bought abroad and 251,000 seized from the enemy (90,000 tons of which have been sunk) in Italian ports. To these should be added the shipping seized in the Austrian harbours (800,000 tons in all), an important quota of which, according to the Spa agreements of July 1920, has been handed over to Italy.

At the end of hostilities the Italian merchant fleet possessed 408 ships aggregating 1,040,000 tons gross. In 1918 the import traffic by sea (12,000,000 tons of goods) was entrusted to the national flag only to the extent of 15 per cent. During the year 1919 122,000 tons built in the Italian yards and 339,000 tons bought abroad were added to the merchant fleet; but even these comparatively important additions do not alter the elements of the situation.

Already before the war the position of the Italian merchant fleet was wholly inadequate. Only 30 per cent. of the goods unloaded in Italian harbours by steamers was carried in Italian bottoms. It is true that since 1881 the tonnage of the steamboats had risen from 77,000 tons to 933,000 tons in 1914. But the efficiency of the Italian floating-stock was low. Sixty per cent. of the ships were old and obsolete, mostly bought second-hand from Britain (90 per cent.) and Germany. This lament-

able phenomenon occurred whilst the Italian shipbuilding industry was ranking for technical progress among the most advanced of the world.

Some people lay the blame for this deficiency on the Government policy of subventions, which kept back the shipowners from the stimulating competition of the international freight market. The shipowners themselves of the old generation are more likely to be blamed for their lack of enterprise. A powerful drawback also was the pressure brought to bear by German capital in order to favour its prosperous Mediterranean lines. Anyhow, the weakness was and still is there. It is all-important that this should be remedied, and the means are at hand.

During the last year of the war the Italian *shipyards* beat all previous records by launching ships aggregating 67,000 tons. The figures for 1919 (122,000 tons) were even more significant, although they evidently include many ships nearly completed during hostilities, the work being interrupted owing to the lack of raw materials. It is evident, however, that the shipbuilding industry is thriving under the stimulus of high freights.

Many shipyards were enlarged during the war and many more were newly built. The inclusion of Julian Venetia within the frontiers of the kingdom has added the powerful shipyards of Monfalcone, Triest and Pola, happily situated near the timber regions of Istria and Croatia. It is not too optimistic an estimate to say that since the war the capacity of the Italian shipyards has more than doubled, and that it lies within the range of possibility to build in a few years' time a merchant-fleet capable of carrying under the national flag all the goods imported by sea.

The coast-wise traffic, which owes its peculiar importance to the fact that many of the greatest centres of population have grown up on the sea-coast, is almost entirely (five-sixths) carried in Italian bottoms. A great percentage of the Italian emigrants sail, especially to South America, on Italian ships. Tens of thousands, however, seek a passage from French harbours on foreign ships, and many more liners must be added to the Italian merchant-fleet if emigration is to resume its pre-war intensity.

Textile Industries .

The group of *textile industries* includes the most important and the best-organised industrial activities of the country, and it absorbs a very considerable proportion of the external trade of Italy. In 1913 the exports of silk and cotton goods

reached 670,000,000 lire (about £27,000,000), being more than one-third of all the Italian exports and exceeding by a large margin the value of the raw materials and manufactured goods of the same categories imported into Italy. These industries are thus an important trade asset; they depend less than others on foreign assistance, so far as coal is concerned—for the motive-power used is chiefly hydro-electricity. The raw materials they use are richer and affected to a lesser extent by the vicissitudes of the freight-market. They are consequently the most likely rapidly to recover from the war crisis and to become again the soundest item of the Italian trade-balance which so badly needs redressing.

These features are most evident in the *silk* industry, which is one of the oldest and by far the richest. The rearing of the silkworm is an ancient occupation of the northern-Italian peasant, and the raw material (i.e. the cocoons) is absolutely inexhaustible.

Soon after 1870 a disease of the silkworms, the "*pebrina*," caused the production of cocoons to decrease by about three-fourths. It went up in 1890–95 to 55,000–60,000 tons (compared with 48,000 tons in 1871), but it decreased again in 1911–14 to 39,600 tons. Meanwhile the silk-manufacturing industry organised itself according to modern ideas, grouping the workers in large factories and supplying them with up-to-date machinery. The year 1900 coincided with the application of electric motive-power to the textile industries and all previous manufacturing records were beaten. The national supply of cocoons became, however, no longer sufficient to keep all spindles and looms going, and large quantities of Asiatic cocoons were imported, rising in 1914 to about one-fourth of the requirements of the silk industry.

The slow development of social conditions was largely responsible for the continuation of the old custom of feeding the silkworms in the homes of the peasants—women, old folk and children being employed in this monotonous task. Then the war broke up the families and forced the women to work in the fields in place of the men called to the colours. The national production of cocoons again went down, while the imports from Asia were entirely interrupted. Matters came to a crisis in the silk market, and the output of the factories decreased by 40 per cent.

But as soon as hostilities were over, the tendency towards normal conditions reappeared. The rearing of silkworms is now improving, new stocks of cocoons are being imported from

the Balkans, the Near East, India, etc., and the export of silken goods takes again the first place in Italian foreign trade, amounting to nominally £60,000,000 in 1919, which figure, after making allowance for the low exchanges and the new scale of prices, compares favourably with the most prosperous pre-war years.

The main product of the Italian silk industry is the raw thrown silk. As a matter of fact, Italy is the greatest producer in Europe of this commodity and the third in the world. Its export, since the interruption of the trade relations with France in 1889, was chiefly diverted to Germany and Switzerland. Before the war the United States and Russia were importing Italian raw silk in considerable quantities, although in those countries the Japanese trade, owing to its stronger organisation, prevailed over the higher quality of the Italian products. Silk waste, being the residuum of the silk-throwing process, was also an important item in the Italian foreign trade.

Silk piece-goods were mainly exported to Britain. But so far as the finished goods are concerned, the predominance of the French industry in the world markets is absolute. Even the Italian internal market is largely supplied by re-imports from France, Switzerland and Germany.

The throwing, spinning and weaving processes have remarkably improved during the last thirty years. French experts have pointed out that the efficiency of the Italian silk-thrower helped by the new "steam-basin" system is almost twice as much as that of his French confrère. Considerable progress is stated to have been achieved also in the dyeing processes during the war. Although much has yet to be done, especially in the direction of increasing the national production of cocoons and further improving the last manufacturing stages of the piece-goods, the position of the silk industry is still the most satisfactory and promising among the Italian industries. There are 175,000 workers directly employed in it, and unlimited numbers of land workers are connected with it in rearing the silk-worms and growing the mulberry-trees.

The silk-warehouses in Milan are the largest in the world, and Milan is the most important raw-silk market in Europe, being only second to Lyons in the manufactured-silk business.

The *cotton* industry stands second in order of importance among the textile industries. It is of comparatively recent growth—its transformation to a modern basis and consequently its growing importance in the national economic system dating from the seventies. In 1876 the existing spindles numbered 716,000; in 1913 they had increased to 4,600,000. In the latter

year 164,000 looms were working as against 27,000 in 1876. During the above-mentioned period the imports of raw cotton jumped from 60,000 to 200,000 tons.

Unlike the silk industry, cotton manufacturing is based almost exclusively on foreign raw material. An attempt to grow cotton in Sicily and Apulia gave remarkable results during the War of Secession (60,000 tons in 1869), but cotton-growing has been abandoned since then owing to the competition of the United States and India. The high freights and cost now prevailing are reopening the question as to whether this cultivation can be revived.

In Italy the growth of this industry has been more rapid than in other countries. It has almost entirely secured the internal market for yarns and piece-goods, and it has created an export trade which amounted in 1913 to 150,000,000 lire (£6,000,000), beating in some cases even the British competition in South American and Near Eastern markets.

Being favoured by the abundance of skilled labour and low cost of motive power, the Italian cotton industry has gone through a crisis of over-production. The war has fundamentally altered this position by forcibly reducing the import of raw materials. But the national consumption has at the same time gone down, owing to the speculation which had raised the prices beyond a reasonable limit. The consequences were that at the end of the war the cotton industry had in hand an important stock of piece-goods (estimated at about 70,000 tons) available for external trade, and soon after the Armistice the exports started again with great intensity (64,000 tons worth £50,000,000 in 1919 comparing with 20,000 tons worth £11,000,000 in 1918).

The Italian cotton goods are widely sold among the populations of the Balkans and the Near East, owing both to their low cost and to the adaptive power shown by the Italian industry in supplying the type of goods specially required.

The capital invested in the cotton industry was estimated in 1913 at 400,000,000 lire (£16,000,000). The number of workers employed was 116,000 and the motive-power 225,000 h.p.

The Italian *wool* industry is at least as old as the silk one, but it has not kept pace with it so far as the volume of production is concerned. The national resources do not supply normally more than one-third of the raw material required by the industry, and the livestock situation does not foreshadow any increased contribution. The quality of the fleece is adversely affected by the lack of suitable grass in the pastures as well as by the exposure to the inclemencies of weather due to the poorness of the

grazing grounds and the consequent nomadic character of the shepherd's calling. Transport difficulties and the defective organisation of the raw-wool market, combined with British-German competition, have diverted the demand to foreign products (chiefly Australia and Argentina).

The factories of Biella (Piedmont), Schio (Venetia) and Prato (Tuscany) are up-to-date and their efforts in facing the situation have had a certain measure of success. Prior to the war the imports of woollen materials were steadily decreasing, while the exports were on the increase; but the exports of worsted goods still compared unfavourably with the imports. The import of woollen yarns had practically disappeared, and that of woollen tops had decreased owing to the progress made in spinning and combing the wool. The weaving process has already reached a remarkable degree of perfection.

The *hemp* industry is of much smaller proportions. It is not organised on a modern basis and is still carried on by single artisans or in small workshops. It draws its raw materials from the native hemp fibre (83,500 tons p.a.), the crop being second in importance only to Russia's. But the industry utilises only a small proportion of it, and 50,000 tons of raw fibre were exported yearly before the war, chiefly to Germany and Great Britain. Yarns and ropes were exported in smaller quantities to Great Britain, France and Argentina.

The yearly crop of *flax* (2,500-3,000 tons) and imports of a like amount are not enough to feed an important industry. Jute is imported (4,200 tons in 1915) chiefly from India and transformed into yarns and piece-goods. Manufactured jute goods are exported (12,000 tons in 1912) chiefly to South America and Rumania.

Chemical Industries

The main activity of the Italian chemical industries is directed to the production of *fertilisers*. Since 1900 the transformation of the natural phosphates into superphosphates by treating the former with sulphuric acid has taken on great proportions (1,000,000 tons of superphosphate in 1915), and the production of sulphuric acid has correspondingly increased (from 60,000 tons in 1898 to 645,000 in 1915). This development has been made possible by the large quantities of sulphur and of pyrites available. It has given impetus to the use of the phosphatic fertilisers and to the corresponding imports of phosphates especially from neighbouring Tunisia. A crisis of over-production troubled the superphosphate market before the war,

but since then the war has upset the situation, and the lack of phosphates is still keenly felt owing to the restrictions by the French Government on the exports from Tunisia. Italian agriculture has suffered throughout the war, and still suffers now, from a scarcity of fertilisers. A small increase of imports of nitrate of soda from Chile during the war was more than absorbed by the explosive factories for the making of nitric acid.

The product of the granulation and oleification of *calcium cachide* (calcium-cyanamide) has proved an excellent fertiliser, although inferior in some respects to the ammonium sulphate which is produced in large quantities by Germany and Great Britain. More than 15,000 tons of cyanamide were produced in 1914, and at the end of the hostilities this standard had been maintained. A part of this production (4,650 tons) was given up to the manufacture of ammonium sulphate, which is also extracted by an electric process from ammoniac water, a by-product of the gas industry. The cyanamide industry, the processes of which are genuinely Italian, has developed also, through Italian initiative, at Sebenico and Almissa (Dalmatia), the total output of those flourishing concerns across the Adriatic mounting before the war up to 26,000 tons p.a.

Potash and *potash salts* do not exist in Italy, but they are very little used in Italian agriculture. The "Thomas scorias," a by-product of steel melting by the Thomas converter, are used extensively (200,000 tons) as a phosphatic fertiliser. But they are little produced in Italy (9,000 tons), the Italian iron-ore being almost without phosphorus.

Experts have lately discussed the possibility of producing an *ammonium phosphate* which would combine the properties of the phosphatic and nitrogenous fertilisers. Studies are also being carried out regarding the possibility of combining, by the application of electricity, phosphates with potassium silicate, large beds of which exist in Central Italy. Important results are expected from such application. Electricity has also been applied to the chemical treatment of peat with advantageous results.

The *calcium-carbide* industry depends for its existence on the electric energy used for heating the kilns. Besides supplying the materials for making fertilisers, calcium carbide produces acetylene gas, widely used for illumination purposes (50,000 tons p.a.).

Chlorine is produced to the extent of 10,000 tons p.a. and is exclusively used in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, which in its turn is an important element in the paper and phosphorus industries.

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Of *carbonate of soda* 11,000 tons were produced in 1913. This very useful chemical is largely used in glass and textile industries and in laundries. Its output could be considerably increased, marine salt and seaweed offering an unlimited supply of raw material.

Like many European countries, Italy used to depend upon German industry for *dyes*. This deficiency was only partly due to the lack of coal, which is the basic raw material of that industry. During the war the distillation of *benzol*, *toluol* and *phenol* from coal-tar for the manufacture of explosives went on on a large scale, and many of the new plants have now turned to the dyeing industry. Although it is known that considerable progress has been made in this branch, no official data are as yet available.

Pharmaceutical products are generally imported, chiefly from Germany. *Quinine*, widely used to fight malaria, is produced in considerable quantities under the control of the Government. The Dolomite Alps supply the raw material for *magnesium salts*, the production of which is also important.

Minor Industries

The *match* industry, covering the whole of the national consumption (72 billions in 1914), is heavily taxed, and the sale of its products is a monopoly of the State.

The production of *essences* (lemon, orange and bergamot) is flourishing. A large export trade (840,000) is done in these commodities, which are required by all manufactories of "eau de Cologne" abroad. Their value during the war amounted to 2,768 tons, worth £3,300,000. This typically Sicilian industry is likely to become better organised and highly profitable.

Soap and *candles* are manufactured on a large scale in Italy. Generally they are produced by the same concerns, the raw materials being the same for the two commodities, and the variation of the consumption according to the season (more soap in summer and more candles in winter) affording a profitable alternation of production. As to the latter, the requirements of the national market can be met by the industry, and even paraffin candles are to a certain extent exported. The output of soap is, however, inadequate, especially of the commonest qualities. This industry is still suffering from the general European shortage of fats.

The *paper* industry is protected by high tariffs. The output of paper had received a great impetus in the years prior to the

war owing on the one hand to the extended utilisation of the hydro-electric motive power, and on the other to the growing circulation of the Press.

The raw materials are rags, wood pulp, straw and cellulose. The two former were to a considerable extent imported from abroad, and the cellulose was almost entirely imported from Germany, Austria and Scandinavia. The Italian paper industry specialised in the production of fine qualities; it is now undergoing the same crisis as in other countries, aggravated here by the scarcity of coal. The newspaper industry correspondingly suffers. The price of the daily papers has been increased fourfold and their size has been reduced. Their sale, however, does not seem to be much affected, and the circulation of some Italian newspapers ranks high among the European Press. The paper crisis has affected more heavily the other branches of publishing. The *celluloid* industry is limited.

The manufacture of *rubber* piece-goods started prior to the growth of its two principal customers, the motor-car industry (tyres) and the electrical industry (cables, wires, insulators, etc.). It is an industry of national importance, and the excellence of its products brings in important business commissions from foreign countries. Italian methods of manufacture have been introduced into Britain and Spain by the branches of the Pirelli Company, which founded this industry and still controls it. Brazil supplies 50 per cent. of the raw material; the remainder is imported from British West Indies or bought on the London market.

A branch of the *glass* industry, namely, the manufacture of decorated glass and of glass-beads, is typically Italian and more especially Venetian. Beads are chiefly exported to India, Africa and the Near East. The other branches of the glass industry, handicapped by lack of coal, only partially cover the most common requirements of the internal market, which depends for the remainder of its supplies on Germany, Belgium and Bohemia.

A sufficiency of *bricks* is produced by the Italian kilns. The same may be said of *chalk* and *concrete*, the latter showing an over-production before the war.

The *timber* industry is chiefly concerned with making *railway-sleepers*. The production of *furniture* is not equal to the national requirements, though serious efforts are being made to improve it. During the war the *piano* industry in Turin developed remarkably owing to the temporary elimination of the German competition. *Musical instruments* (organs, mandolins, violins,

etc.) are widely manufactured, but the industry is generally dependent upon foreign countries (Germany and Austria) for essential parts. Brass instruments are mostly imported.

The *hides* industry depends on the situation of the livestock market, which is not as satisfactory as it should be. The imports and exports of raw skins balance. Tanning is widely practised, but its organisation is not very economical, and the finest qualities of leather are imported. *Kid gloves* are an important speciality of this industry; Great Britain alone takes three million pairs yearly. *Shoe-making* is still industrially in a rudimentary state and is largely confined to hand-work.

Italian *felt hats* are well known to traders for the fine quality of their material; the name of the country of origin being in most cases omitted, the foreign public generally is unaware of this speciality in Italian industry. The same may be said of *straw hats*, which are appreciated for the finish of their work. The former are manufactured in Piedmont and Lombardy; the latter almost exclusively in the province of Florence.

The *button* industry is prospering. Buttons made out of "corozo," a fibre imported from South America and Eritrea, are exported to many markets, Great Britain being the most important customer.

Coral work is also an Italian speciality. The small amount of coral fished up locally and the much larger quantities of raw coral imported from Japan and Hong-Kong are worked up in the large factories of Torre del Greco (Naples), Leghorn and Genoa, and are chiefly re-exported to India, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Emigration

One of the most striking and important features of Italian economic and social life is the phenomenon of emigration.

The present Italians are a prolific race, and before the war the number of births used to exceed the number of deaths by 500,000 to 800,000. Even the war with its tremendous casualties and the epidemics which accompanied it has only narrowed down this excess of births. The Italian soil can probably feed a greater population than the one existing—although the population of Italy is already one of the densest of Europe; but for many local and general reasons, social and economic, the Italian workers have not been able up till now to draw from the country resources enough to improve their standard of

living to the same extent as has been done in other countries. Foreign markets were bound, however, to exert a powerful attraction over Italian labour.

In the seventies, a few years after the constitution of the kingdom, emigration developed in considerable proportions. In 1876 100,000 labourers of the northern provinces (Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia) crossed the frontier to seek better conditions and higher wages in France, Austria, Switzerland and Germany. After ten or twelve years large groups began to sail for the new Continent, and the total number of emigrants from Italy was doubled. It was trebled in another ten years. Towards the end of the last century the United States began to absorb a large number of Italian emigrants; and the movement began to organise itself on a large scale. Streams of labourers cross the ocean to seek in the mines, in the workshops and in the plantations a new and higher standard of living, or the means to accumulate a certain amount of savings in a few years' time. They were welcomed either as permanent settlers or as season-workers by South America, their labour being badly needed for harvesting the rich crops of the Plata plains, and for growing coffee trees in the States of Brazil. In 1905 788,000 emigrants left Italy, and in 1913 872,600; while in the latter year only 189,000 came back from abroad.

In the last twenty years Italian emigration reached the highest figures for any single country in Europe. Italians were swarming in the four continents. Reapers and bricklayers, road-makers and miners, artisans, wood-cutters and small traders, contributed to the prosperity of the New Continent and contributed by their skill, patience and frugality to the prosperity of many industries of Continental Europe. They settled in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, in the latter country largely outnumbering the French. In Egypt, Asiatic Turkey and the Balkans they formed also strong settlements. The Assuan barrage was built predominantly by Italian labour; great numbers of Italians were also employed in the cutting of the Panama Canal and in the building of the Baghdad Railway. The few beggars who hid themselves, with their barbaric hand-organs, in the gigantic stream of emigration cannot disguise the great contribution to modern civilisation paid by the Italian working-man in all countries.

Part of the emigration has a purely temporary character. A striking feature is the annual exodus of land workers from Southern Italy to Argentina, whither they are called to help

in reaping the wheat harvest. They sail at the beginning of the winter (being summer in the Southern hemisphere) and they are back home in time for the spring sowing—bringing with them savings of one or two thousand lire, which come in very useful for the rest of the year. Others remain abroad during four or five years and return after having saved money enough to buy at least the small piece of land on which they used to work as wage-earners. Finally, a great many settle definitely abroad, taking with them their families and often assuming the nationality of the land of adoption.

Just before the war it was reckoned that about 6,000,000 Italians were permanently settled abroad, of whom 1,800,000 were in the United States, 1,500,000 in Brazil, 1,000,000 in Argentina, and 500,000 in France.

Close ties are always kept up between the emigrants and their native country. As soon as they have got to work, they advise their relatives and friends to come across, and they help them to find work in their turn. They live as near as possible to each other, so as to share the traditional customs and to talk the native dialect; so that it often happens, especially in the United States, that the inhabitants of certain Italian villages form groups as numerous as those left behind in their native land.

Emigration of such a character and on such a scale cannot be but a predominant factor in the Italian economic situation. It extends indefinitely the Italian labour-market beyond the boundaries of the kingdom and introduces an international scale of wages within its frontiers. It depopulates whole agricultural districts (e.g. the province of Basilicata) beyond the limits required for their development. The return of the emigrants creates new social and economic factors; it causes here a dividing-up of landed property, there the transferring of ownership of the land from the non-working small owners to the returned workers. Practically everywhere, directly or indirectly, the emigration contributes towards raising the standard of living. But the greatest asset that the emigration brings practically to national economy is probably that formed by the savings of the emigrants and their remittances of money to their relatives.

The amount of money yearly sent home by the emigrants was estimated before the war at about 500,000,000 lire (£20,000,000, which covered half of the deficit in the Italian commercial balance-sheet, the other half being met by the money spent in Italy by foreign visitors). This official esti-

mate is by no means too optimistic, as it does not take into consideration the amounts sent through the Italian and foreign private banks, or by hand through returning friends, or enclosed in registered or insured letters. An estimate inserted in the Report of the U.S. Immigration Commission for 1907 puts the total amount sent home by the Italian emigrants in the United States during that year through the banks and the Post Office, at almost £18,000,000, or the double of the Italian official estimate for the U.S.

The war naturally stopped the outflow of emigrants. It only slowed down for a while the in-pouring of money, which was resumed during the last period of the war and after the armistice, showing a considerable improvement even on the pre-war years. The savings entrusted to the Post Office on account of Italians resident abroad during the year 1919 reached £15,200,000, as compared with £824,000 in the preceding year and £3,680,000 in 1913. The remittances for the first six months of 1920 already exceeded the big figures of 1919. This increase, of course, is partly due to the depreciation of Italian money, but it is the more significant as a token of confidence by the emigrated Italians in the future of their native land.

The savings brought back by the returning emigrants form certainly an imposing total. No exact figures are possible, but a rough estimate can be made, by putting the proportion of the returning emigrants at 40-60 per cent. of the departures and the average amount saved at £24 per head.

It is true that all these are only monetary assets, and that to a certain extent they correspond to a lowering of the potential production of the country. On the whole, an exact calculation in figures as to the economic advantages and disadvantages of the emigration is impossible. However, taken piecemeal, the former appear more important than the latter. It is remarkable, for instance, to see how the products of Italian agriculture and industries follow in the wake of the Italian emigration, which adds considerably to the growth of the external trade of the country.

Emigration in the U.K. and the Dominions.—The British Empire has never offered much scope for Italian immigration. There are probably little more than 20,000 Italians in Great Britain, and the immigration is not growing, chiefly owing to the severity of the trade-union regulations. The emigrants are chiefly waiters (there are over 4,000 of them in London alone), and they generally settle in this country permanently

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or for very long periods. Here and there are found some unskilled labourers and small traders.

The number of Italians emigrating to Canada is exceedingly small compared with those going to the United States. The type of Italian emigrant does not offer the essential requisites prescribed by the laws and by the economic organisation of the country. The Italian does not possess the initial capital required for the acquisition of the land and for first expenses, nor enough technical knowledge to handle modern agricultural machinery.

The Italians in Canada are mostly gathered in the Eastern cities (Montreal, Toronto, Quebec, Ottawa), being generally unskilled labourers.

Australia has been up to now a labour-market even less favourable than Canada to Italian emigration. Its distance and its highly restrictive laws add difficulties to the preventive economic organisation of the country. The initial capital necessary as a condition of success is greater than that required in Canada, and the financial risk is considerable, owing to the recurrence of droughts.

Yet the cultivation of sugar-cane on the lower courses of the northern rivers opens a field of work for which Italian labour has already shown its aptitude. Wide regions like Queensland, endowed with a climate very similar to that of Italy, are fitted for the natural qualities of Italian workers. Sir George Reid, in a speech made in London in 1910, expounded a theory that the exploitation of the Northern States of the Commonwealth should be entrusted to Italian immigration. This plan, at a moment when troubles created by the danger of yellow immigration are rife, should be seriously considered for the benefit of the two countries.

Colonial Resources

The phenomenon of emigration is by itself an obvious explanation of the tendency developed in Italy in the last thirty years toward associating the country with the great European movement of colonial expansion. Unfortunately the regions remaining outside the rule of the older or more powerful colonising nations were few and poor, and unsuitable, owing to their climate and their geographical position, for fulfilling the national ambition of directing the migratory flow to Italian-ruled lands beyond the seas—in contradistinction to allowing Italian workers to emigrate without assistance to foreign countries,

where too often they are exploited and are socially and economically defenceless.

Neighbouring Africa was the natural field of Italian colonial activity. But Tunisia and Egypt, where important Italian settlements were formed during the second half of the last century, were already occupied by Great Britain and France. The opportunity was given instead to Italy to assume the control of stretches of land bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (Eritrea and Somaliland) and in the remaining Turkish provinces on the Mediterranean (Tripoli and Cyrenaica). These colonies and protectorates are as a whole barely habitable by whites, and even the native population is scarce and mostly of a nomadic character. The soil, except in some narrow strips of land, is either desert or mountainous or marshy. In many cases, as in the Libyan hinterland, whole regions are hardly accessible and almost unknown; wherever agricultural improvement is possible, it is only made so by great and perhaps disproportionate technical and economic efforts. The subsoil, although it has never been methodically explored, offers but small chances for economic development.

The area of the colony of *Eritrea* is about 45,800 square miles, and its population is variously estimated between 280,000 and 450,000 inhabitants. The main centres of population are Asmara, the capital (9,000 inhabitants), Massawa, the main seaport, and Keren. A railway-line connects Massawa with Asmara (74 miles). From Asmara to Keren (58 miles) the line is almost completed and traffic is running on a section of it. The works for the extension to Agordat (46 miles) are already well advanced. It is estimated that in a few years' time (the abnormal economic conditions preventing rapidity of progress) this railway will reach the Abyssinian border. A number of highways, of which the country was almost entirely destitute, have been built since the Italian occupation and connect the main centres of the interior, while mule-paths and caravan-routes link the Italian colony with the Abyssinian and Sudanese territories. There are 313 miles of telegraph line connected with the Sudanese and Abyssinian lines. A cable is laid between Massawa, Asab and Perim, where it is connected with the international system. A very efficient subsidiary service is carried out by the wireless stations of Massawa and Asab, the former communicating on one hand with Italian Somaliland and on the other directly with the Italian stations. The telephone (471 miles) connects all the main centres of the colony.

The soil of Eritrea is flat in the north-east and along the

coast; the plains are semi-arid, their climate is tropical, and they are hardly suitable for intense cultivation or even for extensive tillage. From the south the Abyssinian tableland pushes its declivities across the territory of the colony. During and after the rainy season the slopes of the mountains are covered by a luxuriant growth of grass. Cattle-rearing is the main activity of the native population, which is to a great extent nomadic. More than 300,000 head of oxen are bred in the colony. Goats and sheep (the latter being fleecless) are also common, as well as donkeys, mules and camels.

On the tableland the natives grow wheat, barley and "taff"—a native kind of corn—besides flax and some leguminous plants. In the plains another kind of corn, "dura," i.e. millet, is extensively cultivated. Considerable attempts have been made with various results to introduce the culture of coffee and cotton, and experiments in tobacco-planting already made under the Egyptian domination have been renewed. The so-called "dôm-palm" is commercially a valuable tree and it is pretty common; its trunk yields good timber; the dried leaves and the soaked fibre of the branches are widely used by the natives in making mats, baskets, ropes, etc. The fruit is used as fuel and the kernels are exported and used for button-making.

The water-courses flowing across the Eritrean territory are all of a torrential character. Water is always scarce, and almost entirely lacking outside the rainy season. Hydraulic works are required for irrigating the plains, which, with the water-supply once secured, could yield profitable crops of tropical plants.

Local industries are few, and their market is poor owing to the small number of inhabitants and their modest needs. Italian initiative has introduced the mechanical grinding of corn, ice-making, and meat-preserving. The salt-works recently established with modern methods of production on the sea-shore at Massawa are very active and export most of their produce to Arabia and India. Pearl-fishing, although largely uncontrolled statistically, is estimated at a comparatively important figure (£6,400-£7,200), and the pearls are almost entirely exported to India, China and Japan. Of minor importance is the mother-of-pearl trade.

Subsoil research with a view to industrial exploitation has never been methodically carried out, owing to the lack of sufficient capital. There is, however, auriferous quartz, and the existence of copper is a certainty.

The trade of the colony is concentrated in the port of Massawa, the traffic of which is already considerable (130,000 tons of goods loaded and unloaded p.a.). Small sailing "sambuks" carry the trade across the Red Sea to and from Arabia; and many East African and Indian lines call at Massawa.

The main items of the export trade are dried skins, salt potassium, dôm-palm nuts, tinned meat, pearl, mother-of-pearl, and ivory (£24,000 in 1913), while the import trade mainly consists of textiles, foodstuffs and general commodities (£36,800 in 1913).

The Colonial budget shows a deficit, and it balances only thanks to a State subsidy varying from £8,000-£11,200.

Italian Somaliland has an area estimated at over 140,000 square miles and a population of 400,000 to 450,000 inhabitants. The northern districts form a protectorate, while the south (Benadir) is administered as a colony. The Somalis are shepherds and warriors with pronounced commercial tendencies, but endowed with a very limited producing power as labourers. On the coast the climate is wholesome and temperate, except during the exceedingly warm south-western monsoons. In many extensive districts of the interior, where the floods create wide marshes, deadly mosquitoes spread malaria fever.

Along the coasts the soil is arid except at the mouth of the rivers. In the interior the alluvial soil is fertile and, being copiously irrigated in the Juba and Webi Shebeli Valleys by the perennial waters of those rivers, it is suitable both for agricultural and pastoral exploitation. At present the natives cultivate the higher zones of the interior, these being exempt from fever epidemics. "Dura" is most commonly grown, as it forms the staple food of the natives. Less important cultures are maize, sesame, tobacco, some leguminous plants, coco-nuts, bananas and mangoes.

Cotton is found as a spontaneous growth in many regions and especially in Southern Somaliland. It was once widely cultivated by the natives, but their wars have distracted them from the work of the fields. The experimental cultivation tried since the Italian occupation has achieved very remarkable success, and the experts agree in stating that wide stretches of Somaliland can be transformed with moderate expense and with the assistance of comparatively modest hydraulic works into plantations yielding cotton of higher quality than that produced in the United States and very similar to the kinds grown in the Nile Valley.

One of the main economic activities of the native population

is the pastoral industry. The camel is the animal predominantly bred—11,000,000 head being estimated to exist in the colony. The camel supplies milk and meat for local needs, but its main use is to provide transport, which is still in a rudimentary state. Less numerous are the oxen, which are used for transport purposes over smaller distances; their skins are dried and exported: in fact they are the main item in the export trade, together with goat and “dig-dig”¹ skins. Sheep are numerous, reared by the natives only for their meat. Their fleece is of low quality, and it is not industrially treated. Many tribes rear poultry, and in some districts the ostrich is bred. The livestock could easily become, if better cared for, the basis of a comparatively important trade. At present there is an export of cattle (by herd-migration) especially directed towards British Somaliland. Zanzibar and the colonies south of the Juba import a great deal of meat from Italian Somaliland, as well as fresh native butter.

Among the spontaneous growths of the region are the aromatic plants, frankincense and myrrh, well known throughout the Near and Middle East; and the gum-tree, the acacia, the baobab and the dôm-palm grow extensively in this colony.

Fishing is rather active; shark-hunting is widely practised, the shark's meat being dried and exported to Zanzibar, while the fins are exported to India to be treated there. Mother-of-pearl is fished to a considerable extent and exported to Aden; pearl-fishing has less attraction for the natives.

The means of transport are scarce and rudimentary. There are no railways, and the regular motor-car services are limited. Through the efforts of the Italian Government 500 miles of roads have been made, but communication still generally takes place along the primitive paths gradually traced by caravans through the virgin lands. The coast is entirely devoid of natural ports, and ships stopping at Mogadishu, the capital of the colony, when the weather allows it, anchor in the open roadstead. This serious drawback will partly be abolished after the cession by Great Britain of Kismayu, the port at the mouth of the River Juba, agreed to after the European War. The unimportant coastwise traffic is carried by small “sambuks” and is totally interrupted during the monsoons.

Two great water-courses, the Juba, which marked the frontier between Italian Somaliland and British East Africa before the agreements of 1919–20, and the Webi Shebeli, will play an im-

¹ A small species of antelope.

portant rôle in the development of trade of the colony, being to a great extent navigable.

Twelve wireless stations connect the various centres of the colony; and the powerful Mogadishu station communicates with Massawa and directly with the Italian stations.

In the Somaliland budget also the liabilities exceed the assets, and the Italian State yearly contribution amounts to about £7,400.

Italian Libya (formerly Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) is the largest of the Italian colonies. Its area is estimated at about 400,000 square miles, of which probably 150,000–180,000 are suitable for some form of tillage or pasture. Only one-tenth of this latter area is actually exploited.

A great portion of this large territory has not been explored and is hardly accessible. The Turkish Government had always put obstacles in the way of explorers and scientists; the nomadic and warlike populations of the interior have hindered the activity of those who succeeded in overcoming Government's hostility, and the wilderness of the desert hinterland, forming the eastern part of the Sahara, has added to these difficulties.

The Italians, who occupied Libya in 1911, were soon distracted from their colonisation work by the European War, and the Mohammedan unrest spreading among the tribes of the interior rendered impossible not only any considerable economic exploitation, but also the prosecution of the agricultural studies begun in the northern zones after the occupation.

The Libyan coast, about twelve hundred miles long, does not offer any natural harbour except Tobruk bay—towards the Egyptian frontier—which, however, does not possess any economically important hinterland. A safe and comparatively wide port has been built by the Italians at Tripoli, and the works for building a port at Benghazi, the chief town of Cyrenaica, are well advanced.

Not a single river with perennial waters crosses Libyan territory, and the possibilities of agricultural improvement lie only in the presence of water under the soil, especially in the oases. In Tripolitania proper the olive-tree and various fruit-trees grow spontaneously. Most important of all is the date-palm, of which two millions of trees are estimated to exist in the country. The vine is also grown, chiefly along the coasts. Next in importance to the palm is the "spart" (esparto grass), a gramineous plant which is used both as fodder and as raw material for paper-making. For the latter purpose it used to be exported before the war, chiefly to Great Britain.

The only town worthy of the name is Tripoli, the capital of the colony, now numbering about 70,000 inhabitants. Its importance is of a military and administrative character, rather than industrial or commercial.

The soil of Cyrenaica is more fertile, and suitable at least in the coast zone for corn-growing and cattle-rearing. The presence of subsoil water is more frequent than in Tripolitania and it revives hopes in the fecundity of the land which was once the granary of Rome. In normal times barley was produced in proportions greater than the limited need of the scarce population, and it was partly exported. Sheep were also exported to neighbouring Egypt by nomadic shepherds who led the herds along the coast to the Marmarica pastures in order to fatten them and then sell them at the native fairs of Mariut.

Until ten years ago the towns of Tripoli and Benghazi possessed some commercial importance owing to the caravan-trade, which brought thither from the Chad provinces across the Sahara desert dried skins (chiefly bought by the United States), ostrich feathers and ivory (directed to France and England). This trade grew poorer owing to the competition of South Africa; gradually it has been diverted from its course by the new Sudanese Railway and the water-communications of the Niger. It has entirely stopped since the Italian occupation and during the European War. The actual political conditions of the colony prevent it from starting afresh, just as they would bar the way to any methodical exploitation of the interior, should the economic conditions of Italy and Europe allow it.

No reliable data are available so far as the economic value of the subsoil is concerned. Phosphatic beds are supposed to exist as a continuity of the Tunisian and Egyptian layers. Some geologists are of opinion that even if they exist they would be too deep for an economical exploitation. Researches, however, are being carried out by care of the Government in Cyrenaica.

A considerable military expenditure weighs on the budget of Italian Libya, although the actual occupation is reduced to a few points on the coastline. This accounts for the budget's deficit, which is of the same amount.

*Finance and Revenue*¹

The Kingdom of Italy started its financial life (1861-62) with a deficit of about £17,600,000, the expenditure amounting to £36,600,000 and the actual revenue to £19,000,000.

The State being born under those precarious conditions, its task was not limited merely to attaining the balance of the budget. The interest of an enormous public debt absorbed more than two-thirds of the revenue. In view of new wars imminent—the Austrians still occupying Italian territory and threatening the life of the young State—the army and navy had to be reinforced and kept ready. Once the national aspirations were fulfilled by force of arms and at the price of new financial sacrifices, a State machinery had to be built up almost from the beginning in order to secure the administration, the safety and the welfare of the community. Ports and railways, roads and canals, draining and irrigation, schools and law courts, pressed their demands upon the meagre budget of the State. The Government had to turn the screw on the already heavily-burdened taxpayers. In forty-eight years the Italian taxpayer paid to the State £2,500,000,000, being a contribution much higher in proportion to the national wealth than the corresponding contribution paid during the same period in Britain and France. Yet after having faced the financial obligations and the requirements of the national defence, these sacrifices appear in absolute figures to be inadequate for achieving the whole of the programme of public works and education required in order to raise the intellectual and economic standards of the people to the height of those of other Western nations.

At last in 1897-98 the budget balanced. The interest on the public debt was lowered, stocks were bought back from foreign holders and absorbed by the country. The State has already established its reputation for rigorous estimates of revenue and for strict economy in the expenditure. The circulation of currency is guaranteed (1912) by gold reserves to an extent of 64.57 per cent., a proportion which was one of the highest in the world. The Italian "*Rendita*" is quoted above par at home and abroad. Corresponding to the period of high industrial production and of commercial prosperity, it seemed as if the young State had definitely overcome the financial crisis through which it had passed since its adventurous birth. The Italo-Turkish War (1911-12) and the occupation of Libya

¹ Lire are here converted into £ at their normal value (25 l = £1).

swelled the military expenditure but without seriously affecting the budget position—which was only radically transformed since 1915, like that of all belligerent countries in the European War.

From June 30, 1915 to October 31, 1918 the Italian public debt swelled from £600,000,000 to £2,150,000,000 exclusive of the paper circulation (£340,000,000). Since then the budget has not lost its abnormal character, and more "war budgets" are ahead. Owing to the unsettled question of the eastern frontiers, the Army and Navy cost for the year 1919–20 £360,000,000, the estimate for 1921–22 being about £100,000,000 compared with the £20,000,000 of the pre-war budget.

Since the conclusion of hostilities the Italian public debt had gone up to £2,900,000,000 by June 30, 1920, exclusive of the paper circulation and of the ordinary Treasury bonds. The deficit of the financial year 1920–21, which one way or another will increase the public debt, was estimated at £540,000,000 and for 1922 at £160,000,000. The paper circulation went up from £112,000,000 in July 1914 to £726,000,000 in June 1921, about 50 per cent. being issued for the cash requirements of the State; the ordinary Treasury bonds and current debts of the Treasury were fluctuating (May 1921) round £400,000,000. The payment of the interest on the public debt alone will amount practically to twice as much as the total expenditure of a pre-war budget.

Meanwhile the revenue from imposts and taxation and public services has gone up from £96,000,000 in 1913–14 to £451,000,000 in 1922. A new item in the revenue is the tax on war profits, which yielded in the current year £30,000,000.

The State monopolies, which yielded in 1913–14 £21,800,000, have been extended from tobacco, salt, quinine and lotteries to matches, coffee, playing-cards, oil, electric lamps, etc., yielding £88,000,000. Although the wheat duty has been suspended, the customs have yielded in 1922 £18,000,000 against £15,800,000 in 1913–14. The excise duties on spirits, sugar, beer, etc., have yielded £20,000,000 as against £9,000,000. The stamp-duties and business taxes have risen from £12,000,000 to £45,000,000, while the direct ordinary taxation has passed from £21,600,000 to £32,800,000.

The excess profits tax has been lately transformed into a total forfeiture of the profits to the State. Therefore this tax will probably be again an important item in the next budget, in which the wine tax and the capital levy tax, already in operation, will also be prominent. The former is a tax of 8s.

on every hectolitre of wine produced, exacted from the producer at the moment of sale, being thus indirectly charged on the consumers. The capital levy tax is imposed on the estimated capital and is spread over a period of thirty years. The rates vary from 5 per cent. on capitals of £800 to 25 per cent. on the capitals of £4,000,000 or more.

The increase in the revenue achieved up to now is mainly formed by permanent items of taxation, and a further considerable increase is expected in the near future either through the gradual and reasonable raising of the present taxes or through the imposition of new ones. The balance of the budget will be, however, in sight as soon as the reasons for the extraordinary expenditure (Army and Navy supplies and invaded provinces) no longer exist. The return to the practice of moderate and strict estimates will then be possible; the consolidation of the Italian public debt should shortly follow, and a restriction of the paper circulation and of the short-term Treasury bonds would alleviate the general economic crisis.

It is clear that the adjustment of the State budget is possible only through a thorough and scientific working of the credit system.

The elasticity of Italian taxation, which has always been able to face the rising charges of the public debt, has ensured national faith in the solvency of the State. About £600,000,000 net were subscribed in the six national loans, of which £110,000,000 were subscribed by Italian residents abroad. Treasury bonds amounting to £600,000,000 or £800,000,000 are also held in the country.

In this way the Government has been able to face the war expenditure, except for the foreign war supplies and some of the essential commodities (coal, wheat, etc.) for the civil population, which were to a great extent covered by loans contracted with the British and American Governments. On these loans the interest is temporarily capitalised. Their amount in capital and interest on June 30, 1920, were: £472,650,000 due to Great Britain and £336,000,000 to the United States.

This unsettled position of the Italian budget weighs upon the economic organisation of the country, adding to the uneasiness created by social unrest. While the production is directly affected by the labour disturbances, the requirements of the State in excess of revenue draw inevitably upon Italian capital, turning it aside from the undertakings of industry and trade. Thus production dwindles, the demand for foreign

goods increases, Italian money is depreciated, the cost of living rises, the economy of the country is impoverished, the expenditure of the State grows higher. The vicious circle has yet to be broken.

Balance of Trade and General Situation

The balance of trade shows clearly the imprint of this situation. Before the war the imports (£146,000,000 in 1913) exceeded the exports by about £145,000,000. The remittances by the emigrants and the money spent by foreign visitors in Italy made up the difference in about equal parts. In 1919 the value of the imports was estimated at £740,000,000 against £280,000,000 of exports—and a deficit of about £500,000,000 must be accounted for in the near future in the economic international position of Italy. The policy for overcoming this crisis has naturally been framed.

The freights paid to foreign shipowners form one of the main items of the deficit of the trade balance. These alone amount to £100,000,000 in gold p.a., or about £400,000,000 in Italian money at the present rate of the exchange. We have seen that the capacity of the Italian shipyards has been more than doubled since the war, and that it would be easy to build in three or four years a merchant fleet capable of carrying in Italian bottoms the foreign goods imported by sea. An intensification of ship-building would, however, gradually remove to a great extent the present deficit. According to the coal clauses of the Versailles Treaty, as modified by the Spa agreements of July 1920, Germany was to export to Italy 6,000,000 tons of coal in the year 1920–21, 7,500,000 tons in 1921–22, 8,000,000 tons in 1922–23, 8,500,000 tons from 1923 to 1928. The fulfilment of these clauses would mean either a reduction of the imports of British coal, which is very dear owing to the high freights and the low exchange, or an intensification of the production which is hindered now by the inadequacy of coal imports from Britain—and consequently a remarkable improvement in the balance of trade.

As soon as tank-ships are available, it will be possible to import from Romania the oil which is now imported from the United States, involving an expenditure of about 30,000,000 lire p.a. (£1,200,000) owing to the unfavourable exchange.

On the other hand, the demand for fuel from foreign sources can be reduced by a further exploitation of the lignite beds on the same lines as during the war period. The use as industrial fuel of the alcohol distilled in the country either from plants

or from calcium carbide can be widely extended. Various changes can be introduced into the industries in order to make them less dependent on abroad. The remittances also by the emigrants have increased enough at least to compensate for the probable temporary reduction in the influx of foreign tourists into Italy. Thus the factors of the adjustment of the balance of trade are there. Meanwhile the Government's efforts tend to reduce consumption by trade restrictions, high taxation, etc.—the stimulus to consumption created by the rapid inflation of currency not being likely to last for very long. On the other hand, the key to an increased production lies in the attainment of social peace.

It is no use blinking the difficult economic position of the country at the present moment. But even greater difficulties were overcome in the past, when the latent resources of the young nation were not known, the educational standard of the masses was considerably lower, and the organisation of the State and of the economic activities of the nation were still rudimentary. After the above short summary of Italian economic resources, we may confidently remember that peculiarity of the Italian character by which the greatest effort is produced only when the critical point is nearest, and also that the most dangerous crises are followed by a quick recovery.

C—MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

ARMY

SERVICE is compulsory and universal; the present period of service with the colours is fixed at eight months, but will probably be increased to twelve or eighteen months. The Italian Army is at present in process of reorganisation. The mobile militia and the territorial militia have for the time being been abolished, and it has been decided to form from the Fascisti militia a voluntary militia for national security. The militia will be primarily for co-operation with the public security or police force. In the event, however, of mobilisation or the calling-up of certain classes, the militia will be absorbed into the Army and Navy.

The present field army consists of ten army corps, each of three divisions, and there is in addition one cavalry division. The average strength of the Army during 1922 was about 200,000 men.

There is a Colonial Army maintained in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The present strength in Tripolitania is about 10,000 whites and 20,000 natives; in Cyrenaica about 4,000 whites and 5,000 natives; in Eritrea 800 whites and 5,500 natives; in Somaliland about 4,000, of whom 300 are whites.

NAVY

The Navy has been largely reduced since the war, and now numbers only about 5 Dreadnoughts, 11 cruisers, 60 destroyers and 90 torpedo-boats, with commands at Spezia, Naples, Taranto and Pola.

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